Tracing the Establishment of Political Society: Remembering and Forgetting in Ancient Greek Literature by Raudnitz, Sophie
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Tracing the Establishment of Political Society:
Remembering and Forgetting in Ancient Greek
Literature
Thesis
How to cite:
Raudnitz, Sophie (2018). Tracing the Establishment of Political Society: Remembering and Forgetting in
Ancient Greek Literature. PhD thesis The Open University.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2017 The Author
Version: Version of Record
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
  
 
Sophie Elizabeth Raudnitz 
 
 
Tracing the establishment of political society: 
remembering and forgetting in ancient Greek 
literature 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Department of Classical Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social 
Sciences 
The Open University 
 
 
October 2017 
 
Abstract 
This thesis explores the connection between memory and the formation of political 
society in ancient Greek literature. It is grounded in the notion that memory is a political 
process: its narratives are shaped by the social and political groups to which we belong. In 
turn, what and how we remember plays a role in shaping and reshaping those same 
groups.  
The thesis examines three ‘memory texts’: the Odyssey, which contains a moment in 
which forgetting is tied explicitly to political progress; the Trojan Women, a play driven by 
the urge to remember and memorialise as a way of trying to retain political identity; and 
the Theaetetus, which not only contains the first known attempt to create a model of 
memory but also ‘remembers’ the Apology. The texts are also united by the theme of the 
law court which runs through all three in the form of a metaphor, an agōn and an actual 
law court trial. This provides an opportunity to examine testimony as the communication 
of memory in a political context.  
The thesis proposes that an approach informed by the theory of cultural, collective and 
traumatic memory opens new avenues not only for the analysis of these classical texts 
but also for considering their cultural and political impact at the time of their creation or 
performance. It also suggests that such an analysis offers a productive alternative to the 
traditional, individual-focused study of trauma in literature. It finds that while, in certain 
ways, memory supports the texts’ dominant or normative narratives, it also provides 
ways to challenge them. This process of watching or reading with memory is constitutive 
of skills relating to citizenship and is provocative of debate about the norms and values of 
society.  
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Introduction 
Thesis overview 
This thesis explores the connection between memory and political society in ancient 
Greek literature. It is grounded in the notion that memory is a political process, 
conditioned by the societies in which we live and possessing an affective power which, in 
turn, shapes—or ‘re-members’—those same societies. Informed by a range of theory 
about cultural, collective and traumatic memory and its expression as testimony, this 
thesis investigates the ways in which texts across three genres represent the process of 
memory, examining the things which characters or groups remember and forget and the 
manner in which they do so. It also explores the role of the reader’s or audience’s 
memory in textual interpretation: the effect of evoking memories of other texts or 
particular historical moments and the ways in which the process of remembering a text 
might prompt re-evaluations, not only of the text in question, but also of the values or 
norms which underlie the society in which it is performed or read. 
To date, the use of Memory Studies within Classics has largely been limited to single 
genres or to attempts to understand a particular aspect of history or an ancient mind-set. 
This thesis differentiates itself by looking at memory across the genres of epic, tragedy 
and philosophy. The texts studied are Homer’s Odyssey, Euripides’ Trojan Women and 
Plato’s Theaetetus and these particular texts were selected because of the importance of 
memory within them. The Odyssey contains a moment in which forgetting is tied explicitly 
to political progress; the Trojan Women is a play driven by the urge to remember and 
memorialise as a way of trying to retain political identity; and the Theaetetus contains the 
first known attempt to create a model of memory. The texts are also united by the theme 
of the law court which runs through all three in the form of a metaphor in the Odyssey, an 
agōn in the Trojan Women and an actual law court trial in the Theaetetus’ allusions to the 
Apology. This theme provides the opportunity to examine testimony as an expression or 
communication of memory in a political context. The thesis approaches the texts in 
chronological order so as to be able to demonstrate more easily the resonances of earlier 
texts within the later ones but it resists the temptation to look for an evolving political 
consciousness or sophistication. 
Memory is much more than a literary theme running through these texts. This thesis sees 
the politically affective and effective power of memory in literature. The Odyssey, the 
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Trojan Women and the Theaetetus are not just ‘memory texts’, that is texts which contain 
memories or are about memory. The ways in which memory is represented within them 
and the way in which the audience’s memories become part of the interpretive process, 
opens new avenues not only for the analysis of these classical texts but also for their 
cultural and political impact at the time of their creation or performance. In addition, the 
cross-genre approach taken here and the fact that the thesis brings together texts which 
are not usually studied alongside each other, is equally enlightening, both about memory 
and about genre. The thesis finds many continuities in the ways in which texts 
‘remember’ each other and the world around them, and in the ways in which they evoke 
memory in order to provoke political reflection or debate. The study of memory also 
serves to elucidate their differences which occur around audiences and performance 
contexts.  
The Odyssey chapter uses the metaphor of a law court trial as a useful lens through which 
to examine the function of memory in the societies of its internal and external audiences. 
According to this model, the memories expressed in the poem by those such as 
Menelaus, Nestor, the suitors and Odysseus himself can be viewed as legal testimony and 
are examined alongside modern and ancient theories of the same. In its examination of 
who is allowed to give testimony and in what context they are allowed to do so, the 
chapter explores the various forms by which political power is established in the society 
of the poem. In analysing the ways in which the audience is invited to view the text’s 
various testimonies and the things which the audience is prompted to remember, the 
chapter also explores the politically affective and effective power of the poem in 
performance. Paradoxically, it sees memory as a force which is both paralysing and 
motivating and finds that memory both reinforces and undermines the normative thrust 
of the epic.  
The Trojan Women chapter explores the way in which Hecuba draws on tropes of 
traumatic testimony. She both acts out and performs traumatic tropes in order to 
orchestrate a collective response from her internal audience—the chorus—and her 
external audience in the theatre, as she works to build a memorial narrative to Troy’s 
blameless suffering. The law court theme arises again in the chapter’s analysis of the 
agōn which offers a new slant on a well-worn area of scholarly discussion. It sees the 
agōn in the context of the play as a whole and examines its use of conventional fifth 
century forensic narratives and structures in its study of the unsettling effect of 
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empathising with Hecuba here and throughout the play. In this chapter, the evocation of 
audience memory exposes the mechanisms by which Hecuba’s emotive narratives gain 
political traction in the play. By extension, the study of memory and its role in challenging 
such dominant narratives provokes questions in the audience about their own juridical 
and political responses to emotive speech in a polis constructed on the platform of 
agonistic speech. 
The final chapter frames the Theaetetus with Plato’s earlier text, the Apology. The 
Theaetetus is not an overtly political text, discussing as it does, the nature of knowledge, 
and yet the memory of the Apology—evoked by the awareness that Socrates goes 
straight from Theaetetus to the law court to answer Miletus’ charges against him—
suffuses the text and affects our reading. Given that this text shows Socrates at the mercy 
of a powerful institution of the Athenian democratic state, discussing the nature of his 
own citizenship, the colour that this memory lends to the Theaetetus is, inevitably, 
political. Memory, therefore, adds a political nuance to the chapter’s interpretation of the 
Theaetetus but it is also part of the political-philosophical education which, the chapter 
suggests, is central to Plato’s philosophical mission. Whereas the previous chapters see 
memory as serving to question the texts’ dominant narratives, the ‘dominant narrative’ 
from Plato’s Theaetetus is missing or, at least, highly contentious, a fact underscored by 
the dialogue’s ending in aporia. In this chapter, a study of the Wax Tablet passage—one 
itself infused with memories of poetry—suggests the extent to which an interpretation of 
Plato’s text and, indeed, the political philosophy which informs it, might be affected by a 
tension between remembering and forgetting in the mind of the reader. A process of 
reading with memory encourages the reader to construct that meaningful narrative for 
her/himself. 
The law court, then, not only provides thematic unity for the thesis but also serves to 
focus attention on testimony as the means by which memory is communicated. Each 
chapter will explore the political ways in which testimony is mediated in the texts; the 
ways that the texts authorise or discredit certain testimonies and the possible reasons for 
doing so; and the ways that the texts draw attention to the political mechanisms involved 
not only in remembering and giving testimony to those memories, but also in forgetting 
and keeping silent. In this way, the thesis will also reflect on the political effect of reading 
or watching the performance of these texts. The rest of this Introduction will, therefore, 
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discuss the theory of memory, testimony and politics in order to define these terms as I 
will use them in the thesis as a whole.  
 
What is memory and what is politics? 
This section focuses on drawing out the political nature of memory and for this reason, it 
makes sense to begin with a short explanation of the ways in which this thesis 
understands ‘politics.’ Politics is, as Dean Hammer suggests, the activities and ideologies 
by which society seeks to determine and implement ‘community organisation.’1 In light of 
this, it is still possible to speak of ‘politics’ in connection with the pre- or proto-political 
societies of the Homeric epics.2 In this way I hope to avoid the restrictive definition of 
‘political’ as relating to formal institutions of the polis, an approach favoured by, for 
example, Mogens Hansen.3 Such an approach would rely on the polis-centric approach to 
Greek history criticised by Kōstas Vlassopoulos, as a narrative influenced by nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century nationalism and Western prejudice.4 This thesis is also aligned with 
Nicole Loraux’s broader definition of politics as ‘the acknowledgement of conflict in 
society.’ According to this, politics is the way that society institutionalises and manages a 
force which constantly threatens to erupt and destabilise the city.5 
However, unlike Hammer, who sees political activity as being divorced from political 
institutions, this thesis is aligned with Giddens’ approach to the structuration of political 
institutions drawn on by Elton Barker, which holds that political activity reproduces the 
very structures that engender it: in reading or listening to literary political debate then, 
‘the reader or audience experiences the process of going through competing arguments, 
which has the effect of shaping responses to the events: debate becomes internalized. In 
turn, however, by that very process of internalizing competing arguments, the audience 
or reader realises the institution of debate within the text.’6 This is particularly the case 
when, as in all three texts discussed here, the textual institution is shown to be 
inadequate in itself. 
                                                          
1 Hammer (2007), p. 26.  
2 For epic communities as proto-political see Nagy (1979), p. 7. 
3 Hansen (2014), pp. 379-403. 
4 Vlassopoulos (2007). 
5 Loraux (2002), p. 21. 
6 Barker (2009), p. 16, drawing on Foucault and Giddens; Giddens (1984). 
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The following discussion examines the Wax Tablet passage from Plato’s Theaetetus 
alongside other short passages from ancient texts in order to define memory as 
understood in the contexts of ancient literature. As part of this discussion, it will 
incorporate modern memory and testimony theory to elucidate the aspects of memory 
which will be important to this thesis. It will draw on a passage from the Iliad in its 
discussion of the politically affective nature of memory, as related to testimony and 
empathy and it will use an extract from the Odyssey to examine the debates around the 
politics of collective and cultural memory and to define how these terms are understood 
in this thesis. In this way, the discussion moves by stages from an exploration of memory 
as recall, through an analysis of memory as creative, to consider the relationship between 
memory and history. It concludes by exploring the ways in which memory can be 
understood as a force, at once emotionally affective and politically powerful. 
 
The Wax Tablet: a model for memory 
Plato’s Wax Tablet image from the Theaetetus is a model for memory and is the one 
widely adopted over the centuries to describe how memory works. Plato’s Socrates 
explains that each person has a wax tablet in the soul, 
Δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ 
ἐς τοῦτο, ὅ τι ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν ὑπέχοντας αὐτὸ 
ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα 
ἐνσημαινομένους.7 
Let us say, therefore, that this [tablet] is a gift from Mnemosyne 
[Memory], mother of the Muses, and whatever we wish to remember 
from the things we see or hear or which we have in our thoughts, we hold 
the wax under our perceptions and thoughts and impress them onto it, as 
if making impressions from signet rings… 
For the most part, this is a highly functional model. Thoughts and impressions are 
imprinted onto the wax tablet and memory is the process of recalling those imprints and 
matching them to items in the real world.  
                                                          
7 Pl. Tht. 191d. All quotations from Pl. Tht are from Duke et al (1995); translations are a synthesis of Levett, 
revised by Burnyeat (1992) and Rowe (2015) and have been adapted by me. 
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As I will explore later, Plato’s Socrates rejects this model of memory because it fails to 
account for abstract thought, but the image took hold in the minds of those who followed 
him. It is this model which Aristotle develops in On Memory and Recollection. According 
to him, a stimulus (κίνησις) produced an impression (ἐνσημαίνω) in the soul or mind 
(ψυχῇ), a sort of likeness of the perception (αἰσθήνματος). Like Plato, he even compares 
this impression, to the process of sealing with signet rings (καθάπερ οἱ σφραφιζόμενοι 
τοῖς δακτυλίοις).8  
The Wax Tablet is at the heart, too, of Cicero’s story of Simonides of Ceos and the 
burgeoning interest in ‘memory palaces’ and ars memoriae which it inspired and which 
continued through the medieval period and, indeed into the BBC’s Sherlock.9 According to 
Cicero’s story (which may well date from earlier), Simonides was present at a banquet 
and while he stepped outside, the roof of the palace collapsed, killing all within. 
Simonides was able to recollect the pattern of the palace and where each person had 
been dining and in this way, was able to identify the bodies. This suggested to him that: 
Itaque iis, qui hanc partem ingenii exercerent, locos esse capiendos et ea, 
quae memoria tenere vellent, effingenda animo atque in iis locis collocanda 
… res autem ipsas rerum effigies notaret ataque ut locis pro cera simalcris 
pro litteris uteremur.10 
persons desiring to train this faculty must select localities and form mental 
images of the facts they wish to remember and store those images in the 
localities, with the result that the arrangement of the localities will preserve 
the order of the facts … and we shall employ the localities and images 
respectively as a wax writing tablet and the letters written on it. 
It is, therefore, the aspect of memory as recall, encapsulated by the Wax Tablet 
metaphor, which seemed most relevant and useful to those in the political-philosophical 
tradition who followed Plato. 
The influence of Plato’s image can also be felt outside of that tradition, as late as Freud 
and it survives in modern discourse, notably in the writing of Jacques Derrida through its 
Freudian interpretation.11 Freud famously adapted the wax tablet for his model of 
                                                          
8 Arist. Mem. 450a32-450b1. 
9 Sherlock’s mind palace is a feature of several episodes but was first mentioned in “The Hounds of 
Baskerville” (2012). 
10 Cic. De or. 2.86.354, trans. Sutton and Rackham (1942). 
11 In e.g. Derrida (1972). 
14 
 
memory: the ‘Mystic Writing Pad.’12 These ‘pads’ existed at the time, as they do in a 
similar form now. They were comprised of a slab of dark brown resin or wax topped with 
two transparent sheets which could be detached from each other except from at the 
ends. The upper layer was celluloid; the lower, translucent waxed paper. One could write 
on the celluloid layer with a pointed stylus which made depressions and marked the wax 
paper beneath but one could then destroy what had been written by raising the double 
covering sheet from the wax slab. According to this model of memory, the celluloid acts 
as a kind of protective layer for the mind, which might be ‘crumpled or torn’ if written on 
directly. The paper is the level of the mind which actually receives the stimuli but the wax 
slab beneath is the memory which retains the impression even after the sheets have been 
lifted. The principle of the retrieval method laid out by Plato remains unchanged, down to 
the imagery by which it is described. 
However, what is perhaps more significant to this thesis and, in an unacknowledged way, 
to these later studies of the psychological workings of memory, is the fact that Plato’s 
Socrates describes the Wax Tablet as a ‘gift of Mnemosyne, mother of the Muses.’ As I 
will suggest in the Plato chapter, this is an integral part of how the Wax Tablet passage 
should be read. In order to explore the implications of associating memory with 
Mnemosyne and her daughters, it is useful to look at the description of Mnemosyne in 
Hesiod’s Theogony.  
The Theogony tells us that the goddess Mnemosyne, her name the ancient Greek word 
for memory, encompassed not just remembering but also forgetting. To an extent the 
Wax Tablet model does too, in a functional way, in that Plato’s Socrates tells us that what 
is not imprinted properly will be forgotten. But the Hesiodic image operates very 
differently because of its poetic dimension. The Theogony’s image of memory is bound up 
with poetic creation and effect. Mnemosyne is said to offer ‘forgetfulness of evils and 
relief from anxieties’ (λησμοσύνην τε κακῶν ἄμπαυμά τε μερμηράων).13 Her daughters, 
the Muses, were said by Hesiod to inspire others with this gift. Not only did they tell the 
poets ‘of what is and what will be and what was before’ (εἴρουσαι τά τ’ἐόντα τά τ’ 
ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ἐόντα) but their gift had the power to transform or lull the painful 
memories of his listeners: 
                                                          
12 Freud (1925) in Strachey (1991). 
13 Hes. Theog. 53-55. All quotations from the Theogony are from West (1966); trans. West (1988). 
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εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πένθος ἔχων νεοκηδέι θυμῷ 
ἄζηται κραδίην ἀκαχήμενος, αὐτὰρ ἀοιδὸς 
Μουσάων θεράπων κλεῖα προτέρων ἀνθρώπων 
ὑμνήσει μάκαράς τε θεοὺς οἳ  Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν, 
αἶψ’ὅ γε δυσφροσυνέων ἐπιλήθεται οὐδέ τι κηδέων 
μέμνηται∙ ταχέως δὲ παρέτραπε δῶρα θεάων.14 
Even if someone who has unhappiness in his newly anguished spirit is 
parched in his heart with grieving, yet when a poet, servant of the Muses, 
sings of the glorious deeds of people of old and the blessed gods who 
possess Olympus, he forgets his sorrows at once and does not remember his 
anguish at all; for quickly the gifts of the goddesses have turned it aside. 
In this way, Mnemosyne, the Muses and the poets are seen to have active powers over 
memory, with its twin aspects of remembering and forgetting. 
There are three ideas to be drawn out here with reference to modern memory theory and 
the way it is conceived and used in this thesis. The first is that the Muses inspire the poet 
to tell his tale but, though the poet sometimes calls on the Muse to tell him the story 
accurately, it was not only completely accepted but even expected that these mythical 
stories would be told differently by different poets at different times.15 This divinely 
inspired ‘memory’ was the foundation of poetic creation and, as an extreme example, 
permitted Euripides to write his version of the Trojan War in which the ‘Helen’ over 
whom they fought was only an eidōlon, a shadow created by Zeus. The second is that the 
concept of memory unites ‘what is and what will be and what was before.’ It brings the 
past and the future into the present, disrupting the perception of time as a linear 
progression. The third is that the memories inspired by the Muses have an affective 
power on the listener. In this passage from the Theogony, the listener is made to forget 
his anxieties: his emotional state is changed by the power of this memory. As this thesis 
will show repeatedly, this emotionally affecting nature of memory has political 
                                                          
14 Hes. Theog. 98-103. 
15 For the poet calling on the Muse for an accurate account see e.g. the prelude to the Catalogue of Ships at 
Il. 2.484-86, where the narrator also says that while the Muses ‘know’ (οἶδα) all things, we only ‘hear’ 
(ἀκούω) rumours or reports (κλέος). All citations from the Iliad are taken from West (1998). 
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ramifications. The following subsections will explore these three themes using modern 
memory theory to draw out the implications of memory words in ancient sources. 
 
i) The ‘gift of Mnemosyne,’ part 1: memory as creative inspiration 
In part, the first idea—that memory is a kind of inspiration—is relevant to this thesis 
because of the way in which mimnēsko (‘I remember’) and its associated terms are used 
in epic. In the Iliad, by far its most frequent use is in phrases such as ‘remember our 
valour’ (μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς)16 or ‘remembering his warcraft’ (μνήσαντο δὲ 
χάρμης).17 In these phrases, it is not simply that the warrior remembers or needs to 
remember how to fight but that the memory is performative: with the memory of valour, 
the warrior is inspired and infused with valour. This will be important in my Odyssey 
chapter where Telemachus’ memory of his father infuses him with some, at least, of his 
father’s attributes and inspires him to actively seek out news of Odysseus.  
Alongside this, the idea of memory as creative, or perhaps re-creative, represents a 
dominant strand in psychological memory theory in the twentieth century. From the 
1960s to the 1980s, Ulric Neisser published several key works which reacted against the 
Platonic model of memory-as-retrieval which had dominated psychological memory 
studies until this point. He posited the idea that individuals remember according to social 
cues and that because of this, memory is an unstable entity.18 It is not the recall of a 
permanent ‘item’ fixed in the storage of the mind, but a process according to which 
experience or observation is recreated in line with social factors pertaining at the time. In 
his 1981 work, John Dean’s Memory: a case study, for example, he posited the idea of 
‘repisodic’ memory, a process by which the brain condenses a repeated series of events 
into a single memory.19  
Endel Tulving, working around the same time as Neisser, argued that remembering is not 
as radically reconstructivist as Neisser suggested but rather that it is based on ‘ecphory.’ 
‘Ecphory’ is the synthesis of the ‘engram’—a memory trace stored in the brain—and the 
retrieval cue, or the context in which something is recalled. In this way, he does not 
                                                          
16 E.g. Il. 6.112.  
17 E.g. Il. 8.252. 
18 Neisser (1967), (1976) and (1981). 
19 Neisser (1981). 
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completely negate the idea of memory-as-retrieval but unites the idea of the memory as 
a storage facility with the notion that its recall is conditioned by the ‘retrieval cue.’ This 
cue, as Neisser suggested, is likely to be dependent on social factors. Within ‘episodic 
memory’—the kind of memory associated with recalling the events of our lives—he 
argues that memories are converted into narrative.20 Experiences, and the memories 
which recall them, do not naturally form narratives but must be consciously shaped and 
edited to give meaning in the social context of their recall.21 In this way, one of the 
political dimensions of memory begins to emerge: if politics shapes society (and vice 
versa), then the factors which shape the re-creation of memory are also political. As I 
discuss below,22 this becomes still more interesting when characters remember together 
as a group, not simply reconstructing the past in the present but also reshaping the 
political group in the process. 
This cognitive psychology of memory informs Elizabeth Minchin’s recent study of epic 
verse in which she uses memory theory to invigorate the debate surrounding epic 
composition.23 She positions herself in the tradition of Parry and Lord who offered the 
theory that in oral composition, the poet is heavily reliant on oral formulae rather than 
individual creativity.24 In addition, she incorporates cognitive psychology (of Tulving, in 
particular) and socio-linguistic theory in order to study the ways in which memory aids 
and enhances the composition of Homeric verse and the ways in which narrative can 
mimic memory and make itself more memorable for both poet and audience.25 In this, 
she examines the interaction of storyteller, audience and text and looks at how the poet 
manipulates ‘memorability’ in the act of creation for maximum mnemonic effect.  
The synthesis of storyteller, audience and text is so important for this thesis but I pick up 
where Minchin leaves off. Her suggestion that material objects in narrative act as 
‘interpretive cues’ for the audience, evoking memories which tell us about the owner and 
her/his past, is indicative of the way in which memory plays a key role in the interpretive 
process of the audience, a central idea in this thesis.26 What is more important here, 
though, is the destabilisation of memory—its ‘truth’ dependent on who is remembering 
                                                          
20 Tulving and Thompson (1973). See also Erll (2011), pp. 84-87 and Erll (2009), pp. 212-27. 
21 This is the subject of White (1987), pp. 1-25. 
22 See this thesis, ‘Collective memory, politics, and the end of the Odyssey,’ pp. 38-47. 
23 Minchin (2001). 
24 See, for example, Thomas (1992), pp. 29-36. 
25 Minchin (2001), her approach explored in the Introduction. 
26 Ibid, pp. 100-28. 
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and in what context—and the idea that memory becomes narrative as soon as it is 
articulated, either internally or externally.  
The re-creative aspect to memory—the destabilisation of its truth—is also a facet of 
much memory theory in the field of cultural studies. Here, the focus is, predictably, not so 
much on the psychological process by which we remember, but on the way in which ‘the 
past is mediated by, rather than directly reflected in personal memory.’27 This is not 
simply a matter of partiality or subjectivity but rather one of questioning the assumption 
that memory can ever be ‘an inner representation of the past’, that the past is ever 
something which happens ‘outside’ of ourselves.28 Instead, memory always mediates the 
past and is itself mediated by culture, making it doubly unstable.  
This idea becomes particularly interesting when thinking about, for example, genre and 
performance contexts, especially of epic and tragedy. In epic poetry, memory is mediated 
by a form, according to which culturally-understood features generate meaning above 
and beyond the ‘written’ words.29 As I will discuss in Chapter 1, John Miles Foley, for 
example, explores the oral formulae around characters’ names, such as ‘swift-footed 
Achilles.’30 These not only fit the metre of the lines, filling appropriate gaps, but also 
suggest facets to the characters from the mythic tradition other than those which are 
being demonstrated at the given moment of the story. Furthermore, when Homeric 
poetry was performed as part of the Panathenaea festival in fifth century BC Athens, its 
meaning changed from that which might be understood at a private or non-civic occasion. 
In this fifth-century Athenian context, memory was further mediated by the festival and 
all of its own civic and cultural resonances. This idea grounds my chapters on the Odyssey 
and the Trojan Women. 
 
ii) The ‘gift of Mnemosyne,’ part 2: memory vs history 
In the previous subsection, I suggested that the process of memory is the means by which 
the past is mediated and given meaning in the present. This notion feeds into the second 
idea introduced by Plato’s concept of memory as ‘a gift from Mnemosyne’: that memory 
                                                          
27 Radstone (2005), p. 135. 
28 Ibid, p. 135. 
29 This is memory as myth; see pp. 45-47. 
30 Foley (1991). 
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‘folds’ time, disrupting the notion of time’s linear progression. In order to explore this 
idea further, it is useful to think about the ways in which memory might be differentiated 
from history. The question of this differentiation is contentious but setting out the terms 
of the debate nonetheless helps to elucidate some of the key ideas. 
History and memory have much in common. Like memory, ‘written history is a 
constructive, narrative process, deeply imbued with—often unacknowledged—patterns 
of culture and ideology.’31 Arguably, the difference between memory and history is more 
to do with how it is narrativised and how it is received than what it actually ‘is.’ Radstone 
describes memory as tending to ‘invite empathy’ where traditional historiography ‘invites 
cooler and more detached reading and writing.’32 History, like memory, is mediated in the 
present but memory is perceived as being ‘live and active’, especially while those who 
remember are still alive. Fundamentally for this discussion of temporality, however, 
history is commonly understood as ‘the unfolding of events in broadly linear fashion, and 
historiography has been shaped by the linearity and the cause-and-effect structure of 
realist narrative.’33 Voluntary memory can act in such a way, causing us to make rational 
decisions based on our past successes or mistakes. Involuntary memory, though, disrupts 
such linearity, with memories bursting into the present moment in Proustian fashion and 
threatening to disrupt our narratives.  
Within the field of Classics, Jonas Grethlein has sought to redefine the study of memory 
to incorporate an understanding of temporality drawn from the work of Reinhart 
Kosselleck and Hans-Georg Gadamer. His analysis, which ranges from epinician poetry, 
elegy and tragedy to oratory and historiography, suggests that temporality is based on 
contingency. This offers a way of framing actions, chance and results in a tension with 
expectations and experience. Past experience provides an expectation for present results 
and future action, borne out, for example, by traditions, which establish continuity, or by 
exempla, which juxtapose past and present, providing parallels and giving guidance.34 In 
this way, he says, the ancient Greeks used memory to bridge the gap between past and 
present.  
                                                          
31 Erll (2011), p. 39. 
32 Radstone (2005), pp. 138-9. For further discussion of empathy see pp. 35-38. 
33 Ibid, p. 138. 
34 Grethlein (2010), pp. 6-11. 
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Up to a point, Grethlein’s theory about the ways in which the past defines and legitimises 
communities, or how ‘present interests’ prompt characters, authors or poets to turn to 
the past, is entirely consistent with the approach to political memory outlined above. As 
my analysis of the Trojan Women in Chapter 2 will show, Hecuba’s individual identity in 
the present is defined by what she no longer is and no longer has. She contrasts past with 
present and future and, in this process, we see the disjointedness of past and future 
identities as she contrasts her royal past with her future as a slave. According to 
Grethlein’s theory, this would be an ‘exemplum’, juxtaposing past with present to give 
guidance about the instability of social identity.  
However, Grethlein’s study, though wide-ranging and important, is focused on voluntary 
or intentional memory, and overlooks its destabilising, involuntary aspects. While 
voluntary remembering might bring the past into the present, giving a sense of stability or 
safety in continuity, involuntary memory can be deeply unsettling to the self and to the 
narrative. When, for example, Eurycleia sees Odysseus’ scar and remembers the 
circumstances of his injury, the memory breaks through into the narrative of Odysseus’ 
secret homecoming and only death threats can keep his plan on course.35  
On the subject of intention, Grethlein’s work is also focused on author-intention: the 
author shows characters remembering the past in such a way as to make sense of their 
present. While this is a theme which runs through this thesis, the argument here will be 
focused far more on the connection between those characters’ memories and the 
possible memories aroused in the audience, whether intentionally or unintentionally, and 
the importance of this nexus of memory for both literary interpretation and for political 
thought and debate. 
In addition to this, while the terms past, present and future are useful in thinking about 
memory and political identity, they overlook the non-linearity discussed above, which is 
equally important to both memory and to ancient Greek literature. To remember is to 
bring the past into the present and, when Hecuba remembers her past in the Trojan 
Women, it is its very incongruity with her present and future that provides the emotive 
force of the drama. Her mourning, too, brings the past of her loved ones into the present 
moment, causing her to visibly break down, collapsing on the ground. In a similar way, 
                                                          
35 Od.19.386ff. All citations from the Odyssey are taken from West (2017). The ‘present-ness’ of this 
memory in the narrative is explored in Auerbach (1953), 3-23 and with a more modern narratological twist 
in Bakker (1999), pp. 11-26; see also Purves (2013), pp. 37-62. 
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Electra’s mourning for her father and her memories of his murder in the plays by 
Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides threaten to disrupt the political narratives laid down 
by Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. I will say more about the competitive nature of memory 
below but for now it is enough to note that Electra’s mourning dominates her present 
and her likely future to the exclusion of all else and to the peril of her life.36  
For these reasons my thesis is also informed by studies of mourning which stress its non-
linear patterns of memory. The non-linear temporality of memory in the case of mourning 
is something explored by Derrida in Specters of Marx, where he writes that mourning is 
an attempt to make ‘remains’ present.37 Other models of mourning involve interpreting 
the present based on a projection into the future. Judith Butler writes that ‘grievability’ 
and the ‘precarity’ of life come as a result of the sense of death in birth; that is, our sense 
that life is precious and ‘grievable’ goes hand in hand with its precariousness. She terms 
this process the ‘future anterior’: it is a future which has, in the imagination at least, 
already happened.38 
Though they do not address memory as I will, this understanding of temporality is present 
in the work of classical scholars such as Marcel Detienne and Joel Christensen. Detienne’s 
object in Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece clearly differs from mine—his focus being 
truth where mine is memory—but Detienne explores the figure of the poet with his 
connection to the Muses, the daughters of memory who authenticate his verse.39 As 
mentioned above, in Hesiod’s Theogony, the poet/narrator says that the Muses ‘breathed 
a divine voice into me, so that I might glorify what will be and what was before’ 
(ἐνέπωεθσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν / θἐσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ’ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ἐόντα),40 and that 
they sing ‘of what is and what will be and what was before’ (εἴρουσαι τά τ’ἐόντα τά τ’ 
ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ἐόντα).41 Their authority derives from the fact that they see all time and 
this is the gift they bestow on the poet. Detienne uses this idea to examine the way in 
which the poet establishes his authority as a ‘master of truth’ and this analysis ties into 
this thesis in its consideration of the politics by which memory-narratives are authorised 
given the fundamental instability of memory. 
                                                          
36 For the competitive nature of memory see p. 39. 
37 Derrida (1994), p.9. 
38 Butler (2009), pp.1-29. 
39 Detienne (1996), pp. 39-50. 
40 Hes. Theog. 31-32. 
41 Ibid, 38. 
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Detienne also details the way in which this authority devolves from the gods to the poets 
to the ancient kings depicted in epic, Nestor, for example. This is something Joel 
Christensen also explores in detail in his PhD thesis on rhetoric and politics in the Iliad.42 
He suggests that Nestor’s political authority in the poem is drawn from his ability to bring 
the weight of the past into the present moment, but simultaneously undermined by his 
tendency to do this because it hints at his redundancy. This is suggestive of a changing 
political environment and a shifting value system within it and it feeds into my 
exploration of the Odyssey in Chapter 1 and particularly into my analysis of Nestor as an 
Iliadic witness in an Odyssean world. 
 
iii) The ‘gift of Mnemosyne,’ part 3: memory and the politics of empathy 
In the discussion above about the ways in which memory might be differentiated from 
history, one of the criteria which I glossed over was that memory invites empathy. This 
subsection explores the third idea of memory introduced by Plato’s ‘gift of Mnemosyne’: 
the way in which the process of provoking empathy can have consequences, in the case 
of this thesis, political consequences. In the example discussed already about the Muses 
in Hesiod, we hear that the memory-narratives of the poets lead men to forget their 
troubles. Here, I suggest that this is partly so because of the empathy they feel with the 
characters in the poetry. They remember ‘with’ them and feel ‘with’ them, leading them 
to forget their own ills.  
One particular example from ancient Greek literature represents not only the empathy 
which memory invites but also the way in which remembering is effective of political 
action. In one of the Iliad’s final—and emotionally climactic—episodes, Priam risks his life 
to visit Achilles in the Achaean encampment in order to beg for the return of Hector’s 
body. At this moment, Priam is completely vulnerable, alone and defenceless in his 
enemy’s camp. He throws himself at Achilles’ knees, with the words ‘Remember your 
father Achilles like to the gods, of such an age as I…’ (μνῆσαι πατρὸς σοῖο θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ’ 
Ἀχιλλεῦ, / τηλίκου ὥς περ ἐγών...).43 By equating himself with Achilles’ father, he invites 
Achilles, whose hands killed his son, to see their suffering side by side, though pointing 
                                                          
42 Christensen (2007). 
43 Il. 24.486-87. 
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out how much worse is his own.44 He equates them again at the end of the speech, with a 
similar entreaty: ‘Pity me, remembering your father’ (αὐτόν τ’ ἐλέσον / μνησάμενος σοῦ 
πατρός). 
The effectiveness of this approach is immediate. His words stir in Achilles the ‘desire to 
weep for his father’ (τῷ δ’ ἄρα πατρὸς ὑφ’ ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο) and as the two men wept 
together, one remembering his father and his dead friend, the other his son, ‘their groans 
rose through the house’ (τῶν δὲ στοναχὴ κατὰ δώματ’ ὀρώρει). Though the men 
remember and mourn different things, remembering brings them together in empathetic 
grief but there is a political dimension here too. Achilles’ first act on remembering his 
father is to gently push Priam from him, dislodging him from his position as a supplicant 
and so (to an extent, at least) equalising their positions. As in the examples of 
remembering valour and warcraft above, memory is seen to have a transformative 
power. In remembering his father and thus empathising with Priam’s sorrow, Achilles is 
able to forget his animosity towards Priam and, more importantly, his commitment to 
vengeance against Hector.45 As a consequence, he not only agrees to return Hector’s 
body but also to guarantee the suspension of Achaean hostilities until after the Trojans 
have conducted their mourning rites.46 This is not simply a personal agreement but a 
political one. Achilles’ empathy with Priam leads to a rapprochement, albeit temporary, 
with the enemy. 
 
This section began with the relatively simple idea of memory as recall and has moved by 
stages towards a conception of memory as something recreative and impermanent, 
something which ‘folds time’ and something politically effective in its power to evoke 
empathy. All of these ideas are important to this thesis, but the last is particularly so. At 
each stage, I have sought to integrate a study of memory in ancient texts with modern 
memory theory and classical criticism but with regard to memory and empathy, the body 
of criticism on testimony is so bound up with my discussion that it requires a separate 
section. To this end, the next section discusses testimony and trauma theory with a 
particular emphasis on the reception of testimony and the empathetic response. 
                                                          
44 Il. 24.486-506. 
45 Though there is a brief resurgence at 24.560 when Priam (prematurely) asks for the return of his son’s 
body. 
46 Il. 24.656-70. 
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Testimony: truth, empathy and politics 
This thesis focuses on testimony as a way of articulating and communicating memory. In 
the Odyssey, Telemachus, for example, travels to the houses of Nestor and Menelaus to 
hear their testimony regarding the fate of his father; Hecuba and the Trojan women give 
their testimony about the causes and effects of the Trojan War; and Plato reimagines 
Socrates’ law court testimony in the Apology, the text which, I suggest, might frame the 
Theaetetus. In exploring the tension between what and how characters remember and 
what and how the audience remembers, this thesis is informed by the theory of 
testimony. This section examines what testimony is and the ways in which it might be 
received. The theory of testimony was generated by investigations into trauma in the 
wake of the Holocaust. However, for all its grounding in twentieth-century history and 
psychology, testimony theory contains much that is relevant for this thesis. 
The seminal work of Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, working within comparative 
literature and psychoanalysis respectively, relates directly to the testimony of Holocaust 
victims.47 Their ambitious and ground-breaking attempt to theorise the acts of bearing 
witness and of listening to testimony to trauma—bearing witness to the witness—
continues to inform testimony studies today, even taking into account the scepticism with 
which their work is now received in many quarters. This section will detail some of 
Felman and Laub’s significant contributions to testimony theory and the ways in which 
they have been criticised by more recent theorists, with a particular eye to the ways such 
theories inform this thesis. 
Felman and Laub propose that ‘To testify – to vow to tell, to promise and produce one’s 
own speech as material evidence for truth - is to accomplish a speech act, rather than to 
simply formulate a statement.’48 It is more than a ‘statement’ of facts or events which are 
already known to the victim. Rather it gives access for both speaker and listener to a truth 
known only in the moment of speaking, a truth which, paradoxically perhaps, cannot fully 
be conveyed by language.49 In this sense, although Felman stresses the ‘unique’ burden of 
the witness in that testimony cannot be relayed by another without losing its function, 
                                                          
47 Felman and Laub (1992). 
48 Ibid, p. 5. 
49 This idea is closely related to Cathy Caruth’s notion of the ‘belatedness’ trauma as explored in Caruth 
(ed.) (1995). 
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she also sees ‘the appointment to bear witness’ as ‘an appointment to transgress the 
confines of that isolated stance, to speak for another and to others.’50 This is particularly 
apposite in situations in which the person who directly experienced trauma cannot speak 
for themselves – in the context of the Holocaust, because those who experienced the 
ultimate trauma were those who were killed. 
For this reason, as Laub goes on to elaborate, the relationship between the witness – the 
person giving testimony – and the witness to the witness – the person eliciting and 
listening to that testimony – is an important one. He writes of the responsibility which the 
listener bears towards the speaker. He believes that the listener’s factual knowledge of an 
event should not lead the listener to form ‘foregone conclusions’ or ‘preconceived 
dismissals’ about the kind of truth to which they are listening.51 As Felman suggests, 
listeners should see testimony ‘not as a mode of statement of’ truth, such as one might 
find in a court of law, ‘but rather as a mode of access to’ truth.52 Laub’s now famous 
example here is of the woman who gave testimony about a riot at Auschwitz in which 
prisoners set fire to one or a number of chimneys. Historians claimed that her testimony 
could not possibly be ‘true’ because it conflicted with other verified historical accounts 
but Laub argues that her story confirms a deeper truth: she testified to the breakage of 
‘the all compelling frame of Auschwitz, where Jewish revolts just did not happen and had 
no place.’ In conjunction with this, her testimony suggests a further truth: that of her own 
agency of interpretation, an agency which is often overlooked in dealing with ‘victims.’53  
In the field of Classics, Jonathan Shay has done important and influential work on 
representations of war trauma in Homer.54 His studies are based on his extensive 
experience of working as a psychiatrist, listening to the traumatised testimony of 
returning war veterans from Vietnam. His work has borne fruit in the rehabilitation of 
veterans affected by PTSD in projects such as Brian Doerries’ Theater of War. While 
Shay’s reading is valuable here for drawing attention to traumatic behaviours and other 
physical or verbal testimonies to trauma in epic and tragedy, this thesis does not entirely 
accept Shay’s reading for three reasons. Firstly, it is reductive in that, for example, his 
analysis of Achilles’ aristeia as a manifestation of the ‘beserk state’ does not allow for any 
                                                          
50 Felman and Laub (1992), p. 3. 
51 Ibid, p. 61. 
52 Ibid, p. 16. 
53 Ibid, p. 60. 
54 Shay (1994) and (2002). 
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ambiguity in the poem’s presentation of Achilles: its simultaneous celebration and 
problematisation of his bíē.55 Secondly, it is preoccupied with the manifestation of trauma 
in the individual and does not allow for a reading of trauma that is also political, collective 
and culturally transmitted. Thirdly, as the following section will show, criticisms of Felman 
and Laub are largely (though not exclusively) clustered around the difficult notion of 
‘truth’ and this instability in the term—an instability which is closely connected to social 
and political contexts as explored above, in relation to memory, is not something which 
Shay recognises. 
As the discussion above on ‘memory as re-creation’ demonstrates,56 memory is always 
subjective and always, to some extent at least, false. It reflects who we are with, why we 
are remembering and how we are feeling in the present. During the 1990s, the decade in 
which Testimony was published, the notion of truthful memory was tested, notably, in 
two extreme cases, involving False Memory Syndrome and Binjamin Wilkomirski. 
False Memory Syndrome became a highly controversial topic after a cluster of child abuse 
cases were brought to trial in the U.S. These cases involved the clash of two groups of 
psychotherapists. One group worked on conditions under the title Multiple Personality 
Disorder Syndrome, arguing that the personality of their clients disintegrated as a result 
of PTSD, here the result of supposed child abuse. According to this group, the trauma of 
abuse affected their clients to such a degree that the original traumatic experience was 
deeply repressed and only remembered after extensive recovered memory therapy such 
as hypnotism. The other group worked under the title of the False Memory Syndrome 
Foundation and they were assisted by memory researchers such as Elizabeth Loftus. They 
argued that the recovered memory therapy used by the other psychotherapists was 
responsible for generating false memories of child abuse to explain the behavioural 
disturbances in their clients. Loftus’ specialty was the unreliability of memory and in 
clinical tests she proved many times, in line with Neisser, that memory is imprecise and 
subject to outside influence. In many cases the psychologists and psychiatrists who had 
practised recovered memory therapies with clients bringing child abuse cases were 
successfully sued on the charge of generating false memories, sometimes by the clients 
themselves.57 
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Binjamin Wilkomirski was the pen name of Bruno Dössekker who published an award-
winning ‘memoir’, Bruchstücke: Aus einer Kindheit 1939-1948 (later translated into 
English as Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood), in 1995. The work claimed to 
be about his traumatic memories as a young Jewish child in Poland and his internment in 
two Nazi concentration camps. However, in 1998, a Swiss journalist, Daniel Ganzfried, 
exposed it as a fabrication and his findings were supported by historian Stefan 
Maechler.58 Dösseker himself maintained that he had not simply made up the stories and 
genuinely believed that he had lived these experiences. He was supported in this by 
Maechler who believed that he had not attempted to perpetrate a fraud. Rather, it is 
believed that he had identified so closely with accounts of the Holocaust in which he had 
immersed himself that he had come to believe that the trauma he read about was his 
own.59 
I have gone into some detail about these two examples because, in addition to revealing 
the problems inherent in speaking of memory and truth, they also bring into focus two 
further aspects of testimony with which this thesis is concerned: the context in which 
testimony is given and the affective power of testimony. The rest of this section will 
discuss these two aspects of testimony and their political ramifications. The ‘context of 
testimony’ not only describes where that testimony is given but how it is received and 
perceived and how its ‘truth’ value is measured. The ‘affective power of testimony’ is 
discussed via LaCapra’s notion of ‘empathic unsettlement.’ 
 
i) Legal testimony vs testimony to trauma 
False Memory Syndrome highlights what Aleida Assmann calls a ‘clash of frameworks.’60 
In the therapeutic context of testifying to trauma, victim trauma is characterized by its 
infusion with the victim’s own unique and personal perspective of events and what it felt 
like to be subject to them.61 His or her personal, physical experiences of suffering are 
inseparable from the story told ‘and his or her social and cultural authority to tell it.’62 
They are listened to with ‘detached empathy’ by the therapist who is only interested in 
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59 Whitehead (2003), p. 126. 
60 A. Assmann (2011), p. 258. 
61 A. Assmann (2006), p. 263. 
62 Margalit (2002), as discussed in Jones (2014), p. 23. 
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this subjective truth. In contrast, in the context of the court, the legal witness is 
traditionally seen as less interesting than their testimony, which serves to help elucidate 
the truth of guilt or lack of it. Biographical aspects are ‘invoked only to the extent that 
they help to probe and to ascertain the testimony.’63 Because of the need to ascertain an 
objective truth, the witness is listened to with scepticism by the judiciary. 
The rise of truth and reconciliation commissions and war crimes tribunals in which 
testimony to trauma has had to be assessed in a legal setting has gone some way to 
unsettle the dichotomy between legal testimony and testimony to trauma. Aleida 
Assmann has theorised this blurring of categories using an examination of a third kind of 
witness: the religious witness or martyr. The martyr dies in the act of witnessing his or her 
persecution so cannot give testimony to what s/he has experienced. S/he depends on 
others ‘to witness the suffering, to identify him or her as a martyr (rather than a justly 
persecuted rebel), and to codify the story for future generations.’64 In this s/he is similar 
to the witness to trauma who not only witnesses for themselves ‘but for those who died 
and were forever silenced.’65 She writes that ‘The Holocaust witness, like the religious 
martyr, depends on these secondary witnesses who understand the historic significance 
of the testimony and make it public.’66  
Plato’s Theaetetus demonstrates all three of these types of testimony and their overlap. 
Firstly, as Chapter 3 will suggest, the Theaetetus represents a meeting between Socrates 
and a youth of Athens, one of those whom he is accused of corrupting. In this way, the 
text may serve as legal testimony—a sort of extension to the Apology—by which the 
reader may judge the level of Socrates’ guilt. Secondly, it is possible to see, as Hannah 
Arendt has argued, that Socrates’ trial and death was represented as a significant trauma 
for Plato and western philosophy, one which led to a permanent divorce between 
philosophy and politics as represented in the Digression of the Theaetetus. And thirdly, 
Plato could be described as a witness to Socrates’ martyrdom, championing the 
philosophy of his teacher who was misunderstood and condemned by the political mob. 
As the chapter will show, I do not believe any of these pictures to be accurate as Plato’s 
representation(s) of Socrates is so much more nuanced and heavily layered than all of 
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them suggest. Rather, I will suggest a fourth kind of testimony, one which the readers 
must construct themselves by careful reading and a balance of remembering and 
forgetting. In conjunction with the witness to trauma and the witness to the martyr, 
Assman further states that s/he relies on a wider audience for recognition and 
affirmation, hence we may see Plato as writing his texts to disseminate his particular 
version of Socratic thought. As Günter Thomas suggests, ‘a witness is not a witness unless 
there is someone to hear his or her story.’67 It is this aspect of testimony which highlights 
its political nature, as I will detail below. 
 
ii) The politics of testimony 
There is such an imperative for the witness to trauma to have his or her story witnessed 
by others because, as Thomas goes on to suggest, ‘any act of witnessing, confession, or 
testimony – even in “historical” cases – relates to disputed, unstable, conflicting, or 
transitory realities.’68 Testimony would not need to take place if a contested truth were 
not at stake. The setting of the courtroom which pits one argument against another 
makes this ‘contested territory’ plain.69 For this reason, the law court theme which runs 
through this thesis provides a particularly useful way of analysing testimony in this 
political context. The theory and examples discussed below draw out the political nature 
of testimony and continue to exemplify the ways in which the different types of 
testimony overlap as they are understood in this thesis. 
For the reason that their words seek recognition from a listening audience, the witness to 
trauma is often constituted by themselves or by others as having a moral or ethical claim. 
John Durham Peters writes that ‘Witnessing … suggests a morally justified individual who 
speaks out against unjust power’ and further, that ‘to witness means to be on the right 
side.’70 Both Peters and Avishai Margalit argue that testimony’s ethical claim is based on 
suffering and as such, it constitutes its own truth.71 Peters writes that ‘the indisputables 
of pain and death can serve as a resource to persuade others of the truth of one’s words 
of witness’ and so the witness’ body ‘serves as a sort of collateral to justify the loan of our 
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credence.’72 Therefore, while listeners have a responsibility to hear the ‘deeper truth’ of 
testimony, as Laub instructs, they are also subject to the moral ‘imperatives’ of 
testimony: they ‘must know, must remember, must bear the marks of the past.’73 
Because of these moral imperatives, Peters rejects the idea of testimony from the point 
of view of the perpetrators of atrocity in his influential article of 2001.74 However, others 
have sought to open up this avenue of enquiry and this is certainly of importance if 
seeking to find a more objective truth, as in the truth commissions or war crimes trials 
mentioned above.75  
This thesis considers testimony from the point of view both of the victim of trauma and 
the witness in the law court. In particular, it considers moments when these types of 
testimony overlap in such a way that the judgement of the audience, our judgement, is 
put under scrutiny, in, for example, the dead Amphimedon’s testimony against Odysseus 
in the underworld in Book 24 of the Odyssey, or in Hecuba’s testimony against Helen in 
Euripides’ Trojan Women. Here, the slippery notion of ‘truth’ is important because it is 
contested. This is not only so because there are multiple viewpoints in play, but also 
because, as Peters suggests, ‘the journey from experience (the seen) into words (the said) 
is precarious.’76 There is ‘an epistemological gap whose bridging is always fraught with 
difficulty.’77 As in the case of memory, discussed elsewhere, ‘testimonies can be shaped 
by the schematic constraints of narrative structure and altered, perhaps even created, by 
the way they are probed (‘refreshed’) by others.’ As human beings, ‘witnesses are 
evidently a fallible transmission and storage medium for sensory experience.’78 
This intervention by others external to the witness to recreate or refresh the truth of 
testimony is evident in legal uses of testimony where, in classical Greece as now, truth is 
not so much external and objective but part of the different narratives played out by 
prosecution and defence. This idea is explored at length by Steven Johnstone with regard 
to fifth- and fourth-century legal oratory and this study draws heavily on his work in its 
analysis of legal testimony as represented in the literature.79  
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I supplement Johnstone’s work here with that by Kirsten Campbell, writing with regard to 
the international war crimes tribunal relating to the former Yugoslavia. Campbell 
concludes that neither the prosecution (which uses more witnesses), nor the defence, 
sees testimony as complete, factual truth.80 The prosecution builds up a picture of 
verifiable truth by using multiple testimonies. In this way, even when truth is subjective, 
overlapping stories and repeated statements testifying to similar events contribute to an 
overall ‘true description of the world.’81 The defence, on the other hand, starts with the 
assumption that ‘the testimonial narrative of events ‘is actually an opinion or belief as to 
what occurred.’82 The defence also severs testimony from any necessary relation to the 
event, and hence to the wrong’ and understands it as expressing the speaker’s 
psychological or neurobiological states, rather than the reality of the event.’83 According 
to this model, ‘the rupture of bodily integrity results in a rupture of psychic integrity, and 
consequently a rupture of the integrity of memory.’84 
Campbell analyses the ways in which the courts must debate and decide on the place, 
probative value and criteria of evaluation for different kinds of testimony, the relative 
probity of their witnesses and ‘the broader hermeneutic problem of the interpretation of 
evidence in its relevant historical and cultural context by judges who do not share that 
social context.’85 All of these make a valuable contribution to how audiences, particularly 
from other places and times, judge the testimony relayed in ancient texts. In this thesis, 
this will be particularly valuable for thinking about how we, as modern readers, approach 
ancient material which would have been performed or read in very different contexts in 
the past. 
There are two further aspects to the politics of trauma and testimony which this thesis 
addresses. These are related to each other and to date both are relatively under-
theorised. The first is the notion that trauma, like memory, can be construed as collective 
or cultural as well as individual; the second, that whereas trauma is often construed as 
incommunicable, communication is an integral part of cultural trauma. 
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It has been useful to think about cultural trauma in the context of the Odyssey and the 
Trojan Women, since both present political groups in the wake of the Trojan War and, in 
the case of the Odyssey, a violent event in Ithaca which gives rise to a new or revitalised 
social order. Jeffrey Alexander has theorised that ‘[c]ultural trauma occurs when 
members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves 
indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and 
changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways.’86 According to him, 
cultural trauma is felt when ‘the patterned meanings of the collectivity are abruptly 
dislodged’ and such trauma is a result not of the events themselves but of the ‘sense of 
shock and fear’ felt around them.87 He speaks of the gap between the event and its 
representation as the ‘trauma process’ and suggests that individual agents and then 
‘carrier groups’ make claims of trauma, which, if they find purchase with the collective as 
a whole, convince the group that they have experienced such a trauma.88 There are 
several other noteworthy aspects to Alexander’s theory in terms of this thesis: the 
connection between cultural trauma, collective identity and the attribution of blame,89 
and the way in which cultural trauma leads to a revision of political identity—the result of 
‘a searching re-remembering of the collective past.’90  
 
iii) A short digression about ‘truth’ 
From the definition of memory as a re-creative process, to the contests at stake in giving 
testimony, this study of memory has been bound up closely with the unstable notion of 
truth. Though it may appear to be at a tangent to this discussion of testimony, the notion 
of truth and how truth is perceived underlies this whole analysis and needs to be placed 
at front and centre in order to make this clear. Memory and truth are interwoven 
linguistically, in the ancient Greek, and also conceptually and philosophically.  
The literal meaning of alētheia (‘truth’) is ‘unconcealed.’ The a- signifies a negative, and 
the word lēthē (‘forgetting’) derives from lanthanō, meaning ‘escape notice.’ Lēthē is also 
Oblivion, part of the Underworld, hidden from the sight of mortals and from which there 
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is no return. Therefore, ‘truth’ suggests openness while its opposite signals something 
hidden or inaccessible.91 
There is a clear association in the ancient Greek mindset between memory and ‘truth’, 
but this is not truth as we conceive it. Homeric ‘truth’, for example, is as Richard Martin 
has demonstrated closely related to muthos (myth): a type of speech which is reliable and 
authoritative and linked to cultural memory.92 Martin denotes muthos as a speech act of 
recollection. He uses the example of Phoenix introducing the story of the Meleagros with 
memnēmai (‘I remember’) to illustrate this.93 The failure of such a speech act is marked 
by lēthē, as at Iliad 9.259 where Odysseus tells Achilles that he has ‘forgotten’ his father’s 
advice to ‘abstain from strife.’94 Remembering, therefore, goes hand in hand with ‘truth’, 
not in the sense of accuracy as we might understand it, but in the sense of authority. 
This is similar to Detienne’s point,95 that poets and kings need memory in order to lay 
claim to authority for their words: their ability to employ memory gives their speech the 
ring of truth. It is similar also to Johnstone’s analysis of law court testimony in the fifth 
and fourth centuries BC. According to this, testimonies for the prosecution and defence 
commonly involved narratives which would appear truthful because they were familiar.96 
Again, where there is no stable conception of empirical truth, authority comes from the 
way in which memory is articulated as testimony. 
In Homer, use of the term alētheia also ties into its definition as ‘unconcealed.’ It signifies 
‘truth’ but often implies ‘a whole account’, used alongside pas (whole). It has the sense of 
complete openness, of telling all, as opposed to covering things up with deceit. It is used 
in this way by Telemachus in his request that Nestor tells him the truth about his father: 
ὦ Νεστορ Νηληϊάδη, σὺ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς ἐνισπες (O, Nestor, son of Neleus, tell me the true 
story!).97 And again, with pas this time, in Nestor’s reply: τοιγὰρ ἐγώ τοι, τέκνον, ἀληθέα 
πάντ᾽ ἀγορεύσω (So, my child, I will tell you the whole story).98 In this way also, witnesses 
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in court, even today ‘promise to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth’ 
before giving testimony.  
Over time, the definition of alētheia evolved into something more akin to our notion of 
truth. As Gregory Nagy discusses, already by Pindar muthos is being used in contrast to 
alētheia, with muthos denoting ‘a murky multiplicity of discredited versions.’99 However, 
the link between memory and truth continues to resurface in philosophy through the 
ages, notably in Heidegger and later in Derrida, both of whom return to Plato’s Wax 
Tablet. Derrida’s addresses it first in La pharmacie de Platon, where he questions what 
Mnemosyne - a figure of myth - has to do with philosophy - a field that ‘shaped itself 
entirely on the philosophical difference between mythos and logos…’100 He returns to it in 
Mémoires for Paul de Man in which he describes ‘the gift (doron) of Mnemosyne’ as ‘like 
the wax in which all that we wish to guard in our memory is engraved in relief so that it 
may leave a mark.’101 In both of these works, Derrida criticises a ‘philosophical move’ 
which begins with Plato and becomes consolidated by Heidegger, to put ethics at the 
heart of philosophy.  
Derrida uses deconstruction in order to critique and circumvent this philosophical move 
and, in so doing, addresses the binary of writing/logos expressed as good and bad 
pharmaka (drugs) in Plato’s Phaedrus. In this dialogue, Plato’s Socrates draws a 
distinction between real and artificial memory, with writing representing only a memory 
aid and logos representing ‘true’ memory. Derrida argues that for Socrates, writing is a 
technē (technique, skill) that does not help real memory (mnēmēs) but stimulates only 
artificial memory (hypomnēseōs). The former generates science, whereas the latter 
generates only opinion. Therefore, writing is corruptive for truth and memory and this is 
where ‘la moralité’ comes in. Deconstruction, meanwhile, differs because in breaking 
down binary oppositions, it accepts the inevitable contamination between technique and 
philosophy and, therefore, the impossibility of distinguishing between real and artificial 
memory. 
This, clearly, has much in common with memory theory with its destabilised relationship 
between memory and truth, which brings us back to an understanding similar to Homer’s. 
There is no such thing as empirically truthful memory and because of this, we can only 
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examine the way in which memory is mediated and expressed. In the context of trauma—
to return to the starting point of this digression—the False Memory Syndrome cases, 
together with the Binjamin Wilkomirski affair, unsettled the concept at the very centre of 
studies in trauma and testimony: that there is a ‘truthful’ memory which is altered or 
made inaccessible because of trauma.102 Studies of these phenomena reinforce the idea, 
generated in the work of Neisser, for example, that ‘truth’ and ‘memory’ are fickle 
friends, that both are always precarious. 
 
iv) ‘Empathic unsettlement’ 
The above discussion of legal testimony and testimony to trauma is instructive about the 
ways in which hearing testimony can be an affective experience but the example of 
Binjamin Wilkomirski demonstrates the potential power of testimony to unsettle the 
psyche. Anne Whitehead suggests that while Felman comments that testimony can 
‘penetrate us like an actual life’, transmitting itself through sympathetic identification, for 
Wilkomirski it replaces his actual life.103 Although it seems unlikely that many will be 
affected by traumatic testimony to this extreme, this thesis will make extensive use of 
Dominck LaCapra’s work on the less extreme notion of ‘empathic unsettlement’ in 
thinking about the affect and possible political effects of receiving the texts studied. The 
following discussion outlines the three aspects of ‘empathic unsettlement’ on which this 
thesis draws most heavily: its ‘virtual’ nature, the transferential relationship it constructs 
and its power to reeducate politically.  
Firstly, according to LaCapra:  
Desirable empathy, I would suggest, involves not self-sufficient, projective 
or incorporative identification but what might be termed empathetic 
unsettlement in the face of traumatic limit events, their perpetrators and 
their victims … It involves virtual not vicarious experience—that is to say, 
experience in which one puts oneself in the other’s position without taking 
the place of—or speaking for—the other or becoming a surrogate victim.104 
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This stress on the ‘virtual’ rather than the ‘vicarious’, the putting oneself in the place of 
‘without taking the place of’ seems particularly appropriate for thinking about testimony 
in a literary sense. We feel with the characters depicted to the point that it begins to 
unsettle our own sense of self but rarely to the point that we believe we are that fictional 
character or autobiographical subject.  
Secondly, this thesis builds on the idea that traumatic testimony ‘raises problems bound 
up with one’s implication in, or transferential relation to, charged, value-related events 
and those caught up in them.’105 This will have particular resonance in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis in contemplating the extent to which the audience empathises with attitudes or 
viewpoints which they know to be mistaken or even dangerous. 
Finally, LaCapra’s vision of empathic unsettlement is relevant here because of its political 
nature. LaCapra states that ‘One may even contend that there can be no durable ethical 
and political change without the reeducation of affect in its relation to normative 
judgement.’106 In Chapters 1 and 2, this thesis explores the idea that the empathetic 
unsettlement resulting from virtual identification with characters depicted provokes 
political discussion, pushing audiences to question the norms of their own political 
societies. 
That empathy can be politically affective is also borne out by recent studies in the 
psychology of collective memory. Using a sample audience of a political speech by the 
King of Belgium, Stone et al identified that temporary forgetting may be induced in a 
group when the group empathises with the speaker.107 Their research suggests that 
French-speaking Belgians were more likely to remember with the (French-speaking) king, 
not questioning his version of events, whereas Dutch-speaking Belgians were more likely 
to notice or question perceived elisions and omissions. 
Some have been sceptical regarding the potential affective power of empathy generated 
by literary testimony. Peters suggests that ‘literary testimony’ cannot really be judged as 
testimony at all because ‘drama offers terror without danger, pity without duty.’108 This 
thesis, with others such as Sara Jones, is more optimistic about the power of literature. 
Jones cites studies by Tessa Morris-Suzuki and Alison Landsberg which indicate that the 
                                                          
105 Ibid, p. 136. 
106 Ibid, p. 137. 
107 Discussed in Stone and Hirsch (2014), pp. 321-22. 
108 Peters, summarising Aristotle’s Poetics, p. 721. 
37 
 
‘affective response’ generated by fiction ‘has the ability to shape that person’s 
subjectivity and politics’ and can, thereby, create ‘the conditions for ethical thinking 
precisely by encouraging people to feel connected to, while recognizing the alterity of, 
the “other”.’109  
Alexander has conceived of the politics of empathy slightly differently. In his study of the 
way in which the Holocaust came to have the cultural significance it does today, he 
suggests that although empathy and affect are psychological phenomena they do not 
occur without certain sociological factors being in place. In the case of the Holocaust, a 
number of factors influenced identification with the Jews in the USA, including: a reaction 
against anti-Semitism, caused by hatred of Hitler and the Nazis rather than sympathy with 
the Jews; followed by the mass media attention to the trial of Adolph Eichmann and the 
translation of Anne Frank’s diary, its Broadway production and Hollywood adaptation. 
A return to the passage from the Iliad discussed above (pp. 22-23) and its reception in 
later texts such as the Trojan Women is illustrative of this socio-political aspect to 
empathy and affect in memory discourses. In the case of the meeting between Achilles 
and Priam, we might surmise that a cultural respect for fathers in both Trojan and 
Achaean cultures made this an effective way for Priam to trigger Achilles’ empathy but, in 
the Trojan Women, it is possible to trace the political effect of this passage from the Iliad 
in shaping the social conditions by which sympathy with a defeated enemy—both in 
literature and in life—might be positively encouraged.  
In my reading of the Trojan Women in Chapter 2, I respond to a seam of literary criticism 
which suggests that Euripides’ play could not have been a response to the Athenian 
slaughter and enslavement of the Melians during the Peloponnesian War. The basis for 
this criticism is that the Athenians simply would not have had any remorse for their 
actions because ‘might is right’ and this was how defeated enemies were treated lest they 
fight back. I suggest, rather, that such views are not sustained either by literature or by 
history, at least by Thucydides’ account of history. Examples such as this in the Iliad and 
others such as Aeschylus’ Persians actively encourage audiences to empathise with a 
defeated foe for reasons of common humanity. Similarly, Thucydides’ account of the 
Athenians’ decision to hold a second vote on whether such actions should be carried out 
in Mytilene—after the ships had already sailed to give the Athenians’ instructions—
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suggests that while some may have held that ‘might is right’, others had scruples which 
reflected the empathy displayed on stage and in verse.110 
This subsection has demonstrated the ways in which memory-testimony can not only 
produce an emotional effect on the listener but has also shown that the experience of 
this emotion can have political consequences. The listener’s psyche may be unsettled 
leading her/him to ‘remember with’ the speaker, temporarily disrupting old political 
allegiances and forging new ones. In addition to this, we do not hear testimony in a 
vacuum but in our own political contexts and these shape the way in which that 
testimony is received. This last point—that we do not remember or hear testimony in 
isolation—feeds into the next section of this Introduction which examines the notion of 
collective and cultural memory. Again, this discussion is built around ancient source 
material, in this case: the Odyssey. 
 
Collective memory, politics, and the end of the Odyssey 
Zeus’ declaration that he will put complete forgetting (ἔκλησιν θέωμεν) of the slaughter 
on the warring factions, and so end the civil war in Ithaca before it really begins, 
encapsulates many key ideas relating to memory with which this thesis will be 
concerned.111 Most obviously, the passage highlights the political nature of memory, on a 
practical level, in its articulation of memory’s role in conflict and its resolution in society: 
remembering is the cause of conflict and forgetting is a prerequisite for peace. After the 
forgetting, Zeus says, there will be wealth and peace (πλοῦτος δὲ καὶ εἰρήνη ἅλις ἔστω), a 
happily ever after.  
Nicole Loraux uses this moment of forgetting in the Odyssey to illustrate the fact that ‘To 
forget not only the bad deeds of others but also one’s own anger’ is necessary ‘so that the 
bond of life in the city may be renewed.’112 Earlier, she terms this ‘a founding 
forgetting’113 because this forgetting is the condition on which the new Ithacan state is 
founded. In the light of the fact that ‘non-forgetting’ could have such disastrous 
consequences, Loraux writes that the Greeks ‘never stopped trying’ to cast it out, starting 
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with Achilles’ wrath and ending the Oresteia ‘in which it would be neutralized without 
being completely lost; it would be domesticated by being installed in the city, defused, 
indeed turned against itself.’114 Only divinity can bring this successful conclusion in 
literature and therefore, when stasis comes and the people are unable to truly forget, 
‘they will forget in words, with each prohibition on remembering the misfortunes.’115 
According to Loraux, the ban on memory in 403 BC was, more precisely, a ban on bringing 
to court ills done to one during the time of civil war and the oligarchic rule of the 300.  
In the fact that the forgetting is ‘put upon’(theōmen) the population of Ithaca by one in 
(divine) authority, without the knowledge or permission of the people, the passage also 
suggests a further political dimension to memory, one which raises questions about 
memory and power. This is reinforced by the way in which Odysseus is permitted to 
continue unchecked, for a period, killing all of those who threatened his authority, while 
the families are denied the chance to mourn their brothers and sons. 
This reading brings out what Kansteiner refers to as ‘the competitive arena of memory 
politics’:116 as the victor – the man who has silenced his opposition – Odysseus may 
establish the official memory of events. Memory is established in a competitive process 
but where the ‘losing’ memory is suppressed rather than forgotten, this suppressed 
memory might either lie silent with fear, or might rise to the surface to fight. We see this 
happen in Sophocles’ Electra, where Clytemnestra has imposed an ‘official’ version of 
Agamemnon’s death on society but Electra shares her alternative version first with the 
chorus, then with Orestes, to form a force of insurrection.117 Foucault terms this ‘popular 
memory’ according to his analysis of memory as a discursive practice.118 This results, in 
Electra, in a ‘mnemonic battle’ between Electra and Clytemnestra – a verbal conflict 
fought over their different versions of events – before the physical showdown between 
Clytemnestra and Orestes.119 
The passage from the Odyssey also invites us to question who is part of this collective 
and, therefore, who is subject to Zeus’ decree. For a start, the decree states that 
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forgetting will be put on the families of those killed (ἡμεῖς δ’αὖ παίδων τε κασιγνήτων τε 
φόνοιο ἔκλησιν θέωμεν) so we might question whether Odysseus and his family will also 
be made to forget. If not, this will bolster his position of power still further. More 
significantly than this, though, the passage highlights the difference between the internal 
‘people’ of the poem and the external audience. The external audience cannot be subject 
to Zeus’ decree and this might be interpreted politically in one of two ways. As I will 
explore in much more detail in Chapter 1, the forgetting within the poem is total: eklēsis 
is an hapax legomenon (a term with only one recorded use), implying total forgetting, 
something impossible in life and only possible in the poem because of divine involvement. 
However, it could be seen as instructive for the audience—a kind of ideal—as there is 
political expedience to putting aside wrongs done to us so as to ensure peace. On the 
other hand, the fact that the audience remembers the brutality of Odysseus’ revenge 
might lead them to question the political norms and values seemingly espoused by the 
poem. 
The final political dimension here is that because this forgetting is ‘put upon’ upon a 
social group—one which collectively remembers wrongs done to them—the passage also 
suggests a social or collective dimension to memory. Because the Ithacans’ collective 
forgetting is the condition on which the state is re-established with Odysseus as king, it 
seems fair to extrapolate that this process of collective remembering or forgetting also 
has the effect of defining the political community of Ithaca.  
In what follows I will draw out these political dimensions of collective memory using 
prominent theory from the field of memory studies and in doing so I will show the benefit 
of the diverse approach offered by a field which encompasses so many disciplines within 
it. I will then go on to define memory and its political aspects more generally and to 
consider why an approach based on ‘memory’ is more useful and appropriate than one 
predicated on apparently similar terms such as myth or tradition.  
 
i) Collective memory as political process 
As suggested in the previous subsection, this thesis owes much to Nicole Loraux’s 
exploration of collective memory in Ancient Athens, particularly in her focus on the Greek 
terminology of memory and her examination of moments of individual and group 
remembering and forgetting in key texts across the genres, such as the Homeric epics and 
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Sophocles’ Electra. However, the theoretical basis for her model of collective 
remembering differs markedly from mine and this is in line with our differing objects: hers 
to explore the specific historical moment which led to the swearing of oaths of forgetting 
in 403 BC and mine to explore, more generally, how textual representations of affective 
memory mirror but also reshape the political societies of their audiences.   
Loraux adopts a vision of collective memory drawn both from Freud’s Moses and 
Monotheism in which he writes of the ‘inescapability’ of moving between individual and 
group consciousness,120 and what she sees as a Greek conception of the ‘individual-city’ 
expressed by Aristotle, Thucydides, Isocrates and Plato in such formulations as: ‘the city 
has decided.’121 These conceptions of collective memory imply that one can extend an 
‘individual’ consciousness to a group as a whole, an approach which other theorists, such 
as Susannah Radstone, caution against on the grounds that this has the tendency of 
‘hardening into literality what might be better regarded as a series of compelling 
metaphors.’  
Although Loraux’s use of this model for memory is undoubtedly political, the approach of 
this thesis brings out not just the idea that memory is always social, but also the inherent 
politics involved in the process of memory and its effect on the way in which the 
collective defines itself. This understanding of collective memory is based on a 
combination of psychological and sociological theory and on its recent use in comparative 
literature studies, anthropology and history.  
This theory of collective memory begins with Maurice Halbwachs’ sociological study of 
the ‘mémoire collective’ which builds on Durkheimian principles of the collective 
consciousness to suggest that ‘[n]o memory is possible outside frameworks used by 
people living in a society to determine and retrieve their recollections.’122 The individual 
remembers in society, via social triggers and using the social medium of language and so 
all memory might be described as ‘collective memory’; although it is the individual who 
remembers, the memory will be determined by what the collective considers to be 
relevant.123 Concurrently with Halbwachs, in the field of psychology, Frederic Bartlett 
published his results of an experiment in which participants had to memorise an 
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unfamiliar story. He found that they recalled it according to culturally shaped ideas about 
what made a good story and concluded that it is these ‘schemata’, these patterns and 
structures of knowledge, gained through social interaction, which form the way in which 
we perceive and remember.124   
According to both of these sociological and psychological theories, remembering is based 
on what is considered relevant or appropriate in a given social context. As those 
determining social factors change, for example after the upheaval of regime change or as 
values are transformed gradually over time, what is remembered will change too. If a 
group disbands completely, memories will be lost but, while a group is together, those 
shared memories create a sense of cohesion and belonging. Halbwachs has been 
criticised for social determinism—here, the sense that the individual’s actions are 
controlled or predestined by social structures—and for his failure to articulate the 
theoretical basis for the transition between individual and group memory.125 However, in 
spite of this, his theories have been instrumental in the development of psychological, 
cultural and sociological theories of memory ever since. They were, for example, highly 
influential in the research of Ulric Neisser, discussed above, who not only found that 
memory was a reconstructive, re-creative process, but also that the focus in Psychology 
on the individual consciousness had led to the neglect of the social aspects of memory. In 
addition, Halbwachs’ mémoire collective underpins Jeffrey Olick’s work on social memory 
and Jan and Aleida Assmann’s on cultural memory. It is a synthesis of their ideas which 
informs my use of the terms in this thesis. 
Jeffrey Olick’s theory of ‘social memory’ is the model of collective memory on which this 
thesis will draw when examining, in particular, the literary representations of ways in 
which individuals and groups remember. Olick emphasises the political nature of memory 
and this is what makes his theory so useful for this thesis. In the introduction to The 
Politics of Regret, he addresses the relationship between individual memory and group 
memory, saying that, ‘It is not just that we remember as members of groups but that we 
also constitute those groups and their members simultaneously in the act, thus “re-
member-ing”.’126 In a similar way to Giddens, who postulates that political activity 
reproduces the very structures that engender it (see p. 11), Olick espouses the idea that 
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the act of remembering constitutes or reshapes the group and its members. Barbara 
Misztal criticises him for this approach on the grounds that it does not explain why 
individuals with the same social cues sometimes remember differently. However, Olick 
does not deny individual memory, rather he believes that we cannot ‘speak of a presocial 
individual memory’ any more than we can speak of the collective memory as an entity 
which remembers without individuals.127 The two are a continuum and as such, are 
inextricably linked, each constantly informing and affecting the other.  
Therefore, collective memory is not simply a matter of extending individual psychology to 
a group, as in Freud’s model used by Loraux. Nor is it to deny that Radstone’s ‘compelling 
metaphors’ can be useful or instructive but, heeding her warning, this thesis will be 
vigilant in its examination of ‘the processes of articulation through which past happenings 
and their meanings are discursively produced, transmitted and mediated.’128 For this 
reason, this study not only addresses memory as it is represented in the texts studied, but 
also the way in which memory is mediated by the different genres and performance 
contexts involved. It will consider, for example, the fact that the fifth century BC audience 
of the Odyssey witnessed the ‘founding forgetting’ on Ithaca at the Great Panathenaea, a 
ritual which celebrated Athens’ own foundation. 
While Olick’s work provides the sociological basis for my understanding of collective 
memory, Jan and Aleida Assmann’s work underpins my definition of ‘cultural memory’. 
Jan Assmann divides memory into ‘communicative memory’ – that of a few recent 
generations which is communicated between individuals who have experienced it directly 
– and ‘cultural memory’ – of which we have no personal memory but which is embedded 
deep in the history and mythology of the culture in, for example, myth, ritual practice and 
literature.129 It is this, he argues, which binds communities together, creating a sense of 
political or national identity. The hallmark of both Jan and Aleida Assmann’s work on 
memory is the connection between cultural memory, collective identity and political 
legitimation and this connection is central to my thesis, being the site where literature, 
memory and the establishment of political society converge.130  
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Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney have developed the Assmanns’ theory of cultural memory in 
the field of literary studies and it is from this development that this thesis derives its 
approach of bringing together characters’ and audiences’ remembering and forgetting. 
Erll and Rigney articulate the ways in which memory and literature interrelate, talking of 
‘memory in literature’ (the way in which acts of memory are represented in the text), 
‘memory of literature’ (a metaphor for the way in which intertextuality operates as a kind 
of literary memory, tying the text to all other texts), and ‘literature as memory’ (a 
medium of cultural memory).131 They are scrupulous in dealing with the metaphorical 
nature of ‘memory of literature’ because of criticism levelled at it on the grounds that 
psychological terminology cannot be transferred onto literature, but they nonetheless 
value it as a useful mode of analysis, as I do here.132 Rigney has developed this further, 
writing that a text is not the end point of memory but rather part of a ‘mnemonic 
process’: it is a carrier of cultural memory, constantly invested and reinvested with new 
memories as different mnemonic communities encounter it.133 This aspect of cultural 
memory also informs my approach, especially in my engagement with the reception of 
epic at the Panathenaea and in fifth century Athenian tragedy. 
Rigney’s vision of cultural memory is substantially different from the Assmanns’ in the 
respect that while cultural memory in the Assmanns’ seminal studies tends to be tied to 
nationhood, Rigney suggests that literary works play a key role in transferring memories 
across geographical and temporal borders.134 According to Rigney literary scholars have 
tended ‘to view individual texts as the terminus or outcome of remembrance rather than 
as active ingredients in an ongoing cultural process.’135 She is interested not only in how a 
text views the past but also how it functions ‘mnemotechnically’; that is, in the role it 
plays in fixing, transmitting, and transforming memories across space and time. She views 
the text as a ‘portable monument’ and as such, in addition to playing a part in identity 
formation, it is also capable of arousing an interest in history in groups other than its first 
readership and creating ‘new sorts of affiliations based on “discontinuous” and cross-
border memories.’136 Rigney’s ideas are built on by Wai Chee Dimock who reflects ‘the 
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analytic inadequacy of the sovereign state’ in Through Other Continents.137 In the context 
of my thesis, this aspect of cultural memory is particularly relevant to the study of such 
Panhellenic texts as the Homeric epics, performed all over the Greek world for several 
centuries. Dimock’s vision of intertextual ‘deep time’ also provides a rationale for studies 
such as this in the modern age, as it reveals ‘a crisscrossing set of pathways, open-ended 
and ever multiplying, weaving in and out of other geographies, other languages and 
cultures’ in such a way as to bind literature written here and now not only to the rest of 
the world but to the rest of time.138 
In spite of this, the metaphorical nature of ‘memory of literature’ has prompted some to 
question the validity of analysing in terms of memory at all, and to wonder why we need 
to replace ‘old’ terminology such as myth or tradition. The following section explores the 
differences between memory and its ‘older’ alternatives and offers a defence of memory-
based criticism, as used in this thesis. 
 
ii) Memory, myth and tradition 
In an article highly critical of memory studies, Gedi and Elam wrote that collective 
memory ‘is but a misleading new name for the old familiar “myth”.’139 It is ‘new jargon’ 
which erodes old distinctions (for example that between memory and history) and it will 
lead to ‘a deterioration, even… a disintegration of entire fields of scientific knowledge’,140 
a heavy charge, indeed. Myth is, as Gedi and Elam suggested, an important aspect of 
memory studies and one integral to this thesis, as it is one of the most important cultural 
factors informing the poets’/writers’ creative process and the audiences’ interpretive 
process. It is not a term which this study of memory in any way attempts to negate. There 
is precedent for this incorporation of myth into memory theory too. Stephan Feuchtwang 
has written about the way in which memories of events in the relatively recent past 
become mythologised in a ‘caesura moment’141 and Jan Assmann has also engaged with 
this idea, arguing that myth is always the outcome when actual historical events are 
mediated by memory. According to this idea, memory becomes formalised as myth, 
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exerting ‘a lasting, normative, and formative power.’142 This is not to say that they 
become set in stone; myth, rather, offers a template which is flexible and capacious into 
which new events can be folded and thereby, understood. 
Within Classics, Hans-Joachim Gehrke has explored these processes described by 
Feuchtwang and Assmann in action in ancient Athens, in conjunction with the Persian 
Wars.143 He writes not only of the mythologising of the Battle of Marathon in Athens’ 
recent history, which defined Athenians’ self-identity as defenders of liberty against the 
Barbarians and protectors of those weaker than themselves, but also the way in which all 
earlier Athenian mythology was retrospectively redefined in the light of this. 
Furthermore, he writes that myth could be ‘Fed by the imagination of the poets’; for 
example, he states that details invented by Euripides could quickly become assimilated 
into the facts of ‘history’.144  
Gehrke chooses not to identify this process as ‘memory’ but instead calls it ‘intentional 
history.’ His use of the word ‘intentional’ draws attention to the self-conscious moulding 
and re-moulding of political identity based on the distant past. While his approach is 
interesting in its own right, ‘intentional history’ does not provide the scope offered by 
memory. As discussed above, this thesis is grounded in two conceptions of memory which 
go well beyond Gehrke’s model of ‘intentional history.’ Firstly, in addition to ‘intentional’ 
remembering, it is also concerned with involuntary remembering and the triggering of 
memories that might suggest an interpretation which runs counter to the main thrust of 
the text. Secondly, I define memory against conventional definitions of history, as 
possessing a non-linear temporality and an ability to excite empathy, a politically affective 
force.145 In addition, although myth is important to cultural memory, it is only a part of it. 
If myth is ‘the story’, ‘memory of literature’ concerns specific tellings of the story and the 
ways in which they interconnect with other tellings of that story or indeed, via linguistic, 
imagistic or thematic devices, with other texts through time. 
‘Tradition’, too, shares some elements of memory. T. S. Eliot, in his seminal essay 
“Tradition and the Individual Talent”, suggests that the poet exists in a state which 
simultaneously connects him to ‘the whole literature of Europe from Homer’ and the here 
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and now of the contemporary world.146 He also argues that each act of creation in the 
present moment affects the tradition, reshaping all its works in the light of the new.147 In 
this sense, tradition has much in common with memory, which also reconstrues the past 
from the present and so, folds the tenses.  
It is clear that Eliot’s conception of tradition shares much with Erll and Rigney’s model of 
cultural memory, in particular, with their idea of intertextuality as a kind of ‘memory of 
literature.’ His vision of each new work reshaping all the works before it also has 
resonance with Dimock’s perception of ‘deep time.’ However, tradition, like myth, only 
represents a part of memory. Eliot’s version of tradition sees it encapsulated in the mind 
of the poet and in this ‘poet’ bears a resemblance to Roland Barthes’ ‘Author-God’ who, 
alone, holds the elusive ‘meaning’ of the text,148 however much he, as a being in his own 
right, is ‘surrendered’ to his art.149 With Erll and Rigney, this thesis sees memory as being 
held, rather, in the relationship between the text and the minds of its readers, their 
meanings mutually constitutive. In addition, tradition, like myth, suggests a side of 
memory which is intentional, imposing order and existing as an institution in the Canon. 
In contrast, memory is an affective process which in its unintentional, insubordinate guise 
might service the institution of tradition but might equally have an unsettling effect, 
disrupting its careful narrative of inclusion and exclusion. 
Ultimately, this thesis defends the use of ‘memory’ rather than ‘myth’ or ‘tradition’ 
because memory encapsulates those terms and offers so much more potential for 
approaching texts. Astrid Erll defines memory as ‘an umbrella term for all those processes 
of a biological, medial, or social nature which relate past and present (and future) in 
sociocultural contexts,’150 and thus, when it is used as a medium to explore literary texts, 
it can unite traditionally disparate approaches to textual criticism such as the historical, 
sociological and psychological. It also provides a way of thinking about the interaction 
between text and audience, particularly in the way in which character and audience 
memories clash or coincide. 
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Classics and memory studies 
As I mentioned in the thesis overview at the start of this Introduction, there has been 
work within Classics which has taken a similar memory-centred approach to classical texts 
as that which I take here but most of it is focused on single genres. I have discussed a few 
such works already, for example that by Elizabeth Minchin (on p. 16) and Jonathan Shay 
(on pp. 24-25). In the field of tragedy, the most ambitious work has been done on the 
study of memory in two unpublished PhD theses by Elena Christophorou and Catelina 
Popescu.151  
Christophorou’s thesis explores individual and collective memory in Euripides’ plays and, 
like the present study, examines the ways in which ‘tragic memory’ as ‘an active, 
purposeful practice of remembering … both preserved and created an awareness of the 
common past of the Athenians.’152 Her thesis is grounded thoroughly in the theory of 
memory, such as that by Tulving, Kansteiner and Assmann, and considers the ways in 
which the intersection of represented memory and audience memory contributes to 
political definition. Where she concentrates on Euripides, this study broadens the focus to 
look across genres, but also narrows it to look in more detail at the mode of remembering 
as testimony. 
Popescu’s thesis looks at memory across the texts that tell the story of Orestes’ matricide. 
It is also underpinned by theory and involves the interaction of represented memory and 
audience memory. However the theory which informs her thesis is less political in its 
focus and more interested in gendered and bodily remembering. Her work is most 
important for this thesis in its study—in the wake of Aleida Assmann—of the body as a 
carrier of traumatic memory in tragedy. My own focus on traumatic testimony picks up 
and builds from this point. 
The field of oratory is not represented in this thesis but Bernd Steinbock has done 
ground-breaking work in cultural memory here. His analysis delineates the various 
cultural memory communities interacting under the umbrella of the classical polis and 
explores the way in which texts, festivals, rituals, cults and public commemorations acted 
as carriers as well as repositories of social memory.153 In spite of Steinbock’s emphasis on 
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oratory, this is a useful work for this thesis in thinking about the ritual performance 
contexts of epic and tragedy and the contexts in which the works of Plato may also have 
been performed or read. 
While the field of work on memory within Classics is still relatively small, there are several 
works which do not discuss memory directly, or are not informed by memory theory, but 
which nevertheless have an important bearing on this thesis. These fall, broadly, into the 
categories of intertextuality and political criticism and are discussed in the following 
subsections. 
 
i) Intertextuality 
Because memory is still a relatively unexplored area within Classics, some of the most 
interesting and inspiring scholarship on which this project builds has been done in studies 
which are not couched in terms of memory. Many of these speak of intertextuality in 
various guises and as such, are related to memory in that intertextuality can be cast as 
the metaphorical memory which one text has of others. For example, under the heading 
“Text and Tradition” Simon Goldhill explores the ‘interpenetration of ideas’ between 
Homeric epic and tragedy through the characters of Orestes, Ajax and Philoctetes.154 He 
analyses the ways in which ‘the values and characterization of the heroic past and the 
contemporary world clash with, undermine, illuminate each other’ making the moral and 
social evaluations of tragic drama ‘so complex’, concluding that ‘Sophocles may be read 
for and/or against but never without Homer.’155  
A similar intertextual approach to tragedy is found in Isabelle Torrance’s use of 
‘metapoetry.’156 Her vision of ‘metapoetry’ as consisting of both author-intentioned 
intertextuality and ‘audience participation in the production of meaning’ contributed to 
my methodology of considering the site of memory as a process involving the author 
invoking earlier texts and the audience using memories of these texts in their 
interpretations.157  
                                                          
154 Goldhill (1986), pp. 138-67. 
155 Ibid, p. 161. 
156 Torrance (2013). 
157 Ibid, p.5. 
50 
 
Intertextuality is also at the heart of Andrea Wilson Nightingale’s Genres in Dialogue, in 
which she illustrates the fluidity of genre and posits the notion that genres are constantly 
in dialogue.158 It is also an important element of many works of scholarship dealing with 
literary aspects of Plato’s dialogues; for example, Blondell’s The Play of Character in 
Plato’s Dialogues.159 Also, although its specifics sit at a tangent to this study, Johannes 
Haubold’s and G. R. Boys-Stones’ edited volume on Plato’s interaction with Hesiod, 
particularly the chapter by Barbara Graziosi on “Hesiod in Classical Athens”, was 
instrumental to my understanding of the ways in which Plato engages ‘closely, if 
obliquely’ with other texts in order to challenge and replace them with more ‘elevated’ 
discourse.160 
While these discussions of intertextuality were useful for this thesis—especially those by 
Goldhill and Torrance which focused on its political aspects—construing the intertextual 
relationship as one of memory seems to me to offer so much more potential. The 
moments where represented memories, author memories and audience memories meet 
are explosive and productive. The relationship between author, text and audience is 
overlapping and reciprocal (though not symmetrical), making it impossible to speak of 
authorial intention without also speaking of audience memory, or of audience-generated 
meaning that doesn’t interrelate with memories evoked by the author.  
As a short aside, it is also worth offering a definition or explanation for my use of the term 
‘audience’. Throughout, this thesis considers possible audience or reader reactions to the 
texts studied. For the most part, the factors which inform my conception of ‘audience’ are 
closely related to the genres performed or written and will be discussed in individual 
chapters. However, Revermann’s study of competence in audiences of Athenian drama 
seems relevant, and informs my account of ‘audience’, across all three genres. 
Revermann suggests that there is a spectrum or ‘stratification’ of audience response and 
that this stratification is built into the drama.161 In this way, the drama will still ‘work’ if 
there is only base-line audience competence but we might assume high-level competence 
in many in the audience because the ‘[t]he existence, nature and amount of … inter-
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textuality considerably strengthen the argument in favour of frequent exposure to drama 
and the type of competence thus acquired.’162 
With this in mind, the thesis also accepts that speaking of ancient audiences is inevitably 
awkward and imprecise, given how little we know about audiences even in ages which 
are relatively well documented, like those in classical Athens, let alone those which are 
not. In this, the thesis aligns itself with Victoria Wohl who writes that ‘The best I can do is 
work from my own reactions, applying the cultural filters I know about (and there are no 
doubt many more that I don’t know about) to try to imagine his [the audience member’s] 
response.’163 She speaks, as I will, of “our” response ‘in full recognition of the inevitable 
gulf (synchronic and diachronic) the pronoun conceals and the imaginative projection 
required to leap it.’164 
 
ii) Politics and memory 
This thesis draws on a range of political readings of epic, tragedy and Plato, some 
discussed above, others including work by Neil Croally and Justina Gregory on 
Euripides,165 and Malcolm Schofield, Sara Monoson and Peter Euben on Plato.166 Croally 
and Gregory provide detailed political readings of the Trojan Women, considering its 
possible impact on an Athenian audience in the wake of the slaughter of the Melians 
during the Peloponnesian War. Schofield, Euben and Monoson attempt to ‘repoliticise’ 
Plato as an Athenian responding to and engaging with Athenian democracy in his 
philosophy. Monoson, for example, argues that ‘Plato does not present philosophical 
practice as a purely other-worldly activity or as a retreat from and opposition to the 
political world but as a brave and daring effort to call one’s community to its own best 
possible self without romanticizing what a rigorous pursuit of that best self would entail.’  
But while this approach will be important for my Plato chapter, the thesis as a whole is 
most strongly influenced in its conception of politics and citizenship by Elton Barker’s 
study on the theme of the agōn in Homeric epic, historiography and tragedy and Vincent 
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Farenga’s exploration of evolving notions of citizenship in ancient Greece.167 Both are, like 
this thesis, cross-genre studies and both use the idea of memory, both explicitly and 
implicitly, to explore possible audience interpretations. Although memory is not the focus 
of their investigations and is, therefore, not theorised in these instances, they 
nevertheless demonstrate a link between memory, literary interpretation and political 
affect which provided inspiration for this study. This thesis aligns itself with Barker and 
Farenga and the body of literary criticism of classical works which sees literature as 
integral to, rather than divorced from, culture and society.  
These works by Barker and Farenga were influential in a number of ways to greater and 
lesser extents. Their perceptions of political performativity inform this thesis’ approach 
not only in the way that it considers the performance of politics in the texts studied but 
also in the way that it sees the act of memory—particularly collective memory—itself.168 
As discussed above, when groups remember together, that process simultaneously ‘re-
members’ the group, subtly or even radically altering the way in which it sees itself in 
relation to the world around it.  
This study also incorporates the notion of political performativity in its analysis of 
testimony, particularly in the institution of the law-court. I touched, above, on the way in 
which Johnstone analyses the means by which this occurs via rhetoric and narrative,169 
but Stuart Hampshire’s exploration of the institutionalisation of the law court is also 
important to this thesis. In the words of Hampshire, political society is cemented by ‘the 
principle of institutionalised fairness in procedures for the resolution’ of conflict.170 
Political and legal institutions dedicated to ‘fair procedures’ provide ‘a common ground of 
loyalty shared by the citizens who recognise this institutional bond between them.’171 
According to Hampshire too, all such institutions are ‘subject to the single prescription 
audi alteram partem (‘hear the other side’)’ and fairness of public procedure depends on 
this.172 Therefore, the law-court not only provides a forum for hearing and judging 
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contrasting memory-testimonies but also represents a (performative) process which is 
instrumental to and constitutive of political society. 
This thesis was also influenced by Farenga and Barker’s use of Haubold’s Homer’s 
People,173 both in terms of the pre-political groups within the poems and the groups 
listening. Haubold’s analysis builds on seminal work done by Gregory Nagy, who 
according to Haubold, was ground-breaking in his suggestion ‘that what is “poetry” in 
Homer cannot be grasped without a thorough study of its broader socio-cultural 
implications and vice versa.’ Haubold’s analysis of the Homeric laoi as ‘founding people’ 
provides the basis for Farenga’s conceptualisation of developing citizenship in the 
Odyssey and Chapter 1 of this thesis interacts with his reading very closely. 
One of the most satisfying results of approaching classical texts using memory theory was 
that it provided a way to steer a course out of the impasse between political and 
aesthetic approaches to the texts studied, both useful in their ways but both equally 
reductive. In this, it was also influenced by Barker whose stance is both clearly political 
but also rooted in the language of the texts. In this, Victoria Wohl’s work was also 
important. In her analysis of form in Euripides’ plays, she brings aesthetics and politics 
together by suggesting that tragedy’s power to evoke strong emotions is central to what 
makes it political.174 This thesis also aligns itself with such an approach as Chapter 2 will 
discuss in much greater detail.  
The way in which Barker and Farenga were most influential, though, was in their use of 
memory to inform their criticism. Farenga’s chapter on the Odyssey identifies, as I do, the 
ban on memory in Odyssey 24 as a moment which has a different significance for its 
internal and [implied] external audiences. He writes that, for this implied audience, the 
act of total forgetting becomes a ‘grandiose thesmion’ prompting them to debate and 
discuss the means by which Odysseus implemented his justice, whereas for the internal 
audience, Odysseus’ heroic dikē will be forgotten and never replicated.175 I will discuss 
Farenga’s analysis and my rather different conclusions more fully in Chapter 1, but this 
separation between the memories of internal and external audiences is critical to my 
approach in this thesis as a whole. 
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Barker’s analysis of Homeric epic feeds into his exploration of the later texts in a way that 
not only suggests an intertextual relationship but also, implicitly and explicitly, memories 
of the earlier text in the minds of the audience. Barker refers to memory implicitly, in his 
discussion of the embedded and actual audiences of the Iliad and their response to 
Thersites in the assembly.176 Here, he suggests that the audiences’ memories of Achilles’ 
challenge to Agamemnon are dependent on their response to Thersites’ parody of this 
challenge, and vice versa. If they are persuaded by Thersites, they may ‘trivialise’ Achilles’ 
challenge; if however, they view Thersites’ dissent through the frame of Achilles’ 
challenge, they will see Thersites as the trivial one. Similar situations arise throughout the 
poem, notably when Achilles calls the Achaeans to a final assembly regretful of his fall-out 
with Agamemnon;177 and when several Achaean heroes, for example Menelaus and 
Antilochus act out different dissenting modes as spectators at the funeral games.178 The 
reciprocal relationship between memory of the past and experience/interpretation of the 
present in all these examples is one that I have discussed in conjunction with memory 
theory and one that will inform this thesis.  
Barker discusses memory explicitly, and cultural memory implicitly, in his analysis of 
Sophocles’ Ajax. Here, he supposes a memory of epic in the tragic audience which feeds 
directly into their interpretation of Sophocles’ play. He writes that Ajax’s dissent is 
marked in particular ways as Achillean and that in the debates which follow it, the 
audience is invited to view his actions alongside Achilles’ but also alongside their 
memories of his own actions in the Iliad. In this way, the audience’s memory not only 
shapes its response to Ajax but prompts debate about the manner and management of 
dissent in society.179 In this example, it is the possible disjunction between internal and 
external audiences which was most instructive for this thesis: not simply that they may 
remember differently, but that the external audience is viewing the play with the memory 
of a bank of other texts, notably, the Iliad, and that this (cultural) memory informs their 
interpretation. 
Where my approach differs from those of Barker and Farenga is, on the one hand, that 
memory is my central theme rather than a peripheral consideration and also that, in this 
                                                          
176 Barker (2009), p. 60. 
177 Ibid, pp. 78-81. 
178 Ibid, pp. 86-88. 
179 Ibid, pp. 281-324. 
55 
 
thesis, memory is theorised. These examples from Barker and Farenga show the potential 
that a study of memory can bring to political textual criticism but a robustly theorised 
approach—one which takes into account the inherent politics in the processes of 
‘individual’, collective and cultural memory, its re-creative nature and its affective 
power—provides the opportunity to build on their textual criticism in new and exciting 
ways. 
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1 Remembering and Forgetting Among Homer’s People 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter explores the idea that the Odyssey’s performance at the Panathenaea was 
integral to the ways in which the city remembered or commemorated its inception and 
reshaped its identity in the present. It goes about this by analysing the interrelation of 
memory between the poem’s internal and external audiences. The chapter proposes that 
where represented memory evokes, reflects or clashes with the memories of the 
audience, the text provokes debate in the audience about the values and practices which 
should underlie their society. In the course of this analysis, the chapter identifies 
represented memory as testimony in the framework of a metaphorical trial and this 
provides the opportunity to explore the political relations operational within memory and 
within the text. As central to all of this, the chapter perceives the audience as a political 
collective, akin to the juridical collectives of democratic Athens, placing on that audience 
a shared responsibility for justice that is lacking in the poem. At every stage in this 
process, the chapter draws on the theories of memory, testimony and trauma set out in 
the Introduction and discussed with more specific relevance to the Odyssey below. 
The subsections of this introduction set out some of the key ideas in the chapter. I begin 
by detailing the metaphor of the trial which is based on a reading of the Odyssey by 
Vincent Farenga. I continue by examining the collectives of the internal and external 
audiences, firstly within the context of Johannes Haubold’s conception of the epic laos 
and the Athenian leōs; secondly by contrasting the Odyssean collectives with those of the 
Iliad; and finally, by considering what might be meant by the collective memory of the 
external audience.  
i) The Odyssey as trial 
In his book Citizen and Self in Ancient Greece, Vincent Farenga asks the question: ‘is it far-
fetched to infer that Homer encouraged his audience to identify Odysseus, Telemachus, 
and Penelope as potential “plaintiffs” in a dispute settlement … with their enemies, 
particularly the suitors?’180 Using an analysis of the Ithacan assembly in Book 2, he 
concludes that it is not ‘far-fetched’ at all: Telemachus operates as the “plaintiff” and the 
suitors, led by Antinous, are his enemies. The dispute is heard by the Ithacan people, the 
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laoi.181 Farenga underpins his reading with Johannes Haubold’s analysis of the epic laoi as 
a ‘“founding people” who lay the groundwork for civic institutions.’ Drawing on Haubold, 
Farenga argues that because the people are depicted as ‘an audience of epic’ within epic 
poetry, the actual audience is encouraged to see continuity between themselves and the 
epic laoi; in Farenga’s words, they would ‘recognize in Ithaca’s laos a primitive, imperfect 
prototype of themselves.’182 In the Ithacan assembly of Book 2, because the epic laoi take 
the role of ‘imperfect’ juror-judges, the Odyssey encourages its ‘implied’ audience to see 
themselves as juridical figures, who must ‘compensate for their ancestors’ cognitive and 
moral helplessness.’183 Farenga’s argument concludes that the meaning of justice in the 
poem differs for its internal jury – the laos of Ithaca – who experience Zeus’ divinely 
bestowed eklēsis (‘complete forgetting’), and the external jury – the ‘implied’ audience – 
who do not.184 While the internal laos of Ithaca is forbidden to remember or retell the 
tale of Odysseus’ slaughter of the suitors, the implied audience is encouraged to see it as 
a ‘grandiose thesmion,’ or legal precedent grounded in cultural memory.185  
The notional trial is particularly important in Farenga’s analysis because of his central 
focus on the evolution of citizenship. Indeed, his chapter on the Odyssey is followed by 
one on Hesiod’s Works and Days, which deals with a legal dispute in a polis more 
recognisable to contemporary audiences. This chapter draws on Farenga’s approach—
and will return to his analysis of the relationship between the Odyssey and Works and 
Days in its conclusion—but I do not argue here that the Odyssey literally represents a 
trial. Unlike Farenga, I find this far-fetched. I do suggest, however, that the model of the 
trial is a useful lens through which to view memory’s functions in the political societies of 
epic’s internal and external audiences. My use of the trial metaphor differs from 
Farenga’s in significant ways though. While Farenga’s exploration of the Odyssey as a trial 
focuses on the first Ithacan assembly in Book 2, my analysis will use the metaphor as a 
way of reading the text as a whole. According to my analysis, the memories which other 
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characters—Menelaus and Nestor, for example—share with Telemachus function as the 
testimony by which Odysseus and the suitors are judged inside and outside the poem.  
To see these memory-narratives as testimony further differentiates my analysis from 
Farenga’s. When he speaks of testimony at all, it is untheorised and presupposes a 
narrow, legalistic interpretation.186 In contrast, this chapter considers the full resonance 
of the term, as discussed in the Introduction. The suppression or encouragement of 
testimony is revealing of the biases inherent in the way the metaphorical trial is 
constructed. This, in turn, reflects the authority at play, not only in the world of the 
poem, but also the authority the poem seeks to exert over its own interpretation. The 
processes of memory and the evaluation of testimony are key to understanding this play 
of authority: both memory and evaluation, here, are collective and politically effective. 
They do not merely feed a literary-critical experience of the text but allow the audience 
to read beyond the words of the narrator or even the edicts of Zeus.  
This chapter will be built around Farenga’s conclusion that the eklēsis separates the 
‘imperfect’ internal audience from the implied audience, in whom a political 
transformation is effected. Unlike Farenga, however, who focuses on the implied 
audience members, this chapter also explores the poem’s possible reception by its actual 
audiences in classical Athens, at the Panathenaea. Though this approach is necessarily 
speculative, its consideration of the political context of the poem’s performance and 
reception will add greater nuance to Farenga’s argument. As part of this analysis of 
internal and external audiences, the chapter will examine the mechanics by which the 
trial is constructed, in particular, the use made of memory as testimony. By examining 
who is allowed to remember, or bear witness, how their testimony attempts to ‘re-
member’ or restructure political society and how the audience is encouraged to interpret 
these memories, it will investigate the interplay of memory and power in the poem. 
Finally, whereas Farenga focuses on the mimetic way in which the poem represents the 
self-transformation needed to form juridical citizens from the pre-civic basileus and laoi, 
my analysis will place greater emphasis on the audience as a collective, and in particular, 
on their collective memory.  
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ii) Athenian leōs/epic laos 
As stated above, Johannes Haubold’s analysis of the epic laoi as ‘founding people’ 
provides the basis for Farenga’s reading of the Odyssey and it is also the bedrock of my 
argument here. Haubold suggests, the performance context of the poem alters the extent 
to which the audience identifies with the epic laoi. He describes a change in the depiction 
of the laoi from epic to archaic and classical texts and explores the effect of this change 
on the way in which the epic laoi were received in classical Athens. In archaic and classical 
poetry, the laoi no longer ‘expose the incurable vulnerability of social life’ as they do in 
epic, but rather ‘celebrate its successful transformation.’ Whereas in Homer, ‘the 
gathering of the people does not usually lead to the establishment of a permanent social 
structure’, archaic and classical texts ‘insist that definite progress can be made.’187 These 
later laoi are peoples who bridge the transition between pre-political and political society 
and are associated with the foundation of the polis or of institutions of it.  
One significant example Haubold uses to illustrate this is Athena’s institution of the 
Areopagus in Aeschylus’ Eumenides: 
Αθ.  κλύοιτ’ ἂν ἤδη θεσμόν, Ἀττικὸς λεώς, 
 πρώτας δίκας κρίνοντες αἵματος χυτοῦ. 
 ἔσται δὲ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν Αἰγέως στρατῷ 
 αἰεὶ δικαστῶν τοῦτο βουλευτήριον.188 
Athena:  If it please you, people of Attica, hear now my decree, 
  who are judging the first case of bloodletting. 
  In future times there will always be this council of judges 
  for the army of Aegeus. 
He argues that it is the people who experience this foundation as a ‘decisive change’ and 
that this is indicated by the contrast between Athena’s use of ‘now’ / ‘the first case’ (ἤδη 
/ πρώτας δίκας) and ‘in the future’ / ‘always’ (αἰεί / τὸ λοιπόν).189 Therefore, while the 
laos of the play are still pre-political, this foundational act institutes a link between the 
people of the primitive past and those watching in the theatre. For the audiences of 
classical Athens, these are the ‘founding people’ of their city, whereas the laoi of epic 
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represent something more distant both in terms of time and space. They are not only 
‘long ago,’ they are also not exclusively Athenian.  
In light of this, Haubold suggests that rather than identifying wholly with the Homeric 
laos, ‘the laos of Homer’s epic and the leos of Athenian ritual intersect with and thus 
illuminate each other.’190 He argues that the Great Panathenaea encouraged the 
Athenian people to see themselves as a gathered laos and that because of this ‘it is hard 
to believe that the celebrants at the Great Panathenaea would not have reacted with a 
mixture of recognition and rejection to what they heard.’191 However, he concludes that 
the ritual solution to the Achaeans’ problems is provided not by the poem but by the 
festival itself in its celebration of the founding of Athens. The Athenians, therefore, 
identify as ‘Attic because [they] are not Homeric’; and they are not Homeric because they 
are ‘not doomed like the people of the Achaeans.’ Ultimately, as Haubold states, ‘[t]he 
problems described in Homer are “Achaean”’; their solution—found in the institutions of 
Athens’ democratic polis—‘is left to the Athenians.’192 
This chapter sets out to explore not only what is remembered or forgotten by internal 
and implied audiences of the poem, but also the poem’s cultural and political resonance 
in the context of democratic Athens. What is especially important in considering this 
political framework for receiving Homer’s poems is that the audience—especially the 
audience at the Panathenaea—is a collective. One thing which makes them so is, 
paradoxically perhaps, their shared cultural memory of the Odyssey, the founding history 
of their culture. The notion of the audience as a collective will be central to this chapter’s 
exploration of the way in which memory is provoked by the text, with repeated formulas 
or resonant details, for reasons of political effect. It will also inform the chapter’s 
understanding of the way in which the ‘apathy’ and ‘moral helplessness’ of Ithacan laos 
encourages audience members to assess their own social structures and social 
engagement.193 It will, furthermore, demonstrate that one aspect of the epic laos’ 
inadequacy is their failure to remember together, to find a consensus and to act as a 
collective, a failure which the external audience must rectify. 
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iii) Iliadic and Odyssean collectives  
As I will come to discuss, the Ithacan assemblies do, at least, allow for some discussion of 
collective decisions and this stands in stark contrast to the decisions made by Alcinous, 
for the Phaeacians, and Zeus, for the gods, which are entirely autocratic. Alcinous’ 
decision to transport Odysseus back to Ithaca is made in the Phaeacian assembly.194 
Though there are several references to Alcinous’ ‘men of counsel,’ Alcinous does not 
invite discussion or advice but opens the assembly with his decision. The assembly closes 
at the end of his speech with the words μηδέ τις ἀρνείσθω (‘Let no one refuse’).195 The 
decision is made, with no debate, despite the prophecy that one day their ship would be 
turned to stone and rocks thrown up around their island to hide it because of the help 
they give to wayfarers.196  
This may be seen as courageous on the Phaeacians’ part but I suggest that the audience 
of the Odyssey is invited to see the decision of the Phaeacians as inadequate in its failure 
to allow members of the collective a voice in a course of action which they know may 
prove disastrous for the community. As Haubold suggests, the laoi of Scherie ‘have sunk 
into blissful stagnation.’197 I will go on to show that aspects of this stagnation are also 
seen in the Ithacan assembly, where political inaction is allied with poor or ineffectual 
memories.198 
Indeed, the inadequacy of political decision-making in the Odyssey stands in stark 
contrast to the way in which it is depicted among the Achaeans in the Iliad and the 
audience’s memory of this is also something which they may bring to bear on their 
interpretation of the poem. Although decision-making is highly problematic in the Iliad, 
Elton Barker argues persuasively that the assemblies in the poem may be read as ‘part of 
a series of struggles that progressively explore the possibility for, and value of, dissent in 
the community.’199 According to this reading, the audience’s experience of debate in the 
poem ‘helps construct an audience engaged in thinking about how people interact with 
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each other in the context of an arena in which public concerns are raised and 
contested.’200 Debate is institutionalised in the Iliad, not in the poem, but in the polis of 
the audience. This might be seen, as Barker suggests, in the representation of dispute 
settlement depicted on Achilles’ shield in Iliad 18. Here, in the first city depicted, two men 
put their quarrel over ‘the blood price / for a man who had been killed’ in front of a jury 
of elders, ‘in session on benches of polished stone’ (οἳ δὲ γέροντες / εἵατ’ ἐπὶ ξεστοῖσι 
λίθοις ἱερῷ).201 In such a process, the individual juror interacts with the group in order to 
formulate a judgement which will benefit the whole community. The fact that the 
benches are made of stone indicates a permanence to this practice; that the stone is 
‘polished,’ either seems to suggest that the community cares enough to polish the 
benches or that they have been rubbed to a shine with regular use. In both cases, there is 
a sense of the institution’s value within the political community. If this scene depicts a 
flash-forward to the life of the Iliad’s audience beyond the epic world, there is every 
reason to think that even the first audiences of the Odyssey must have been well-versed 
in the idea of juridical decision-making as a collective process. 
For this reason, I disagree with Farenga's conclusion that the end of the Odyssey stands as 
a 'grandiose thesmion' for the implied or external audience. The poem's civic value stands 
less as a precedent and more as an incitement to debate amongst the collective about 
the nature of justice and the way it should be enacted. Because of this, the implied 
audience of the poem must measure itself not only in terms of the development of its 
individual citizen-jurors but as a decision-making collective. It is their shared memory of 
the totality of the poem, together with the way in which the poem interacts with their 
cultural memory, which allows them to do this. 
 
iv) Re-membering the collective 
To speak of shared, collective or cultural memory is not to deny that the individual 
memories of audience members will not differ in some respects, but rather, to suggest 
that that these differences have to be negotiated as a group. In his study of Polarity and 
Analogy, Geoffrey Lloyd discusses the idea that the institutions of democracy ‘guaranteed 
free speech’ but that ‘it was not imagined that this procured unanimity.’ In his terms, the 
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‘democratic ideal’ was not one of ‘total agreement’ but, rather, one of managing 
disagreement.202 Similarly, David Elmer’s analysis of collective decision making in Homeric 
epic rests on the distinction between consensus and unanimity.203 In consensus all parties 
are not necessarily of one mind but acquiescence is negotiated and there is a similar 
negotiation involved in collective memory and its role in interpretation. Certain details or 
episodes may resonate more strongly with some, given their personal circumstances but 
these differences feed and enliven the resulting debate.  
Moreover, such differences occur within what seems likely to have been a shared 
experience of the poem as a whole. Martin Revermann’s study of audience competence 
in the context of tragic theatre suggests that ‘vase paintings…provide fascinating 
analogies for audience response in the theatre’ and given the preponderance of vase 
paintings based on epic themes, this seems likely to carry over into audiences of epic.204 
He argues that the lack of name tags on such vessels suggests that viewers would have 
had ‘the expertise needed to decode the iconography’ because such ‘vases would not 
exist if ‘the predominant response to the iconographies in their primary context of use 
were (socially exclusive) ignorance and puzzlement rather than (socially inclusive) 
recognition.'205 This is not to say that audiences would have interpreted this iconography 
in a uniform way—as discussed above, interpretation would have to be negotiated. 
Reverman’s study does, however, lend weight to the idea of a base level of uniform 
recognition among audience members and this suggests that shared memory of such 
things is also likely. 
That there would have been some semblance of a ‘shared memory’ of the poem also 
seems likely for those audiences at the Athenian Panathenaea, who would have heard 
the poem not just as a group, collected in one place, but as a political collective with 
shared values and critically, cultural memory.206 Nicole Loraux suggests that the Great 
Panathenaea was significant not just in that it commemorated Athens’ founding but that 
the ritual itself ‘founded and refounded’ the city in its enactment.207 Haubold claims that 
it was ‘the one Attic festival which most ostensibly plays out processes of social 
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formation’;208 that ‘it dramatizes precisely that test-case of social life where collective 
crisis leads on to the rise of a renewed social world whose survival is in turn secured by 
new institutions, above all a new “contract” with the Patron goddess.’209 My discussion of 
Farenga and Haubold has shown already that the Odyssey is, in itself, a foundational epic 
for ancient Greek societies—a narrative that ‘set[s] out to explain where we come 
from’210 and as such, a key part of those societies’ cultural memories. When heard at the 
Panathenaea, however, it becomes part of the ritual of the foundation of Athens 
specifically, of its inception and of its ritualised re-membering of that event. In view of 
this, Haubold suggests, that the Athenians would identify as the Attic leōs, both 
identifying with and rejecting the Homeric laos of the Odyssey.211 It is because of this too 
that the experience of listening to the poem would have been framed for the whole 
audience by this specific—political—context. And, as discussed in the Introduction,212 this 
shared context would have shaped the kinds of memories and empathies provoked by 
poem in its audience. 
This introduction has set out the key metaphor of the trial which underlies this chapter, 
providing it with a political context for thinking about memory. As part of this, it has 
detailed my conception of the audiences internal and external to the poem and has 
suggested the importance of seeing these audiences as political collectives. It has also 
suggested the ways in which one might realistically and most productively speak of the 
external audience’s collective memory in their reception of the poem. The next section 
draws out some of the theory discussed in the Introduction with more specific relevance 
to the way it is used in this chapter.  
 
1.2 Modern theory/ancient texts: trauma, testimony and truth. 
This chapter draws on the main theories around the political nature of individual and 
social memory discussed in the Introduction. These theories underpin the chapter’s study 
of the place of memory in dispute settlement and its analysis of the creative or re-
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creative memories voiced in the poem.213 They also inform my use of the trial metaphor, 
especially those theories surrounding the competitive nature of memory,214 as the 
suitors’ testimony regarding Odysseus clashes with the ‘official version’ offered by the 
narrator. At all times, the synthesis of Assmann’s and Olick’s theories discussed in the 
Introduction—that remembering as a group redefines that group—provides the 
groundwork for my examination of ‘audience memory.’215  
In addition to these theories which underlie the thesis as a whole, this chapter adds, or 
draws out in greater detail, others which relate to the material more specifically. Firstly, 
to the bank of political theory discussed in the Introduction, I add here the notion that 
the text functions as a ‘supplement’ to the broken political society it represents. In 
Derrida’s writing, the supplement serves two functions: it ‘adds’ meaning to the thing it 
supplements but it also signals a ‘lack’ which must be filled. The supplement is not the 
whole answer but is itself also lacking.216 In the case of the Odyssey, the experience of 
listening to the poem supplements the ‘lack’ it depicts. It highlights the ‘lack’ of an 
effective political society in the poem, the problems of political apathy among the people 
and of an autocratic rule of law. In so doing, it provokes a response that stresses 
collective discussion and responsibility. In this way it offers itself as a supplement to 
stimulate the very political activity in the societies receiving the text, which is lacking in 
the societies it depicts. 
Secondly, the theory of traumatic memory will underpin my analysis of the various 
testimonies to trauma in the poem but also my notion of the poem’s reception by ancient 
audiences. Trauma is often defined as the effect of an incident which afflicts the 
individual so profoundly that it cannot be expressed but this chapter will, rather, be 
concerned with a more collective, communicative experience of trauma such as that 
described by Jeffrey Alexander and discussed in the Introduction.217 The Odyssey 
represents a foundational trauma not just for the Ithacan people but also for ancient 
Greek society as a whole. The Ithacan laos must endure the mass slaughter of the 
suitors—their brothers and sons—by the returning Odysseus, and the almost-outbreak of 
                                                          
213 For the discussion of memory in dispute settlement in the Introduction see pp. 38-39; for memory as 
creative see pp. 16-18. 
214 See this thesis, p. 39. 
215 For Assmann and Olick’s theories see this thesis, pp. 42-43. 
216 Derrida (1974), p. 144. 
217 Alexander (2004), pp. 1-30. See Introduction, pp. 32. 
 66 
  
civil war, in order for their society to be founded anew, in peace, under the benevolent 
reign of Odysseus. However, because the Odyssey is also a foundational text and ancient 
Greek audiences would have identified with the laos of the poem as the ‘founding people’ 
(albeit problematically as discussed above), they would also identify this trauma as their 
own. This is not to say that they would experience the intensity of its effects in their own 
psyches but that it would be a part of their own cultural memory of the foundation of 
their society. 
The use of the word ‘trauma’ would be anachronistic in Homer but Eupeithes, the first 
speaker in the Ithacan assembly of Book 24 is described as having ‘unforgettable grief in 
his heart for his son’ (παιδὸς γάρ οἱ ἄλαστον ἐνὶ πρεσὶ πένθος ἔκειτο) and I suggest that 
such a phrase is indicative of trauma. Dominick LaCapra describes trauma as:  
a shattering experience that disrupts or even threatens to destroy 
experience in the sense of an integrated or at least viably articulated life. 
There is a sense in which trauma is an out-of-context experience that upsets 
expectations and unsettles one’s very understanding of existing contexts. … 
Here one has an aporetic relation between representation and affect with 
the possibility of uncontrolled oscillation between poles of a double bind. 
Indeed one might postulate that an aporia marks a trauma that has not 
been viably worked through, hence inducing compulsive repetition of the 
aporetic relation.218 
Traumatic experience is marked by its shattering effect on the individual’s perception of 
themselves and the world around them. The traumatic experience is always present and 
always dominant and this affects the traumatised individual’s expectations, 
understanding and interaction with others. It is also marked by ‘compulsive repetition’ or 
(always failed) attempts to articulate the experience. 
These definitions of trauma as an event which dominates the psyche and as ‘compulsive 
repetition’ are also evident in Nicole Loraux’s exploration of the phrase alaston 
penthos.219 Alastos, like alētheia is ‘built on a negation of the root of forgetting’ and is 
always attached to either penthos (mourning) or kholos (wrath).220 It indicates an inability 
to stop grieving or being angry and therefore, like trauma, it dominates the psyche, 
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shattering contexts and making the past ‘into an eternal present.’221 Loraux describes it, 
rather poetically, as ‘a sense of haunting … a ghostly presence which enters the subject 
and does not leave.’222 It is, like trauma, a compulsion or ‘obsession.’ The main example 
which Loraux explores in connection with alaston is Achilles in his mourning for Patroclus 
and wrath with Hector,223 and Achilles is the key subject also of Jonathan Shay’s Achilles 
in Vietnam, a study of war trauma. Here, he describes Achilles’ battlefield rampage as an 
effect of ‘the beserk state,’ itself a symptom of his grief-trauma at the death of 
Patroclus.224 
Loraux also explores the dangers of alaston for political stability, which at once translates 
the term from something intensely personal to something which has an effect on the 
community.225 Her argument is that the unforgettable experience forms the ‘unforgetful’ 
person who will never give way to amnesty. She focuses here on Electra, who needs to 
communicate her trauma only to her brother in order for vengeance to be fulfilled, but as 
I will discuss in detail below, in Odyssey 24, Eupeithes’ alaston penthos mobilises an 
army.226  
The third and final strand of theory which I add involves the interweaving of the theory of 
testimony with that of epic formularity, in the sense that both are concerned with 
narrative ‘truth.’ These theories provide valuable insights into the ways in which 
audiences may: evaluate the memory-testimony they hear voiced by the characters of the 
Odyssey; examine the way in which that testimony is received in the poem; and analyse 
the poem itself and its early reception, especially as the construction of oral epic mirrors 
closely the working of individual memory and its relationship with cultural memory. This 
will be particularly significant in this chapter when considering the political dimension to 
why certain testimonies are authorised in the way that they are and why some are not. 
As discussed in the Introduction, Felman and Laub suggest that testimony to trauma 
should ‘be understood … not as a mode of statement of, but rather as a mode of access 
to’ truth.227 In this way, listeners have to look beyond the narrative ‘facts’ of the 
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testimony for a more substantial ‘truth.’ Work done in the wake of Felman and Laub, 
suggests that this definition of testimony is equally true in courtroom situations. As also 
laid out in the Introduction, Kirsten Campbell has written about the use of testimony in 
the international tribunals for war crimes that happened during the civil war in the 
former Yugoslavia.228 In her study of modes of testimony she examines how testimony is 
viewed and used by the prosecution, the defence and by the judiciary.229 Her research 
concludes that the prosecution does not see testimony as complete, factual truth but 
rather as ‘meaningful truth,’ in the sense suggested by Felman and Laub.230 The defence, 
on the other hand, starts with the assumption that ‘the testimonial narrative of events ‘is 
actually an opinion or belief as to what occurred.’231 In this way, the relationship between 
the witness—who, orally, turns memory into narrative—and the storyteller, becomes 
apparent and so my argument will touch on the long critical debate about truth in the 
Odyssey. 
While I do not propose to enter the lists of critics who seek to prove the truth or 
otherwise of Odysseus’ testimony,232 the kind of truth the audience might seek in the 
poem is of great relevance to this chapter. In Graziosi and Haubold’s terms, this takes the 
form of an authorisation that comes from ‘resonance’ with ‘what bards say and what we 
know about the universe.’233 This resonance is explored by Foley in his reevaluation of 
Parry and Lord’s work on traditional, oral formulas. For Foley, these are not empty, 
repetitive units of metrical feet but rather they carry ‘immanent’ meaning: a meaning 
which is ‘extratextual,’ calling up and indeed, recreating ‘an unexpressed, and 
inexpressible, whole, a larger story that will forever remain beyond the reach of an 
acoustically recorded, oral-dictated, or even written textualization.’234 Foley points, for 
example, to characters’ noun epithets which, he says, carry the resonance of 
‘innumerable separate moments of that character’s existence in oral traditional story.’235 
In this way, we might speak of words, phrases or episodes in the Odyssey as resonant 
items which find their meaning in or against the cultural memory of the audience. Here, 
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then, the represented memories of the characters, the ‘compositional’ memory of the 
poet and the cultural memories of the audience intersect. 
In analysing the testimonies of the Odyssey and the kinds of truth they communicate, it is 
also important to consider the way in which the text authorises certain narratives and 
discredits others. Campbell’s analysis of courtroom testimony is useful here. She suggests 
that international war crimes courts not only have to enforce the law but also have to 
debate and decide on the principles by which such cases should be adjudicated,236 in 
particular, the place, probative value and criteria of evaluation for different kinds of 
testimony. She cites, for example, first person testimony or hearsay. These are also 
decisions for the audience of the Odyssey. In order to reach judgement on the case, they 
must formulate the criteria by which they will judge Menelaus’ testimony of Proteus’ 
testimony regarding Odysseus, to give one example. They must weigh up how to evaluate 
the relative probity of their witnesses and while, as I mentioned above, these criteria may 
rely more on storytelling ability and resonance with the tradition than modern day court 
officials acknowledge, research done into the effectiveness of legal testimony with juries 
seems to suggest that recognisable stories still hold more persuasive power than those 
which do not ‘resonate.’237  
Narrative theory is also useful in thinking about the authorisaton of narratives or 
testimonies in the poem, especially when considering hearsay or long first person 
narratives by characters. Lubomír Doležel sets out the theory that literary truth is 
established by the text’s narrator, who carries the ultimate authority in the text. His/her 
words establish the facts of the textual world.238 This is slightly more complicated in 
traditional oral poetry as one might see resonance as a kind of external set of standards 
provided by tradition and cultural memory – a shifting ‘truth’ which is held in a 
relationship between the poet, the audience and their combined cultural memory – but 
Doležel’s work is useful here nonetheless. According to his theory, character-speech in 
the text must be measured against the facts set out by the narrator. Where the character 
has very long speeches, though, he becomes a kind of ‘Ich-form’ narrator himself. Doležel 
writes that the ‘Ich-form,’ or first person, narrator must earn his authority. He may do this 
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firstly, by signalling the limits of his knowledge, that is, by not pretending to be able to 
report word for word conversations that he did not hear; and secondly, by signalling the 
sources of his knowledge, should he narrate events for which he was not present. 
Therefore, ‘[b]y explicitly expressing his ignorance, the narrator demonstrates his 
scrupulousness in defining the limits of his knowledge and, consequently, the scope of his 
authentication authority.’239  
John Marincola suggests that the issue of authenticating narrative is particularly 
important to the Odyssey, in contrast to the Iliad in which poetic knowledge is explicitly 
equated with inspiration from the Muses. He writes that ‘In the Odyssey, where discovery 
and report play a greater role, one finds more interest in the human sources and 
reliability of knowledge,’ especially in the methods of autopsy and enquiry.240 While this 
chapter will address these methods for authenticating character-narratives within the 
text—such as those by Nestor, Menelaus and Odysseus—it will also examine the 
authority of the omniscient narrator’s testimony. In particular, it will look at the ways in 
which the authority of the narrative is used to affirm the authority of characters within 
the poem, ratifying their words and actions. In such ways the poem seeks to impose one 
particular political interpretation while shutting off others. In this, it builds on Barker’s 
analysis of “Sidelining debate in the Odyssey” but whereas Barker sees the narrative as 
completely successful in closing off other interpretations, the use of memory in my 
exploration—particularly the enduring memory of the audience—is instrumental to my 
argument that these other avenues remain wide open.241  
This ‘enduring memory’ of incidents or details encourages the audience to link seemingly 
disparate moments in the text, opening doors into an alternative reading of the poem. 
While the narrator might affirm the dominant normative thrust of the poem, his use of 
resonant words, phrases or details provide ways to challenge the authority of his voice. 
One way in which this chapter explores such an idea is by using Egbert Bakker’s theory of 
interformularity. As with Foley’s work on resonance, this theory is built on Parry and 
Lord’s work on epic formulas but Bakker focuses on the effects of repeated formulas 
which he places on an ‘interformularity scale.’242 According to this scale, formulas which 
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are repeated many times will be instantly recognisable but their repetition will be less 
meaningful. At the other end of the scale, very ‘restricted’ formulas – those which are 
repeated only once – can link two episodes which may otherwise seem totally unrelated.  
While there may be unevenness in audience competence, Bakker argues that speakers 
(here, bards or rhapsodes) can mark new situations which they feel to be similar to 
previous ones by self-consciously repeating an utterance. ‘And the motivation for such 
conscious behaviour, is, of course, greatest when speakers can assume that they share 
the memory of that earlier occasion with their listeners’ (my italics).243 It is not necessary, 
then, as a modern scholar, to assume complete and uniform audience competence but 
rather to be aware of the way in which the poet manipulates traditional themes, 
narratives and formulas, stimulating memories in such a way that repetition can be 
meaningful. I will go into greater detail about this in the main body of the chapter but as 
an example, this chapter suggests that, by linking the murder of Agamemnon by 
Aegisthus with Odysseus’ slaughter of the suitors through the use of repeated formulas, 
the narrative simultaneously legitimises Odysseus’ revenge and calls into question its 
bloody brutality. 
This section has shown how theories relating to collective and cultural memory, as well as 
trauma and testimony, might be applied with integrity to the Odyssey, as an ancient text 
and part of the oral tradition. The next section discusses in greater detail the ways in 
which the study of memory works in the text to affect political action and the ways in 
which it contributes to the build-up to, and construction of, the ‘trial.’ 
  
1.3 The construction of the trial: memory and power 
This section details the ways in which the Odyssey prepares the ground for its 
metaphorical trial. The first subsection considers Telemachus, ‘the plaintiff’ and the 
political impetus which the memory of his father gives him. The second examines the 
different juridical audiences inside and outside the poem. In this, it pays particular 
attention to the way in which Zeus is authorised as the supreme judge within the poem, 
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revealing a collusion between Zeus, Odysseus and the narrator which seeks to control the 
interpretation and legacy of the poem.  
 
i) The Plaintiff 
I have stated already—in general terms in the Introduction and specifically with regard to 
the Odyssey—that memory has an affective power and that this stimulates political 
action. So far, I have discussed this a little in relation to the external audience of the 
poem but it is equally true of the way in which characters are shown to remember in the 
poem. In Book 1, when Athena visits Telemachus, disguised as Mentes, it is with the 
intention of ‘stirring him’ (ἐποτρύνω) and instilling menos (‘might’) into him.244 Bakker 
equates this menos with memory, drawing attention to the linguistic connection between 
menos and the verb memona, which can mean ‘to have in mind,’ ‘be mindful,’ or indeed, 
‘to remember.’ Menos is, itself, semantically linked to the verb mimnesko, ‘to be 
reminded.’245 Significantly, this is also true for the name, Mentes. When Athena adopts 
this name in her disguise, she also takes on its resonance. Her role is literally to provoke 
memory in Telemachus. As Bakker argues, the true sense of memory is ‘to absorb the 
menos of something so as to embody it.’ The warriors in the Iliad ‘remember warcraft’ 
(μνήσαντο δὲ χάρμης) in the thick of battle,246 indicating that their fighting prowess is an 
embodiment of their memory of ‘warcraft’. So it is in the Odyssey, when Athena flies 
away from Telemachus, revealing her divine status, that Telemachus is reminded of his 
father (ὑπέμνησέν τέ πατρός) and this ‘reminder’ represents an infusion of paternal 
menos.247 
This menos is explicitly equated with the ‘determination and courage’ with which 
Athena/Mentes imbues him, in association with the memory of his father. One could 
speculate that these are virtues which Telemachus has inherited from him, virtues which 
he can access now on account of his infusion of menos. However, I suggest that this 
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moment of remembering his father, represents the start of Telemachus’ physical and 
mental journey to become his father’s son and that this process has a strong bearing on 
the construction of political society in the poem. Joel Christensen writes that in Odysseus’ 
absence, ‘all members of the Ithacan state have been stripped of agency in this vacuum 
of power,’ a product, he says, of the trauma of losing a generation of warriors.248 He does 
not explicitly link trauma to penthos alaston, as I do above, but there is a sense of trauma 
implicit in his suggestion that penthos alaston denotes grief which is ‘unrelenting’ 
because it is unresolved.249 This lack of resolution, he suggests, is part and parcel of ‘our 
cognitive desire to turn events into action-narratives that have clear outcomes.’250 He 
argues that after Athena’s visit, Telemachus is able to accept that Odysseus is dead, a 
conclusion which he voices in the Ithacan assembly and restates in his conversations with 
Nestor and Menelaus.251 Christensen suggests that in choosing this end to Odysseus’ 
narrative, Telemachus finds closure and in so doing, regains a sense of agency. 
While I agree with Christensen’s suggestion that Telemachus begins to select his own 
narratives and that this process is constitutive of his new sense of political agency, I also 
believe that Telemachus’ statements about Odysseus’ death should not be taken at face 
value. This lack of clarity comes, I suggest, as a result of Telemachus’ infusion of paternal 
menos. In Bakker’s words, in remembering his father, Telemachus ‘absorb[s] the menos’ 
of Odysseus ‘so as to embody it.’ From this point onward he becomes the ‘man of the 
house,’ surprising his mother by criticising her for her response to Phemios’ song of Troy 
and instructing her to go back into the house to ply her work because ‘the power is [his] 
in the household’ (τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔστ’ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ).252  
In addition to this, however, is a suspicion that Telemachus has become, like his father, 
polytropos. According to Barker, after the failure of the first Ithacan assembly, 
Telemachus learns that his path lies outside the assembly and that he ‘must learn instead 
to use speech in a different, less open way, and become more like his father, the figure 
who says one things while keeping another in his heart.’253 I suggest, rather, that this 
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change comes as a result of remembering his father on Athena’s departure. There is 
strong evidence to suggest that Telemachus’ avowals of Odysseus’ death represent an 
Odyssean misrepresentation of his true state of mind. When Athena (as Mentes) first 
meets Telemachus, he is imagining his father returning to scatter the suitors and regain 
his rightful place.254 ‘Mentes,’ whom Telemachus knows to be a god as s/he flies away in 
the shape of a bird, tells him that Odysseus is still alive at sea and plotting his way home, 
and so Telemachus has no good reason to conclude, suddenly, that his father is dead.255 
And yet, in the assembly the following day, he states that his ‘noble father has been 
killed’ (τὸ μὲν πατέρ’ ἐσθλὸν ἀπώλεσα).256 
Telemachus’ memory of his father is also a stimulus for political action. We may interpret 
Telemachus’ calling of this assembly as the move of a young man beginning to flex his 
political muscles for the first time. Whether he believes Athena/Mentes’ assertion that 
his father is alive or not, the memory of Odysseus inspires his realisation that to 
remember and weep is not enough and that action must taken. There is a sense too in 
which this assembly could be seen as the reawakening of political life in Ithaca following 
the long period of stagnation and impotence during Odysseus’ absence. According to 
Haubold’s analysis of the Homeric laoi, ‘renewed political life starts from the gathering of 
the people,’ an interpretation which he draws from Plutarch’s Theseus.257 Here, Plutarch 
(supposedly quoting Aristotle) states that Theseus ‘established’ Athens with the words 
‘Come hither all ye people’ (‘δεῦρ’ ἴτε πάντες λεῴ’) but Haubold suggests that this basic 
process ‘is also implied in many earlier Greek texts.’258 In this way, Telemachus’ calling of 
the assembly is potentially a foundational moment and yet, this assembly is doomed, not 
least because Telemachus goes into it, like his father, concealing his true opinion. As 
Barker writes, ‘concealment and suppression of real opinions—recognised traits of both 
the hero and his narrative, and illustrated here by his son—sit ill with the idea of open 
debate.’259 One might say that Telemachus wants the assembly to fail, or that it succeeds 
on his terms in that it makes the opposition to him transparent so that he can now act to 
evade or counter it. In any case, as I will discuss in further detail in ‘The First Hearing’ (pp. 
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78-84), he knows from the start that he will not stay to rebuild Ithaca’s broken political 
system as he might have done had he been convinced that his father really were dead. 
Rather, he will depart, as per Athena’s instructions, on his own journey of discovery. 
 
ii) Judge and Jury 
According to Farenga’s outline of the trial described at the beginning of the chapter, the 
people, the Ithacan laos, are the primary juridical audience of the dispute in the Odyssey. 
It is against them that the implied audience of the poem must measure themselves. I 
suggest rather that, while this may be true in the example of the Ithacan assembly, 
individual testimonies are heard by a range of audiences throughout the poem. The 
metaphor of the trial need not end with the folding of the Ithacan assembly but can be 
extended to explore the poem as a whole. Each juridical audience represented in the 
poem reaches decisions based on what it hears (the Phaeacians, for example, agree to 
take Odysseus home on the basis of his testimony) but the only groups privileged to hear 
all the evidence are the gods, in their position of omniscience, and the external audience. 
The gods, with Zeus presiding, are indeed the ultimate dispensers of justice in the poem, 
the highest court in the Odyssey’s world.  
However, one of the balancing acts to be negotiated in analysing the poem is that in a 
sense, the audience finds itself above the gods, privy to their judicial discussions which 
themselves include memory-testimony about Odysseus. According to this reading, the 
gods are reduced to the level of witnesses, on a par with the other characters. The 
‘balancing act’ comes because in a foundational narrative such as this – one which sets 
out for the Greek people this particular chapter in the history of their cosmos – it would 
be misguided to simply depose the king of the gods and put his speech on a level with 
that of other characters.260 This sets limits on how an implied audience or an historical 
ancient audience might interpret the poem.  
Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to draw attention to the seeming ‘collusion’ between 
the narrator and Zeus (the judge, perhaps) in the poem’s prompts regarding where 
correct judgement should fall. This judicial ‘guidance’ represents the strong normative 
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thrust of the poem regarding the nature and dispensation of justice. Homer sets out his 
stall early on, giving the first speech of the epic to Zeus, who states that mortals are fools 
to blame the gods for their misfortunes but rather they bring them on themselves for 
their own ‘recklessness’ (ἀτασθαλία).261 This ‘recklessness’ does not only describe their 
actions – in this case, Aegisthus’ seduction of Clytemnestra and his murder of 
Agamemnon – but also their failure to read properly the signs sent to guide them. In 
Aegisthus’ case, according to Zeus, he had continued with his course of action in spite of 
very clear warnings from Hermes, sent by the gods themselves: he was told but he would 
not be persuaded.262 As Barker writes, ‘Aegisthus is introduced as a paradigmatically poor 
listener: he failed to interpret his warnings properly, which is why he perishes.’263 
Therefore, Barker argues, ‘Zeus’ speech is aimed at an audience of the events as a 
warning to get interpretation right.’264 The audience’s failure to remember this 
paradigmatic example would surely be evidence of their own ‘recklessness.’ In this way, 
the poem seeks to control its own interpretation, and in so doing, to preserve Zeus’ 
omnipotence. 
The Odyssey does not only seek to exert power over its own interpretation but also over 
rival traditions and indeed, the epic genre as a whole. It seeks to dominate cultural 
memory as ‘the epic to end all epics.’265 One way in which it does this is by referencing 
and incorporating numerous other nostoi narratives – the most obvious being those of 
Agamemnon, Nestor and Menelaus – and these again, are presented as testimony.266 The 
poem uses these rival tales in order to explore elements of, or potential dangers in 
Odysseus’ story. Clearly, the threat offered by unfaithful wives is represented by 
Clytemnestra, just as Menelaus and Helen represent the uneasy peace of reconciliation 
with such. Menelaus’ adventures on his homeward journey foreshadow many of those 
faced by Odysseus, while the emptiness of Nestor’s life on his return, filled as it seems to 
be with memories of Troy and mourning for Antilochus, might represent the flatness of 
life after nostos.   
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Typically, perhaps, just as the model of decision-making in the Odyssey is shown to be 
autocratic, so the Odyssey rides roughshod over all these rival testimonies and situates 
itself as the nostos to end all nostoi. Odysseus’ wife is not just faithful, she is also clever. 
She tricks the suitors with her ploy to weave (and unravel) a shroud for Laertes and 
although the narrator never portrays her as anything other than loyal to Odysseus, she 
also never rejects the suitors outright but leads them on to suggest that she will 
eventually marry one of them.267 In this way, the Odyssey nods not just to the stories of 
Menelaus and Agamemnon with their unfaithful wives but also to other versions of the 
story which may feature a less chaste version of Penelope. Amphimedon even states 
squarely that Penelope led the suitors on while ‘planning [their] death and black 
destruction’ (ἡμῖν φραζομένη θάνατον καὶ κῆρα μέλαιναν).268 I will discuss the ways in 
which the narrative discredits Amphimedon’s version below (pp. 85-87), but in allowing 
such a character—whose narrative must be discredited—to voice this rival version, the 
Odyssey seeks to bring the tradition under its control. 
Odysseus’ adventures eclipse all others and his revenge on over a hundred rivals makes 
Agamemnon’s murder by Aegisthus look paltry. Odysseus’ nostos will not feel empty 
because it will not be complete: the Odyssey forecasts, by way of Teiresias’ prophecy, the 
way forward into further possible tales of Odysseus journeying to bury his oar in a place 
where none have heard of the sea. Barker and Christensen comment on the linguistic 
parity between measure, metra and poetic metre as contained in Odysseus’ reference to 
his future wanderings as ‘unmeasured’ (ametrētos) suffering: if Odysseus’ future beyond 
the Odyssey will be ‘without metre’ then ‘this poem heralds the end of … the heroic 
metre of heroic epic.’269 They also point out that because of the association between the 
sea and the epic world, a journey to a place where someone mistakes Odysseus’ oar as ‘a 
winnowing fan’ indicates ‘a literary terrain far removed from the Odyssey, far removed 
even from the kind of heroic epic that Homer’s poem represents.’270 In this way, the 
Odyssey is ‘the epic to end all epics.’271 
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So it is that Zeus is established as the main arbiter of justice in the poem and so also the 
Odyssey seeks control not only over its own interpretation but over the epic tradition. 
Yet, foolhardy as the poem suggests that it is to stand against the power of Zeus and the 
dominant narrative of the poem, there is an equally important counter-thrust which leads 
the audience to question and debate and this, is also founded on memory. While it would 
be ‘reckless’ to question Zeus’ judgement too far, the details of the trial—explored over 
the next three sections—provide strong evidence for the need to examine the ways in 
which decisions are reached and justice is enacted in the text.  
 
1.4 The First Hearing 
In the first Ithacan assembly—here, the first hearing—Telemachus attempts to influence 
the Ithacan laos to join with him in expelling the suitors from his house. The laos here 
represents the internal jury whose sympathies must be won in order for Telemachus’ will 
to be worked and he, his allies who speak on his behalf and the suitors who speak against 
him, try to harness and manipulate collective memory in order to re-member the 
community for their own benefit. 
In a way, calling this assembly is a foundational act on Telemachus’ part. I will look at how 
the external audience may interpret this below, but in the world of the poem, 
Telemachus appears to be calling the people together in order to instigate a collective 
responsibility for justice in the private concerns of individuals or households. In his 
question at the beginning of the assembly, Aegyptius reveals why the people might 
expect an assembly to have been called: to share news of the returning army or to 
address ‘some other public matter’ (ἦέ τι δήμιον ἄλλο πιφαύσκεται ἠδ’ ἀγορεύει;).272 As 
Moses Finley writes, Telemachus’ dispute with the suitors is a household affair and for 
this reason, the Ithacan people would have been under no obligation to help him.273 
Telemachus is fully aware of this and points his opening speech towards stressing that his 
own concerns and those of the laos are closely linked. His personal loss of his father is 
their collective loss of a king, ‘who was kind to you like a father’ (πατὴρ δ’ ὣς ἤπιος 
ἦεν).274 In so evoking the people’s collective memories of Odysseus—a father to him but 
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also to the state—Telemachus ‘creates a gathered people,’ who might be capable of 
acting as a body on his behalf.275  
However, as his speech, and the assembly as a whole, progresses, it becomes clear that 
this is not an impartial jury but one which is already working in collusion with the suitors. 
In the second half of Telemachus’ impassioned speech, it is apparent that the people are 
not only the jury but also the accused. While the first half of his speech seeks to align the 
people’s interests with his, the second stresses how their actions have, until this point, 
worked against him. He talks about the people’s ‘evil deeds’ (κακὰ ἔργα) in working with 
the suitors, deeds for which the gods—that higher jury—may punish them, and about the 
‘pains [they] put upon [his] heart’ (ὀδύνας έμβάλλετε θυμῷ).276 He even speaks of the 
people’s behavior as being more hurtful to him than the suitors’ saying that if it were 
them eating away his treasures and his cattle it would be easier to cope with because of 
the systems already in place for dealing with such transgressions within the 
community.277 If the first half of the speech invites the people to remember Odysseus 
together, the second half adjures them to remember their own actions, the ultimate goal 
of both being for the people to re-member themselves around him as their leader. 
His actions seem like they might pay dividends when this group is united further in pity 
for his outburst of tears at the end of his testimony. The power of this unity is palpable, as 
evidenced by the fact that ‘all the others were stricken to silence, none was so hardy / as 
to answer angry word against word, the speech of Telemachus’ (ἔνθ’ ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες 
ἀκὴν ἔσαν, οὐδέ τις ἔτλη / Τηλέμαχον μύθοισιν ἀμείψασθαι χαλεποῖσιν).278 Here, the 
separation between Telemachus and the people on one side and the suitors – ‘all the 
others’ (ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες) – on the other, is clear. 
As so often in modern court dramas, however, the statement of the case for the defence 
alters the people’s sympathies, certainties and so, loyalties. Antinous uses the story of 
Penelope and the shroud, ‘spinning’ his own memories in order to muddy the reputation 
of the house of Odysseus and to manipulate political allegiances. Barker discusses 
Antinous’ representation of the suitors as the Achaeans in this assembly, drawing on 
Iliadic tropes – and so the audience’s memory of Trojan heroes – in his testimony of 
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proceedings in Ithaca.279 Indeed, although all the people of Ithaca are demarcated as 
Achaeans at the start of the poem by Athena,280 the suitors’ invocation of Iliadic language 
to justify their pursuit of Penelope along heroic lines points to a deliberate appropriation 
of this rival poem.281  
The success or otherwise of Antinous’ words is hard to judge as, in what follows, the 
people’s reactions are notably absent from the narration. However, the people, tellingly, 
become grouped with the suitors in the main speakers’ comments. Telemachus, for 
example, seems swayed by the suitors’ self-designation as Achaeans. In his prayer to 
Athena following the assembly, Telemachus marks the unity of suitors and people against 
himself by referring to them as one group, delaying his endeavours: they are ‘the 
Achaeans / and particularly the suitors’ (τὰ δὲ πάντα διαρίβουσιν Ἀχαιοί / μνηστῆρες δὲ 
μὰλιστα).282 As a slight side note, this moment also provides further evidence of the fact 
that Telemachus may not be speaking plainly. In his later exchange with Nestor, he very 
deliberately sets up the suitors as opposed to the Achaeans and this formulation is 
adopted by Nestor who wonders whether Odysseus will come one day, perhaps with the 
Achaeans, in order to punish the suitors.283  
The implicit compliance—marked by silence—between people and suitors is also 
addressed when Mentor berates the people. He echoes Telemachus’ earlier phrase about 
Odysseus as king, saying that ‘no one of the people he was lord over / remembers godlike 
Odysseus, and he was kind like a father’ (ὡς οὔ τις μέμνηται Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο / λαῶν 
οἷσιν ἄνασσε, πατὴρ δ’ ὣς ἤπιος ἦεν).284 Here, his incitement to remember—his name, 
like Mentes, cognate with menos, mimona and mimneskō—seeks to unite through 
memory all ‘the people’ over whom Odysseus was lord, when currently, they are united 
in their forgetting. Mentor explicitly directs his ire towards ‘you other people’ (δ’ ἀλλῳ 
δήμῳ) who ‘sit there in silence … though they are so few and you so many.’285 These 
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‘other people,’ the not-suitors, are the Ithacan laos. However, though he differentiates 
between suitors and people, he indicates very clearly that silence here represents 
complicity and that for this they are no longer deserving of just rule.286  
Mentor’s use of mimnēskō in μέμνηται Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο carries a similar suggestion to 
when it was used earlier in conjunction with Telemachus’ infusion of paternal menos. 
Clearly, the Ithacans remember Odysseus – their memories have not (yet) been wiped – 
but these memories do not carry sufficient force to fill the people with the need for 
political action. They are not affective in the same way as Telemachus’ memory of 
Odysseus and the people remain apathetic. In a sense, this is equally true of the audience. 
In the context of listening to the poem, the audience has no prior memory of Odysseus 
because he does not even enter the poem until Book 5. One might argue then, that in 
measuring themselves against the internal laos, the external audience might be forgiven 
for equal apathy. However, the external audience is not watching ‘without memory’ but 
rather with an extensive cultural memory of the Odyssean tradition. In fifth-century BC 
Athens too, the likelihood is that most of them will have been familiar with this Odyssey 
too, if Cook’s convincing argument regarding the solidification of the text in sixth-century 
BC Athens is to be believed.287 For this reason, they would find themselves on the side of 
the house of Odysseus here, not only out of sympathy for Telemachus but in the certain 
knowledge of the punishment that lies in store for the suitors’ transgressions. 
This early attempt at what we might term, ‘dispute settlement’ by Telemachus, is a failure 
precisely because his memories of Odysseus are not strong enough, in the face of the 
suitors’ active presence, to supplement or bolster the inadequate memories of the 
people. Mentor’s response to this failure is instructive: in spite of Finley’s statement 
about the Ithacans’ lack of obligation to help Telemachus in this private matter, Mentor’s 
speech points to a collective responsibility which the people should have felt but did not. 
Perhaps they were not ready for it but the audience should be. 
The formula which Mentor uses to expresses the people’s silence in his speech—ἧσθ’ 
ἄνεῳ (‘sitting in silence’)—speaks volumes. In his analysis of the impact of speech acts in 
Iliadic and Odyssean assemblies, David Elmer writes that when speech is met by silence it 
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always signifies a lack of collective support.288 That the people here remain silent after all 
the speakers is a sign, then, that they do not actively support anyone but as Haubold 
suggests, they passively align themselves with the suitors as the most powerful group 
present. There is also evidence to suggest, again from the examination of assemblies in 
both epics, that sitting ‘connotes idleness and even impotence.’289 In analysing the 
formulas concerned with sitting in silence, Montiglio argues that ‘silence joined to sitting 
is the negation of heroic fervor not only on the battlefield, but also in the arena of 
speech.’290 According to her analysis, just as Menelaus chides the seated, silent warriors 
when a champion is called for in the Iliad, so ‘Mentor chides the people of Ithaca for 
remaining “seated in silence” (ἧσθ’ ἄνεῳ) whereas they should attack the enemy with 
their words, with assaults of speech.’291  
Montiglio’s conclusions about sitting in silence have repercussions for how we, as an 
audience, might judge the failure of this first assembly. She suggests: 
sitting in silence only befits those listeners who are not expected to speak in 
turn, above all an undifferentiated group, which either status or 
circumstances exclude from verbal participation. It is the multitude that sits 
down in silence to listen to the words of a single hero, the anonymous 
multitude that has no right to speak in the Homeric agorê.292 
The assembly fails, from Telemachus’ point of view, because he does not succeed in 
enlisting the people’s support but it is interesting to note that had he and Mentor 
succeeded, this assembly would have marked the first step towards an institution which 
does not envision the ‘single hero’ and the ‘undifferentiated group.’ Rather, it would have 
opened the assembly to the voices of others. But, as I have shown, this openness is 
something which, at every stage, the Odyssey seeks to shut down.  
An examination of the differences in the manner in which the internal juridical audience 
hears the testimonies in the assembly, and the manner in which external audience hears 
it, reveals the ways in which the Odyssey tries to silence other voices. For the internal 
audience, testimony comes free from any kind of interpretive certainties, whereas the 
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interpretation of the external audience is framed by the guidance of the narrator and 
their memories of earlier episodes in the poem. When Zeus sends signs – two eagles who 
attack each other over the heads of the assembled men – the Ithacans ‘pondered in their 
hearts over what might come of it’ (ὥρμηναν δ’ ἀνὰ θυμὸν ἅ περ τελέεσθαι ἔμελλον).293 
Even the best ‘readers’ among them, will not know, as the external audience does, that 
Zeus sent the eagles in support of Telemachus’ speech;294 nor, as Barker discusses, that 
Halitherses, who interprets the signs, is introduced with resonant words which should 
reinforce his authority as a figure of good counsel and wise judgement.295 He (like 
Mentor) is introduced with the formula ‘in kind intention toward all, he spoke and 
addressed them’ (ὅ σφιν ἐϋφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπε), the same used to 
introduce the wise elder statesman, Nestor, in the assembly in Iliad 1.296  
The internal audience is not privy, in addition, to the gods’ assembly of Book 1, in which 
we hear that Zeus, like Telemachus, does not forget Odysseus (Ὀδυσῆος ἐγὼ θείοιο 
λαθοίμην)297 and that his memory of him, as in Bakker’s formulation above (p. 72), is 
performative and denotes action on his behalf. They do not know either that our opinions 
have already been swayed against the suitors by Athena and Telemachus. These all offer 
strong inducements for the audience to rule with the house of Odysseus.  
On the one hand, one might conclude with Barker that for the audience of the Odyssey, 
there is ‘no room for ambiguity,’ even in the notoriously slippery business of reading 
omens.298 I suggest, however, that the audience’s memory also exposes the techniques 
by which the poem seeks to manipulate our interpretation and so signals an alternative. 
In the case of this assembly, if we remember that Telemachus goes into it with 
instructions from Athena to make his feelings known and then to state that he’s going on 
a journey, we know that at no point was this assembly meant to work. They may also see 
what the internal audience cannot, that the assembly, in theory, offered the potential for 
a very different institution, one carried into actuality (as in the case of Achilles’ shield, 
discussed above, p. 61) in their own society.  
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While there is no room for debate on Ithaca, the failure of the first assembly provokes the 
juridical audience into reflection on how things might have been different and in so 
doing, into debate on the performance of such institutions in their own society. Following 
the collapse of this first ‘law court’ hearing, Telemachus must ‘build his case’ and in order 
to do this, he travels from Ithaca to collect testimony. The following section discusses 
three examples of testimony, some of it heard by Telemachus, most not, but all of it 
heard by the external juridical audience. It explores the authority of these three 
testimonies and the ways in which the poem reinforces or undermines this authority. This 
gives a further insight into the politics of power in operation within the poem. It also 
considers the kind of truth which this kind of epic testimony might convey. 
 
1.5 Testimony in the Odyssey 
The three memory-testimonies that this section will analyse in order to further 
understand the play of politics in the Odyssey are: Nestor’s, for the prosecution; 
Amphimedon’s, for the defence; and Odysseus’ own. These testimonies are very different 
in terms of character and context and these differences play a significant part in how they 
may be interpreted. Nestor’s testimony takes the form of a relatively straightforward 
legal attestation: it is, as I will demonstrate below, subject to the usual issues of 
subjectivity and creativity but it is the most clear-cut of the three. Amphimedon’s 
testimony bears more in common with the kind of testimony to trauma considered by 
theorists such as Felman and Laub. Unlike in contemporary war crimes trials in which the 
dead cannot testify and ‘the missing persons, families and villages … continually appear 
like ghosts throughout the case transcripts’,299 Odysseus’ victims appear as souls in Hades 
and Amphimedon is asked to speak, remembering the horrific scene of the suitors’ 
slaughter. The difficulty of judging the truth value of Odysseus’ testimony, however, 
imperils the whole endeavour and reveals the inherent futility of looking for empirical 
truth in memory. Instead, it explores other forms of truth, no less meaningful, in the 
context of epic poetry. 
In looking at how these testimonies are authorised by the text, I will firstly consider the 
witnesses themselves and their testimonies. All three will be scrutinised in accordance 
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with Kirsten Campbell’s list of factors which juries must consider in evaluating witness 
evidence. This consists of: demeanour, conduct, character, probability, consistency, 
disinterestedness, integrity ‘and the fact that they are bound to speak the truth in terms 
of the solemn declaration taken by them.’300 Secondly, I will examine the involvement of 
the narrator and other key players in the text. Finally, I will consider the role of the 
external audience’s memory of the text and its cultural memory: the way that they 
intersect with the testimony heard and the way that they both authorise and undermine 
the memories voiced. 
 
i) Authorisation by the text, or how the text prepares us to hear the witness 
Athena herself, Odysseus’ chief advocate in the assembly of the immortals, chooses the 
character witnesses whom Telemachus should seek out, and in the guise of Mentor, tells 
him to go to Pylos where he should question Nestor and from there, to Sparta to see 
Menelaus. Again, Athena’s name in this disguise draws attention to her role in provoking 
memory in the poem and here prepares the audience for a narrative explicitly aimed at 
stimulating and reflecting on memory testimonies. Athena’s involvement in this process 
alerts the external audience to the fact that Nestor and Menelaus are not merely 
prompted to remember, they are divinely chosen to give their testimony. While 
Telemachus does not know this, the fact that these words are spoken by Mentor – his 
father’s trusted companion in Ithaca – means that they carry an authoritative truth for 
him. Athena, disguised as Mentor, also stresses that Nestor will tell him the truth, saying 
ψεῦδος δ’ οὐκ ἐρέει (‘He will not tell you any falsehood’), a formula which Nestor – also 
his father’s trusted companion – repeats with regard to Menelaus. For the external 
audience, then, their testimony, has divine authentication, while for Telemachus the 
witnesses’ authority is evinced by his father’s trust in them. In this way, neither the 
internal audience (Telemachus) nor the external one will hear the testimonies of Nestor 
and Menelaus without bias. 
This is equally true for Amphimedon only, in his case, the narrative/narrator works 
against him. Before Amphimedon’s actual testimony is taken into account, the audience is 
prejudiced against him as a witness. This prejudice comes as a result of Amphimedon’s 
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association with the suitors, as I will explore below, but the lack of transparency in his 
testimony is also partly reflected by his name. ‘Medon,’ though often translated as ‘ruler’ 
is also cognate with mēdomai, meaning ‘to be mindful’ or ‘to hold in mind’ so Amphi-
medon could be ‘concerning being mindful.’ There is clearly an overlap between holding 
in mind and remembering (as at Od. 11.110, 3.334 and Il. 4.418) so it may be tempting to 
give Amphimedon the same kind of authority with regard to memory as Mentes or 
Mentor. ‘Amphi-’ can also mean ‘both sides’, so there is a suggestion that Amphimedon’s 
testimony could reflect his ability to be able to remember in an unbiased way, seeing 
‘both sides’. However, the names of other suitors and their family members are not 
entirely straightforward, containing as they do, an element of truth but also one of irony. 
Agelaus, for example, is ‘the leader of the laos’ although he is not the foremost among 
the suitors and the conflation of the suitors with the laos is always controversial, as 
demonstrated above.301  
The external audience has heard testimony against the suitors from the start of the poem 
and has also received guidance as to how to interpret it. Athena, for example, speaks of 
them ‘forever’ slaughtering Odysseus’ sheep and cows,302 and comments on their 
‘insolence’ and ‘disgraceful’ behaviour.303 The suitors and Aegisthus (the figure whom 
Zeus used to exemplify a crime deserving of punishment, in the proem)304 are equated in 
the resonant epithet ἄναλκις, meaning impotent, feeble and unwarlike. Nestor 
denounces Aegisthus as ἄναλκις, stating that he stayed at home in comfort while 
Agamemnon went off to war;305 while Menelaus uses the same term to denounce the 
suitors for seeking to lie in the bed of a bolder man.306 Zeus also equates and justifies the 
fates of Aegisthus and the suitors: he speaks of Aegisthus being ‘paid’ (ἀποτίνω) for his 
transgression,307 the same word he uses with regard to Athena’s plans for the suitors in 
Book 5.308 The external jury would be wise not to disregard such guidance from the 
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supreme judge. They know, even before hearing his words, that to be led astray by 
Amphimedon’s testimony would seem like ‘recklessness.’309  
So it is that the poem privileges Nestor’s testimony even before it is given. He is chosen as 
a witness by Athena herself and she guarantees the truth of his words. In contrast, the 
juridical audience is not only biased against Amphimedon because of his association with 
the suitors but we are given a divine warning that to side with him against the house of 
Odysseus would only be to invite disaster. The next subsection considers the testimony 
itself and its truth value, in the context of cultural memory or resonance. 
 
ii) Testimony and Truth 
It is in the light of Campbell’s list that Nestor’s testimony appears relatively authoritative. 
Not only is it, as I have argued above, divinely authenticated ‘truth’ but he exhibits many 
characteristics of Campbell’s ideal witness. For a start, Nestor is ‘bound to speak the truth 
in terms of the solemn declaration taken by [him].’ It is given in response to a formulaic, 
courtroom-style speech from Telemachus, which asks that Nestor tell him, accurately, all 
that he has witnessed:  
τοὔνεκα νῦν τὰ σὰ φούναθ᾽ ἱκάνομαι, αἴ κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσθα 
κείνου λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον ἐνισπεῖν, εἴ που ὅπωπας 
ὀφθαλμοῖσι τεοῖσιν ἢ ἄλλου μῦθον ἄκουσασ 
πλαζομένου: πέρι γάρ μιν ὀιζυροὸν τέκε μήτηρ. 
μηδέ τί μ᾽ αἰδόμενος μειλίσσεο μηδ᾽ ἐλεαίρων, 
ἀλλ᾽ εὖ μοι κατάλεξον ὃπως ἤντησας ὀπωπῆς. 
λίσσομαι, εἴ ποτέ τοί τι πατὴρ ἐμός, ἐσθλός Ὀδυσσεύς, 
ἢ ἔπος ἡέ τι ἔργοω ὑποστὰς ἐξετέλεσσε 
δήμῳ ἔνι Τρώων, ὅθι πάσχετε πήματ᾽ Ἀχαιοί, 
τῶν νῦν μοι μνῆσαι, καί μοι νημερτὲς ἐνισπες.310 
That is why I come to your knees now, in case you might wish 
to tell me of his dismal destruction, whether you saw it 
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perhaps with your own eyes, or heard the tale from another 
who wandered too. His mother bore this man to be wretched. 
Do not soften it because you pity me and are sorry 
for me, but fairly tell me all that your eyes have witnessed. 
I implore you, if ever noble Odysseus, my father, 
ever undertook any word or work and fulfilled it 
for you, in the land of the Trojans where you Achaians suffered, 
tell me these things from your memory. And tell me the whole truth. 
So, Telemachus formalises their conversation and sets up a kind of contractual 
expectation of truth. This formality is reflected in the fact that Telemachus uses the 
exactly the same formula when asking Menelaus for his equivalent testimony at Od. 
4.322-331. Just as, in Book 1, Zeus declares that he remembers Odysseus and this 
memory signifies that he will act on Odysseus’ behalf,311 so here, the contract of truth is 
founded on memory and reciprocity: Telemachus asks that Nestor tell the truth if he 
remembers the times when Odysseus was good to him in the past.  
In addition to his declaration to tell the truth, Nestor signals his integrity as a witness in a 
number of ways, even though his friendship with Odysseus makes him partisan. In 
analysing these, it is useful to use both Campbell’s checklist and Lubomír Doležel’s 
narratological theories of ‘fictional truth’ (as set out on p. 69). In some ways, Nestor 
measures up to these criteria quite well. He signals the limits of his knowledge with clarity 
saying: 
ὣς ἦλθον, φίλε τέκνον, ἀπευθής, οὐδέ τι οἶδα 
κείνων, οἵ τ’ ἐσάωθεν Ἀχαιῶν οἵ ἀπόλοντο. 312 
So, dear child, I came back, without news, and I knew nothing 
of those other Achaians, which had survived, which ones had perished. 
Here, as at Od. 3.88, Nestor’s use of ἀπευθής suggests not only ignorance but also his own 
lack of inquiry, or at 3.88, the limits of mortal inquiry. Also, though he does not cite his 
sources for the information he provides about the other nostoi, he does separate his 
eyewitness testimony from hearsay, saying that after his separation from the others, all 
the rest of his news he ‘got by hearsay sitting here in my palace’ (ὅσσα δ᾽ ἐνὶ μεγάροισι 
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καθήμενος ἡμερέροισι / πεύθομαι).313 As John Marincola suggests, these methods of 
opsis (eyewitness testimony or autopsy) and inquiry were formative for the way in which 
the ancient Greeks thought of truth and narrative. For Herodotus, for example, opsis was 
‘the most certain way to knowledge’; where his own autopsy was unavailable, he had 
recourse to inquiry, or the use of others’ eyewitness accounts.314 
In other ways, Nestor’s world view and his belief in his own superior insight bleed into his 
narrative suggesting that his testimony is not to be believed entirely. He states, for 
example: 
καὶ τότε δή Ζεὺς λυγρὸν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μήδετο νόστον 
Αργείοις, ἐπεὶ οὔ τι νοήμονες οὐδὲ δίκαιοι 
πάντες ἔσαν.315 
then Zeus in his mind devised a sorry homecoming  
for the Argives, since not all were considerate or righteous.  
This must be Nestor’s conjecture about why events happened as they did since he could 
not have known Zeus’ thoughts. A further conjecture follows: he states that it was 
Athena’s anger that caused the quarrel between Agamemnon and Menelaus (ἥ τ᾽ ἔριν 
Ατρεΐδῃσι μετ᾽ ἀμφοτέροισιν ἔθηκε).316 He assumes that he escaped from the evils that 
beset the others because of his superior insight into the workings of the gods, designating 
Agamemnon a fool (νήπιος) for believing that he could change Athena’s mind with 
hecatombs,317 and saying that he himself ‘fled away for [he] saw how the god was 
devising evils (αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ σὺν νηυσὶν ἀολλέσιν, αἵ μοι ἕποντο, φεῦγον, ἐπεὶ γίγνωσκον, 
ὃδὴ κακὰ μήδετο δαίμων).’318 His use of the word νήπιος to designate Agamemnon here 
is telling, given its usage in the Iliad. The word is used many times by the narrator there in 
order to accentuate the helplessness or ignorance of mortals in relation to the gods.319 At 
such times, the word suggests infantilism or tragic innocence. It is used with most force at 
Il. 18.311, when the narrator castigates the Trojans for being persuaded by Hector to 
remain encamped outside Troy rather than retreating into the city, as Polydamus advised. 
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Tellingly, Hector himself uses the word to describe Polydamus sixteen lines earlier 
(19.295) and given the narrator’s subsequent condemnation, there is an element of irony, 
even hubris, in his usage, as if in using the term he is assuming more than mortal 
knowledge or power. With this in mind, Nestor’s use of this resonant Iliadic diction might 
lead to questions regarding his judgement about other ‘facts’ in his narrative. Perhaps, 
given his belief in his own ‘right-ness,’ Nestor’s high praise for Odysseus rests on the fact 
that they were ‘of one mind’ (ἕνα θυμον /ἔχοντε νόω).320 
Unlike Nestor, who is partisan due to his friendship with Odysseus, Amphimedon is 
partisan because he is an interested party in the case. He uses a similar formulaic contract 
for delivering truth testimony as that used by Nestor. In this case, the formula is σοὶ δ᾽ 
ἐγὼ εὖ μάλα πάντα καὶ ἀτρεκέως καταλέξω (‘I will tell you well and accurately the entire 
story’).321 This echoes another used for eliciting truthful testimony by Menelaus, Alcinous 
and Odysseus and so we see, as with Nestor, a resonant formulaic and formalised ‘solemn 
declaration to speak the truth.’322 Here again, this contractual truth is based on memory 
and reciprocity as Agamemnon demands the story in the light of his guest-friendship with 
Amphimedon. 
Up to a point, his testimony—as his name suggests—is remarkably balanced. While he 
does not own openly to the suitors having eaten Odysseus out of house and home, he 
does confess that when Odysseus returned, disguised as a beggar, the suitors attacked 
him ‘with evil words and blows’ (ἔπεσíν τε κακοῖσιν ἐνίσσομεν ἠδὲ βολῃσιν) ‘in his own 
palace’ (ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἑοῖσι).323 This seems to acknowledge some, at least, of their 
transgression against him.  
However, in certain key details Amphimedon’s story runs counter to the narrative of the 
suitors’ deaths that the audience has already heard from the narrator. Because of this, 
the authority of his testimony is undermined. He speaks of Penelope’s δόλος in planning 
the ruse of endless weaving, not only emphasising her cunning but also stating that by 
this device, ‘she was planning our death and black destruction’ (ἡμῖν φραζομένη θάνατὸν 
καὶ κῆρα μέλαιναν).324 He implies that Penelope and Odysseus were acting in cahoots (a 
                                                          
320 Od. 3.128. 
321 Od. 24.123. 
322 Od. 4.486, 8.573 and 15.383. 
323 Od. 24.161-63. 
324 Od. 24. 127. 
 91 
  
point of view with which some critics have sympathised) in setting up the contest of the 
bow.325 While this reading is possible, Zeus’ warning about the ‘recklessness’ of siding 
with the suitors suggests that the poem resists such a straightforward interpretation. 
Finally, when Amphimedon comes to describe the manner of the suitors’ deaths, he 
says—correctly—that Odysseus must have been helped by some god,326 but there is no 
acknowledgement that this help may have been attributable to divine justice, in 
retribution for the suitors’ own behaviour. 
Some have attempted to evaluate Odysseus’ testimony using similar criteria to those 
outlined above but trying to judge Odysseus’ narrative in these terms underlines the 
futility of looking for objective, ‘external’ truth in memory. As a witness, Odysseus is 
‘abysmally imperfect’: he has a ‘demonstrated penchant and talent for lying’ and ‘yet at 
times he tells the exact truth.’327 When Alcinous requests Odysseus’ story, he does so 
with that resonant formulaic request which, as in the examples above, sets up a 
contractual understanding that the truth will be told. He says, ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε μοι τόδε εἰπὲ καὶ 
ἀτρεκέως κατάλεξον (‘So come now tell me this and give me an accurate answer’).328 
However, Odysseus does not reply in kind, even though the first part of his narrative, at 
least, is full of details which are verified at other points in the text. He begins with his 
name, which we know to be true - εἴμ᾽ Ὀδυσεὺς Λαερτιάδης (‘I am Odysseus, son of 
Laertes’) and where he’s from. He describes Ithaca as a mountain that stands tall with 
islands settled around it, his own island lying low; a rugged place.329 Here, for the internal 
audience, the details he uses are persuasive but for the external audience, these are facts 
confirmed by the poem as a whole. Some of the facts of his story are also ratified for the 
external audience by the gods: his encounter with Polyphemus, for example, and his 
‘imprisonment’ on Calypso’s island.  
Conversely, at times when Odysseus is disguised and the audience knows Odysseus’ 
stories to be untrue—such as when he relates his history to Eumaeus—he does use the 
contractual formula for a truthful narrative described above. Eumaeus says to Odysseus: 
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε μοι σύ, γεραιέ, τὰ σ᾽ αὐτοῦ κήδε᾽ ἐνίσπες 
                                                          
325 Od. 24. 167. See, for example, Goldhill (1988), p. 28 (n.29). 
326 Od. 24.182. 
327 Richardson (1996), pp. 395-96. 
328 Od. 8.573. The same expression is used by Menelaus in his request to the Old Man of the Sea at Od. 
4.486. 
329 Od. 9.23-28. 
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καὶ μοι τοῦτ᾽ ἀγόρευσον ἐτήτυμον, ὄφρ᾽ ἐῢ εἰδῶ.330 
But come, old man, tell me your troubles,  
and speak this truly to me, so I may know it well. 
And Odysseus replies τοιγὰρ ἐγώ τοι ταῦτα μάλ᾽ ἀτρεκέως ἀγορεύσω (‘See, I will 
accurately answer all that you ask me’). The stories he tells to Eumaeus are, in a way, far 
more plausible than his stories about sea goddesses or Cyclops and yet we know these 
latter to be ‘truth.’ Eumaeus’ reaction to Odysseus’ narrative should, perhaps be 
instructive to the external audience of the poem. He believes every word apart from the 
one nugget that is true: that Odysseus is alive. Meanwhile, very little of Odysseus’ 
narrative to the Phaeacians is verified by other sources in the poem and even those 
sections may be embellished. If we believe Odysseus, are we allowing ourselves to be 
carried along by a few points of truth and a plethora of plausible details? 
Many scholars have concluded that to seek factual truth, or otherwise, in Odysseus’ 
narrative testimony is not only impossible but also less interesting and instructive than 
the ‘meaningful truth’ or truths that lie beneath or around his words. The exact nature of 
this ‘meaningful truth’ remains ambiguous. Emlyn-Jones, for example, relegates the 
notion of truth to think instead about telling a tale which is κατὰ μοῖραν, or 
appropriate.331 His analysis of the pirate trope which runs through Odysseus’ stories, told 
to various audiences for differing purposes, ends with the conclusion that ‘the story can 
be used by the teller to convey subtly facts about himself and different aspects of his 
personality, as well as to convey warnings and suggest paradigms for behaviour.’332 The 
‘truth,’ according to Emlyn-Jones, is not a question of telling a factually accurate narrative 
but of creating an appropriate story, for a specific audience, through which to 
communicate ‘truthful’ aspects of character or deeper ‘truths’ about human behaviour. In 
this, it corresponds exactly to the social and creative formation and communication of 
memory discussed throughout this thesis. 
This section has explored some of the issues relating to interpreting testimony in the 
Odyssey according to the ways in which we might expect to establish the truth value of 
testimony in court. It concludes by suggesting that the audience may need to question 
                                                          
330 Od. 14.185-86. 
331 Emlyn-Jones (1986), pp. 1-10. 
332 Emlyn-Jones, pp.5-8; quotations from p. 8.  
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the kind of truth it seeks. This approach to truth and memory informs my further 
discussion of the Odyssey’s testimonies below. It is also refined by Simon Goldhill’s 
analysis which goes a step further than Emlyn-Jones’ to suggest that we need not look for 
a truth that lies beyond the words spoken. In the same way that memory theory posits 
that memory constitutes identity, Goldhill suggests that Odysseus/man ‘is made up by the 
language in which he represents himself and is represented,’ and ‘duplicitous fictions are 
a necessary part of the representation and formulation of the self.’333 That is, because the 
audience is given so few hints as to their truth or otherwise they can only use the tales to 
consider what they reveal about the speaker.334 This is a concept which I will explore in 
much more detail below, in connection with the theory of memory and of cultural 
memory. 
 
iii) Memory and authority 
I discussed above the ways that Nestor is authorised as a witness by the gods and by the 
integrity he displays. In this section, I suggest that he is granted a further level of 
authorisation from cultural memory and from his resonant reputation in the wider 
scheme of epic poetry.  
We know that there was a Nestor before there was an Iliad but it is through the Iliad that 
we, as a modern audience, are most familiar with him.335 In the Iliad, Nestor is valued as a 
man of experience, as a speaker and as a politician. His advice is listened to (though not 
always acted upon) and he is a trusted and important member of the Achaean 
community.336 One reason why this is so important here is that the Trojan tales he tells of 
Odysseus in the Odyssey do not quite resonate with our memories of the Iliad. We might 
recognise the Odysseus who went out with Diomedes to spy on the Trojan camp in 
Nestor’s statement that: 
ἔνθ᾽ οὔ τίς ποτε μῆτιν ὁμοιωθήμεναι ἄντην 
ἤθελ᾽, ἐπεὶ μάλα πολλὸν ἐνίκα δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς 
                                                          
333 Goldhill (1991), p. 56. 
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335 See, for example, Christensen (2007), pp. 50-51. 
336 For a much more detailed analysis of Nestor’s function in the Iliad: ibid, pp. 49-130. 
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παντοίσι δόλοισι.337 
there was no man who wanted to be set up 
for cunning against great Odysseus; he far surpassed them 
in every kind of stratagem. 
However, it is harder to reconcile the notion that the Trojan War boiled down to the 
Achaeans trying every kind of strategem (παντοίσι δόλοισι) in order to win.338 In view of 
Odysseus’ reputation for δόλος (craftiness or trickery) in the Odyssey, Nestor’s depiction 
of the war as a series of tricks suggests that Odysseus was at the forefront of such 
assaults and, therefore, the most important player in the final victory over the Trojans. 
But this is a reading which privileges clever tricks over the valour, warcraft (χάρμης or 
ἀλκῆς) and force (βίος) which seem to characterise the war in the Iliad. That these views 
are expressed by Nestor gives them greater credence. Our respect for Nestor as a 
witness—supported by cultural memory of his integrity and reliability—predispose us to 
accept that this version of Troy is ‘true’ for the Odyssey, even if not for the Iliad. So, the 
Odyssey uses Nestor’s Iliadic reputation – or rather the audience’s memory of it – in order 
to authenticate its un-Iliadic presentation of the Trojan War and Odysseus’ starring role in 
it.  
At the same time, though, the Odyssey undermines Nestor’s reputation in this post-Iliadic 
world. What Nestor narrates in his testimony is the breakdown of the Achaean 
community. In the Iliad, the community is almost entirely broken by the argument 
between Agamemnon and Achilles in the first assembly and the poem explores the way in 
which the community finds a way of accommodating dissent and reaching consensus in 
its wake.339 In this world, Nestor’s authority and so, influence, was based, in part, on his 
memory.340 He served as a link to a race of heroes much greater than those around him 
and he used his memory to provide examples by which the Iliadic heroes should measure 
themselves or should act. His memory provided him significant authority and influence in 
the political group, with political action taken as a result of it. As Christensen explores, 
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Nestor’s introduction in the Iliad resonates strongly with Hesiod’s Theogony.341 Like the 
basileus of the Theogony, ‘his speech flowed from his tongue, sweeter than honey’ (ἀπὸ 
γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή).342 Like the basileus too, it is through ‘the recitation 
of paradigmatic stories and proverbial wisdom’ that he attempts to resolve conflict.343 He 
is a vessel of cultural memory and in Nestor, as with the basileus, this cultural memory 
provides the basis for true judgement in matters of group politics and justice. 
In the Odyssey, Nestor tells Telemachus that the final break-up of the Achaeans 
happened, not as part of an organic process of dividing to return to their separate lands, 
but because of another argument in the assembly. This one occurred ‘as the sun was 
setting,’ literally and metaphorically, on this political community. The quarrel was 
between Agamemnon and Menelaus, who, tellingly, called the assembly ‘wildly, and in no 
kind of order.’344 They were ‘heavy with drinking wine.’345 Nestor does not relate his part 
in the assembly but the fact that he calls Agamemnon ‘fool’ (νήπιος),346 suggests that he 
offered advice that was not taken. There was a further quarrel in a further assembly 
among those who left with Menelaus, which split the group again and so the sun set on 
the heroic Achaeans. With the end of the Achaean community, comes the end of the 
assembly, an institution which does not ever really recover in the Odyssey, in spite of 
Telemachus’ efforts in Book 2.347 Paradoxically, while the Odyssey relies on Nestor’s 
authority to establish Odysseus’ character, Nestor gives this testimony at the expense of 
his own political influence and epic reputation: he narrates his own impotence to resolve 
the problems amongst the Achaeans. In the Iliad, Nestor’s public sharing of memory is 
highly prized by the political community, even if, as Christensen suggests, the political 
community is in transition away from his traditional place as Hesiodic basileus.348 His 
value as an elder statesman, together with the sense of its transience is evinced by the 
honours bestowed on him by Achilles at the funeral games.349 In contrast, in the Odyssey, 
Nestor remembers privately, as one witness amongst many. More than in the Iliad, where 
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his lengthy memory-narratives served a political purpose, he now seems lost in the world 
of his past and in his grief for his son. He is a relic of an age that is now past. 
Just as the audience’s memory helps to evaluate Nestor’s testimony, so too their 
memories of earlier episodes recounted in the poem defines their reception of 
Amphimedon’s testimony. While, as I have said, his testimony is undermined by the 
narrative’s heavy condemnation of the suitors, the audiences’ memories demand that 
they do not write off his narrative altogether. Amphimedon describes what happened in 
Odysseus’ halls using the resonant term φόνος (‘slaughter’)350—an emotive word, 
meaning ‘murder’ or ‘slaughter’ rather than the less emotive ‘killing’—and his description 
of the scene conveys the sense of panic and horror.351 The short phrase τοὶ δ’ ἀγχιστῖνοι 
ἔπιπτον (unsatisfyingly translated as: they ‘dropped one after another’) suggests in the 
word ἀγχιστῖνος, a sense of crowding and closeness, in the heaps of the dead but also in 
the hall itself:352 they were on top of each other and being struck down on all sides. He 
also uses the resonant formula δάπεδον δ’ ἅπαν αἵματι θῦεν (‘the floor was smoking / 
with blood’)353 – the same that Agamemnon used to describe his own slaughter to 
Odysseus and as used in the main narrative of the slaughter in Book 22 – just before 
saying that their bodies still lie there, uncared for and unmourned, so claiming that 
Odysseus has transgressed against them, not only in their slaughter but also in his neglect 
of what is due to the dead. 
I will explore the very different ramifications of the equation of Odysseus’ slaughter of 
the suitors with Agamemnon’s version of his murder by Aegisthus’ below.354 That analysis 
will suggest that we might read the slaughter of the suitors against the normative thrust 
of the poem. Here, I will focus on how Agamemnon’s reaction to Amphimedon’s story 
reinforces that normative reading. 
As discussed above in relation to his accusations against Penelope (pp. 90-91) and in his 
implication regarding Odysseus’ transgressions against the suitors and their corpses, 
Amphimedon gives an alternative take on the narrative the audience has just experienced 
and interpreted. This could destabilise the normative ‘truths’ of Odysseus’ justice but 
                                                          
350 Od. 24.169. 
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353 Od. 24.185, 11.420 and 22.309. 
354 See this thesis, pp. 99-101. 
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when it comes to evaluating Amphimedon’s testimony, it is useful to look at the internal 
jury’s response. While we might expect Agamemnon’s response to be conditioned by his 
memories of his own death and, therefore, a recognition that the suitors were killed in a 
similar manner – in a hall, taken by surprise, people running around and falling on all 
sides, ‘the floor steaming with blood,’ it is actually conditioned by his perception of 
Penelope’s faithfulness and virtue, in contrast with his own wife’s perfidy. This rings true 
with our memory of his account which concludes not with self-pity about his death and 
the manner of it but with his sense of betrayal and the notion that Clytemnestra has 
brought shame upon the whole of her sex.355 
Finally, memory also plays an important role in the audience’s evaluation of Odysseus’ 
testimony. I suggested above, in exploring Odysseus as a witness, that memory provides a 
way to think about Goldhill’s notion, that ‘duplicitous fictions are a necessary part of the 
representation and formulation of the self.’356 The way in which this representation of 
Odysseus’ self functions in the Odyssey, and the way in which the audience will interpret 
it, relies on cultural memory. In particular, it relies on ‘resonance’. Just as the Odyssey’s 
presentation of Nestor and his testimony resonated with and against his presentation 
elsewhere in epic, Graziosi and Haubold suggest Odysseus’ audience can trust his account 
‘because it resonates with what bards say and what we know about the universe.’ With 
regard to the fact that ‘it resonates with what bards say,’ they analyse Alcinous’ response 
to Odysseus’ account: it can be trusted ‘because it sounds like a bardic performance.’ His 
tales resonate with other bardic performances and so, sound like truth. The tales also 
resonate with what the audience knows about the universe: with the epic cycle which 
tells and retells the story of the history of the cosmos. As Graziosi and Haubold go on to 
say, the effect of Odysseus’ story on the Phaeacians must have been similar to the effect 
of the Odyssey on its early audiences: they judged the performance of a particular bard or 
travelling rhapsode on its resonance within the wider tradition.’357 
The ‘significant truth’ of Odysseus’ tales, and the Odyssey as a whole, therefore, comes in 
their resonance with what the audience knows, from a vast bank of cultural memory, to 
be true about Odysseus’ character and what they know to be true about his epic 
landscape and its inhabitants. This is not to say that this information tallies exactly with a 
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known and stable body of work but that their resonance with a multiplicity of tales and 
tellings gives it an authority strong enough to stabilise the tradition, in the sense that the 
Odyssey became the definitive version of who Odysseus is, while other versions 
disappeared into obscurity.358 His tales carry the truth that he is Odysseus and that he 
deserves to return home, to set his lands in order and to rule as king. 
This section has suggested that cultural memory of epic and myth, including memory of 
earlier moments in the poem, signals alternative ways of reading testimony in the 
Odyssey. At the same time as it may provide foundations for Nestor’s and Amphimedon’s 
authority as witnesses, it also takes those foundations away, stripping their narratives of 
that poetic endorsement. This section has indicated that cultural memory may predispose 
the audience of the Odyssey to accept Odysseus and to accept his tales and this, in turn, 
supports the normative drive of the poem. If we believe that Odysseus deserves to 
‘return home, to set his lands in order and to rule as king’ then we support the narrative 
which suggests that the suitors must be violently punished, the rebellion of their families 
suppressed, and oblivion cast upon all. The next section explores the ways in which 
memory might undermine this normative message. 
 
1.6 The Verdict 
Ultimately, there is no trial by jury depicted in the text. The gods help to orchestrate a 
brutal out-of-court settlement with the suitors; their families are deaf to arbitration; and 
in the end, there is silence as Zeus ‘puts forgetting’ on all. This section examines the ‘out-
of-court-settlement,’ the ‘final hearing’ and the eklēsis and explores how we, as the 
external jury, might read these episodes. It also considers how this text could have 
functioned as a foundational narrative for political society in the fifth century BC. I have 
said already that remembering ‘with’ the poem and so, ‘with’ Zeus, contributes to the 
normative thrust of the poem, but that there is an important ‘counter-thrust’ which is 
also set in motion by memory. An analysis of the out-of-court settlement in Book 22 and 
the imposed forgetting in Book 24 helps to elucidate this idea. 
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There are strong Iliadic parallels inscribed in Book 22 of the Odyssey and Pietro Pucci has 
written in great detail on these. He focuses on the moment when Odysseus beheads 
Leiodes, his supplicant, as equivalent to that when Achilles beheads Lycaon in Iliad 21, 
bringing out the characteristically Iliadic use of animal imagery to describe Odysseus in 
this scene as well the fact that Odysseus uses a sword here for the first time in the scene, 
to mirror Achilles’ use of the sword to kill Lycaon.359 For Pucci, these Iliadic memories are 
stimulated in order to underscore Odysseus’ victory over the Iliadic tradition. Whereas 
Achilles mocks his supplicant for wishing to ‘return home after many toils,’ Odysseus kills 
Leiodes because he must have prayed that Odysseus would never return home.360 Pucci 
writes that Odysseus’ ‘mimicry’ of Achilles ‘emphasizes how complete is the Odyssey’s 
revision of Achilles’ sarcastic, pathetic attitude towards return. Odysseus, in the garb of 
Achilles, vindicates the value of homecoming, of life and its pleasures.’361 
It is evident that Pucci’s reading of the Iliadic parallels with Book 22 of the Odyssey 
emphasises Odysseus’ triumph but I am inclined to agree with Barker’s more sinister 
reading, which stresses the typically Odyssean move from public to private: here, the 
battlefield to the domestic hall.362 The suitors, those Achaeans of Book 2, are instructed 
by Eurymachus to ‘remember [their] warcraft’ (μνησώμεθα χάρμης), the only Odyssean 
use of this formula which occurs a multitude of times in the battle scenes of the Iliad.363 
This battle, though, is Achaean against Achaean, and crucially, Odysseus’ enemies remain 
unarmed for a large part of it. It is ‘slaughter behind closed doors,’ doors which, in 
Barker’s terms not only imprison the suitors inside, but also ‘marginaliz[e] open conflict 
and [bring] it within the bounds of Odysseus’ control.’364 Those who might help the 
suitors, either physically in battle or by witnessing the slaughter and speaking out on their 
part, remain shut out. 
In addition to this, Achilles’ aristeia in the Iliad, which this episode recalls, is itself far from 
free of ethical ambiguity. The animal imagery – particularly the lion simile – which Pucci 
highlights as being referenced in Book 22 of the Odyssey, is illustrative of the wild, bestial 
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side of Achilles’ biē. This imagery, which culminates in Achilles’ wish ‘to hack [Hector’s] 
meat away and eat it raw for the things that [he has] done to [him],’365 is testament to 
the way in which the Iliad represents tisis, or the repayment of wrongs done to one, as 
highly problematic.366 That the Odyssey recalls such bestial imagery,367 in this scene of 
Odysseus’ aristeia, in Odysseus’ own enactment of tisis against the suitors,368 is to lay 
ambiguity upon ambiguity. 
In addition to referencing the Iliad here though, the Odyssey is ‘self-referential,’369 and its 
self-referentiality – the way that it draws on the audience’s memory of previous episodes 
– is also provocative. Pucci comments on the use of thuō, used in Book 22 as well as in 
Agamemnon’s testimony regarding his murder in Book 11 but the similarities between 
the episodes do not end here.370 Both slaughters take place in halls, at feasts and in each 
the blood and food mingle: Agamemnon describes how they ‘lay sprawled by the mixing 
bowl and the loaded / tables all over the palace,’ (ὡς ἀμφὶ κρητῆρα τραπέζας τε 
πληθυόσας / κείμεθ’ ἐνὶ μεγαρῳ); while in Book 22, ‘the good food was scattered on the 
floor and the bread and roast flesh were spoiled’ (ἀπὸ δ’ εἴδατα χεῦεν ἔραζε / σῖτός τε 
κρέα τ’ ὀπτὰ φορύνετο).371 Both describe the ‘victims’ in terms of beasts for the 
slaughter: Agamemnon compares his companions to ‘pigs with shining / tusks’ (σύες ὥς 
ἀργιόδοντες); while the narrator in Book 22 compares the suitors to ‘a herd of cattle’ 
(βόες ὣς ἀγελαῖαι).372 In the divine assembly of Book 1, Zeus constructs Aegisthus’ 
seduction of Clytemnestra and murder of Agamemnon as the ultimate hubristic act 
requiring of retributive justice and the text guides us to construe Odysseus’ triumph over 
the suitors as the ultimate act of such justice. However, the equation of these acts – the 
hubristic slaughter and the glorious revenge – in the diction and imagery with which they 
are related, must give the audience pause. The suitors’ families may be shut out but the 
audience is shut in with the suitors. We are their witnesses. In this sense, the traumatic 
memories which Amphimedon voices in his testimony, discussed above (p. 96) are our 
traumatic memories too. The deliberate evocation of the audience’s memories in this 
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instance is surely a cue that ‘justice’ is a concept which political society needs constantly 
to debate and assess, in its definition and in its practice. 
In the length and detail of the account of this slaughter, Book 22 far exceeds 
Agamemnon’s testimony of his own death – this isn’t, after all, his story – but the very 
details of this episode are central to the way in which the text uses memory as an 
affective political force. In his discussion of the Contest Between Homer and Hesiod, 
Haubold remarks that the poet represents ‘Homer’s ability to depict a scene so gruelling 
that we would not want to witness it directly.’ He goes on to argue that ‘Homeric 
enargeia was a quality to display, reflect on and worry about,’ that the gruesome details 
which Homer depicts represent ‘a point of concern’ for ancient audiences as well as for 
modern ones.373 The recent reading of the Odyssey, staged by the Almeida theatre, 
brought this sense vividly to life.374 The eye skips over details when reading and the scene 
moves quickly but in hearing the recitation of thrust after thrust with spear and then 
sword, gushes of blood, tearing of tendons, snapping of bones, twitching of feet and 
ripping off of genitals, the full scale and brutality of the scene cannot be ignored. The 
scene is long and the details relentless. The suitors’ families are unaware of these details 
when Zeus casts forgetting on them to end the civil war, but they are etched into the 
minds of the audience, in all their grisly vividness. For this reason, it seems not only that 
we can remember – we are not subject to Zeus’ decree – but that we must do so. 
In this way, the poem casts doubt upon the very ethical and political certainties it appears 
to espouse and memory is at the centre of the way in which it does this. The audience’s 
memories of Achilles’ aristeia in the Iliad and Agamemnon’s account of his murder from 
earlier in the Odyssey, frame the way in which it receives Odysseus’ slaughter of the 
suitors. So it is that this text which seems to privilege privacy – even secrecy – and 
storytelling over public debate,375 actually models debate in the ambiguity of its 
normative ‘message.’  
During my analysis of the first Ithacan assembly, I suggested that the laos had failed to be 
motivated to action on Telemachus’ behalf because their memories of Odysseus were not 
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powerful enough.376 The slaughter of the suitors could be read as a brutal reminder of 
Odysseus’ power for the Ithacan people and it is in the light of this reminder that the laos 
meets again in assembly.  
In many ways, this assembly provides another way in which the text seeks to control its 
own interpretation. I suggested above that Amphimedon’s testimony offered one 
example of the way in which the text deals with those who seek to undermine it and 
Eupeithes offers another example here. As I touched on in the opening to this chapter, 
Eupeithes is partially successful in mobilizing an army against Odysseus and he achieves 
this through his communication of collective trauma.  
In order to accomplish this, he must, as Jeffrey Alexander suggests, communicate such a 
‘sense of shock and fear’ that the collective feels their ‘patterned meanings’ to have been 
‘abruptly dislodged.’377 He manages this by reinterpreting for the Ithacans their memory 
of Odysseus as king, articulating, in Haubold’s words, ‘a highly plausible forcefully 
traditional alternative to the official version.’378 The Ithacans have as yet no stable version 
of what happened to Odysseus and his companions which makes it that much easier for 
Eupeithes to rewrite the narrative. Now, instead of the sorrowful story we have seen 
through the eyes of Telemachus or Penelope, Eupeithes tells a story of Odysseus’ 
intentional (Eupeithes uses medomai, ‘to be minded, intend’) ruin of the Achaeans.379 He 
says that he utterly destroyed his people (ἀπὸ δ’ ὤλεσε λαούς)—the laos here being his 
companions—and then, on his return, killed others, the best of the Cephallenians (τοὺς δ’ 
ἐλθὼν ἔκτεινε κεφαλλήνων ὄχ’ ἀρίστους).380 Haubold also draws attention to the fact 
that the equation of the companions and the laos in this version of events emphasises 
Odysseus’ irresponsibility as a king. Whereas the companions have agency and, in the 
narrative of the poem, destroyed themselves because of their recklessness, the laos are 
powerless and as king, Odysseus should protect them.381 Eupeithes’ weeping predisposes 
the Ithacans to pity while his words ‘abruptly’ dislodge their perceptions of a king who 
protects his people, stirring more than half to run for their armour. 
                                                          
376 See this thesis pp. 78-84. 
377 Alexander (2004), p. 4. 
378 Haubold (2000), p. 108. 
379 Od. 24.426. 
380 Od. 24.426-29. 
381 Haubold (2000), pp. 10 and 104-10. 
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For the Ithacans, the communicative, collective dimension to this trauma is short-lived. 
Eupeithes’ rebellious actions could not be more forcefully put down: as Barker writes, ‘It 
is only after Eupeithes, that last dissenting voice, has been done away with – and god 
knows how many others with him – that Athena finally intercedes to halt the 
slaughter.’382 Forgetting cannot be imposed until Eupeithes has got his just desserts for 
challenging the narrative in such a way.  
In a way, though, the silencing of debate is even more total and this becomes apparent 
immediately after the debate as the gods discuss the eklēsis. In the assembly, the Ithacan 
laos is once more shown to be divided and fickle. When Eupeithes speaks, the Achaeans 
pity him, however when Medon answers him, the Ithacans respond with ‘green fear’ 
(χλωρὸν δέος) at his warning that the gods are supporting Odysseus.383 So it is that after 
Halitherses’ vehement, ‘Let us not go’: 
οἱ δ’ ἄρ’ ἀνήϊξαν μεγάλῳ ἀλαλητῷ 
ἡμίσεων πλείους: τοὶ δ’ ἀθρόοι αὐτόθι μίμον:384 
they sprang up with great shouts—  
more than half of them—though others remained where they were. 
There is still no debate among the people, no weighing up of testimony or evidence and 
this could certainly be seen as a failing in them which the audience should be ready to 
rectify among themselves. However, the eklēsis challenges this reading. Zeus’ imposition 
of forgetting makes it clear that any and all political debate and consensus among the 
people is essentially meaningless. Even had the Ithacans been completely unified in their 
stance against the house of Odysseus, their joint strength would have made no difference 
in the face of divine will. 
Readings of the eklēsis, up to now, have gestured towards the fact that this is not the 
whole story. Barker suggests that the episode shows the ‘precariousness’ of the 
narrative’s ‘hold over alternative voices.’385 Haubold, meanwhile, argues that each time a 
character conflates the laoi with the companions (or the suitors), as Eupeithes does in his 
speech, this adds a layer of uncertainty to the text, even where we know that the 
                                                          
382 Barker (2009), p. 132. 
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384 Od. 24.463-44. 
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collapsing of these terms is a misrepresentation.386 In similar ways, Christensen and 
Farenga are more radical in their interpretation. Christensen sees the eklēsis as similar to 
Platonic aporia (‘confusion’), suggesting that the aporetic state requires ‘group 
intellectual and emotional work.’387 In language very like Olick’s (with regard to social 
memory), Christensen argues that the audience’s perception of and response to the 
narrative, in the light of this aporia, ‘remakes’ the audience. The social and political 
debate which it inspires, regarding the decisions made, the morality of revenge and the 
mode of justice, reforms the audience as a political group. Farenga too, suggests that ‘the 
poet certainly wants his implied audiences to debate and discuss the means and reason 
giving Odysseus uses to implement that justice.’388 
While my reading is similar to these, especially in the sense that the external audience 
remembers while the internal audience forgets, it is crucially different in putting memory 
at the centre of the political development of ancient Greek society. It is not simply that 
the audience must remember in the face of Zeus’ and Athena’s insistence ‘that the 
traditional cognitive acts and emotions on which revenge feeds – especially 
remembering, retelling, and re-experiencing – be jettisoned with the sort of force 
Odysseus used to slaughter the suitors,’389 the audience must retell the story. For the 
audience, that collective, communicative aspect of the trauma remains. It is a memory to 
be repeated and retold. In this, the poem is formative in two very different ways. On the 
one hand, it demonstrates the political value of forgetting but, on the other, carries a 
memory that continues to inform and underlie its audience’s present identity. This 
identity – almost anywhere in the ancient Greek world which cherished the Homeric 
epics, not only in democratic Athens – is that of a society which debates communal issues 
in the assembly and settles disputes as a group of representative citizens. It is a society 
which will not allow the events of the Odyssey to take place again, neither the stagnation 
of the assembly as a political institution, nor the brutal and autocratic settling of disputes. 
Unlike individual trauma, then, this collective trauma gains momentum and affective, 
political power in communication, in the annual retelling at the Panathenaea.  
                                                          
386 Haubold (2000), pp. 120-1. 
387 Christensen (forthcoming). I will return to this discussion of aporia at the end of Chapter 3, pp. 238-42. 
388 Farenga (2006), p. 259. 
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In the context of the trial metaphor, the audience’s juridical verdict is unimportant; what 
matters is that just as memory kickstarts the neglected assembly on Ithaca, so memory 
fuels and underpins the evolution of political society. It is because of their memory of 
Agamemnon’s account of his slaughter that the audience equates this despicable act of 
murder with Odysseus’ honourable act of justice, causing them to examine justice in their 
own political community. Similarly, the audience retains memories of the horrific details 
of Odysseus’ ‘justice’—details to which the outraged suitors families were never privy—
long after the inhabitants of Ithaca are made to forget. The Odyssey lived in the cultural 
memory of Athens as not only a foundational story to explain their origins, but also a 
foundational trauma which must be communicated and acted upon so as never to be 
repeated.  
In addition to this, as set out in the introduction to this chapter (p. 65) the Odyssey acts as 
a political ‘supplement’ in its performance, engendering the institution (albeit an informal 
one) of its audience-jury. The collective apathy and the autocratic style of government 
modelled in the poem, together with the memories which the text both evokes and 
creates for its audience, point to the political void in the world of the Odyssey: a void 
where collective discussion and decision-making should belong. The poem also fills this 
void, setting out the different sides of the dispute and provoking the audience to become 
engaged not merely in the matter of the suitors’ vs the house of Odysseus, but also in the 
matter of how justice should be performed in society. However, as in the Derridean 
description, the supplement is, itself, always lacking. For this reason, the audience’s 
commitment to this debate must be ongoing: it will always be a ‘striving towards’ and will 
never be ‘finished.’ The following section will consider the mechanics of the text as 
supplement in further detail. 
 
1.7 Conclusions: the epic cosmos and the Odyssey as supplement 
The debate over whether the Odyssey portrays a conception of justice which is more 
advanced than that represented in the Iliad is long and heated.390 In spite of this, most 
critics now agree that in the cosmological history related by epic, the Odyssey follows the 
Iliad, a text which foregrounds what it is to be mortal and living as part of a community, 
                                                          
390 See, for example, Lloyd-Jones (1971) and Dickie (1978), pp. 91-101. 
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and is itself followed by Hesiod’s Works and Days, a text which discusses what it means to 
live in a political community in which mortals control justice, though with divine support 
in the background. Most critics are also agreed that it is the final imposition of forgetting 
to end civil war which represents the sea change from what has gone before. Farenga 
describes it as a moment when the gods warn both parties ‘to check pursuits of self-
interest and pursue instead the interest of community peace and prosperity.’391 Heubeck, 
meanwhile, heralds it as the ‘abolition of the blood feud’ in favour of an abstract system 
of justice, to be presided over in future by Odysseus, as king. Heubeck suggests, thereby, 
that such an abstract system should encompass collective decision-making rather than 
the personal, private nature of the blood feud.392  
As an illustration of the Odyssey’s place before the Works and Days, Farenga’s chapter on 
the Odyssey as proto-trial is followed by one in which he explores Hesiod’s Works and 
Days as a text which deals with an actual legal dispute in the mortal world. He see the 
Works and Days as a forerunner to the statute laws which were inscribed on wood or 
stone around the classical poleis and which were ‘particularly concerned to control 
abuses by magistrates’ in the matter of dispute settlement cases.393 Farenga argues that 
Hesiod’s poetic performance is ‘designed to supplant a poor performance by a judicial 
basileis,’ the kind of performance Hesiod represents in the poem as delivered by the 
‘bribe-eating’ judges.394 Farenga goes on from this to posit that ‘here the “jurors” are 
members of the poet’s audience and the “defendant” is Perses.’395 He argues that ‘the 
poem pleads for what Solon, at around 590, would call ephesis or “removal,” an “appeal,” 
from one level of justice (before a magistrate) to another (the court of the citizen 
assembly).’396  
In the same way as I suggested with regard to the Odyssey, I take Farenga’s conclusions 
further. The key notion for me is that the ill-judging basileus in question is a single person 
and that as such, he is incapable of making sound judgement. This is similar to the story 
of the judge, Deioces in Herodotus, who is made king by the Medes, on account of his 
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 107 
  
sound judgements, but who, in his lust for and love of power, becomes despotic.397 The 
central concept of Solonic ephesis is, then, the move from the trial held before a single 
magistrate, to the trial held before a court of citizen-jurors. 
Farenga’s argument clearly has much in common with my proposal that the Odyssey 
functions as a political ‘supplement,’ in that the text itself both enhances, and illustrates a 
‘lack’ in the political structures that it represents. Farenga argues that Works and Days 
suffers as such a supplement because Hesiod’s ‘peculiar repertoire in Works and Days of 
axioms, proverbs, fables, mythological snippets and thesmia reflects an idiosyncratic 
virtuosity’ and is not designed to ‘recruit’ others to repeat its performance.398 Elmer 
shares a similar concern about Odysseus in the Odyssey, arguing that his performance is 
unrepeatable by any other than himself,399 and that for all he is a wise politician, he is 
secretive: his social and political wisdom does little good if it cannot be effectively 
transmitted to and circulated amongst others.400 While this may be true of Odysseus, 
with regard to the poem as a whole, I suggest the opposite. Although Odysseus’ justice is 
unrepeatable by the ordinary mortal, what is repeatable is the process of analysing and 
debating evidence, of weighing the truth value of speech and of listening and responding 
as a collective. This process is invited – even demanded – by the poem and was repeated 
at the Panathenaea.   
The model of autocratic government represented in the poem undoubtedly makes the 
modern scholar, eager to ‘trace the establishment of political society,’ squirm. In the 
‘positive’ conclusions above, regarding the Odyssey as founding a new system of justice, a 
lot seems to hang on four lines just before the closing credits. What I have proposed is 
that to focus solely on the represented collective in the poem is to ignore the fact that 
the poem was performed in front of a very different collective, one which would have 
been well versed in the process of collective decision-making as depicted on the Shield of 
Achilles. This is the collective which hears the whole trial, hears all the testimony given in 
whispered conversations or in lavish after-dinner speeches in other lands, and who can 
see, and reflect on the dismal apathy and high emotions which hamper productive debate 
                                                          
397 Herodotus 1.96.1ff. 
398 Ibid, p. 283. 
399 Elmer (2012), p. 227. 
400 Ibid, p. 231. 
 108 
  
and decision-making in the text. This is the collective who, through its experience of the 
poem, is transformed into a citizen jury. 
While this chapter has analysed the role of memory in establishing the political community via the 
trial as a metaphor, the following chapter picks up the theme of the law court again to examine 
how this is formalised and institutionalised in Euripidean tragedy. It will continue to examine the 
ways in which the audience’s memories might authorise or discredit the characters’ narratives, 
but given the subject matter of its key text—the Trojan Women—the notion of traumatic memory 
will come to the fore. In the light of this, it will consider the affective and politically effective 
impact of traumatic testimony on an audience in the Athenian theatre. 
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2 Trauma, Empathy and the Politics of Tragedy in Euripides’ Trojan Women 
2.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed the ways in which memory not only informed and 
underscored the normative, political thrust of the Odyssey but also served to challenge it. 
In the case of the Odyssey, I suggested that audience memory of earlier episodes of the 
poem, authorised by the gods and the omniscient narrator, reinforced the poem’s drive 
towards autocracy. The ‘alternative’ memories which challenged this drive were those to 
which the external audience still had access after the act of divine eklēsis. In that chapter 
too, cultural memory not only added nuance to the aesthetic interpretation of the poem, 
bringing out resonances of characters and their depictions elsewhere in epic, but also 
served to authorise certain memories over others in the ‘trial’ of Odysseus. The chapter 
suggested that the slaughter in Book 22 of the Odyssey became a moment of collective 
foundational trauma for ancient Greek societies such as classical Athens. For this reason, 
the poem’s place in the cultural memory of fifth-century BC Athens not only affirmed and 
explained the political society’s foundations, but also served to re-member them each 
year at the Panathenaea, reinforcing the idea that the story must be retold and acted 
upon politically in order to prevent such a collective trauma from occurring again. 
In this chapter, the locus for Athens’ ‘re-membering’ of those political foundations moves 
from the Panathenaea to the City Dionysia. As stated in the Introduction, this thesis is not 
looking for an evolving political sophistication across the texts studied but there is, 
inevitably, some kind of teleological narrative here. Tragedy was the aesthetic successor 
to epic, its plots built on ‘slices from Homer’s great banquets,’ and ‘the adoption and 
adaption of the epic timbre … central to the force of tragic language.’401 However, as 
Haubold suggests, if the epic laoi ‘expose the incurable vulnerability of social life,’ the 
classical laoi rather ‘celebrate its successful transformation.’402 These classical laoi, the 
laoi of tragedy, mark the transition from pre-political society to political society and are 
associated with the foundation of the polis or its institutions.403 In this way, the City 
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Dionysia and the tragedies staged in it, represent the institutional fulfilment of epic’s 
foundational narrative. 
This chapter will explore the ways in which the Trojan Women uses memory, similarly, to 
establish and authorise Hecuba’s narrative of the Trojan War. I will discuss the notion that 
just as, in the Odyssey, where Odysseus, aided by Zeus and the narrator, attempts to 
control interpretation of his story, so in the Trojan Women, Hecuba narrates and stages 
her own tragedy. In the first stage of this analysis (2.2) I will use trauma theory to explore 
the ways in which Euripides establishes the authority of Hecuba’s narrative and the 
reasons why the audience might be so receptive to and accepting of this authority. In the 
second (2.3), I will examine the ways in which Hecuba remembers publicly—making the 
personal political and vice versa—exhibiting and harnessing tropes of traumatic behaviour 
in order to create a ‘community of feeling’ in the theatre and so, to generate sympathy 
for her political interpretation of events. The third stage (2.4) focuses on the idea that 
Hecuba’s memory-narrative is one of exclusion and blame, which emphasises Greek 
duplicity and cowardliness and eschews all culpability on her own part and on the part of 
Troy as a whole, instead casting blame onto Helen. As part of this, I will examine the ways 
in which this narrative is constructed and supported by the play in such a way that it 
achieves dominance. As in the case of Chapter 1, where memory was seen to support and 
to challenge the Odyssey’s normative message, this section will also analyse the ways in 
which an understanding of memory and trauma theory can help to deconstruct Hecuba’s 
dominant narrative. As part of both processes—of remembering with and against 
Hecuba—I will examine the role played by the audience’s cultural memory of myth, 
Homeric epic and of other tragedies, such as Euripides’ Hecuba. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 
provide close analysis of this last idea using firstly, the agōn and secondly, Hecuba’s 
relationship with Odysseus. 
The use of LaCapra’s theory of ‘empathic unsettlement’ in this analysis ultimately 
provokes wider questions about the ways in which empathy affects the performance of 
politics and the law in fifth-century BC Athens. In considering the empathic response to 
Hecuba which the onstage audience demonstrates and which the theatre audience might 
reasonably be expected to feel, this chapter explores the ways in which Hecuba 
orchestrates a collective response to her narrative, drawing on forensic rhetoric, familiar 
poetic and mythic tropes and the language of traumatic testimony. It also explores the 
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potential dangers for a political system which relies upon juridical responses to such 
narratives in its political and legal arenas. Finally, it suggests that for the theatre 
audience, recollection of the ‘living moment’ of watching and responding to the play 
provides a means of resistance to the dominant interpretation of events imposed by 
Hecuba. By exposing the mechanisms of memory and the political manipulation involved, 
it offers a glimpse of a politics which might be less binary and more embracing of 
complexity. 
The rest of this introduction discusses the theory and criticism that informed this chapter. 
This will take place over four subsections, the first three focusing on theory and the 
criticsm of tragedy in general, the last, focusing on the Trojan Women specifically. Much 
of the theory which underpins the chapter was discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 
1 but here, the performance and orchestration of the traumatic response are of greater 
importance, alongside LaCapra’s theory of empathetic unsettlement. As I will suggest in 
the first subsection below, one effect of approaching tragedy using this framework of 
memory theory is that it provides a way of synthesising or transcending the traditional 
and entrenched ‘aesthetic’ and ‘political’ approaches to tragedy which dominated tragic 
scholarship for so long. In this, as I will show, it builds on recent work by scholars such as 
Victoria Wohl and Elton Barker. The second subsection outlines my methodology with 
regard to constructing the audience response which is so central to my investigation. In 
this, it uses theories of memory and postmemory. The third subsection focuses on the 
political and legal rhetoric which also plays a vital part in the play and in my analysis of it.  
 
i) Politics and aesthetics in tragic criticism    
Though this chapter will not focus on the deep divisions within tragic scholarship it is 
useful to outline them here to show my indebtedness to both and my departure from 
them. On the one side, Malcolm Heath has suggested that while it is not impossible or 
unlikely that Greek tragedy had intellectual (political or religious) resonances for its 
audiences, ‘it may be that our concern with the ideas of tragedy too often becomes in 
practice a preoccupation overwhelming our awareness of tragedy as a vehicle for 
emotional stimulus.’404 He does not deny that an audience’s response to tragedy must 
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contain an intellectual element but states, on the basis of his analysis of ancient sources 
such as Hesiod, Homer, Plato and Aristotle, that the tragedian’s ‘overriding task—the one 
on which competitive success would depend—was to satisfy an audience that looked for 
emotional stimulus and aesthetic satisfaction.’405 In a similar vein, Nicole Loraux has 
argued that the ‘mourning voice’ of tragedy appeals to something essentially human in its 
audience rather than essentially civic.406 It finds its truest expression in a cry of pain 
rather than in the logos of political life. 
On the other side, scholars such as Paul Cartledge, Simon Goldhill and Edith Hall have 
seen the classical Athenian theatre as an extension of its law courts and propounded the 
idea that ‘to be in an audience’ in classical Athens ‘is above all to play the role of 
democratic citizen.’407 According to this political reading of tragedy, the audience is allied 
to the voting caucus in the assembly and the jury of the law court in the way that it sits in 
judgement not only on the quality of the dramatic performances on offer at the Great 
Dionysia, but also on the agonistic debates represented on stage and often (especially in 
Euripides) conducted in the language of the court, or even as quasi-trials. Such an 
approach to tragedy raises questions about civic identity and public discourse in the 
context of a major public festival in the political calendar. 
Although neither Heath nor Loraux rejects the claim that tragedy can have both aesthetic 
and political effects, in privileging one over the other to such a degree, their 
interpretations—though useful and informative for this study—are reductive. What 
Victoria Wohl suggests—and what this thesis builds on—is, rather, that tragedy’s power 
to evoke strong emotions is central to what makes it political.408 This comes down to the 
way that Euripides’ plays ‘shape political sensibilities, create political attachments, 
structure political feelings.’409 My reading relies on Wohl’s to a point but departs from it 
in a crucial respect. For me, the theatrical experience is not limited to ‘the living moment’ 
of watching the play in the theatre but must also include the period of reflection which 
follows. It is in this period, when the audience remembers their strong emotions, reflects 
on why they felt them and remembers alternative arguments presented, for example, by 
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less sympathetic characters and forgotten in the heat of the moment, that debate is truly 
internalised and realised.410 It is this combination of heightened emotion, swayed by 
memory, followed by reflection, informed by memory, which, I suggest, structures the 
audience’s political engagement with Euripides’ plays. 
Pat Easterling has argued against this separation between the emotion of the ‘living 
moment’ and the intellectual reflection which an audience, civic or otherwise, might 
experience.411 In her discussions of the role of the chorus, she suggests that, as witnesses, 
the chorus’ ‘job is to help the audience become involved in the process of responding’ to 
emotional, intellectual or philosophical issues.412 One example she gives of this is in 
relation to the protagonist’s anagnōrisis. Here, her argument is that Aristotle’s notion of 
catharsis consists of a ‘continuous whole’: the chorus directs the audience to respond to 
the protagonist’s tragic recognition with pity and fear but there is an intellectual stimulus 
contained in this recognition also.413  
However, as Easterling also suggests, ‘the guidance offered by a chorus may be quite 
elusive,’414 especially when the chorus is made up of people closely involved in the action 
of the play. In discussing Aeschylus’ Suppliants, for example, Vincent Farenga notes that 
‘the nature of the Danaid self is undecidedly cast between extra-political and political 
senses of identity.’415 On the one hand, this chorus ‘compel[s]’ the audience to respond to 
emotion and to intellectual reasoning that challenges civic discourse. On the other, they 
demand, with increasing insistence, ‘that Pelasgus and the Argives translate their 
dangerous plea for suppliance into the ultimate democratic discourse: a law in the form 
of a unanimous vocal vote (psêphos).’416 That is, at the same time as they challenge civic 
discourse, they demand for themselves the ‘ultimate’ confirmation that this discourse can 
offer. The solution which Farenga turns to in order to illuminate this ethical ‘obscurity’ is 
memory. The Athenians will remember that ‘these women … in the course of the trilogy 
turn from being objects of hybris into subjects (perpetrators) of violence when they 
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murder their Egyptian husbands on their wedding night.’417 The audience’s memory of 
the women’s wider story contributes to their understanding and interpretation of this 
problematic moment. 
Farenga does not refer to any split between experience and reflection here and indeed, I 
do not believe that there is one as such. As in Easterling’s characterisation of Aristotelian 
catharsis, I see the theatrical experience as comprising of both the moment in the theatre 
and the period of subsequent reflection: it is a continuous whole in which emotional and 
intellectual responses circle and inform each other. My reading, as Wohl’s, is also based 
on Aristotle, who depicted Euripides as the ‘most tragic’ of the tragedians precisely 
because his plots are of the kind most conducive to fear and pity.418 These emotions are 
transporting: to use the terminology of LaCapra, they are ‘unsettling’ (discussed further in 
the next subsection). They temporarily take the spectator out of their settled identity, 
allowing them to feel some of the emotion of another. While the audience may still retain 
a sense of themselves as spectators, if the drama is effective, this will be weakest when 
the emotion of the drama is at its most intense. Even were they to feel some discomfort, 
some sense that the emotion they are reflecting from the protagonists or the chorus does 
not ‘sit right,’ it is likely that they would not be able to articulate this fully until the effects 
of the strong emotion had diminished.  
Furthermore, the separation made between feeling in the moment and subsequent 
intellectual reflection can be misleading because often that period of reflection is also 
infused with strong feeling. In the Introduction, I discussed the destabilising power of 
involuntary memory to return and overwhelm the subject (p. 20) and this may well affect 
the nature of reflection. In addition to this, sometimes—and I believe this is key here—
the subsequent emotion one feels may well differ from that experienced in the moment. 
 
ii) Methodology: postmemory, empathy and audience response  
My methodology for this chapter is partly informed by Wohl’s. Her methodology for 
constructing audience response—discussed in the Introduction (p. 51)—is largely focused 
on emotional reactions, grounded in a mixture of her own responses and known ‘cultural 
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filters,’ with the caveat that these will, inevitably, not be comprehensive. My approach 
here builds on hers but also, in its consideration of the connections which ancient 
audiences might be expected to make, on Martin Revermann’s analysis of ‘theatrical 
competence.’ Here, through a study of paratragedy in Aristophanic comedy, he develops 
a theory of ‘stratification’ which, he suggests, is built into the plays themselves. According 
to Revermann, the plays are composed with stratified levels of audience competence in 
mind, the base line being ‘an awareness of the key visual and verbal markers of the 
genres,’ while at the highest level they presuppose knowledge of stock scenes, rival 
playwrights and their plays and the oeuvre of the poet.419 
To Wohl’s methodology, I also add the bank of memory, cultural memory and trauma 
theory already discussed at length in the Introduction and Chapter 1. As outlined in the 
Introduction (p. 43), this chapter sees cultural memory as the memory which is 
embedded deep in the history and mythology of the culture in, for example, myth, ritual 
practice and literature. Homeric epic—the main seam of cultural memory examined 
here—encompasses all three of these, ingrained as it was in the educational and ritual 
practices of the city. The chapter looks at how cultural memory of epic, in the specific 
context of classical Athens, shapes the portrayal and possible receptions of Hecuba. In 
this, although cultural memory is not fixed, the chapter sees it as a kind of intertextual 
reservoir on which both tragedian and audience might draw, defining and interpreting 
characters and actions within and against former, perhaps traditional, incarnations. 
Unlike memory, or communicative memory in Assmann’s terms, cultural memory is not 
comprised of first hand experiences. In this, though the generations are many times 
removed, it bears some important aspects in common with ‘postmemory,’ as described 
by Marianne Hirsch and these will be particularly relevant to this chapter. Hirsch 
describes ‘postmemory’ as:   
the relationship that the ‘generation after’ bears to the personal, collective, 
and cultural trauma of those who came before—to experiences they 
‘remember’ only by means of the stories, images, and behaviors among 
which they grew up. But these experiences were transmitted to them so 
deeply and affectively as to seem to constitute memories in their own right. 
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Postmemory’s connection to the past is thus actually motivated not by recall 
but by imaginative investment, projection and creation.420 
The events of both the Iliad and the Odyssey stand as collective foundational traumas to 
ancient Greek societies and they are recalled imaginatively and creatively in poetry and 
drama. In this sense, tragedy may be described as postmemory in itself. However, in 
another sense, the trauma expressed by the characters on stage in the Trojan Women 
may itself be transmitted to the audience ‘so deeply and affectively’ that they operate on 
the audience members as postmemory. The audience members are so imaginatively 
invested in the narratives they hear and they sympathise so closely that they begin to lose 
the boundary between personal and vicarious experience. This is something explored in 
both psychological experiments in collective memory and in the theory of traumatic 
memory. 
In terms of psychological collective memory, this idea of empathy and reflection 
corresponds to the experiments discussed in the Introduction (p. 36), which suggest that 
collective memory and induced forgetting may be attributable to the way in which we 
empathise (or not) with a speaker.421 According to such studies, empathising with a 
speaker leads us to remember ‘with’ them; that is, our memories are guided and formed 
by their memory-narratives. In such cases, we are less likely to notice or question 
omissions and elisions than if we do not empathise. These omitted or elided ‘facts’ are 
not erased but are mentally inaccessible immediately after the ‘event’ of listening, only 
returning when the rush of feeling for the speaker has subsided.  
In terms of trauma theory, in writing about the Wilkomirski affair,422 Andrew Gross and 
Michael Hoffman suggest that the ‘prescribed’ audience response to traumatic testimony 
‘is sympathy or personal identification rather than criticism.’423 As I will in my analysis of 
Hecuba, they link ‘the affect of testimony,’ which they describe as ‘its emotive power,’ to 
its ‘authority.’424 Here, they define ‘authority’ as a ‘subject position made unquestionable 
by virtue of its suffering.’425 They are critical of the fact that a response of unquestioning 
‘sympathetic moral righteousness’ seems the only acceptable response to traumatic 
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testimony. Such a position reflects an emphasis on the personal over the political and in 
this, the cognitive response is displaced by affect, resulting in the fact that serious 
questions about why genocide happens are not asked.426  
These theories—of postmemory, of collective memory and of traumatic testimony—tend 
toward the notion that the affective nature of memory narrative leads to the impairment 
of the audience’s cognitive faculties and destabilises their sense of self. This is something 
explored further in LaCapra’s theory of empathic unsettlement. LaCapra’s theory in itself 
unites the emotional and the political response. This theory, which posits an imaginative, 
vicarious experience of trauma on the part of those witnessing the traumatic testimony of 
others, suggests that our own sense of self is ‘unsettled,’ though not displaced, by the 
experience. In turn, this ‘raises problems bound up with one’s implication in, or 
transferential relation to, charged, value-related events and those caught up in them.’427 
In this way, LaCapra’s theory could be seen to provide a framework for thinking about 
Wohl’s audience and its emotional response which shapes and structures political 
allegiances. The audience responds emotionally to the traumatised testimony of the 
protagonist and, in so doing, forms political allegiances with them, becoming implicated 
themselves in decisions which the characters make. LaCapra also discusses the political 
ramifications of ‘empathic unsettlement,’ suggesting that ethical and political change 
depends on a ‘reeducation’ regarding the nature of affect in normative judgement. 
I suggest that by thinking about Euripides’ plays in the light of empathic unsettlement and 
the psychological studies outlined above, they might be seen to offer such a ‘reeducation’ 
by highlighting the extent to which empathy leads to uncomfortable alliances—a 
discomfort which may only become apparent or articulated as the initial rush of empathy 
for Hecuba wanes after watching the play. Chapter 1 touched on this in its examination of 
the audience’s possible response to Odysseus’ revenge on the suitors but Euripides 
problematises such things more overtly by emphasising the legal and ethical ambivalence 
of perpetrators and onlookers: in Medea’s murder of her children, for example, in 
Orestes’ attempted murder of Helen, or in Hecuba’s murder of Polymestor’s children and 
maiming of Polymestor himself.428 
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iii) Rhetoric and the law court  
If the audience’s political engagement is structured by emotional response and 
subsequent memory, the dramatic stimulus for this response in the Trojan Women comes 
from the characters’ use of rhetoric. Unease concerning the effects of ‘clever’ speech – 
specifically, the notion that listening to such speech can lead one to ‘forget’ (λανθάνω) – 
is evident in the Homeric poems. At Iliad 22.281-82, for example, Hector accuses Achilles 
of being someone both ready with and clever or wily in speech who spoke ‘to make him 
afraid and so to forget his valour’ (ἀλλά τις ἀρτιεπὴς καὶ ἐπίκλοπος ἔπλεο μύθων / ὄφρά 
σ᾽ ὑποδείσας μένεος ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι); while at Odyssey 1.56-57 Calypso ‘ever with soft 
and flattering words … works to charm [Odysseus] to forget Ithaca’ (αἰεὶ δὲ μαλακοῖσι καὶ 
αἰμυλίοισι λόγοισι /θέλγει, ὅπως Ἰθάκης ἐπιλήσεται). It is understood in both of these 
examples that clever or flattering words may lead to one forgetting what, in that 
moment, is most important and this is an anxiety which Euripides explores.  
On this basis, much of the chapter rests on the idea that the plays’ testimonies are 
consciously rhetorical, delivered with the intention of winning over listeners to a 
particular point of view. Therefore, my study draws on scholarship by Buxton and Goldhill 
on peitho in tragedy and, more particularly, on Johnstone’s analysis of Athenian litigation 
practices in the fifth and fourth centuries BC.429 In his analysis of peitho in tragedy, Richard 
Buxton outlines the clear connection between rhetorical persuasion and democracy. He 
writes that whereas in epic poetry persuasion is clearly the prerogative of kings, classical 
Athenian democracy institutionalised the public judgement of disputes and so peitho 
became an important tool of the democratic citizen. Buxton states that peitho is not 
specifically bound to language and that it is also used of sexual seduction and this is an 
aspect of peitho which Goldhill stresses in his analysis of the Trojan Women. Here, 
Goldhill suggests that, while Hecuba ‘wins’ the agōn based on her superior arguments, 
the connotation throughout is that Helen’s beauty and sexual allure, of which Hecuba 
warns Menelaus so many times, will actually be the persuading force in the end.430  
While Buxton and Goldhill specifically discuss persuasion in tragedy, I have found 
Johnstone’s work on rhetorical narratives in the fifth and fourth century law courts most 
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useful for this study. In his extended examination of classical Athenian forensic oratory, 
Johnstone explores the narratives and gestures that form the bases of the litigation 
speeches of defendants and prosecutors and it is with these aspects of peitho that I will 
be most concerned here. Johnstone introduces his study by stating that ancient Athenian 
litigation was, by its nature, an adversarial conflict between two litigants with no legal 
‘experts’ such as lawyers or judges, but rather a jury of citizens whom each litigant 
needed to persuade.431 In addition to this, even when the history between the litigants 
might be fraught with hostilities on both sides, the litigation itself centred on a single 
transgression made by one against the other.432 As a result, he argues, conflict was 
simplified by being sharply dichotomised. Each speaker attacked the authority of the 
other but the jury’s decision lay less with objective or provable truth and more with the 
litigants’ ability to create ‘the type of story that jurors would recognise as true’ or with 
their ability to convince the court of their good citizenship outside the realm of the 
trial.433 These are, in Johnstone’s words the ‘strategies that rhetorical language used to 
conceal its status as rhetoric.’434 These strategies will inform my analysis of the litigants’ 
testimonies in the Trojan Women. 
Finally, my Introduction briefly outlined the link between the legal and the political as this 
thesis sees it,435 but this link is so central to this chapter that it is worth justifying my 
focus on the courts in slightly more detail. Simon Goldhill writes:  
For dikē is one of the dominant terms in the public discourse of fifth-century 
Athens. The role of the law courts and the law (nomos) is regarded by the 
ancient writers (as well as modern historians) as essential to the 
development of the political system of democracy. The general publishing 
and discussion of laws, the equality of citizens before the law, the citizens’ 
part in the adjudication of cases, the citizens’ duty to uphold the city’s laws 
– the movement away from the authority of an individual ruler in the 
process of decision-making towards the idea of the sovereignty of the city 
and its laws – are major topics in the discussion of the growth of democracy 
and democratic ideology.436 
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By dramatising a quasi-courtroom, with an individual ruler/judge presiding, yet with traits 
recognisable from the contemporary courts, Euripides invites his audience to reflect on 
their part as citizens in adjudication as well as on the problems inherent in the 
contemporary systems for making the laws and dispensing justice. Furthermore, this 
chapter will suggest that the Trojan Women demonstrates the potential dangers in any 
system—legal or political—which dichotomises conflict and requires the citizen to judge 
between two opposing speeches.  
Thus far I have outlined my approach to tragedy and the place and potential of a 
memory-based investigation of tragedy within the canon of tragic criticism. I have also 
discussed the key theoretical texts which inform my investigation. The final introductory 
subsection will address the place of this chapter within the field of critical work on the 
Trojan Women. 
 
iv) Politics and rhetoric: critical approaches to the Trojan Women 
Scholarship on the Trojan Women tends to revolve, firstly, around the use of rhetoric and, 
typically, centres on the agōn scene in which Helen and Hecuba serve as defence and 
prosecution litigants in a trial for Helen’s life, in front of Menelaus as judge.437 Often, 
emotional issues are overlooked in favour of a cold, analytical approach to the logical, 
point by point nature of the arguments and the contemporary philosophical concerns 
about truth and religion which are alluded to in Helen’s and Hecuba’s words. Scodel, for 
example writes that ‘Troades balances its emotional pathos with a large component of 
dry and analytic rhetoric.’ She and others suggest that the rhetorical tone of the agōn, 
together with inconsistencies in character and style set it apart from the rest of the 
play.438 Scodel’s approach is consistent with scholarship on the Euripidean agōn in 
general. In his study of this, Michael Lloyd suggests that in Euripides’ plays, the agōn is 
nearly always ‘marked as a distinct and separate section’ in contrast to Sophocles’ 
tragedies where the agōn is less formally marked and therefore, integrated more 
naturally.439 
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Secondly, scholarship revolves around its politics: that is, whether it is pro- or anti-war 
and whether it constitutes a comment on contemporary events in Melos. Some scholars, 
Gilbert Murray, Peter Burian and Isabelle Torrance, for example, read the Trojan Women 
as uncompromisingly anti-war and in doing so, they are, as I will go on to show, 
undoubtedly influenced by the emotions aroused in them by viewing the women’s 
suffering and hearing Poseidon’s supposed indictment in the Prologue, on those mortals 
who sack cities.440 Other political interpretations such as that by Neil Croally offer a 
slightly more cautious approach. Croally suggests that the play is provocative of questions 
about political concerns concerning Melos but does not offer concrete political views. 
Nonetheless his stance is still essentially that Euripides is anti-war in general, if not 
specifically criticising the events of Melos: that he raises questions in order to provoke a 
re-evaluation of ‘the criteria used to judge victory and the value that should be attached 
to it’ and the ‘unstated principles which inform the traditional construction of war.’441 On 
the other side, some argue, still regarding Melos, that we should not be misled by such 
modern day scruples about ancient Greek warfare: that the slaughter of men and the 
enslavement of women would have been viewed pragmatically by contemporary 
audiences as the inevitable consequences of war in which the more powerful state had to 
enforce its might to prevent a future challenge to its power.442 
This chapter does not see the politics of the Trojan Women in terms of those events in 
Melos, but rather takes its inspiration from Thucydides’ representation of the debate 
regarding Mytilene. According to Thucydides, the Athenians first voted in the assembly to 
sack Mytilene, killing its men and enslaving its women and children, but the following day, 
heard further debate and reversed their decision.443 That is to say, rather than 
commenting on extra-theatrical events, I argue that the play focuses on the democratic 
process of coming to collective judgement and of the inherent problems and weaknesses 
in this system. As discussed above, it does this through an examination of the way in 
which empathy affects memory and unsettles our cognitive faculties. 
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This chapter unites these scholarly concerns of politics and rhetoric but interprets them 
rather differently. With Elton Barker, it sees the agōn as an integral part of the play’s 
politics, not only in the issues it rehearses but also in its formal structure.444 This is not, as 
many have construed it, because it mirrors the democratic process of agonistic speech, 
forcing the audience to take sides in the debate: it is, as the chapter will demonstrate, 
obvious whose side the audience should be on. Rather, it incites reflection on the very act 
of taking sides and the processes by which we make these decisions. The chapter suggests 
that the agōn in the Trojan Women functions as a kind of case study for the way that the 
politics of empathy work in practice, but that in this, it is integral to the themes and 
character arcs of the drama as a whole. Hecuba’s most obviously rhetorical speeches in 
the Trojan Women (e.g. those in the agōn) are driven by emotion, with an expected 
emotional response from her audience, while her most emotional outpourings are 
consciously rhetorical and political in intent. In both cases, this rhetoric is formed around 
the way in which she remembers and endeavours to provoke others into remembering 
‘with’ her. When the audience responds to Hecuba emotionally, it often loses sight of – or 
forgets – alternative ‘rational’ arguments made by other, perhaps less sympathetic, 
characters, or contradictions which may make us question the validity of Hecuba’s words.   
Through this analysis and a further examination of how cultural memory of epic intersects 
with this discussion, I hope to offer a more nuanced approach to political and aesthetic 
readings of the Trojan Women, one that reveals politics as something messily emotional 
and far from binary. This is only emphasised by the formally and artificially polarising 
structure of the agōn. Through a study of remembering and forgetting, I suggest that we 
might understand the play as political, not because of any political message – anti-war or 
otherwise – that it contains, but because it offers a model by which Euripides’ audiences 
might process, understand and engage with contemporary politics.445 
This introduction has discussed possibly audience responses to tragedy in the light of 
their emotional and imaginative investment in the drama and the resulting dissociation 
between cognition and affect. It has suggested that this is no accident with regard to the 
Trojan Women but that, through Hecuba’s use of emotionally driven rhetoric, the play 
draws attention to the rhetorical strategies employed in actual courts and in the 
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assembly. It has further proposed that the play offers a reflection on the processes of 
collective decision making within the Athenian democracy.  
I stated at the outset that this chapter would explore the ways in which the Trojan 
Women uses memory both to authorise and to undermine Hecuba’s narrative of Troy, 
and in particular, Troy’s destruction. I have also suggested above that her authority and 
persuasiveness is such that many have taken it to be the narrative of the play. This next 
section of the chapter addresses the ways in which theories of traumatic memory and 
testimony help to construct a model for the victim-as-authority, how Hecuba conforms to 
this model and how the audience’s memories of the Iliad aid in its construction.  
 
2.2 Hecuba: the authority of the traumatised victim 
Before addressing the establishment of Hecuba’s authority, it is necessary to clarify the 
sense in which I can speak about a ‘dominant narrative’ in connection with a dramatic 
performance where there is no privileged narrator as such and here I draw on John 
Gould’s Myth, Ritual Memory, and Exchange.446 Gould quotes Genette as stating that 
there is a ‘truly insurmountable opposition between dramatic representation and 
narrative’ but he overcomes this opposition using a detailed analysis of Oedipus 
Tyrannus.447 This play, he suggests, while it does not have an omniscient narrator, does 
show evidence of an ‘implied author,’ a ‘controlling and selective’ mind at work.448 There 
is a ‘regulation of narrative information’—a selection about what is left in and what left 
out—and our experience of the text is ‘guided.’449 Gould also points to the number of 
unprivileged, internally focalised narratives in tragedy: the messenger speeches, choral 
songs protagonists’ narratives.450 He concludes that the number of these narratives 
points to the fact that we cannot reduce tragedy to a ‘univocal reading,’ but rather the 
plethora of narratives enforces ‘our acceptance of narrative multiplicity.’451 Up to a point I 
agree with this conclusion; however, this chapter will suggest that Hecuba makes a play 
for just such a ‘univocal reading’ and that, to an extent, the play supports her in this 
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effort. Clearly, I do not mean by this that I see this fictional Hecuba as acting 
independently of Euripides. Rather, the speech that Euripides writes for her constantly 
and consciously tries to influence the narrative of the play to the exclusion of all other 
voices. 
To a large extent, Hecuba’s authority derives from the audience’s perception of her as an 
authentic figure of traumatic memory. Modern trauma theory helps to elucidate the 
symptoms of her trauma and the features of her traumatic testimony. In writing about 
testimony to trauma, particularly Holocaust trauma, Aleida Assmann writes:  
On the stage of ancient Greek tragedy, the witness carries the news of a 
catastrophic event as a messenger who has seen an extremely violent scene 
but has escaped to tell the story. … In the context of ancient and modern 
drama, the witness describes what cannot be brought onto the stage, in the 
name of those who are no longer able to speak for themselves. The division 
of roles between the one who experiences and the one who testifies 
becomes here a structural feature of the witness.452 
While the messenger speech reporting offstage trauma is undoubtedly a feature of Greek 
tragedy, this evaluation is not wholly representative of traumatic testimony in the genre 
and Hecuba is ‘testament’ to this. She was personally involved in the ‘catastrophic event’ 
of Troy’s destruction and not a detached bystander in someone else’s tragedy. Indeed, 
she is famed in the literary tradition for her suffering. As Mossman comments, Hecuba is 
‘the archetype of extreme unhappiness and misfortune from antiquity onwards.’453 
Although she wasn’t killed herself, we do not know what violence may have been inflicted 
on her and she did witness the murder of her husband directly. Because of this, we may 
see her narrative as an authentic testimony to trauma and as such, it bears much in 
common with observations about the testimony of modern trauma victims. 
According to modern trauma theory, the apparent authenticity of testimony also 
constitutes its authority. Often, this authenticity is evidenced by testimony other than the 
content of the victims’ speech. In his definition of trauma, LaCapra suggests that the 
trauma victim experiences ‘a dissociation between cognition and affect.’ By this he means 
that ‘in traumatic experience one typically can represent numbly or with aloofness what 
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one cannot feel, and one feels overwhelmingly what one is unable to represent.’454 The 
effect of this is that the victim’s verbal testimony is often punctuated by gaps in which 
their inarticulate emotion punctures the narrative.  
Trauma theory also suggests that the body of the victim bears witness to her/his spoken 
testimony. Assmann states that, ‘[h]aving been in the center of the action, the Holocaust 
witnesses have not come away unscathed, which is the reason why they testify not only 
verbally with their words, but also bodily with the symptoms of their trauma.’455 
According to John Durham Peters, this bodily testimony ‘serves as a sort of collateral to 
justify the loan of our credence.’456 In this way, authenticity and authority go hand in 
hand. If the victim’s bodily symptoms convince us that they have experienced trauma 
then their spoken narrative will have the ring of authority. Without this grounding in 
trauma theory, Barbara Goff discusses something similar in her study of Euripides’ 
Hippolytus. Goff writes that ‘[t]he death of Phaidra outweighs even the most powerful 
words,’ discrediting all Hippolytus’ avowals and allowing credence only to her version of 
the story written in her letter.457 The physical presence of Phaidra’s body, therefore, 
provides her narrative with an authority which Hippolytus lacks.   
In a similar way, trauma theory also suggests that authentic testimony such as this has an 
authoritative ‘ethical claim.’458 As Peters states, ‘Witnessing in this sense suggests a 
morally justified individual who speaks out against unjust power. …to witness means to 
be on the right side.’459 This does not negate the fact that testimony is still subject to all 
the pitfalls of memory discussed in the Introduction, but it does affect the manner in 
which it is likely to be received. 
Just as my exploration of trauma in connection to the Odyssey was discussed via the epic 
formula alaston penthos, as glossed by Nicole Loraux, so my discussion of Hecuba’s 
traumatic symptoms is also informed by Loraux’s analysis. In this case, Loraux focuses on 
the use of the word aei (‘always’) and the mourner in Euripidean tragedy, saying that ‘aei 
punctuates the unbreakable attachment of the weeper to her own tears’ and that the 
‘adverb finds its twin in the interjection aiai [most commonly translated as ‘alas’], in 
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which grief seems to be expressed in perfect immediacy without the mediation of 
articulated speech.’460 As with alaston (‘unforgetting’ or ‘unforgettable’), aei signifies the 
infinite grief of traumatic loss, a grief which dominates and defines the individual. In the 
terminology of trauma theory, aei expresses Assmann’s notion of trauma as ‘the form of a 
placeless and restless present that prevents closure’ and LaCapra’s definition that it 
‘disrupts or even threatens to destroy experience in the sense of an integrated or at least 
viably articulated life.’461 Even more significantly for Hecuba, as I will go on to show 
below, is that there is a sense in which this infinite, dominating grief ‘is an out-of-context 
experience that upsets expectations and unsettles one’s very understanding of existing 
contexts.’462 
Even Loraux’s interpretation of aei is inadequate to describe Hecuba’s grief as expressed 
in her first speech of the Trojan Women. Her words and actions here are expressive of 
deep, unresolved trauma: not mourning, as in Loraux’s analysis, but melancholia. Here, 
although she uses the phrase αἰεὶ δακρυων (‘endlessly weeping’), she does so in wishing 
that she could express her grief in such an endless lament. As Freud describes in his 
theory of ‘Mourning and Melancholia,’ she is unable to work through her grief via the 
process of mourning and so her grief remains internalised and dominates her psyche.463 
Her inability to articulate it or externalise it is suggested by her questioning τί με χρὴ 
σιγᾶν; τί δὲ μὴ σιγᾶν; / τί δὲ θρηνῆσαι; (‘What should I keep silent? What should I not 
keep silent? What should I lament?’). The all-encompassing nature of her grief is 
exhibited in her question τί γὰρ οὐ πάρα μοι μελέᾳ στενάχειν / ᾗ πατρὶς ἔρρει καὶ τέχνα 
καὶ πόσις; (‘What is there but wailing for me, whose fatherland, children and husband are 
gone?’). Here, she not only states that the mainstays of her existence have gone but also 
that what replaces them is her grief. As in the traumatic experience, her grief totally 
dominates her present, and perceived future, existence. 
As in the theory of trauma discussed above, Hecuba also shows verbal and physical 
manifestations of her traumatic experience. In her first speech, when counselling herself 
to accept and endure her situation and not to ‘set the prow of the ship of life / against the 
swell’ (μηδὲ προσίστη πρῷραν βιότου / πρὸς κῦμα), her memory of what she has lost 
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breaks through and her narrative of endurance collapses with an explosive and 
inarticulate αἰαῖ αἰαῖ of pain. We also know from Poseidon’s prologue that the actor of 
Hecuba is lying on the ground, crying (Ἑκάβην κειμένην πυλῶν πάρος, / δάκρυα χέουσαν 
πολλὰ καὶ πολλῶν ὕπερ, ‘Hecuba lying before the gates, shedding many tears for many 
reasons’)464 and in Hecuba’s own speech she suggests that she cannot move from this 
position, neither to raise herself up nor even to move from one side to the other in her 
lament. Rather, she speaks of her πόθος (longing or yearning) to turn her back from side 
to side.465 Her inability to move is, then, a physical symptom of her inability to express her 
grief in a(n endless) lament. In Freudian terms, like the melancholic patient, her ego is 
completely identified with those she has lost and as a result she is committed to her grief 
to the exclusion of all the activities of life. She is lying like one dead, on a sepulchre. 
In addition to this, Hecuba refers to her head as ἐκπορθηθεῖσ’ οἰκτρῶς (‘pitifully 
pillaged’).466 She is referring to her torn hair but the cause of this tearing is unclear. 
Cropping or tearing hair was a sign of ritual mourning but slaves’ hair was also cropped.467 
Both interpretations, however, accentuate the trauma of its occurrence. The word 
ἐκπορθέω is not used elsewhere to refer to hair cutting. This is no cutting of a ritual 
curl!468 It is an act of violence which either Hecuba has inflicted on herself or which has 
been inflicted on her by the Greeks. The term ἐκπορθέω is used by Poseidon a little under 
fifty lines earlier to refer to the pillaging of cities, as the Achaeans have pillaged Troy.469 
Hecuba’s use of the word here suggests that what Troy has undergone as a result of war, 
she has embodied in microcosm. 
This is one way in which the play makes of Hecuba a kind of figurehead for the traumatic 
memory of Troy. Hecuba and, by extension, her women are equated with the ‘destroyed’ 
city in the poet’s use of the verb ollumi to describe both. At the start of the play, Poseidon 
uses ollumi to describe the city as it lies smouldering, laid waste by the Argive spear (πρὸς 
Ἀργείου δορὸς / ὄλωλε πορθηθεῖσ’). Similarly, the Chorus use ollumi to describe their 
own condition as they ask the Muse to sing a tale of Troy, describing ‘how I was 
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destroyed, fell a wretched captive of the Argive spear because of the four-footed beast 
on the four-wheeled wagon (τετραβάμονος ὡς ὑπ’ ἀπήνας / Ἀργείων ὀλόμαν τάλαινα 
δοριάλωτος).470 These ‘destroyed’ women are an extension of their ‘destroyed’ city. They 
too are relics or ruins of Troy. 
This suggestion that the women and the city are equated is supported by the way in 
which Euripides uses memories of the Iliad in his characterisation of Hecuba as a kind of 
representative of the city. These memories conjure Hector as representative of Troy in its 
defence alongside Hecuba as its representative in its destruction. In the Iliad, the impact 
of Hector’s death is described as being ‘most like what would have happened, if all 
lowering/ Ilion had been burning top to bottom in fire’ (τῷ δὲ μάλιστ’ ἄρ’ ἔην ἐναλίγκιον 
ὡς εἰ ἅπασα / Ἴλιος ὀφρυόεσσα πυρὶ φμύχοιτο κατ’ ἄκρης).471 In his fall, the fall of the 
city is imagined because Hector ‘is’ the city.  
Now that Troy is ‘burning top to bottom in fire,’ it is Hecuba who stands for the city in her 
position as mourner. Not only are both Hecuba and Troy represented as ollumi, but both 
are described using the simile of a mother bird mourning for its lost chicks. The Chorus 
describes Troy as  
ἠιόνες δ’ ἅλιαι  
ἴακχον οἰμὸς οἷ-  
ον τεκέων ὕπερ βοᾷ,  
ᾇ μὲν εὐνατορας, ᾇ δὲ παῖδας,  
ᾇ δὲ ματέρας γεραιάς.472 
The sea shores 
- Like a bird wailing for its young -  
cry out, here for husbands, here for children,  
here for aged mothers. 
Similarly, Hecuba commences one of her laments with the words 
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μάτηρ δ’ ὡσεὶ πτανοῖς κλαγγαν  
ὄρνισιν.473 
Just as the mother-bird raises the cry  
for its nestlings.  
This equation of Hecuba and Troy in its time of mourning gains authority from the Iliad. 
Hector stood for Troy at the time at which its greatest need was protection; now, at the 
point of its total annihilation, its greatest need is for mourning and commemoration so 
that it might not be forgotten. As I will discuss in greater detail in the next section, just as 
Hecuba ‘led out the thronging / chant of sorrow’ among the women of Troy after Hector’s 
death in the Iliad (Τρῳῇσιν δ’ Ἑκάβη ἁδινοῦ ἐξῆρχε γόοιο),474 so now, she ‘begin[s] the 
chant’ (ἐξάρξω ’γὼ /κλαγγάν) for Troy.475 As the women pause on the brink of oblivion, 
Hecuba represents the Trojans in memory and mourning just as Hector once represented 
them in battle. 
One way of thinking about their display of grief at this time, might be that the women, 
with Hecuba at their head, embody what Loraux terms ‘a female figure of memory.’ 
Loraux dismisses the appropriateness of this term saying (in her analysis of Sophocles’ 
Electra) that  
If it were not for Achilles, whose mēnis is in all Greek memories, I would say 
that we have a female figure of memory, which the cities try to confine 
within anti- (or ante-) politics.476 
Here, she dismisses the idea of a ‘female figure of memory’ because Achilles’ alaston 
penthos for Patroclus is her foundational instance of the grief and anger caused by 
unforgetting. However, I argue that the case of Hecuba is different and makes the label of 
‘female figure of memory’ entirely appropriate. Achilles’ grief is private, although its 
effects are public. It is grief for a loved one. Clearly Hecuba and the women also grieve for 
loved ones but beyond this, they grieve for their city and their culture. The choral odes of 
mourning range through Troy’s history: the building of its walls by Poseidon and Apollo, 
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alluded to in their mention of ‘Phoebus’ stonework’ (τυκίσματα Φοίβου),477 its first 
destruction by Telamon and Heracles,478 and the daily lives they led in the city, 
performing its rituals and worshipping its gods.479 In this way, study of the Trojan Women 
brings to mind Marianne Hirsch and Valerie Smith’s exploration of the relevance of 
feminism to studies of collective memory.480 They write:  
What a culture remembers and what it chooses to forget are intricately 
bound up with issues of power and hegemony, and thus with gender.481 
In slaughtering the Trojan men, carrying the women off to the far corners of the Greek 
world and destroying the buildings of the cities, the powerful Greek force is choosing to 
erase the memory of Troy from history. Hecuba and the women are, therefore, the last 
embodiments of the cultural memory of Troy but this is memory rendered (almost) 
entirely powerless. As in Loraux’s description, the women are confined within ‘anti- (or 
ante-) politics’ not just because they are excluded from political life as women, but in 
their position now as slaves. Memory of Troy is literally the prisoner of the Greeks. 
This section has argued that Hecuba’s authority in the play comes from her position as an 
authentic victim of trauma. She manifests and acts out traumatic symptoms which lend 
credibility to her role as such and her authority is shored up by memories of the Iliad. 
However, although this position suggests vulnerability, Hecuba is not entirely powerless. 
As the trauma theory discussed above suggests, it is from her position as victim that 
Hecuba gains authority as a spokesperson and, as representative of Troy, she speaks with 
the authority of the Trojan civilisation. While this section has focused on exploring 
Hecuba’s authoritative victim status, the next section investigates the power she finds in 
her traumatised state. The narrative of victimhood and suffering which begins with her 
first speech alone on the stage is communicated and shared in such a way that it comes 
to dominate the play and the audience’s experience of it. As in the case of Eupeithes in 
the Odyssey, whose alaston penthos mobilised an army,482 Hecuba’s communication and 
performance of trauma creates a community—not just on the stage but also in the 
theatre—and her orchestration of trauma provokes a collective, political response. 
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Perhaps the ultimate proof of Hecuba’s authority is that even though she and her women, 
and by extension the cultural memory of Troy, are prisoners of the Greeks, the memory 
of Troy has not only endured but has been preserved and tended by those very Greeks 
and their descendants. 
 
2.3 Hecuba: performing trauma and re-membering Troy 
This section demonstrates how, from her position as traumatised victim, Hecuba creates 
a community around her. The discussion takes place over three subsections. The first 
focuses on the rhetoric Hecuba uses and on the metatheatrical way in which she sets out 
her intention, conflating her role of queen with that of choral director. The second 
addresses this rhetoric from the point of view of communicative and collective trauma 
and the third explores the choral and possible audience responses to Hecuba. 
My use of the term metatheatre is drawn from Henrichs, who uses it to examine 
examples of choral self-referentiality.483 Crucially here, the self-referentiality is almost 
entirely on Hecuba’s part. It is she who was Queen of Troy and she who controls the 
community still. As I will explore below the chorus remain woefully innocent of their 
theatrical function.484 
 
i) Bringing the group together: rhetoric and metatheatre 
As Hecuba builds to the conclusion of her speech she calls on the ‘sorrowful wives’ 
(ἄλοχοι μέλεαι) and ‘ill-wedded girls’ (κοῦραι δύσνυμφοι) in the Trojan camp to bewail 
Ilium. There is already a metatheatrical element to her speech here in that she is, in doing 
this, effectively directing the chorus, calling them onto the stage. She also signals her 
intention for the rest of the play in these few lines. She uses the first person plural for 
cry/bewail—αἰάξωμεν—to show that from this point, mourning will be a communal task. 
She goes from being ‘alone’ with only the external audience in the theatre to creating an 
internal audience of the chorus: the other Trojan women. 
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There is a metatheatricality to her next words also, which is highly suggestive of the role 
she intends to take for the remainder of the play and also of the purpose which she 
intends the play to serve. She says 
ὅπως ἐξάρξω ‘γὼ 
μολπάν, οὐ τὰν αὐταν  
οἵαν ποτὲ δὴ σκήπτρῳ Πριάμου διερειδομένα  
ποδὸς ἀρχεχόρου πληγαῖς φρυγίους  
εὐκόμποις ἐξῆρχον θεούς.485 
In this way, I will lead 
the chant: not the self 
same as at that time when  
I leaned on Priam’s staff,  
leading the chorus with the with the stamp of my foot in Phyrgian time  
in loud celebration of the gods.  
The metatheatricality is particularly evident in Hecuba’s use of the word ἀρχέχορος, 
which I have translated literally as ‘leading the chorus.’ As she suggests, this will be her 
role over the course of the play: to lead the women in mourning, as she once led them in 
celebration. In so doing, she hopes to re-member Troy and the Trojan civilisation in the 
present day by creating a ‘community of feeling’ around her. The ways in which she goes 
about this are twofold and one is encapsulated here: she juxtaposes her past with her 
present in order to heighten her audience’s (or audiences’) sense of the suffering she 
endures in the present and will endure in the future. The other way she goes about this is 
that she performs traumatic behaviour, something I will come to in the next subsection. 
In this instance, Hecuba remembers her past in such a way as to redefine her present. Her 
speech up to now has focused on her powerlessness: as discussed above, she does not 
even have power over her own body. Now though, she frames her current leading of the 
mourning chant with the kind of rituals she once presided over. Priam’s staff is 
emblematic of her former power and status in the community and, although her 
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juxtaposition highlights her lack of such status now, there is a sense in which her 
behaviour mirrors her former life as a sort of echo or relic of that time. She does not have 
the staff of office, nor the husband-king and the chant is of mourning not of celebration, 
but it will still be Hecuba who leads it, who brings the Trojan women together. 
She has an immediate effect. Her chant brings the chorus of Trojan women—those who 
danced to the rhythm she beat out formerly—from their tents and it operates on them, 
as I will demonstrate, as a call to memory. The only thing which defines them as the 
‘Trojan women’ now is their shared memory of life as Trojans. Memory, therefore, binds 
the political community. As Justina Gregory suggests, in this their state of physical 
powerlessness, their reflections offer ‘not just a defense against psychic dissolution but a 
positive means of self-assertion and of maintaining communal ties.’486 As the group will 
shortly be divided and sent into slavery all around the Greek world, the brief period of 
this play operates as a kind of ‘last hurrah’ for memory and community before its utter 
fragmentation and loss, along with the burning of the literal remains of their city.  
More than this, however, there is the sense in her metatheatrical awareness here and 
elsewhere that Hecuba hopes this memory will bring a kind of epic kleos for Troy. In her 
initial call to the ‘sorrowful wives,’ she says that it is ‘smouldering Ilium’ which they must 
bewail (τύφεται Ἴλιον, αἰάζωμεν).487 She goes so far as to say later that had it not been for 
the misfortune brought on them by a god, ‘we would be invisible and not sung of by the 
Muses nor in the songs of later mortals’ (ἀφανεῖς ἂν ὄντες οὐκ ἂν ὑμνήθημεν ἄν / 
μούσαις ἀοιδὰς δόντες ὑστέρων βροτῶν).488 It is with an eye on future memory that 
Hecuba unites the women to sing of their past.  
This conclusion to Hecuba’s first speech, therefore, establishes four main tenets. Firstly, 
Hecuba is now acting as a leader, bringing together a community. Secondly, her 
behaviour in this is consciously manipulative. Thirdly, her reason for uniting this group is 
to re-member and memorialise Troy. Fourthly, she attempts this so as to generate 
empathy in her audience(s). The section so far has focused on establishing these tenets 
using Hecuba’s first speech. From here, it will explore in detail how they are developed in 
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the play as a whole and how Hecuba’s performance and communication of traumatic 
testimony contributes to her mission. 
 
ii) Hecuba: rhetoric and the communication of trauma 
I have suggested that the examples from Hecuba’s first speech discussed above are all 
typical manifestations of traumatic behaviour, which give Hecuba’s testimony authority. 
This section suggests that from here on, many of Hecuba’s traumatic ‘symptoms’ are 
narrated consciously, rather than exhibited unconsciously. This is not to deny that she is 
genuinely traumatised but rather to suggest that she is channelling her trauma into the 
generation of a collective reaction such as that theorised by Jeffrey Alexander.489 In this 
way, her response to trauma is communicative and is expressed rhetorically. In effect, 
rather than trauma obliterating Hecuba’s sense of self, as discussed above in relation to 
her first speech, it actually intensifies and magnifies it. 
Hecuba’s performance and communication of the affective authenticity of the victim is 
allied to her use of rhetoric. As stated above, Hecuba’s rhetoric in the agōn has already 
received much critical attention but this chapter suggests that her use of rhetoric is 
prevalent throughout the play and its insidious nature, together with the way it builds is 
integral to my interpretation of the play’s unity.  
The alliance of communicative trauma and rhetoric is something which has also been 
addressed in testimony theory, particularly that relating to the U.S. government’s 
response to 9/11 and their justification for the ‘War on Terror.’ Mitchum Huehls and 
Barbara Biesecker both comment on the rhetoric of pre-emption which drove President 
Bush’s speeches at this time. Huehls’ theorises that this is a result of needing to ‘identify 
new temporal forms’ which would enable America to move beyond 9/11’s traumatic 
effects.490 He states that the rhetoric of pre-emption ‘determines the future before it has 
a chance to occur.’491 One concrete—and highly contentious—result of this thinking was 
that the government felt it could justify the detaining of suspects at Guantanamo Bay 
without due process on the grounds that they were pre-empting future attacks.  
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Similarly, Biesecker analyses President Bush’s speech-making after 9/11 and focuses on 
his use of the future anterior in the sentence, ‘These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, 
but to disrupt and end a way of life.’492 She deconstructs this in two ways. She calls into 
question the ‘tightly controlled hallucination of a loss that is at once certain and 
indeterminate, both what always already is and what will have been.’ On the one hand, 
the President constructs the 9/11 attacks as attacks on American democracy. His use of 
the future anterior sees these attacks as part of a mission to ‘end a way of life’ which 
justifies an ongoing state of emergency in the country.493 On the other hand, she also 
discredits the President’s statement by addressing the ‘alchemy that is rhetoric’ involved 
in his use of ‘a way of life.’ By this, he clearly means the ‘democratic way of life,’ which 
had, she says, ‘been an object not only of “contemplation” but of persistent criticism and 
even rebuke in the recent past. By virtue of the President’s rhetoric, however, it 
reappears as the idealized object of the melancholic citizen-subject’s amorous 
embrace.’494 
Time is central to both of these analyses of the U.S. government’s attempt to orchestrate 
a collective traumatic response, allowing the government to implement special powers 
and to conduct a war which, some might speculate, had little to do with terrorism. As 
suggested in my analysis of the end of Hecuba’s first speech, Hecuba’s rhetoric is also 
governed by time and, in particular, by the way in which her present and her projected 
future are divorced from the expectations of her past. 
This element of rhetorical attention to past present and future arises in Hecuba’s first 
major address to the chorus which comes as Cassandra leaves to join Agamemnon as his 
bride. In what might be seen as a genuine symptom of her trauma, Hecuba falls to the 
ground in despair, echoing the start of the play and providing another example of her 
unexpressed feelings erupting physically. However, from this moment, she appears to 
make political capital of her situation. Her speech becomes markedly rhetorical, as 
evinced by the tricolon πάσχω τε καὶ πέπονθα κἄτι πείσομαι (‘all I suffer, all I have 
suffered and all I will suffer’).495 Lee, reflecting a more widespread critical response to 
Hecuba’s use of rhetoric, suggests that ‘the words are not suitable in Hecuba’s mouth in 
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her current sorrowful state,’ a kind of stylistic error, perhaps, on the part of Euripides. I 
suggest, rather, that it is entirely of a piece with Hecuba’s consciously manipulative use of 
the rhetoric of trauma and suffering in the play as a whole.  
Hecuba sets out clearly what she will do in the rest of the speech and why she will do it. 
She says: 
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν μοι τἀγάθ’ ἐξᾷσαι φίλον∙ 
τοῖς γὰρ κακοῖσι πλείον’ οἶκτον ἐμβαλῶ.496 
First I will sing my swan-song of my former blessings: 
in this way I shall inspire greater pity for my woes. 
This is another moment of metatheatrical awareness on Hecuba’s part, the evocation of 
pity being, in Aristotelian terms, one of the proper pleasures of tragedy.497 It certainly 
implies an awareness that she is choosing her words with care and that she intends them 
to have a particular effect. Her use of the word ἐξᾴδω, for example, means to sing out but 
is also suggestive of a last song and is, therefore, emotive in this.498 I suggest that, in 
addition, the word oiktos, meaning pity or compassion, carries the connotation of feeling 
or suffering ‘with’ someone. In this, it is closely related to empathy and carries the same 
potential for political affect—for unsettling our cognitive response and for forging new 
political allegiances—as discussed above.499  
In practice, the blessings of which Hecuba sings are brief in comparison to the description 
of her suffering in the recent past and those she imagines in her future. Besides saying 
that she was born of royal blood and married into a royal house’ (ἦμεν τύραννοι κἀς 
τύρανν’ ἐγημάμην),500 and that she gave birth to ‘the best of children’ (ἀριστεύοντ’ 
ἐγεινάμην τέκνα),501 the rest of her speech concentrates on the deaths of her children 
and of Priam and on the future she imagines for herself as a slave. She speaks of having 
‘cut [her] hair before the tombs of her sons’ corpses’ (τρίχας τ’ ἐτμήθην τάσδε πρὸς 
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τύμβοις νεκρῶν)502 and of her husband’s death: she ‘saw, with her own eyes, him 
slaughtered at the hearth’ (τοῖσδε δ’ εἶδον ὄμμασιν / αὐτὴ κατασφαγέντ’ ἐφ’ ἑρκείῳ 
πυρᾷ).503 However, although it is not a ‘swansong’ as such, the emotive nature of her 
imagined life as a slave is ratcheted up by her contrast of past and future. When she 
speaks of the lowly tasks her masters will put her to—keeping the keys as a porteress or 
making bread—she pauses between them to interject, ‘the mother of Hector!’ (τὴν 
τεκοῦσαν Ἕκτορα). This signals a rupture between her expectations of the future based 
on her past status as mother of the city’s most valiant hero and the (imagined) actuality.  
Later, when she hears that her grandson, Astyanax, is to be killed, a similar rhetorical 
performance of traumatic authenticity can be seen. When she hears of his impending 
murder, she says: 
   τί σ’ἐγώ, 
δύσμορε, δράσω; τάδε σοι δίδομεν 
πλήγματα κρατὸς στέρνων τε κόπους∙ 
τῶνδε γὰρ ἄρχομεν.504    
What can I 
do, unfortunate child? I can give you 
these strikes to my head, these blows to my breast, 
I have the power for that. 
These blows and strikes are ritual gestures of mourning but are also expressive of a 
traumatic response. The context here is powerfully suggestive of both, as in the case of 
Hecuba’s hair cutting earlier (p. 128). She is clearly anticipating her mourning for 
Astyanax’s body, but, at the same time, this is a physical reaction to the total 
powerlessness that she feels in the face of the events which overwhelm her. There is 
nothing that she can do to protect Astyanax or, as she goes on to say, the city. However, 
unlike her previous traumatic responses which have been pointed out by observers—
Poseidon at the start and the chorus when she falls to the ground—in this case, Hecuba 
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narrates her own symptoms. Here, she is not so overwhelmed by emotion that she 
cannot speak; indeed, her words are highly articulate of the powerlessness one feels 
when confronted by such outrage. 
Although she does not go on to contrast past and future here, she does so later when she 
receives Astyanax’s body. There, she contrasts his mouth ‘once so free with grand 
promises’ (ὦ πόλλὰ κόμπους ἐκβαλὸν φίλον στόμα) to its silence now.505 Then she goes 
on to recount one of these promises in Astyanax’s words, made as he clung to her robes: 
that, on Hecuba’s death, ‘I shall cut many locks of my hair for you and bring troops of 
friends to your grave and give you a loving address’ (ἦ πολύν σοι βοστρύχοων / πλόκαμον 
κεροῦμαι, πρὸς τάφον θ’ ὁμηλίκων / κώμους ἀπάξω, φίλα διδοὺς προσφθέγματα).506 
Instead, she says, ‘But I, an old woman without city, without children, will bury your 
pitiable, young corpse’ (σὺ δ’ οὐκ ἔμ’ ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ σὲ τὸν νεώτερον, / γραῦς ἄπολις ατεκνος, 
ἄθλιον θάπτω νεκρόν).507 This passage emphasises Astyanax’s former youthful innocence 
for pathetic effect. The fact that Astyanax clung to her robes is resonant not of his fear 
but of his vulnerability and the physical intimacy and trust of their former relationship.508 
His promises to her show the extent of his love but also highlight the unnaturalness of his 
early death—it should have been him burying her—something to which Hecuba also 
draws attention in her words that she, ‘an old woman,’ will bury his corpse. Furthermore, 
hearing his direct speech makes the contrast with his now-silent mouth the more 
emotive. 
These examples demonstrate the ways in which Hecuba self-consciously performs 
traumatic victimhood in order to elicit empathy and to create a community of feeling 
around her. In these examples, as I have shown, she narrates her traumatic symptoms, 
suggesting a self-awareness and a theatricality absent from genuine traumatic behaviour. 
In addition, her rhetoric is suggestive of the fact that what she wants here is for her 
audience to feel with her. As she herself states, she does this by contrasting the riches, 
the status and the love of her family in her past with the isolation, desolation and poverty 
of her present and future. She re-members her past and with it, her future. The following 
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section considers the reception—or possible reception—of her words by her internal and 
external audiences.  
 
iii) Chorus and audience: the response to Hecuba 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, in considering the effect of such 
speeches, it is instructive to consider the chorus. According to Gould, Euripides’ frequent 
use of a woman protagonist aligned with a chorus of women enforces a point of view 
‘from which the “heroic” world of men is seen as wholly alien.’509 According to Gould too, 
the alignment of a woman-protagonist with a chorus of women is grounds for his 
argument that the choral reaction cannot be read as reflective of the direct or 
uncomplicated reaction of the democratic community of the audience. In this, Gould is 
reacting against scholars such as Simon Goldhill, Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre 
Emmanuel Vidal-Naquet. Vernant and Vidal-Naquet’s account of the chorus suggests that 
it embodies ‘the collective truth, the truth of the mean, the truth of the [democratic] 
city.’510 This is set against the ‘excess’ of tragic protagonists who belong to an ‘absent 
world,’ representing the otherness of the heroic code as it appeared to the dramatists 
and audiences of the fifth century BC.  
Goldhill responds to similar arguments expressed by Gould elsewhere with the suggestion 
that we might still read the chorus as instructive for the democratic audience in that just 
because their voice is ‘other’ does not mean that it has no authority in tragedy. He writes, 
‘all response to tragedy involves projection, sympathy, idealization – a negotiation of “the 
other” to find meaning for the self.’511 While I agree with Gould that the voice of the 
chorus expresses collective memory—as I will show immediately below—I have already 
established that Hecuba wields considerable authority and I believe that the same is true 
of the chorus’ response, certainly in as far as they direct the audience to empathy here. 
The notion that this empathy has a political effect takes shape as Hecuba increasingly 
dominates the stage and all her encounters on it. Although this chorus and protagonist 
are women and ‘others’ in Athenian terms, they are not ‘others’ in the world of the play. 
As stated above, what Hecuba does is to re-member her social group. The city of Troy, its 
                                                          
509 Gould (2001), p. 385. 
510 Vernant and Vidal Naquet (1986), pp. 21-23 and 158-59; Gould (2001), pp. 381-387. 
511 For the chorus as representative of collective voice see e.g. Goldhill (1996), p. 253. 
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king and its heroes, are gone and only the women remain. They are outside as there is no 
oikos to which they should be bound, and they speak for themselves as there are no men 
to speak for them.512 From her position of relative powerlessness, Hecuba engenders a 
political community capable of creating a lasting memorial to their city and even, up to a 
point (as I will show in connection with the agōn), of influencing public decision making. 
This is no longer a group of ‘others’ outside the political community: this is the political 
community depicted in the play. What is more, the audience plays an active role in 
engendering this community as I will show below. 
When Hecuba’s individual memories of the luxury and status of her former life and the 
deaths of her husband and children become shared with the group onstage, they create a 
bond of common feeling which defines community. She is, in effect, reconstructing, or re-
membering the chorus’ Trojan identity based on a common experience of suffering. The 
chorus’ response to her words reveals their effectiveness in that her individual memory of 
loss and suffering provokes further memories from the group. Here, as Gould suggests of 
the chorus in general, because their identity is collective, based on the place in which 
they live/d or the purpose which they served, the traditional ‘I’ of the chorus offers a 
‘single univocal expression…to a group consciousness and to the experience and memory 
of that group.’513 It expresses a truly collective memory as they sing in unison the story of 
‘how I was destroyed and became a wretched captive of the Argive spear’ (Ἀργείων 
ὀλόμαν τάλαινα δοριάλωτος). Similarly, after Hecuba’s speeches over the body of 
Astyanax, the chorus exclaims ‘Ah, ah! You have stabbed me, stabbed me to the heart!’ (ἒ 
ἔ, φρενῶν / ἔθιγες ἔθιγες). The inarticulate sounds of grief and the ‘sobbing dochmiacs’ 
of the chorus’ words here express the fact that they have taken on Hecuba’s traumatic 
grief as their own.514 Collective memory and collective trauma unites the group in its 
adversity.  
A similar effect might take place in the audience. I have shown that Hecuba’s memories, 
juxtaposed with indications of her present and future suffering, create a community of 
memory and feeling onstage but they also create one in the theatre. The audience cannot 
but be moved by her account of the deaths of her numerous children, the butchery of her 
                                                          
512 As a contrast to this, Croally quotes Il 6.490-93 and Od 1.356-9 on women’s place being inside with their 
looms: Croally (1994), pp. 201-2. 
513 Ibid, p. 387. 
514 Quotation from Lee (1976), p. 268. 
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husband at their household altar, the capture of her city and her prognosis—contrasting 
past and present again—that she will be forced to ‘lay [her] shrivelled body on the ground 
to sleep, instead of on a queen’s bed’ (κἀν πέδῳ κοίτας ἔχειν / ῥυσοῖσι νῶτοις, βασιλικῶν 
ἐκ δεμνίων).515 Similarly, the passage regarding Astyanax’s corpse moves us not only as 
observers but as possible parents. Many in the audience will have been familiar with the 
childhood traits which she describes—the ‘grand promises’ for example—and many will 
have experienced the love, trust and intimacy her words convey. Her lament for the loss 
of ‘all those embraces, all the care with which I nurtured you, all those broken nights’ (τὰ 
πόλλ’ ἀσπάσμαθ’ αἵ τ’ ἐμαὶ τροφαὶ / ὕπνοι τε κοινοὶ φροῦδά μοι) may ring true for 
parents ancient and modern.516 In addition, many of Euripides’ contemporary audience 
will have known what it is to bury a child. For these reasons, the passage is calculated to 
arouse strong emotion. 
Clearly the audience does not share Hecuba’s suffering in the same way as the chorus 
does but it is likely, especially given the context of the play’s first performance, during the 
Peloponnesian War, that most of the audience’s lives would have been touched by it. 
Because of this, their empathy may be even stronger than that generated in a modern 
audience where for most of us, war happens at a distance. As a result of the choral action, 
and informed by their own extra-theatrical experience, the audience becomes part of a 
community of feeling in the theatre, what Loraux refers to as a kind of ‘theatrical 
allegiance.’517 For her, this is not to be equated with the ‘we’ of the civic body of Athens 
but rather it is a temporary union of individual humans, united in their shared emotions. I 
will come to the political ramifications which I see for this ‘temporary union’ below and to 
the audience’s dual nature as community of feeling and civic community.518 For now, it is 
important to recognise that the audience are not merely on the outside of this 
community, looking in and empathising, but are also invested—through their memories—
in the creation of this community. Just as Hecuba’s memories provoke the memories of 
her onstage audience, so the audience in the theatre remembers and re-members the 
stories of Troy as Hecuba revisits and reworks them. 
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In general terms, the audience may reflect back on moments in the Iliad which 
foreshadow the events of the Trojan Women: Andromache’s forecast, for example, that 
Astyanax will be thrown to his death.519 Most significant for this discussion, however, are 
the ways in which the Trojan Women adapts instances in the Iliad where characters 
remember the past, describe their present, and make projections for the future based on 
their experiences of these. Where these occur around Astyanax, the masculine society in 
the memories and projections of the Iliad sits in stark contrast to the feminine nature of 
those expressed in the Trojan Women. When Andromache imagines Astyanax’s future 
without his father in the Iliad, she contrasts his imagined future of deprivation with his 
past/present of luxury and plenty. She imagines that in the future, he will go ‘a needy boy 
among his father’s companions’ (δευόμενος δὲ τ’ ἄνεισι πάϊς ἐς πατρὸς ἑταίρους), while 
now he is accustomed to being fed on his father’s lap ‘only the marrow or the flesh of 
sheep that was fattest’ (μυελὸν οἰον ἔδεσκε καὶ οἰῶν πίονα δημόν).520 Astyanax’s 
past/present is dependent on his father’s status and indulgence of his son, whereas 
Andromache’s imagined future for Astyanax, without Hector, sees him begging in a 
community of his father’s former companions.  
When Hecuba receives Astayanax’s body in the Trojan Women, the imagined future she 
projects for him is also, like Andromache’s in the Iliadic example, one that is tied to the 
fortunes of his father. In Andromache’s example, Astyanax would have been deprived 
because of the absence of his father, whereas in Hecuba’s, he would have inherited his 
father’s wealth and status and died, like his father, for his city. However, in contrasting his 
past with his present, Hecuba says: 
δύστηνε, κρατὸς ὥς σ’ ἔκειρεν ἀθλίως 
τείχη πατρῷα, Λοξίου πυργώματα, 
ὃν πόλλ’ ἐκήπευσ’ ἡ τεκοῦσα βόστρυχον 
φιλήμασίν τ’ ἔδωκεν, ἔνθεν ἐκγελᾷ 
ὀστέων ῥαγέντων φόνος...521 
Poor child, how pitiable have the walls of  
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your father’s city, the towers built by Loxias,  
shorn the curls from your head which your mother often kissed  
and tended like a garden; the blood gurgles out from them 
where the bones are smashed… 
This is clearly an emotive description, one to which we might surmise any audience 
reacting with horror and pity but there is also a re-membering here. The walls which are 
responsible for Astyanax’s death are those of his father’s city. Though it might be 
overstating the case to say that there is any blame for Hector here, there is the 
connotation that these walls were part of the city of men, the city ruled by men and 
destroyed by men. In contrast to this, the luxury which Hecuba associates with Astyanax’s 
past is not that endowed on him by his father’s status, but the physical luxury of his 
mother’s love: he is not nurtured with food as in Andromache’s words in the Iliad, but 
rather by his mother’s kisses. In this feminisation, Hecuba’s re-membering is in line with 
her recreation of a Trojan community outside the city of men. That world is gone now. 
The final facet of Hecuba’s re-membering of Troy to address here before moving on to 
discuss the political ramifications of her memories is that Hecuba attempts to fix the 
memories of her internal and external audiences by embedding them in objects. This is a 
technique commonly used in epic, especially the Iliad, and one treated at length by 
Elizabeth Minchin in that context.522 Minchin writes that visual imagery is a powerful 
mnemonic aid for both the poet and the audience of epic.523 Of ‘souvenirs’ such as 
Andromache’s headdress or Agamemnon’s sceptre in the Iliad, Minchin states that 
‘[b]ecause the poet’s descriptions of these small treasures render the items themselves 
memorable, the occasions with which they are associated remain in our memories 
also.’524 They are reminders of events that pre-date the war.525 I have already mentioned 
several of these in passing but it is useful to consider them together so as to see them as 
part of a consistent rhetorical strategy. Hecuba describes how she used to lean on Priam’s 
staff as she led the rituals of Troy.526 Though the staff is absent, the mental image of her 
with this object is resonant, as I have said, of her former power and indeed, the loss of it. 
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526 See this thesis, pp. 132-34. 
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In receiving Astyanax’s body, she focuses in on parts of his body: his head with its former 
curls, now broken and bleeding and his mouth, once full of ‘grand promises,’ now 
silent.527 In so doing, she overlays the image of his broken, bleeding corpse with the 
image of the laughing, chattering, curly-haired boy of the past, intensifying, for the 
audience, the affective power of his death. 
Perhaps the object with which one can see this most clearly—the object in which most 
memory is invested—is Hector’s shield.528 This is because it carries a two-fold purpose: on 
the one hand it contains memories of Hector as Troy’s defender, while on the other, 
Astyanax is laid on it for burial. Hecuba twice addresses the shield as she might a 
person.529 The first time she does this, she describes it as Hector’s ‘protector’: it ‘kept safe 
Hector’s arm’ (Ἕκτορος βραχίονα / σῷζους’).530 It is the one, therefore, who protected 
Troy’s protector! For the audience, Hecuba’s description of the shield partly re-embodies 
the Hector of the Iliad—drawing on and simultaneously reshaping their cultural memory 
of him—as she looks at it. It ‘kept safe Hector’s arm,’ it bears the ‘imprint’ (τύπος) of his 
hand on the handle and its rim is marked with the sweat (ἱδρώς) ‘which so often dripped 
from Hector’s forehead as he pressed you against his beard amid the toil of battle!’ (ὃν ἐκ 
μετώπου πολλάκις πόνους ἔχων / ἔσταζεν Ἔκτωρ προστιθεὶς γενειάδι).531 The traces of 
Hector—the imprint of his hand and the sweat of his brow on the rim—re-embody Hector 
on the battlefield in all his sweaty, bearded physicality, in the imaginations of Hecuba’s 
audience. 
When she addresses the shield again a few lines later it is to embed it with memories of 
Astyanax also and these memories, she implies, will enhance the glory it gained from its 
association with Hector. With Hector, it was ‘the victorious mother of countless trophies’ 
(μυρίων / μῆτερ τροπαίων) but Astyanax’s corpse is its ‘adornment’ or ‘crown’ 
(στέφανος). Though she pictures the personified shield ‘dying’ with the boy’s corpse, she 
imagines for it a kind of immortal epic fame. She says that ‘though dead, dying cannot 
touch it’ (θανῇ γὰρ οὐ θανοῦσα σὺν νεκρῷ) since it is ‘far more worthy of honour than 
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the arms carried by that clever villain Odysseus’ (ἐπεὶ σὲ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἣ τὰ τοῦ σοφοῦ / 
κακοῦ τ’ Ὀδυσσέως ἄξιον τιμᾶν ὅπλα).532 
This section has suggested that Hecuba’s trauma, though it begins as something silent 
and incommunicable, becomes something powerfully communicative. The rhetoric with 
which she communicates it is powerfully emotive and has the effect of uniting her 
audience, both on- and off-stage, in empathy. Her last statement, that Astyanax is more 
worthy of the shield than Odysseus, ‘that monster of cleverness,’ at length, brings this 
chapter around to a discussion of the political import of Hecuba’s re-membering. 
Although her traumatic testimony carries the authenticity and authority of the victim, her 
memory-narrative is nonetheless creative and highly selective. It is also driven by blame 
and recrimination. The next section focuses on the political import of collective empathy: 
to empathise with Hecuba’s suffering and to become part of her ‘community of feeling’ 
may also be to accept her version of events: that Helen and the cowardly Greeks are 
responsible for her suffering.  
 
2.4 Using memory to challenge Hecuba’s narrative 
At the outset of this chapter, I stated that my study of memory would illuminate the ways 
in which Hecuba’s narrative is established and authorised in the play but also the ways in 
which her narrative might be deconstructed. Up to now, I have focused on the 
establishment and authorisation of Hecuba’s narrative and gestured towards the political 
import for the audience of being part of an empathic community which re-members the 
past based on the dominance of one narrative. The rest of the chapter will consider the 
ways in which Hecuba’s narrative might be challenged and the role which memory plays 
within this. Later, in section 2.6, this will involve an analysis of the ways in which the 
Trojan Women remembers the Odyssey. This section, however, uses Hecuba’s accusations 
against the Greeks and Helen as a case study in order to bring out the dangers of making 
political decisions based on empathic allegiances. The discussion is divided into two 
subsections, the first addressing Hecuba’s accusations against the Greeks and the second, 
her accusation against Helen. Both will continue to examine the ways in which the play 
endorses Hecuba’s narrative, even when characters appear to dispute it. 
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Before analysing Hecuba’s narratives, however, it is worthwhile at this point to bring out 
an aspect of trauma theory which my earlier discussion passed over. This concerns 
traumatic testimony and truth. Aleida Assmann writes:  
The survivors as witnesses do not, as a rule, add to our knowledge of factual 
history; their testimonies, in fact, have often proved inaccurate. This, 
however, does not invalidate them as a unique contribution to our 
knowledge of the past. Their point is less to tell us what happened than 
what it felt like to be in the center of those events; they provide very 
personal views from within.533  
As discussed in the Introduction, some trauma theory has been criticised for sanctifying 
traumatic memory by modelling it as a ‘truthful’ or accurate memory, the access to which 
is blocked because of trauma.534 Assmann suggests here that we should view traumatic 
memory with the same kind of reservations with which we would view any memory. It 
might give us a valuable insight but this insight reveals the effects of trauma more than it 
reveals an accurate account. In addition to detailing her suffering, which may be very real, 
Hecuba’s testimony is insistent and consistent in its appointment of blame and it is this 
which drives her narrative of, or memorial to, Troy’s destruction. Her need to apportion 
blame may be a symptom of her trauma, but, when the audience empathises with and 
remembers with Hecuba, they are complicit in re-membering the war in her image.  
Testimony, as Jones reminds us, is always a site of conflict.535 The need to state one 
version of events is always a direct result of needing to counter an alternative version. 
Hecuba’s testimony is explicitly designed to make her listeners feel with her, using the 
rhetorical strategies described above, against those who might argue to the contrary. 
Most obviously, those who might argue against Hecuba are the conquering Greeks and 
Helen, but once one becomes aware of her insistent attempt to dominate the Trojan 
narrative, one also sees how the play privileges her version over those offered by women 
in the encampment, notably Cassandra, Andromache and Helen.  
Because of this, Loraux’s ‘theatrical allegiance’ is not simply one of feeling, as she 
suggests, but also one of politics.536 At the very least, empathy blurs the boundary 
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between these fields. If their empathy with Hecuba leads the audience to become 
‘unsettled’ enough to take her part against the offending Greeks, they have entered into 
a political allegiance of sorts with her. Although she cannot take political action against 
them directly, the memorial which the play and, more specifically, her narrative creates of 
the Trojan War is not one that allows for Greek heroism of any kind. This not only 
challenges other narratives of Troy, such as the Iliad, but also has ramifications for the 
ways in which the receiving audience might think about the conduct of war more 
generally, especially pertinent for an audience involved at the time in the protracted war 
with Sparta. 
 
i) ‘An epitaph to bring shame on Hellas!’ 
I have already commented in some detail on the scene in which Hecuba receives 
Astyanax’s body, on the rhetoric with which she contrasts past, present and future, re-
members Iliadic memories and with which she seeks to re-embody the memories of 
Astyanax and Hector. It is also the moment at which Hecuba crystallises her disdain for 
the Greeks, a moment which, I suggest, has fuelled much of the ‘anti-war’ scholarship 
written about the play. The scene’s power comes from its emotional intensity but this 
subsection will suggest that Hecuba’s narrative of grief is a highly crafted piece of 
rhetorical speech, calculated to evoke pity in her audience rather than an outpouring of 
grief. Moreover, it will explore the notion that Hecuba’s trauma is always inseparable 
from her sense of blame and that accusations against the Greeks are tightly bound into 
her rhetorical lament.  
Hecuba conveys the enormity of the murder of Astyanax by describing it as καινός, 
sometimes defined as ‘new’ but here, ‘unprecedented.’537 She questions, μὴ Τροίαν ποτὲ 
/ πεσοῦσαν ὀρθώσειεν; (‘Did you fear that he would someday raise Troy again?) and 
suggests that their fear of this βρεφός (‘babe’) is contemptible and foolish. Later, at the 
height of her lament for Astyanax, she says: 
   τί καί ποτε 
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Polydorus). For an extended discussion of kainos, see D’Angour (2011). 
 149 
 
γράψειεν ἄν σε μουσοποιὸς ἐν τάφῳ; 
Τὸν παῖδα τόνδ’ ἔκτειναν Ἀργεῖοί ποτε 
δείσαντες;—ᾱἰσχρὸν τοὐπίγραμμά γ’ Ἑλλάδι.538 
What will the poet one day inscribe on your grave? 
‘The Argives once killed this child 
Out of fear’? An epitaph to bring shame on Hellas!  
I suggest that this is another metatheatrical moment in which Hecuba consciously shapes 
the response of her audience. In a similar way to her comment discussed above (see p. 
134) that the Trojan suffering ensures that they will be sung of in times to come, there 
seems to be an awareness here that they will be the subject of poetry. Both examples 
suggest also that this play is that poetic song of ‘one day’ in the future and if that is the 
case, then Hecuba herself is writing the script here. She is shaping the epitaph to 
Astyanax, a facet of her own memorial to Trojan suffering, in such a way as to bring 
shame on their Greek aggressors who have acted with cowardliness and needless 
brutality. 
Hecuba’s words here imply that she is not merely shaping or reshaping the audience’s 
memories of the past according to her version of events, but also their ‘future memories.’ 
According to Mark Currie, ‘[t]he present is the object of a future memory, and we live it as 
such, in anticipation of the story we will tell later, envisaging the present as past.’539 In 
this moment of ‘prolepsis,’ Hecuba anticipates some future moment when her story will 
be narrated and also, anticipates the shame that those Hellenes of the future—the fifth 
century BC audience—will feel at the Achaeans’ treatment of her family.540 
Hecuba’s words here seem to have shaped the critical response to the play which takes 
the line that Euripides espouses pacificism. Torrance, for example, also addresses the 
metatheatrical nature of Hecuba’s imagined epigraph for Astyanax but questions, ‘Who is 
the mousopoios writing an “epigram” for Astyanax if not Euripides in this tragedy?’541 She 
suggests that the ‘Trojan Women forces the audience to relive old [i.e. familiar from 
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poetry] events anew, one after another, through the sufferings of its victims,’ adding a 
perspective which was underplayed in epic.542 In connection with this, she discusses 
Euripides’ use of kainos as ironic, in that most of the things labelled as such are not new 
at all but familiar from epic, poetry and drama already and she points to this as Euripides’ 
warning that the audience should ‘contemplate the destructive nature of repeating the 
violence of past historical events.’543 
I suggest, rather, that Euripides political stance in the play is much harder to identify. I 
have established already that he seems to privilege Hecuba’s words in the drama but 
these can also be challenged by the audience’s memory which after the ‘living moment’ 
of watching the play will work independently of Hecuba’s narrative again. In the case of 
Hecuba’s vilification of the Greeks, the audience’s empathy for Hecuba at this time might 
lead them to forget the ‘truth’ that only a matter of a few hundred lines before, she was 
exhorting Andromache to commit the rest of her life to bringing up this same boy so that 
his offspring ‘might found Ilium anew,’ the very thing which the Greeks were anxious to 
prevent.544 Here, the period of reflection, of memory, is instructive both about how 
Hecuba’s rhetoric operates on us emotionally and politically but furthermore, about the 
possible dangers of emotive, rhetorical public speech more generally. 
 
ii) ‘Abhorred’ Helen 
While the last subsection focused on Hecuba’s accusations against the Greeks, this one 
addresses her vitriol against Helen. That Hecuba also holds Helen to blame for her 
suffering is evident from the first. In her opening speech, she not only refers to Helen as 
‘abhorred’ (στυγνός), ‘the dishonour of Castor and the shame of the Eurotas’ (Κάστορι 
λώβαν τῷ τ’ Εὐρώτᾳ δυσκλείαν) but also names her as ‘the murderer of Priam, the father 
of fifty children’ (ἃ σφάζει μέν / τὸν πεντήκοντ’ ἀροτῆρα τέκνων / Πρίαμον).545 Hecuba 
names Helen specifically as the reason why she is ‘wretched’ (μέλεος) and ‘run aground’ 
(ἐξοκέλλω).546 
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She warms to her theme later. In her first long address to the chorus, after comparing her 
past with her present and future she concludes that  
διὰ γάμον μιᾶς ἕνα 
γυναικὸς οἵων ἔτυχον ὦν τε τεύξομαι.547   
because of one woman’s marriage  
this is what falls to me and what will fall to me.   
All the past and future sufferings then, which she has just described—the deaths of her 
children over whose tombs she has cut her hair, the slaughter of Priam which she saw 
with her own eyes, her expectation that as a slave she will bake bread, keep keys and lay 
her shrivelled body of the ground never to see her children again—all of this is the fault of 
Helen and her marriage. 
It is in relation to Astynax’s death that Hecuba’s blame of Helen, as with her blame for the 
Greeks, reaches its climax. When Astyanax is taken away, the audience beholds her 
powerless: as discussed above (p. 138) the only thing she is able to do for him is to strike 
her head and her chest. However, when his body is returned to her for burial, she says 
   νῦν δέ σ’ ἡ θεοστυγὴς 
ἀφείλεθ’ Ἑλένη, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ψυχὴν σέθεν 
ἔκτεινε καὶ πάντ’ οἶκον ἐξαπώλεσεν.548 
   now, God-hated Helen 
has taken all this away from you, she has destroyed your life 
and has brought your entire house to ruin.  
Once again, according to Hecuba’s version of events, there is no other blame to cast here, 
no acceptance of a chain of events or that others may be culpable even in small ways. 
Helen is directly and entirely responsible for all that happened to Astyanax. 
It is clear, then, that in Hecuba’s memory-narrative of Troy, the war, the death and 
destruction and the overwhelming suffering of the remaining Trojans, is inseparable from 
the fact that Helen is to blame. The testimony she gives and the memorial she attempts 
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to establish thereby in the minds of those listening and watching, is not only of the ruin of 
Troy but of the gross iniquity of Helen. This is the narrative which is allowed to dominate 
the play.  
Cassandra’s is the first narrative offered to counter Hecuba’s. Cassandra enters singing, 
dancing and brandishing torches to celebrate her marriage to Agamemnon. In a way, her 
narrative is most easily discredited because of her mental instability, to which there are 
many allusions made, and because of her fantastical, even sophistic, account of the 
war.549 As she enters the stage, Hecuba refers to her as mainas (‘frenzied’), already an 
injunction to listen to her words with caution,550 while the chorus refers to her frenzied 
celebration as Bacchic with the word βακχεύουσαν. Her version of the war (368-405) 
posits the Trojans as victors because, while the Greeks died in a foreign land, away from 
their wives and children, with no one to give them proper burial rites, the Trojans died for 
and in their fatherland, buried properly by their families. She even goes so far as to say 
that Hector would not have won fame had the Achaeans not come and that Paris would 
have been unknown if he had not married Helen. Because Cassandra is so evidently 
disturbed, Hecuba has no need to offer an alternative argument here but her fall to the 
ground—possibly in a faint—overwhelmed by her sorrow and grief speaks volumes.  
Yet Cassandra’s account is not so easily dismissed. While those around her are right to 
see her ‘madness’ as connected to possession by a god, it is not Bacchus but Apollo—the 
god associated with prophecy—who has cursed her, as the cultural memories of the 
audience will inform them. Furthermore, they will know that her prophecies, while they 
contain at least an element of truth, must always be disbelieved. Because of this, the 
audience will realise at once, based on their knowledge of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, that 
her prophecies of doom for herself and the house of Atreus are all too true. While saying 
that she will not sing of it, she tells of:  
  πέλεκυν οὐχ ὑμνήσομεν, 
ὃς ἐς τράχηλον τὸν ἐμὸν εἶσι χἀτέρων∙ 
μητροκτόνους τ’ ἀγῶνας, οὓς οὑμοὶ γάμοι 
                                                          
549 For an extended discussion of Cassandra’s rhetoric, see Croally (1994), p. 122f and Goldhill (1986), pp. 
165-66. 
550 Eur. Tro. 307. 
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θήσουσιν, οἴκων τ’ Ἀτρέως ἀνάστασιν.551 
[I shall not sing of] the axe  
which will cut into my neck and others’ necks as well,  
and the agonies of matricide which my marriage will cause,  
and the fall of the house of Atreus. 
The narrative of the house of Atreus were so well known that Cassandra’s prophecies 
would have aroused memories of these events with ease and speed: Lee, for example, 
states that the word μητροκτόνος (‘matricide’) seldom occurs outside tragedy where it 
always refers to Orestes’ murder of Clytemnestra.552 Croally extrapolates from this that 
Cassandra must therefore be speaking the truth for the whole scene, that her account of 
the war is covered by the same curse and the same truth value as her prophetic 
utterances.553 And yet her account of the war is memory rather than prophecy and 
Cassandra specifically states that in giving this account, she ‘will, for all [her] frenzy, stand 
outside [her] daemonic fit’ (ἔνθεος μέν, ἀλλ’ ὅμως / τοσόνδε γ’ ἔξω στήσομαι 
βακχευμάτων).554  
So, the audience may be left in some confusion: first, Cassandra is proven to speak the 
truth but not to be believed; secondly, this curse only applies to her prophecy and not to 
her memory. Thirdly, one might also question whether speaking ‘outside’ of her 
daemonic frenzy makes her more or less believable. The very uncertainty, however, offers 
a challenge to Hecuba’s dominant narrative of suffering and victimhood.  
Having said this, in one important respect, Hecuba’s narrative is upheld by Cassandra’s 
account, frenzied or otherwise. Just as Hecuba blames Helen for the start of the war, so 
too does Cassandra. It was, she says ‘because of one woman’ (οἳ διὰ μίαν γυναῖκα) that 
the Greeks lost countless men.555 Because of this, although her narrative differs 
drastically from Hecuba’s in its tone of celebration in contrast to Hecuba’s tone of grief 
and suffering, in its essentials it still supports Hecuba’s account. 
                                                          
551 Ibid, 361-64. 
552 Lee (1976), p. 136. 
553 Croally (1994), p. 126. 
554 Eur. Tro. 366-67. 
555 Ibid, 368. 
 154 
 
Andromache’s narrative is less easily to differentiate from Hecuba’s because both are 
informed by the same rhetoric of suffering and victimhood. Though Lee views the 
stichomythic exchange with which it opens as ‘a duet lamenting their fate,’ one might go 
so far as to describe it as an example of competitive mourning.556 Indeed, Andromache’s 
accusatory question in response to Hecuba’s οἴμοι—τί παιᾶν’ ἐμὸν στενάζεις; (‘Why do 
you utter a lament that belongs to me?’)—seems to support this interpretation.557 They 
often speak across each other rather than in harmony. When, for example, Hecuba says 
‘O Zeus …’ (ὦ Ζεῦ), Andromache continues with her previous utterance, ‘and for my ruin!’ 
(καὶ συμφορᾶς) which Hecuba follows (still on her train of thought) with ‘my children’ 
(τέκεα), for which Andromache seems to upbraid her with ‘we were your children once!’ 
(πρίν ποτ’ ἦμεν). Therefore, although this exchange does not conform to the formal 
description of an agōn, it is nonetheless competitive and significant therefore that the 
passage of stichomythia ends with a longer speech by Hecuba as if to signify her victory. 
It is the end of their exchange, before Talthybius enters the stage, which marks the terms 
of the true challenge to Hecuba’s narrative. While Andromache argues that Polyxena has 
a happier fate in her death than she herself does in continuing to live, Hecuba maintains 
that ‘while there is life there is hope.’ Her advice to Andromache is pragmatic and shows 
the same spirit which she attempted to instil in herself at the start of the play. There, she 
counselled herself to sail with the tide, rather than against it: here she uses the metaphor 
of a storm at sea to convince Andromache that to struggle is futile. Rather she counsels 
her to ‘suffer’ (ἔασον) Hector’s death and to bring up Astyanax that his children might 
build Ilium again.558 
However, once again, though the ideological differences between Andromache’s and 
Hecuba’s testimonies are great, like Cassandra, Andromache confirms Hecuba in her 
attribution of blame for their current position. Andromache casts blame three ways: on 
the Greeks for ‘devising atrocities worthy of barbarians,’ on the gods ‘who are destroying 
us,’ but her most vitriolic and lengthy accusation is reserved for Helen who, she says, is 
not the daughter of Zeus but rather ‘the child of many fathers: the Avenging Spirit first, 
then of Envy and Murder and Death and all the evils that the earth breeds’ (πολλῶν δὲ 
πατέρων φημί σ’ ἐκπεφυκέναι, / Ἀλάστορος μὲν πρῶτον, εἶτα δὲ Φθόνου, / Φόνου τε 
                                                          
556 Lee (1976), p. 176. Morwood (2000), p. 138 supports the latter argument. 
557 Eur. Tro. 578. 
558 Ibid, 686-705. 
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Θανάτου θ’ ὅσα τε γῆ τρέφει κακά).559 More directly, she accuses her of being ‘a goddess 
of death to many barbarians and Greeks’ (πολλοῖσι κῆρα βαρβάροις Ἕλλησί τε)560 and of 
having ‘brought, with her lovely eyes, shameful destruction on the famous plains of the 
Phrygians’ (καλλίστων γὰρ ὀμμάτων ἄπο / αἰσχρῶς τὰ κλεινὰ πεδί’ ἀπώλεσας 
Φρυγων).561  
So it is that, as this subsection has demonstrated, even where Cassandra’s and 
Andromache’s memory-narratives appear to challenge Hecuba’s, they actually confirm 
Hecuba’s version of events in the most important respect. What this accumulation and 
reinforcement of blame for Helen means for the political engagement of the audience, is 
that by the time we reach the agōn scene, the audience is likely not only to be 
empathically allied to Hecuba in her suffering, but also to be firmly on her side against 
Helen. Whereas one might expect an agōn, in the theatre or in the city, to engage its 
audience in weighing speech and taking sides accordingly, this agōn is set up in such a 
way that the audience sides with Hecuba from the start. It, therefore, requires us to 
examine our empathy and where it leads us, and to consider the processes inherent in 
the institution of the agōn—in particular its rhetoric and narratives—and the ways that 
these shape our political allegiances.  
 
2.5 The agōn 
In the Trojan Women, the agōn operates as a case study for how the politics of empathy 
work in practice. In the introduction to this chapter, I suggested that the agōn is often 
treated in isolation from the rest of the play and that most critical attention is devoted to 
its rhetoric which scholars have felt to be at odds with Hecuba’s emotional speech 
elsewhere in the play. Here, I suggest that the agōn of the Trojan Women makes most 
sense as a practical example of the possible political effects when an audience is drawn 
into an emotional allegiance with a speaker in the legal and political areas of democratic 
life. It transposes the ‘epic’ problems of Hecuba to a fifth-century forensic context, 
recognisable by its language and practices to all Athenian citizens. In this way, it operates 
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as a kind of climax to Hecuba’s insistence on Helen’s culpability and provides a continuity 
in the play that some have found lacking.562 
In addition to finding its language jarring with the rest of the play, some scholars have 
also criticised it as being thematically incongruous. They have criticised the agōn scene as 
‘specious’ because Menelaus has already decided, before the start of the speeches, to 
have Helen killed on his return to Greece and his mind does not change over the course of 
the scene.563 Because of this, they have argued that the scene merely provides the 
opportunity to explore, philosophically, themes of responsibility and religion and serves 
no dramatic purpose.564 This section suggests, rather, that Hecuba’s personal hatred for 
Helen and her desire for revenge is what drives the scene and what provides the unity 
with the rest of the play. My discussion so far has also proposed that Hecuba’s use of 
rhetoric is not limited to the agōn as it drives her emotional rheseis as much as it does her 
speech there. Menelaus has already stated, in Hecuba’s hearing, that he will kill Helen so 
the only reason why Hecuba insists to him that Helen’s argument should be heard is so 
that she might also have her say and in so doing, ‘stick the knife in’ herself. This way, she 
can feel that Helen’s death is, to some extent, attributable to her. Her compulsion is to 
actively destroy the woman who, she feels, is responsible for her suffering. 
I have already discussed the fact that Hecuba’s memory-testimonies are dominated by 
this consuming hatred of Helen but my analysis of the agōn highlights the rhetoric by 
which she seeks to destroy her. It also examines the rhetoric by which Helen seeks to 
defend herself. The section addresses memory in two different respects. Firstly, it focuses 
on the ways in which Helen’s and Hecuba’s memory-testimonies conform to the kind of 
memory narratives commonly associated with the roles of prosecution and defence in the 
courts of fifth-century Athens. Secondly, it explores the ways in which the audience’s 
cultural memory of the stories of the Trojan War and of Hecuba herself, outside the world 
of the Trojan Women, might cause them to re-evaluate the testimonies offered here and 
to reflect on the wider issues of justice and politics in play.  
 
i) Memory testimonies 
                                                          
562 C.f. Lloyd (1992), p. 94. 
563 Quotation from Croally (1994), p. 137 but see also Lloyd (1992), pp. 110-11. 
564 See e.g. Lloyd (1992), pp. 108-9; Scodel (1980), p. 81. 
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According to Johnstone, the kinds of testimonies made by prosecutors and defendants in 
the courts of the fifth and fourth centuries BC evolved out of the litigation process. As in 
my earlier analysis of testimony in the Odyssey, Johnstone suggests that the issue of 
‘truth’ in legal speeches came down to what was plausible or probable. However, what 
made them so may have had ‘less to do with the kinds of things that actually typically 
happen than with the kinds of stories that are normally told in a particular context.’565 For 
the prosecutor who brought the proceedings, it made sense to tell a story which focused 
on a particular incident of transgression against the law: a ‘black and white’ story of a law 
broken. It was in the defendant’s interests, on the other hand, to rebut that, either with 
an ‘antinarrative’ – a straight reversal (i.e. the prosecutor actually transgressed against 
him) – or with a more complex counternarrative, relating a history of mutual hostility 
which put the incident in the context of other transgressions.566 
The order of the speeches is reversed in this dramatic version of the courtroom: usually 
the prosecutor would speak first but here it is Helen for the defence. This is so because 
the audience in the theatre has already heard the many testimonies made against her 
over the course of the play.567 In a sense then, Helen’s speech here operates as her reply 
to these testimonies and the prosecution then gets a second chance to make its case by 
picking apart the specifics of hers. 
Although the order of speeches is reversed, the pattern of narratives Johnstone describes 
as given by the prosecution and defence is exactly the pattern we see in the agōn of the 
Trojan Women. The memories of the war and its origins to which Helen testifies here 
anticipate the ways in which Hecuba will attempt to dichotomise the conflict. At every 
stage in her defence speech, Helen is concerned to spread the blame for the start of the 
war, showing the involvement of numerous agents, both mortal and divine. In this way, 
she hopes to demonstrate the complexity of judging who is to be held to account. First, 
she reverses the blame, naming Hecuba herself, as guilty on account of the fact that she 
gave birth to Paris; then she blames Priam for failing to kill his son. She also apportions 
shares of the blame to the goddesses who held the beauty contest; to Paris, who took her 
from Menelaus’ house; to Aphrodite, whose power even Zeus cannot resist and finally to 
                                                          
565 Johnstone (1999), pp. 12-13. 
566 Ibid, pp. 47-56. 
567 This is suggested by Lloyd (1992), p. 101. 
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Deiphobus who took her and kept her by force when Paris had been killed, so preventing 
her from returning to the Greeks and putting a stop to further slaughter. 
As Helen anticipates, Hecuba rebuts her speech by concentrating her blame for the war 
on her alone and in this Hecuba’s speech mirrors the way in which prosecution narratives 
focus on a single guilty party and a single transgression. Although the charges against 
Helen are not stated specifically here, they have been stated over the course of the play 
as discussed above. Helen is personally responsible for the murders of Priam and 
Astyanax, and for the whole of her own suffering.568 To this end, Hecuba’s speech is 
wholly concerned with placing responsibility for the war solely on Helen’s shoulders and it 
is with this in mind that she answers all of Helen’s attempts above to spread the blame. 
She uses the argument of probability to argue that the goddesses would not have been so 
childish as to hold something as frivolous as a beauty contest and answers Helen’s 
argument regarding Aphrodite’s power by saying that ‘Aphrodite’ is always merely an 
excuse for mortal folly or sensuality (ἀφροσύνη).569 She deflects blame from Paris, 
arguing that Helen could have cried out for help from her brothers but didn’t and, in the 
end, could have killed herself to prevent further bloodshed but chose not to.  
Within this over-arching structure of memory-narrative and counternarrative (or vice 
versa as the case is here) we see other typical legal narrative strategies in play. Johnstone 
writes that defendants frequently reminded jurors of services they had performed for the 
good of the polis, like acts of charity.570 While there is no democratic polis onstage, and 
though Hecuba has now stepped out of the quasi-polis of women she created to put 
herself under the adjudication of a man, some of the comments made by Helen and 
Hecuba seem to be addressed to a wider political community. Helen states, for example, 
that Aphrodite’s victory in the beauty contest – the incident which sparked the actions 
leading to her elopement with Paris – saved Greece from military conquest by the 
Trojans. This was the outcome, according to Helen, which would have resulted had 
Athene won the contest.571 For standing as Paris’ reward in choosing Aphrodite, Helen 
says that she should have been awarded a crown by those who now vilify her.572 Her 
words seem calculated to appeal to a Greek audience concerned with the wider 
                                                          
568 See this thesis, pp. 150-51.  
569 Eur. Tro. 990. 
570 Johnstone (1999), pp. 14-15. 
571 Eur. Tro. 930-35. 
572 Ibid, 937. 
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ramifications of war and conquest, rather than to Menelaus, concerned only with 
retrieving his wife. This is particularly so given the frequent analogies in classical Athenian 
culture between the Trojan War, with its Panhellenic force, and the Persian Wars, in 
which a similarly unified Greek force fought off a barbarian invader.573 
Helen also, as per Johnstone’s defendants, uses the ‘performative language and gestures’ 
of ritual supplication as she begs Menelaus by his knees to pardon her.574 In Johnstone’s 
analysis, such gestures were intended to undercut the fact that litigants were often from 
the elites of Athens and in prostrating themselves before the citizen jury they reproduced 
the notion of a democratic consciousness. While there is no jury onstage here and all the 
protagonists in the scene are members of the elite, the gesture nonetheless recalls the 
gestures of abasement by defendants with which the audience would have been familiar 
and to which they would have responded in court. This again is suggestive of the idea that 
Euripides transplanted the concerns of the play to a familiar forensic context so as to 
highlight their relevance for his Athenian audience. 
Hecuba’s response also seems to have this audience in mind. She draws attention to the 
hypocrisy of Helen’s act of abasement, pointing out that Helen has ‘decked herself out’ 
(ἀσκέω) when she ‘should have come humbly, in ragged clothes, shivering with fear’ (ἣν 
χρὴν ταπεινὴν ἐν πέπλων ἐρειπίοις).575 True, as Lloyd says, our only proof that this is so is 
in Hecuba’s words but I do not believe that we can conclude from this that it is untrue:576 
Helen’s suggestion that she deserves a crown certainly does not imply humility and 
Hecuba’s description of Helen here is of a piece with descriptions of her elsewhere in 
Euripidean tragedy, for example, Electra’s vitriolic condemnation of Helen’s vanity (in 
merely snipping the very ends of her hair) in the Orestes.577 Hecuba’s words here may 
remind fifth-century audiences of their own laws relating to adultery which stated that 
adulterous women must appear humbly dressed and that should they appear in fine 
clothes, they could be publicly stripped and beaten.578  
                                                          
573 See e.g. Herodotus, who uses the Iliad to ground his narrative of the Persian Wars from the outset (Hdt. 
1. 2-5). Note that this is a 5th century Athenian re-membering of Homer, cast in terms of Greeks and 
barbarians, where the Homeric texts does not contain the same sense of a clash of cultures. 
574 Johnstone (1999), p.15; Eur. Tro. 1042-43. 
575 Eur. Tro. 1022-23 and 1025-28. 
576 Lloyd (1984), p. 305. 
577 It is clearly not consistent with Euripides’ portrayal of Helen in the Helen but for ‘Old Helen’ and ‘New 
Helen’ see Wright (2006) pp. 33-47; this discussion pp. 35-37. Eur. Or. 126-29. 
578 Aeschines, 1.183. 
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Hecuba too appeals to Menelaus and the external audience, as Greeks, suggesting that to 
execute Helen for her crimes would be to ‘crown Greece’ (στεφάνωσον Ἑλλάδ’).579 The 
crown, in her example, would belong to the whole of Greece – that is, Menelaus’ actions 
would be in the public interest as the whole of Greece was wronged by Helen and in 
executing her, all Greece would be honoured. Here again, Hecuba plays the role of 
Johnstone’s prosecutor, inducing the audience-jury to think of themselves as injured 
parties in this most personal of cases.580 
I have shown that Hecuba’s prosecutorial speech and Helen’s for the defence are 
conditioned by the rhetorical strategies of the law court. Like the speakers in court, both 
stress the benefits of their actions for the greater good of a wider community and this 
seems designed to appeal to the citizenry of the Athenian polis in the audience. It is when 
considering the audience’s possible reception of these speeches that the politics of the 
play emerge and it is in this that the cultural memories of the audience come into play in 
their judgement of the characters. 
 
ii) Cultural memory 
When the bank of Athenian cultural memory—of myth, poetry and other drama—is 
brought to bear on the agōn, adjudication becomes much more complicated. In part, 
cultural memory works together with the unsympathetic portrayal of Helen to prejudice 
the audience against her. As Goldhill remarks, ‘her speech is constructed as if she had 
used Gorgias for her rhetoric training’ as her arguments are formed point by point from 
his Encomium to Helen.581 Gorgias himself compares the effect of deceptive persuasion as 
being akin to the effect of drugs on the body,582 and Hesk notes that sophistry is often 
described in oratory as foreign to ‘normative Athenian identity.’583 Scodel goes so far as 
to say that ‘The repellent self-confidence of Helen is a reminder that to accept the 
Gorgianic defense is virtually to abandon the right to judge any human act whatever.’584 
                                                          
579 Eur. Tro. 1030. 
580 Johnstone (1999), p. 132. 
581 Goldhill (1986), p. 237, though Lloyd is sceptical of this argument on the grounds that we cannot 
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582 One might be reminded here of Helen’s drugs of forgetting in Od. 4.221. 
583 Hesk (2000), p. 215 and discussion of Gorgias pp. 281-82. 
584 Scodel (1980), p. 99. 
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Helen clearly does herself no favours with an audience familiar with Gorgias’ Encomium in 
adopting such a line of defence. 
However, as Hesk points out with regard to Euripides’ Hippolytus (in the Hippolytus), ‘Just 
because someone sounds like a sorcerer-sophist doesn’t mean they are lying.’585 Cultural 
memory of the more traditional myths and poetry surrounding the Trojan War should tell 
the audience that Helen’s testimony contains recognisable truths. The beauty contest, for 
example, is one of the mainstays of the traditional narrative.586 Helen’s narrative also tells 
the ‘truth’ of anthropomorphised gods who control the lives of mortals, something which 
Hecuba’s denies when she speaks of Aphrodite as merely men’s excuse for folly. In this, 
the audience only need think back to the prologue of the play to see the ‘truth’ of Helen’s 
words: here Poseidon and Athene plot together to punish the Greeks for their sacrilegious 
attacks on the Trojan temples by raising a storm to wreck the Greek ships on their journey 
home. Helen’s comments that Hecuba and Priam were themselves also partly responsible 
for the war also gain traction from the audience’s memory of the Alexandros, the first 
play in the trilogy. The plot of this fragment can only be speculative but it is expected that 
here, Hecuba and Priam accept their adult son back into the family in spite of the 
prophecy that had previously led them to expose him, a prophecy which foretold that 
Paris would bring Troy’s destruction.587 
In judging Hecuba too, cultural memory brings a different, much darker side to her 
character and to the audience’s empathy with her. I have said that it is revenge that 
drives Hecuba’s behaviour in the agōn and in this way, her behaviour here recalls the 
revenge she exacts on Polymestor in Euripides’ Hecuba. Although she doesn’t commit the 
actual deed in the Trojan Women, she does ‘team up’ with her Greek oppressors – there 
Agamemnon and here Menelaus – in order to achieve her goal of vengeance. In the 
Hecuba, as in the Trojan Women, Euripides creates a strong bond of empathy between 
the audience and Hecuba through the prolonged and oppressive representation of her 
suffering and there, just as here, he tests in dramatic form, just how far that empathy will 
stretch.588 The audience of Hecuba must question whether their empathy for Hecuba’s 
                                                          
585 Hesk (2000), p. 287. 
586 E.g. Il. 24. 25-30. 
587 Scodel (1980), pp. 20-43. 
588 For a more detailed discussion of how this operates in the Hecuba see Barker (2009), pp. 342-65. 
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plight is enough to sweep them into condoning the grisly maiming of her enemy and the 
slaughter of his children.  
The Trojan Women is less extreme in its demands but nonetheless similar. Whether Helen 
is eventually killed by Menelaus or not, it is hard to argue that Hecuba does not ‘win’ the 
contest of logos on stage and, because of the scene’s position between hearing the fate 
of Astyanax and the return of his mutilated body, the scene becomes part of the 
crescendo of emotion which the audience must feel in empathy for Hecuba.  
It is in the period of reflection which follows the ‘living moment’ that the audience might 
question where their empathy for Hecuba has taken them. I have said already that it may 
have induced them to forget the mythic truths of the war but the place to which they are 
led instead is much darker. To empathise with Hecuba and to cheer her victory is to 
follow her on a personal, vindictive quest for revenge, dressed up as justice. In this, the 
audience is required to question their complicity, as they are if, like Eurycleia, they cheer 
Odysseus in his revenge on the suitors in the Odyssey.589 Because the Hecuba is an earlier 
play but it takes place after the Trojan Women in Hecuba’s timeline, it offers a 
paradoxical view of ‘memory of the future’ for the audience. It provides foreknowledge of 
Hecuba’s capability for vindictive cruelty and violence culminating in her transformation 
into a vicious hellhound and it seems likely that this might affect the audience’s view of 
Hecuba here. Her insistent pursuit of Helen may be a step on the ladder to this final 
depravity. 
Cultural memory may also affect the audience’s perception of Menelaus and, in 
particular, his role as judge of this trial. As in my discussion of internal and external 
audiences in the Odyssey, here too the response of the internal judicial audience – 
Menelaus – is provocative of a political response from its external audience in the 
theatre. Menelaus’ role as internal judge in the Trojan Women is similar to the role he 
plays in the later play, Euripides’ Orestes. In the agōn between Orestes and Tyndareus in 
the Orestes, he acts as judge again and we see him change his mind, influenced by the 
more powerful Tyndareus. While a contemporary audience clearly will not be aware of 
this later play, it may shed light on Euripides’ portrayal of Menelaus in the Trojan Women. 
In addition, the role is similar to that played by Agamemnon in the Hecuba where we 
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know that he has already promised Hecuba his support against her enemy before the 
‘trial’ begins. Menelaus in the Orestes and Agamemnon in the Hecuba are both imperfect 
judges and Menalaus is no different in his role here. Not only is he a single man (as 
opposed to a jury)—highlighting the perils of tyrannical systems of justice—but even 
before he speaks, the play has shown him to be a weak character. Jon Hesk points to a 
‘commonplace’ rhetoric in epic and tragedy in which the cause of the Trojan War is seen 
to be ‘a quarrel over a woman.’590 Kovacs has argued that this is indicative of a ‘grossly 
exaggerated reaction’ on Menelaus’ part,591 and one that calls his capacities as a judge 
into consideration.  
Menelaus’ unfitness for the role is not only evinced by his weakness but also by his 
potential for tyranny. As Lloyd points out, this judge has decided his verdict in advance of 
the trial, but in addition to this what most affects him about Hecuba’s argument is her 
concluding statement that Helen’s execution should stand as a legal precedent for other 
unfaithful wives. He decrees that her death ‘will impress the need for restraint on all 
women’ (γυναιξὶ σωφρονεῖν / πάσαισι θήσει) and that it will ‘strike fear into their sexual 
incontinence’ (ὅμως δ’ ὁ τῆσδ’ ὄλεθρος ἐς φόβον βαλεῖ / τὸ μῶρον αὐτῶν).592 In the 
classical Athenian polis, the extremity of this would not have been lost. Although it had 
upheld Draco’s law that a man who killed his wife’s lover on catching them in flagrante 
could not be tried for homicide,593 the precedent for killing adulterous wives themselves, 
in cold blood, could not but be seen as provocative. As Barker suggests, with regard to 
Agamemnon in the Hecuba, ‘The audience must not only assess the agōn, but judge the 
judge.’594  
However, Menelaus is not the only imperfect judge in the agōn. The chorus also 
represents a jury of sorts and highlights the fact that such collective juridical audiences 
can also get it wrong. As a collective with whom, as I have discussed above, the audience 
is already joined in their empathy with Hecuba, the fallibility of the chorus could be even 
more instructive for the audience, as their empathy ebbs and they remember the play. 
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Like the audience going into this scene, the chorus is no unbiased group of bystanders. 
They not only empathise with Hecuba but have experienced some of the same suffering 
so are personally involved in the trial. They champion Hecuba, cheering for her to ‘defend 
your children and your fatherland’ (ἄμυνον σοῖς τέκνοισι καὶ πάτρᾳ) and to ‘destroy 
[Helen’s] persuasive arguments’ (πειθὼ διαφθείρουσα τῆσδ’).595 In the end, they even 
start arguing Hecuba’s cause for her, imploring Menelaus to ‘take vengeance on your wife 
as is worthy of your house and your ancestors!’ (προγόνων τ’ ἀξίως δόμων τε σῶν / τεῖσαι 
δάμαρτα).596 Lee goes so far as to suggest that the chorus ‘voices the opinion which the 
audience is invited to hold by the dramatist.’597 I suggest rather that the scene reveals the 
chorus’ naïve understanding of rhetorical speech and provides another imperfect juridical 
audience against whom the audience should measure themselves. 
The chorus reflect the Athenian concern over the language of the courts and the 
assembly and to some extent their reaction to the rhetoric they hear demonstrates an 
awareness of the ways in which rhetoric operates on its listeners. As Johnstone writes, 
‘Because language alone established the relationship between speaker and audience, the 
uncertainties of this social relationship were expressed as anxieties about language.’598 
The chorus recognise Helen’s rhetoric as sophistic because of the speciousness of some of 
her arguments, that, for example, in which she argues that she should receive a crown for 
her services.  
However, Hecuba’s rhetoric, driven as it is by intense emotion—emotion with which they 
empathise—remains hidden or perhaps unimportant to them because she is on the side 
of ‘right.’ Her answer to Helen comes in the form of ‘common sense’ or probability, itself 
a highly effective form of rhetoric.599 Her rhetorical questions such as ‘Why should the 
goddess Hera have so great a desire to be beautiful?’ (τοῦ φὰρ οὕνεκ’ ἄν θεὰ / Ἥρα 
τοσοῦτον ἔσχ’ ἔρωτα καλλονῆς;) are designed to highlight the ludicrousness of Helen’s 
argument.600 This is reinforced by her statement, ‘You will never persuade wise people [of 
                                                          
595 Eur. Tro. 966-68. 
596 Ibid, 133-34. 
597 Lee (1976), p. 242. 
598 Johnstone (1999), p. 2. 
599 See e.g. Lloyd (1992), p. 106. 
600 Eur. Tro. 976-77. 
 165 
 
this],’ (μὴ οὐ πείσῃς σοφούς) which both flatters those who agree with her and warns 
that to think otherwise would be foolishness.601  
In this respect, I suggest that Hecuba’s rhetoric shares much in common with Hesk’s 
‘rhetoric of anti-rhetoric,’ even though it does not explicitly attack the use of rhetoric in 
others.602 Hesk comments that orators frequently admitted to writing and practising their 
orations, teaching others how to plead and even to ‘cleverness at speaking’ (deinotēs 
legein) provided that they could draw ‘a contrast between a rhetorical activism which is 
deceitful and harmful to the polis and the honest, beneficial activism which (of course) he 
has adhered to.’603 In Hecuba’s speech these traits are present but more implicit and 
therefore, even more ‘pernicious’ perhaps than the rhetoric which he considers. While 
Hecuba does not claim to be a ‘clever speaker’ she does lay out her rhetorical tactics. As 
discussed above, when she starts the chant of mourning for Troy, she states that she will 
lead the chorus and, indeed, the chorus have followed her lead throughout, not 
questioning her in anything. She is open about her tactic of contrasting her past with her 
present so as to evoke compassion and, far from questioning their reactions to this, I have 
shown that the chorus responds in kind. Also, although she is silent on the subject of her 
rhetoric in the agōn, I have suggested that her prosecutorial narratives underline her 
supposed commitment to ‘honest, beneficial activism’ for the good of Menelaus and for 
Greece as a whole, and that these act to counter Helen’s more overtly sophistic rhetorical 
style. 
The chorus is not only persuaded by Hecuba’s speech into remembering with her and 
biased against Helen by hers but also by their performance of these speeches. In this 
there is a metatheatrical element again, one which draws attention to the similarities 
between the performance of speech in the theatre and its performance in political and 
legal contexts. In her abasement at Menelaus’ knees, Hecuba plays the game of 
courtroom performance better than Helen, who will not abase herself fully and embrace 
the part of the humble defendant. Hecuba also performs tragedy better than Helen by 
‘milking’ her situation for its full pathetic potential with her audiences, both internal and 
external. While Hecuba wins empathy and so induces her audiences to remember (re-
member) ‘with’ her, Helen’s performance makes her actively repellent. In this she is 
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comparable to Euripides’ Hipploytus whose uncompromising pride in his own ‘purity,’ 
leads him to offend the equally proud goddess Aphrodite while his overt use of rhetoric in 
the agōn only leads ‘Theseus to conclude that his son is indulging in lazy and specious 
sophistry.’604 
Therefore, in spite of their fears about ‘pernicious’ rhetoric, the chorus of the Trojan 
Women is shown to be ‘tragically’ naïve when it comes to the adjudication of this conflict 
in the agōn. If the audience are, as I have suggested, swept along with the chorus by their 
empathy for Hecuba, then in the moment of watching the play, the same accusation 
could be levelled at them, as juridical citizens. Their empathy leads them to remember 
with Hecuba, seeing the conflict through her eyes. In doing so, affect inhibits cognition 
and the audience forgets the many memories which should make them question her 
narrative.  
In this way, Euripides dramatises the dangers of empathy in the legal and political arenas, 
particularly in the context of dichotomised conflicts. Where voting followed immediately 
on hearing two contrasting speeches, with no time for empathy to wane, miscarriages of 
justice must have been commonplace. Therefore, by recasting Hecuba’s suffering and 
revenge in the context of the fifth-century courts, Euripides draws attention to the 
problems inherent in contemporary political and juridical systems and practices. Hesk 
concludes that ‘such stagings surely helped the citizenry to be self-aware and cautious as 
they listened to litigants or the (anti-) rhetoric of advisers’. I suggest, in addition, that 
such self-awareness applies, in particular, to empathy and its unsettling effects on 
memory and cognition.605 
This section has explored the ways in which memory of the play, the trilogy and of the 
epic tradition provides a means by which to challenge and deconstruct Hecuba’s 
dominant narrative in the play. It also offers a way to expose the construction and the 
effects of such affective discourse and highlights the importance for the external 
audience of taking an active role in judgement here. There is one final element to add to 
this discussion, which brings together my analysis of the Odyssey in Chapter 1 and of 
Hecuba here. The following exploration of Hecuba and Odysseus analyses the ways in 
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which the Trojan Women remembers and re-members the Odyssey and the impact which 
this memory might have on the audience’s interpretation of both texts. 
 
2.6 Hecuba and Odysseus 
I said above that testimony is always a site of conflict but the contests in the Trojan 
Women go beyond the obvious clashes between Hecuba and the Greeks and Hecuba and 
Helen. A contest for dominance is also played out at the level of cultural memory 
between the two Homeric epics and this contest is instructive in revealing facets of the 
arguments discussed at the level of the text already. This chapter has addressed some of 
the ways in which cultural memory of the Iliad affirms and challenges Hecuba’s dominant 
narrative in the play but there is also a strong thread of Odyssean memory. This section 
will examine the Odyssean connection and will highlight the ways in which, by turns, it 
enhances and darkens the audience’s possible perceptions of Hecuba.  
Isabelle Torrance has written persuasively on the way that the Trojan Women both recalls 
and builds on Odysseus’ reaction to hearing Demodocus sing about the fall of Troy in 
Book 8 of the Odyssey. He is described as weeping: 
ὡς δὲ γυνὴ κλαίῃσι φίλον πόσιν ἀμφιπεσοῦσα, 
ὅς τε ἑῆς πρόσσθεν πόλιος λαῶν τε πέσῃσιν, 
[…] 
[…] λίγα κωκύει: οἱ δέ τ’ ὄπισθε 
κόπτοντες δούρεσσι μετάφρενον ἠδὲ καὶ ὤμους 
εἴρερον εἰσανάγουσι, πόνον τ’ ἐχέμεν καὶ ὀιζύν: 
τῆς δ’ ἐλεειωοτάτῳ ἄχεϊ φθινύθουσι παρειαί:606 
As a woman weeps, lying over the body  
of her dear husband, who fell fighting for her city and people 
[…]  
[…]she cries high and shrill, while the men behind her,  
                                                          
606 Od. 8.523-30. 
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hitting her with their spear butts on the back and the shoulders, 
force her up and lead her away into slavery, to have 
hard work and sorrow, and her cheeks are wracked with pitiful weeping.  
Torrance suggests that, when the chorus calls on the Muse to ‘sing to me a new song 
about Ilium’ (ἀμφί μοι Ἴλιον, ὦ / Μοῦσα, καινῶν ὕμνων),607 this is Euripides offering his 
own new version of the Troy story based on the experience of the victims rather than on 
the warrior heroes. While this reading opens a new vista on the Trojan Women and its 
intertextual relationship with the Odyssey, I suggest that it is still insufficient. There is a 
specific relationship between Hecuba and Odysseus that sheds new light on both texts.608 
When Hecuba hears that she is to be slave to Odysseus, she rails against him as a 
‘monster’ (δάκος).609 Yet the play itself draws an association between the two through 
their experience of suffering and their endurance.610 Hecuba cries out that ‘all I suffer, all I 
have suffered and all I will suffer’ (πάσχω τε καὶ πεπονθα κἄτι πείσομαι)611 make her fit 
for nothing but to lie on the ground, and yet she endures on her ‘trembling limbs’ 
(τρομερὰ μέλεα) even as she goes forward with her women into slavery.612 Because 
πάσχω is used so often with regard to Odysseus’ suffering in the Odyssey, this use of 
πάσχω in connection with Hecuba may trigger the audience’s memory of the suffering 
and endurance of Odysseus on his journey homeward.613 It is there already in the opening 
lines of the Odyssey, in which we hear that ‘many were the pains he suffered in his spirit 
on the wide sea’ (πολλὰ δ’ ὅ γ’ ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὃν κατὰ θυμόν).614 In the ghost-
Achilles’ pronouncement that he would ‘rather follow the plow as thrall to another / than 
be a king over all the perished dead,’615 the Odyssey suggests that a new kind of heroism 
lies in Odysseus’ endurance of suffering, one which defines him against Achilles’ wartime 
characteristics lauded in the Iliad. Perhaps, then, in recalling these features and 
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resonance of the phrase in the epic tradition, see Barker and Christensen (2008). 
615 Ibid, 11.489-90. 
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bestowing them on Hecuba, Euripides offers her as a new kind of hero for his new song of 
Troy.  
If Hecuba’s heroism and suffering is related intertextually to that of Odysseus, then there 
is also a sense in which Hecuba’s suffering and endurance prefigure—even condition—
that which Odysseus will undergo. The events of the Odyssey are, after all, still to come as 
those of the Trojan Women unfold. His suffering on his journey homeward will transform 
him from the brutal monster who used his twisted rhetoric in arguing that Astyanax must 
be thrown from the walls, into the man who breaks down in tears of empathy when he 
hears of the pain of the Trojans in Book 8 of the Odyssey. His tears here are all the more 
poignant for the insight we have gained into this weeping woman’s experience and for 
the transformation we have seen in him.  
If Odysseus can be seen more favourably through this memory of the Odyssey then the 
reverse is true for Hecuba. Though, as explored above, it might be seen to enhance her 
‘heroism,’ it also brings out the more unsavoury aspects of Hecuba’s character. Just as in 
the Odyssey, our sympathy for Odysseus leads us to not only condone, but also rejoice in 
the slaughter of the suitors, so our sympathy for Hecuba leads us to be complicit in her 
actions and arguments against Helen and the Greeks in ways which should make us 
uncomfortable.616 Furthermore, Hecuba and Odysseus are connected by their use of 
linguistic guile which goes alongside this. Hecuba derides Odysseus as: 
πολεμίῳ δίκας, παρανόμῳ δάκει,  
ὃς πάντα τἀκεῖθεν ἐνθάδε στρέφει, τὰ δ’  
ἀντίπαλ’ αὖθις ἐκεῖσε διπτύχῳ γλώσσᾳ  
φίλα τὰ πρότερ’ ἄφιλα τιθέμονος πάντων.617  
an enemy of justice, a lawless beast  
who turns everything from that side to this and then back again  
with his double tongue,  
changing men to hatred of what they once loved. 
                                                          
616 See Barker (2009), p. 328 for a similar comparison with regard to the Hecuba. 
617 Eur. Tro. 284-87. 
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To an extent, the same could be argued of Hecuba. While it might be impossible to argue 
that the audience holds Helen dear, the discussion above shows the way in which Hecuba 
turns back to front Helen’s mythologically ‘true’ arguments about blame for the Trojan 
War and that the ‘justice’ she seeks is far from being balanced and objective.  
In his chapter on the Hecuba, Elton Barker sets up an extended comparison between 
Hecuba and Odysseus in which he suggests that the Hecuba provides a ‘radical twist’ to 
the narrative of the protagonist’s ‘necessary and desirable’ pursuit of vengeance.618 
Because Hecuba is not a returning hero ‘but a foreign woman turned slave,’ her revenge 
on Polymestor, ‘though sympathetically manufactured to a degree comparable to that 
enjoyed by the epic Odysseus, ultimately represents the revenge of a figure who stands 
outside, and threatens, the carefully policed Hellenic order.’619 Because she is not, like 
Odysseus, a figure of authority, her actions, Barker suggests, provide a way for Euripides 
to ‘explore the possibilities for, and problems of, dissent outside a civic institutional 
framework.’620 Barker further suggests that her revenge, unlike Odysseus’ ‘cannot be 
constructed as the reassertion of authority; it is inevitably an act of dissent from the 
(Greek) occupying powers that control her life, particularly since the object of her fury is 
their friend and ally.’621 
While there are clearly similarities here with my argument regarding the Trojan Women, I 
suggest that there are also important differences. For one thing, my notion of a theatrical 
experience in which an initial empathic response informs a period of memory and 
reflection is indicative of the way in which tragedy might ‘reeducate’ the citizen audience, 
in the manner suggested by LaCapra.622 For another, the process of voting in the moment 
of empathic unsettlement and ‘repenting at leisure’ mirrors a process known to have 
happened in classical Athens. As discussed above, Thucydides account of the Athenian’s 
change of mind over Mytilene suggest something similar.623  
With regard to the specifics of Barker’s argument, my reading differs again because the 
defendants in the two cases are very different. Whereas Polymester is, as Barker states, a 
friend and ally of the Greeks, Helen is already marked for execution. For this reason, 
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Hecuba’s revenge cannot be described as an act of dissent against the Greeks. I discussed 
above the ways in which Hecuba creates her own political group outside the sphere of the 
Trojan men and the dominant Greeks; in the agōn, however, she steps inside this world 
to argue her case against Helen in the language of the polis. Unlike Odysseus, she had no 
power in this realm to reassert but here she demonstrates herself—a woman and a 
slave—to be capable of standing up with them on their own terms.  
In this way, Hecuba achieves her victory in the play. If the sections of the play before and 
after the agōn focus on Hecuba’s attempt to memorialise her particular version of events 
in Troy, the agōn shows that she has convinced the Greeks—or at least, one important 
representative—of her story. If, as Torrance discusses, Troy and its people are only visible 
through the songs of the Greek victors,624 this is a step towards ensuring that these are 
songs she would want sung. This is Hecuba’s attempt to—Odysseus-like—control the 
narrative in which she appears by whatever means possible. 
The Trojan Women wears its Iliadic heritage on its sleeve: it is clear to see in the tropes of 
mourning and in the characters and content of the play. In this the Iliad could be said to 
inform Hecuba’s grief and our memory of it enhances the pity we feel for her. Its 
Odyssean heritage is, characteristically, disguised and ‘forgotten,’ overridden by 
vehement statements in hatred of Odysseus which belie Hecuba’s connection to him. 
Ultimately, what memory of the Odyssey brings to the Trojan Women is twofold. Firstly, it 
highlights the ways in which Hecuba attempts to control the narrative of the text. 
Secondly, this in itself provides additional weight for the idea that the audience must not 
watch passively but rather take on the responsibility for judgement, measuring 
themselves against the imperfect juridical audiences represented in the texts. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
I quoted John Gould above as concluding that the plethora of narratives in tragedy 
enforces ‘our acceptance of narrative multiplicity,’625 but suggested then that Hecuba, 
like Odysseus, ‘makes a play for’ a ‘univocal reading’ supported, to an extent, by 
Euripides. I have shown that many of the narratives which seem to challenge Hecuba’s 
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version of events actually support it in essentials, while Helen’s narrative—the only one 
to truly offer a different perspective—is highly unattractive in both its performance and 
its style.  
However, whereas the normative thrust of the Odyssey is confirmed by the narrator and 
the gods, the opposite is true of the Trojan Women. There is no narrator and the gods 
actually assert their presence as anthropomorphised beings in direct contravention of 
Hecuba’s words. In addition, although Helen’s arguments, like the suitors’, are 
unattractive, the basic facts contained in them are demonstrably ‘true’ as confirmed by 
the audience’s memory of the play, their memory of the trilogy and their cultural 
memory. Hecuba is very convincing and her plight is harrowing but her story is not 
Euripides’ story and not the whole story of the play.  
Ultimately it is not true to say, with Gould, that the Trojan Women offers a ‘plethora’ of 
narratives allowing the audience to engage in the issues and to build their own narrative. 
However, as in the Odyssey, where the memory which undercuts the poem’s normativity 
is unauthorised—a facet of the audience’s ‘unforgetting’—so in the Trojan Women, 
memory allows the audience to question Hecuba’s dominant narrative. Furthermore, it 
encourages them to reflect on their own performance as citizens in a political and legal 
system which thrives on emotive speech.  
 
The next chapter, on Plato’s Theaetetus, and by extension, his Apology, moves from the 
quasi-courtroom of the tragic agōn to the law court trial of Socrates. It also moves from 
investigating the reactions of an audience to the response of a reader and the literary 
craft of a writer. There, I will investigate the importance of memory in the reader’s 
overlapping development as a philosopher and as a citizen.
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3 Re-membering Socrates: memory and philosophical citizenship in Plato’s 
Theaetetus 
3.1 Introduction 
My discussions of the Odyssey and the Trojan Women suggested that a study of memory, 
or an analysis informed by memory, both reinforced and undermined the dominant 
political narratives of those texts. Each chapter explored the ways in which particular 
memory-narratives seemed authorised by their texts but also considered the ways in 
which memory served to expose the mechanisms by which such narratives dominated. In 
both cases, memory was seen to be politically effective in its power to arouse strong 
emotion.  
My approach to Plato’s Theaetetus in this chapter is slightly different. This chapter will 
continue to study the interrelation of textually represented memory and audience (here, 
the reader’s) memory, but the memory with which it is most concerned is the Theaetetus’ 
‘memory of’ the Apology.626 Although the previous chapters engaged with the idea of 
such intertextual relationships between texts—Chapter 2, in particular, explored the 
Trojan Women’s relationship with epic and the Hecuba in some depth—the sustained 
attention given to this relationship sets Chapter 3 apart. This chapter suggests that 
memory of the Apology provides a political frame through which the Theaetetus might be 
read. I do not place this frame over the dialogue arbitrarily. Rather, the Apology is 
recalled for the reader by Socrates’ words at the end of the dialogue: that he ‘must go to 
the Porch of the King Archon, to meet Meletus’ indictment, the one he has brought 
against me,’ the same indictment addressed in the Apology. While others have argued 
that this fleeting reference adds nuance to the more political passages in the Theaetetus, 
such as the Digression which I will address below,627 this chapter suggests something 
more radical. The reference to the Apology acts as a memory trigger for the reader, the 
effect of which is that the reader’s memory of the Apology suffuses her/his reading of the 
Theaetetus.  
In the Apology, Plato’s engagement with politics is direct and explicit. It is clear that 
Socrates was perceived as dangerously political by those who accused and condemned 
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him: corrupting (diaphtheirei, 23d, 24c) the youth—one of the charges brought against 
him by Meletus—implies corruption not just on an individual level but of a generation on 
the verge of entering public life. As Euben puts it, ‘Given the force and range of 
diaphtheirō and its cognates—leading astray and seducing, bribing and spoiling, maiming 
and killing—the charge amounts to the claim that Socrates is destroying the polis.’628 For 
this reason, Socrates’ defence, as mediated by Plato, justifies his behaviour politically, as 
he attempts to render their criticisms in a positive light. Because the Theaetetus shows 
Socrates interacting with an actual Athenian youth we might construe the dialogue as a 
continuation of Plato’s testimony on behalf of Socrates. This chapter suggests, then, that 
in the Theaetetus, we see in practice the theory which Plato’s Socrates argues in the 
Apology, so that, perhaps, this more discerning jury of readers might interpret Socrates’ 
fame differently from the jury who condemned him in court. Here, then, we have a ‘real’ 
law court trial, as opposed to the metaphorical or quasi courts of the previous chapters. 
Here too, the law court is used explicitly as part of a dialogue about memory itself and 
about the memory of Socrates, or how to remember him. 
In the same way as in the previous chapters this analysis sees the reader in the position of 
juror and the process of reading as one that is also constitutive of juridical capabilities. As 
in the previous chapters too, the reader’s memory is actively engaged in the interpretive 
process and indeed, the very act of reading, of engaging with the text, is also an act of 
learning to read more carefully, more precisely, with greater judgement. However, 
whereas in the previous chapters my emphasis was on the communal experience of the 
audience and on the public performance of epic and tragedy, my emphasis here is on the 
(socially informed) individual reader and on Plato as a writer and a teacher.  
 
i) Chapter overview  
As stated above, Chapter 3 will examine the Theaetetus through the frame—or with the 
memory—of the Apology. This memory will inform my discussion of the Digression in the 
Theaetetus, the passage in which Socrates contrasts the philosopher to the political man, 
which is often cited to underline the division Plato sees between politics and philosophy. 
This discussion will serve to elucidate my conception of Plato’s political philosophy, which 
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will inform the chapter as a whole. Memory of the Apology will also inform my 
consideration of Socrates’ midwife metaphor. By examining the way in which the later 
text remembers the earlier one, I will assess the political, philosophical and didactic 
ramifications of this representation of his role, in line with the model of political 
philosophy drawn from the Digression. Finally, memory of the Apology will underpin my 
examination of the way in which the Wax Tablet image is framed in the Theaetetus. Here, 
memories of Socrates’ trial in the Apology interrelate with the Jurymen example and the 
Digression and this serves to cast the Wax Tablet passage—with its emphasis on false 
belief—in a political light. 
In its exploration of the Wax Tablet as a model for memory, the chapter will examine the 
agonistic relationship which Plato constructs between philosophy and other forms of 
knowledge, especially poetry. In this, it will draw on the critical conceptions of Plato’s use 
and exploitation of forms of democratic interaction discussed below. In memory terms, it 
will explore the text’s memory of, or re-membering of, tragedy for Plato’s own 
philosophical purposes.  
The Wax Tablet also provides an opportunity to explore some of the implications of my 
argument, set out earlier in the thesis, of philosophical citizenship and of the relationship 
between reading, writing and memory as construed by Plato’s teaching. In doing this, I 
will dwell on two key terms: eidōlon (‘phantom’) and exaleiphein (‘to wipe clean’ or ‘to 
paint over’). These recur in the text, creating a build-up of significance in the reader’s 
memory and resonate with cultural memory. This discussion will illustrate, on the one 
hand, Plato’s authorial anxiety and on the other, the guidance he gives about reading in 
order to compensate for this anxiety. As I have partly suggested already, this guidance 
revolves around reading with an active memory—a memory in which remembering and 
forgetting are balanced. This becomes political when the discussion encompasses the 
things which Theaetetus and the reader may be obliged to forget in the name of 
philosophical progress and the political stakes involved in such forgetting.  
Finally, from focusing in on these two concepts, I will conclude with a consideration of the 
dialogue’s form as aporetic. In this way, I will pull together the salient points of the 
chapter, in particular, with regard to my earlier readings of the Apology and of the 
midwife image. I will also examine aporia in connection with the ending of the Odyssey, a 
discussion which will send the reader of this thesis, like Theaetetus and Plato’s readers, 
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‘back to the beginning.’629 In this way, I will suggest that the placing of the memory trigger 
for the Apology at the end of the dialogue goes to the heart of Plato’s didactic purpose in 
the Theaetetus. At various points in the dialogue, Socrates instructs Theaetetus to return 
to the beginning, to think again armed with the memory of what worked last time and 
what did not.630 Placing the reference to the Apology at the end of the dialogue reinforces 
these instructions. It sends the reader back to the start armed with the memory—the 
future memory, perhaps—of Socrates’ demise, requiring her/him to reread in the light of 
what might be gleaned from that ‘new’ knowledge.  
Overall, in the light of my emphasis on Plato as a writer and teacher, I will not grapple 
much with the main philosophical discussion of the dialogue—the attempt to define 
knowledge—although my analysis will inevitably engage with this debate in places. 
Rather, this chapter will examine what reading the Theaetetus with the memory of the 
Apology reveals about Plato’s conception of politics in the world of philosophy and vice 
versa.  
In addition, this chapter will suggest not only that memory plays a central thematic role in 
the Theaetetus but also that the dialogue shows Plato investigating the process of 
memory as an integral part of the philosophy he teaches. As I will show, the dialogue 
itself is a representation or performance of memory. As discussed in the Introduction, the 
Theaetetus contains the first known attempt to understand the psychological workings of 
memory: the Wax Tablet passage. This, in itself, builds on a strong cultural memory of 
tragic drama and the whole dialogue, as much of Plato’s writing, is invested with an 
anxiety about accurate memory and testimony.631 In this way, memory of the Apology 
connects with the theme of memory and its role in philosophical practice which is so 
important to the dialogue as a whole. 
This chapter continues to be informed by the theories of memory, cultural memory and 
testimony which underpin the thesis as a whole. As the following subsection discusses, 
there are also some aspects of these theories with which this chapter engages more 
closely or different nuances which it brings out. These are related to the ‘memory of 
literature’, to the notion of collective remembering and to philosophical testimony.  
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ii) Memory, testimony and philosophy 
Broadly speaking, in its consideration of Socrates’ testimony in the Apology and in its 
wider examination of the Theaetetus as testimony, this chapter continues to engage with 
the memory theory outlined in the Introduction and built on in my discussions of Homer 
and Euripides. As in the previous chapters, it will explore moments when memory is 
represented textually, for example, in discussions of memory or in characters’ 
remembering, and their intersection with the audience’s cultural memories of poetry and 
myth. Where cultural memory is discussed in this chapter, it is often, as in Chapter 2, 
invoked as a tool of interpretation which either adds depth and resonance to words or 
passages or which suggests an alternative reading. This is not to suggest that it is 
‘corrective’; on the contrary, it is always used with an understanding that cultural 
memory is constituted and altered by all those social and cultural factors discussed in the 
Introduction.632 
Perhaps the most significant form of memory discussed here is the ‘memory of literature’, 
a type of cultural memory explored by Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney.633 Memory of literature 
is, clearly, a metaphorical term and this has led to it being highly criticised but I still feel 
that it has much to add to this study of literature. It is most usually and usefully conceived 
of in terms of intertextuality and while the theory of intertextuality is not couched in 
terms of memory, Erll characterises it as the means by which literature ‘remembers 
itself.’634 Renate Lachmann discusses the idea of ‘memory of literature’ in her 1997 study, 
Memory and Literature. She writes that ‘[l]iterature inscribes itself in a memory space 
made up of texts and it sketches out a memory space into which earlier texts are 
gradually absorbed and transformed.’635 Both Erll and Lachmann suggest that the 
memory of literature is something which accumulates over time and which is formed 
entirely by reader responses. I don’t disagree with this presentation: in Chapter 2, I 
explored precisely this kind of intertextual memory between the Trojan Women, the 
Hecuba and the Homeric epics. But I suggest here that the intertextual relationship 
between the Apology and the Theaetetus is rather more intentional and author-centred, 
                                                          
632 See Introduction to this thesis, pp. 43-45. 
633 Erll (2011), p. 67-74; Erll and Rigney (2006), p. 112. 
634 Erll (2011), p. 70. 
635 Lachmann (1997), p. 15. 
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in that Plato provides specific clues in the Theaetetus by his use of particular words, 
phrases and images which direct the reader to points in the Apology. There is a close 
reciprocal relationship established between the two texts: at times, the Theaetetus seems 
to extrapolate ideas which are mentioned in passing in the Apology, while at others, the 
Apology adds detail and nuance to ideas arising in the later text. 
Furthermore, as Erll discusses, memory theory has seen an increasing emphasis on 
‘memory genres’ and ‘genre memories’, where intertextuality does not only refer to 
individual texts but to whole genres.636 This is also something which this chapter will 
explore in relation to the Theaetetus. Erll writes that a reader’s memory is a requirement 
for a genre to be ‘realised’. Genres such as comedy and tragedy depend on the author’s 
and the reader’s/audience’s shared memory of other similar texts. At the same time, 
certain genres, such as tragedy are charged with ideological meaning and carry the 
memory of norms, values and world views.637 Where such genres are remembered—as 
Plato remembers tragedy in the Theaetetus—this comes with a range of considerations 
about all of those ‘norms, values and world views.’ Below, I consider this theory in the 
light of Nightingale’s work on Plato’s ‘parodic’ engagement with tragedy (p. 184) and it 
underpins my exploration of the Wax Tablet in the Theaetetus. 
Unlike the last two chapters, however, which emphasised the collective nature of 
remembering and forgetting experienced by the audiences of epic and tragedy because of 
their public, political performance contexts, this chapter emphasises an idea of individual 
memory which feeds into a collective, or collected consciousness. In the thesis 
Introduction, I examined Olick’s claim that ‘It is not just that we remember as members of 
groups but that we also constitute those groups and their members simultaneously in the 
act, thus “re-member-ing”’ (p. 42). There, as in the thesis so far, I focused on the second 
aspect of this: the way that ‘groups and their members’ are reconstituted in the act of 
collective ‘re-membering.’ This chapter, however, emphasises the first idea, that we 
remember as individual members of groups. As I will go on to show, Socratic and Platonic 
philosophy works first and foremost with private individuals, while retaining a sense of 
these readers as members of political groups and subject to the various influences which 
that entails. One expressed aim of this philosophy is that those individuals’ philosophical 
                                                          
636 Erll (2011), p. 74. 
637 Ibid, p. 74. 
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experiences will be shared, or collected, in such a way as to challenge and improve 
political society as a whole. 
My analysis here will also continue to build on the testimony theory which has informed 
the thesis so far. My exploration of Socrates’ speech in the Apology will build on the 
discussion in Chapter 2 regarding the mediation of Hecuba’s memories by the narratives 
of the Athenian law courts.638 More importantly than this, however, Socrates’ memory is 
also mediated, perhaps entirely reimagined, by Plato.639 In view of this, we might more 
accurately identify this testimony as Plato’s own and led by Hannah Arendt, might view it 
in the light of testimony to trauma. Arendt described the trial and execution of Socrates 
as being to the development of western philosophy, what the crucifixion was to 
Christianity: a moment of foundational trauma. This was, for Plato, the apotheosis of the 
‘politically decaying society’ in which he lived and it became for him a traumatic memory 
which prompted his despair of radical democracy and infused his philosophy, opening a 
‘gulf between philosophy and politics’ which, she argues, persists to the present day.640 
According to this reading, all Plato’s writing expressed his traumatic memory of the 
execution of Socrates: a trauma which permanently changed his perception of the way in 
which philosophy and philosophers could function in political society. 
It is equally possible, and I think more convincing, to see Plato in the mould of Aleida 
Assmann’s witness to the religious martyr. The martyr, here Socrates, dies in the act of 
witnessing his persecution at the hands of an unjust society but ‘depends on someone’—
Plato—‘to witness the suffering, to identify him or her as a martyr (rather than a justly 
persecuted rebel), and to codify the story for future generations.’641 In linking the Apology 
to the Theaetetus and constructing the later text as his testimony to Socrates’ political 
and philosophical methods, this is precisely the role which Plato plays here. He asks the 
audience to reconsider the jury’s conviction of his teacher by demonstrating the flagrant 
injustice of the charges brought against him, thereby ‘codifying’ his story in an alternative 
way for ‘future generations’ such as us. In this way, as with the witness to the martyr or 
the witness testifying to the trauma inflicted on others who can no longer speak for 
                                                          
638 See Chapter 2 of this thesis, pp. 156-60. 
639 This is very much Plato’s apology for Socrates rather than, say, Xenophon’s. 
640 Arendt (2005), p. 6. 
641 Assmann (2006), p. 268. 
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themselves, Plato’s testimony does not only represent his own memory, but it is also an 
(eminently successful) attempt to shape the memory of Socrates for all time. 
The instability and unreliability of testimony is something to which Plato’s Socrates refers 
explicitly in the Theaetetus. In his example of the Jurymen, the jury must decide a case 
based only on the testimony they hear rather than on the basis of what they themselves 
have seen, and therefore know, to be true. Clearly this passage becomes strikingly 
relevant to the above discussion when seen through the frame of the Apology and I will 
address this in more detail later (p. 218). In addition to this, the passage has informed the 
understanding of and assumptions about testimony in the philosophical tradition, as 
Anthony Coady has discussed in his ground-breaking philosophical study of testimony. 
Coady writes that Plato relies ‘upon some sort of “obviousness” about testimony’s not 
being a source of knowledge and about its inferiority, in this respect, to perception.’ 
According to Coady, this reliance has informed subsequent thinking and led to the 
philosophical tradition’s neglect of testimony in favour of perception.642 
This chapter, however, goes on to suggest Plato’s encouragement of another form of 
philosophical testimony: one that takes place not in the act of writing or speaking but in 
the act of reading. Many have commented on the fact that Plato himself is an absent 
figure in his texts.643 In fact, he deliberately writes himself out of some of them, such as 
the Phaedo when he tells us explicitly that ‘Plato’ was ill and so not among those present 
with Socrates in his cell. In the Theaetetus too, as I will explore further below, Plato would 
have us believe that the dialogue is a transcription, by Euclides of Megara, of a 
conversation reported to him by Socrates.644 Plato removes himself from the act of 
testifying altogether. Plato’s testimony—his answer in this case to the question ‘What is 
knowledge?’—does not exist. For this reason, we cannot—as in reading or hearing other 
kinds of witness testimony—look for any kind of truth, subjective or otherwise, in the 
writer’s words. Rather, we must construct our own testimony, our own truth, in our 
interpretation of the texts. Philosophy is not a testimony which Plato shares with us, but 
one which his writing ‘stings’ us to by its difficulty and by our many confusions and 
frustrations.645 
                                                          
642 Coady (1992), pp. 5-6. 
643 See e.g. Goldhill (1993), p.137. 
644 See discussion in this thesis on pp. 224-26. 
645 I draw here on Plato’s Socrates characterisation of himself as Athens’ gadfly in Pl. Ap. 30e-31a. 
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This subsection has focused on the theory which will inform my study of Plato, in 
particular, on the notion of cultural memory as intertextuality, on a collective memory 
which is more about collecting individual memories and on a philosophical form of 
testimony. The following subsection surveys the range of Platonic criticism on which this 
chapter builds or with which intersects, some of it focused on the Theaetetus itself and 
some on Plato more generally. In view of the fact that the chapter concentrates on Plato’s 
politics and his authorship and on the theme of memory, it breaks this body of criticism 
down into the further subheadings: ‘Political Philosophy,’ ‘Plato as Author’ and ‘Memory.’ 
 
iii) Critical survey 
a) Political Philosophy 
Where Arendt argued that Socrates’ trial and execution led to Plato divorcing politics 
from philosophy, recent criticism by scholars such as Peter Euben, Vincent Farenga, Sara 
Monoson and Dana Villa has sought to repoliticise Plato’s works.646 In arguing that the 
Platonic practice of philosophy is not divorced from, but still intimately bound up with, 
Athenian democracy, this chapter will build on this recent scholarship. Euben explores 
‘the ways in which Socrates expanded a democratic tradition of accountability and self-
critique into a way of doing philosophy that remained parasitic upon, if not respectful of, 
that tradition, even when he found fault with it.’647 He also suggests that Socratic 
insistence on parrhēsia, ‘free or frank speech,’ and his demonstration of a fair process of 
reasoned deliberation, actually model what democratic politics have the potential to be if 
freed from the taint of corruption.648  
Of particular note for this chapter is his gloss of Socrates’ claim that ‘the unexamined life 
is not worth living’ (ὁ δὲ ανεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ).649 He sees this claim as 
‘a philosophical articulation of democratic practices and a way of making public the 
thinking process present in the dialogue between me and myself.’650 This claim, he 
explains, implies philosophical dialogue is truly necessary because ‘only by examining my 
                                                          
646 Euben (1994 and 1997), Monoson (2000), Villa (2001) and Farenga (2006), pp. 471-535. 
647 Euben (1997), p. xiii. 
648 Euben (1994), p. 222; see also Monoson (2000), pp. 154-80. For wider discussions of parrhēsia, especially 
in relation to tragedy see Burian (2011), pp. 95-118 and Barker (2011), pp. 154-62. 
649 Pl. Ap. 38a. 
650 Euben (1997), p. 36. 
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own life in the context of others will I be able to think at all.’651 Euben compares this idea 
to Arendt’s ‘representative thinking.’ According to Arendt’s formulation, political opinions 
take shape as different viewpoints are considered. This takes place in a process of ‘making 
present to one’s mind the standpoints of those who are absent.’ Arendt does not imply 
that one gives up one’s own standpoint in experiencing the issue from the point of view 
of another but does imply that one’s standpoint might be revised or refined. She 
concludes that the more standpoints one considers ‘the more valid my final conclusions, 
my opinion.’652 As Euben writes, such ‘representative thinking’ helps us not only to 
recognise and to respect the plurality of others but also to recognise the plurality of the 
self. This may feed into our conception of the democratic community in that ‘[o]nce we 
realize that the thinking self can be more than one without losing its unity, we can better 
understand how a political community can contain differences and still be a 
community.’653 Socratic dialogue with interlocutors, with imagined interlocutors and 
sometimes with himself, not only mirrors and gives voice to the plurality of ‘others’ in the 
community but envisions an ideal political community in which those voices can exist at 
once and in opposition and yet remain a community. 
Monoson insists on something similar in her statement that:  
Plato does not present philosophical practice as a purely other-worldly 
activity or as a retreat from and opposition to the political world but as a 
brave and daring effort to call one’s community to its own best possible self 
without romanticizing what a rigorous pursuit of that best self would 
entail.654  
This chapter sees, with her, that Plato’s (and his Socrates’) relationship with democracy 
cannot be described as straightforwardly negative even though they do not consistently 
champion democratic ideals. There is a relationship, not simply a rejection, and often this 
entails an acknowledgement that, while the institutions are faltering, they may yet be 
turned around by ‘rigorous’ (Platonic/Socratic) philosophical engagement.  
Building on Monoson and Euben, I will discuss the idea that for Plato and for those 
following him, politics and philosophy are inseparable. As I will show, the Theaetetus and 
                                                          
651 Ibid, p. 37. 
652 Arendt (1977), p. 241; Euben (1997), p. 37. 
653 Euben (1997), p. 37. 
654 Monoson (2000), p. 13. 
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its wider context demonstrate that political and philosophical concerns are not distinct 
from each other but are interrelated, the one informing the other in Plato’s discussion. 
This definition of politics is not tied to a support for democracy or otherwise but suggests 
that any political participation should be predicated on personal integrity.  
However, my approach differs from some, such as Villa’s, in that the political theorist 
tends to be less interested in Plato’s craft than in Socrates’ philosophical citizenship. This 
is the case in some highly sophisticated readings of Socrates such as Euben’s and 
Farenga’s, where, although they acknowledge that Socrates is mainly known to us 
through Plato’s texts, Plato remains almost absent from their analyses. This chapter will 
focus less on any conception of a historical Socrates and more on ‘Socrates’ as a figure 
constantly reinvented by Plato. With Malcolm Schofield and Simon Goldhill the chapter 
contends that even in the most ‘Socratic’ of Plato’s texts, ‘the detailed development … 
and its concrete literary and argumentative texture will have been at least as much 
Platonic as Socratic.’655 Socrates is always mediated for us by Plato: he is Plato’s Socrates. 
Where I do not state this explicitly, it is implied. The following subsection explores just 
this. 
 
b) Plato as Author 
My consideration of Socrates as a literary character is informed by scholars such as Ruby 
Blondell who writes about the changing nature of ‘Socrates’ as Plato’s literary and 
philosophical creation, and also by Jan Assmann. Assmann does not refer to Socrates 
explicitly but his conception of the way in which Greek written culture ‘absorbed and 
developed’ oral culture was a very influential idea for this chapter. According to Assmann, 
written culture in ancient Greece differed in key respects from written culture in other 
ancient cultures such as Israel and Egypt. In these cultures, writing was seen ‘as an 
eternal, unchangeable, sacred counter to the transience of the spoken word.’656 Because 
this kind of cultural memory in Greek societies was contained within oral culture and was 
sustained within the rituals and practices of social groups, this, according to Assmann, left 
                                                          
655 Schofield (2006), p.21; for a similar approach see Goldhill (2002), pp. 80-110. 
656 Assmann (2011), pp. 241-42. 
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Greek scribal culture peculiarly open to penetration by oral culture.657 In the light of 
Assmann’s writing, this chapter will see Plato’s Socrates not merely as a figure who 
worked in the medium of oral dialectic but as a representative of oral culture—the 
equivalent, perhaps, of a Homer to Herodotus and Thucydides—one with and against 
whom, Plato defines the new genre of written philosophy. 
In its examination of Plato’s philosophy as a genre, the chapter is also heavily influenced 
by Andrea Nightingale who, in her seminal study Genres in Dialogue, suggests that Plato 
engages parodically with other genres of his time and in this way defines his new genre of 
philosophical dialogue.658 Although Nightingale’s work is not conceived of in terms of 
memory, it clearly bears much in common with the theory on ‘memory of literature’ and 
genre discussed above. To engage parodically, in Nightingale’s terms, is not always 
suggestive of comic ridicule but is rather the process of recontextualising an object ‘so as 
to make it serve tasks contrary to its original tasks.’659 According to her, Plato uses this 
kind of engagement with texts from established genres such as oratory, comedy and 
tragedy to affirm his continuity with established traditions while also distinguishing ‘what 
he was doing from all other discursive practices that laid claim to wisdom.’ Of Plato’s 
Socrates’ famous assertion in Republic 10 about an ‘ancient quarrel between philosophy 
and poetry,’ Nightingale writes that this may not be historical fact but could rather stand 
as ‘a bold rhetorical strategy designed to define philosophy and invest it with a near-
timeless status.’660 Although something recognisable as philosophical thought had been 
around for at least two hundred years (since the Pythagoreans) by the time Plato was 
writing, philosophy as a formal discipline was in its infancy and Plato a relatively 
‘unknown stripling measuring himself against a venerable giant’ in the form of poetry.661 
For Nightingale, parodic engagement is signalled by a cluster of allusions and it is such a 
cluster which, I will suggest, we find with regard to tragedy in the Wax Tablet passage.662  
For the most part, scholarship on the Theaetetus revolves around the philosophical 
concerns of the dialogue, in particular, the definition of knowledge. This, notably by 
Burnyeat, Chappell and Fine provides important background for this study, but because of 
                                                          
657 An excellent exploration of such repositories of Athenian cultural memory can be found in Steinbock 
(2013), especially pp. 70-97.  
658 Nightingale (1995), pp. 1-12. 
659 Ibid, p. 7, paraphrasing Morson (1989), p. 69. 
660 Ibid, p. 60. 
661 Ibid, p. 60. 
662 Ibid, p. 9. 
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my particular focus on memory, politics and genre these philosophical concerns are not 
central to my analysis.663 However, although its primary focus is, like the others, on the 
subject of knowledge, this chapter builds on Zina Giannopoulou’s very thorough reading 
of the intertextual relationship between the Apology and the Theaetetus.664 
Giannopoulou suggests that the  
Theaetetus, Plato’s most systematic enquiry into the nature of knowledge, is 
a philosophically sophisticated elaboration of Apology that successfully 
differentiates Socrates from the sophists. In Apology Socrates defends his 
philosophical activity partly by distinguishing it from sophistic practices, and 
in Theaetetus he enacts this distinction.665 
Like Giannopoulou, I find significance in Plato’s attempts to distance Socrates—in both 
the Apology and the Theaetetus—from the sophists but my emphasis differs from hers in 
three important respects. Firstly, whereas Giannopoulou’s study is built around the 
definitions of knowledge which arise in the Theaetetus and their intertextual relationship 
with the arguments presented in the Apology, my analysis of this intertextual relationship 
is part of a wider study of memory and its relationship with political philosophy in the text 
as a whole. Secondly, and relatedly, while politics plays no part in Giannopoulou’s 
exploration, politics is the very reason why I sought to bring the frame of the Apology to 
the Theaetetus. After all, it is in the Apology that Socrates’ philosophy is seen in its most 
political setting and where its political effects and possibilities are most obvious. Thirdly, 
because Giannopoulou is interested in Socratism, albeit mediated by Plato, her study is 
not concerned with what the relationship of the Apology and the Theaetetus might reveal 
about Plato himself as a political philosopher, a teacher and a writer, whereas that forms 
an important part of my work here, especially towards the end of the chapter. It is worth 
mentioning here also that this chapter is not concerned with the sophists themselves, 
however that disparate group might be categorised, but rather with Plato’s attempts to 
demarcate them as a group in opposition to Socrates.666 
For this study, the most influential scholarship was that which united analyses of form 
and function in Plato’s writing. Ruby Blondell’s examination of character and the dialogic 
                                                          
663 Burnyeat (1990), Chappell (2004), Fine (1979). 
664 Giannopoulou (2013). 
665 Ibid, p. 2. 
666 Goldhill (1986), pp. 222-33. 
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form in the Theaetetus (among other dialogues) was important in informing my approach. 
Here, she argues that the artificial boundary traditionally constructed in Platonic criticism 
leads to reductive analyses. In doing so, she suggests that Plato’s use of characterisation 
‘is integral both to the “literary” enterprise of representing human interaction in spoken 
dialogue, and the “philosophical” enquiry into the best form of human life and 
behaviour.’667 Also significant was John Henderson’s study of the effects of the various 
framing devices in the Symposium, which had specific relevance for thinking through the 
levels of framing and memory at work in the Theaetetus.668 Although Henderson’s 
analysis does not address memory and testimony as such, his analysis looks in detail at 
the ways in which the speakers—Apollodorus in particular—mediates memory, the way 
that narratives are authorised or not by the text as a whole and the effects that all of this 
has on the reader.  
Also influential were scholarly works addressing the relationship between Socratic and 
Platonic philosophy, especially with a view to their didactic methods. Foremost among 
these was David Sedley’s extended examination of Socrates’ use of the ‘midwife’ 
metaphor to describe his teaching. In this, like Blondell, he links the form of the dialogue 
to its philosophical content. Here the form he discusses is Plato’s reversion to an ‘early’ 
style of aporetic dialogue with a ‘semi-historical’ Socrates, while the content is, he 
suggests, a demonstration of the way in which Socratic philosophy metaphorically gave 
birth to Platonism.669 Christopher Long’s analysis of the political practice of reading Plato 
was also important in thinking about Socratism and Platonism.670 Long’s approach 
compares and contrasts the practices of Socratic speaking and Platonic writing and 
stresses the experience of reading Plato alone and in a group. 
 
c) Memory 
Finally, Chapter 3 builds on work in the field relating to memory in Plato’s dialogues. Anne 
Whitehead discusses the Wax Tablet image at some length in her guide to prominent 
thinkers and ideas in the field of memory studies, while Sophie Grace Chappell has 
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written on the use of memory in Platonic philosophy specifically, also focusing on the Wax 
Tablet in the Theaetetus. My work departs from both of these studies, however, in seeing 
memory at the centre of the Theaetetus and in tying the image of the Wax Tablet into my 
analysis of the wider theme. This analysis also encompasses cultural memory, as triggered 
by the text, rather than focusing purely on the psychological process of remembering and 
its relationship to false belief, in the context of the passage.  
Before moving on from this discussion of Platonic criticism and memory studies, it is 
necessary to address Plato’s theory of recollection and the Forms, which both Whitehead 
and Chappell also explore in some detail. To do full justice to this subject, I would need to 
undertake another thesis, but the arguments must be laid out in broad terms as the 
understanding of memory in this chapter is different from that in the rest of the thesis as 
a result. Baldly speaking then, scholarship is deeply divided over whether the Theaetetus 
addresses recollection and the Forms or not. Some, such as Cornford, argue that it does. 
He suggests that Socrates’ stance as midwife, which I will discuss more fully below (in 
section 3.3) draws directly on the Meno and the Phaedo. In these dialogues, Socrates 
outlines his theory that all knowledge is recollection of the immortal truths which one’s 
soul sees before it becomes embodied and mortal.671 MacDowell’s sceptical response is 
that there is nothing in the theory of recollection which corresponds to Socrates’ sterility 
of knowledge, a central part of his pose as midwife, and that the offspring he discusses in 
the Theaetetus are more likely to be ‘wind-eggs’ than truths.672 This debate is clearly 
important for my thesis as the Forms represent the notion of universal truth at the core 
of memory, an idea which I have been anxious to disavow. 
My own reading of this issue is that the midwife image does indeed gesture towards the 
theory of recollection and the idea that asking the right questions could eventually yield 
memory of the ‘Truth,’ as expressed in the Meno. However, I would qualify this reading 
using the Phaedrus and thereby suggest that Plato’s theory is closer to modern memory 
theory than the Meno or the Phaedo might allow. In the Phaedrus, Socrates speaks of the 
immortal soul which flies up into the heavens and while there it: 
καθορᾷ μὲν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ σωφροσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ 
ἐπιστήμην, οὐχ ᾗ γένεσις πρόσεστιν, οὐδ’ ἥ ἐστίν ἑτέρα ἐν ἑτέρῳ οὖσα ὧν 
                                                          
671 Particularly, Meno 81c-86b. 
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ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῳ ὅ ἐστιν ὅν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην 
οὖσαν.673  
looks on justice itself, looks on temperance, looks on knowledge, not such 
knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with one or 
another of the things we call realities, but that which abides in the real 
eternal absolute.674  
In this the Phaedrus is in line with those texts which posit the existence of such absolute 
truths.  
The mortal soul, meanwhile, strives to follow the immortals but although the best of us 
might raise our heads into the upper region and catch a glimpse of this truth (ἀλήθεια), 
we cannot rise up properly. So, the mortal soul ‘fails to see, and through some mischance 
is filled with forgetfulness (λήθη) and evil (κακία) and grows heavy (βαρύνω), and when it 
has grown heavy, loses its wings and falls to earth ….’675 In this way, Socrates suggests 
that while these absolute truths exist and while it is possible that through his exertions 
the philosopher may, in time, recollect them perfectly, memories of these truths are, for 
mortals, always unstable, incoherent and inadequate. Our recollections are, therefore, 
always part of a process of trying to get closer to the original perfection but are always 
also flawed. To address MacDowell’s doubts: Socrates’ sterility of knowledge lies in his 
acceptance that this is so, that he has no knowledge of these absolutes. The fact that all 
the births discussed are ‘phantoms’ comes down to the fact that he, and all of his 
students, are mortals and while Socratic dialectic may get them closer to the truth, it is 
inevitably, always a process of refining and of moving slowly towards that truth, rather 
than grasping it with both hands. 
This subsection has established the chapter’s place in the wide sweep of critical writing 
on Plato and on the Theaetetus specifically, at the same time setting out the main critical 
arguments which underlie my analysis. These are: that Plato’s philosophy engages with 
Athenian democracy at the levels of both content and form and that reading the 
Theaetetus through the frame of the Apology serves to elucidate Plato’s political 
philosophy and in connection with this, his role as a teacher and a writer. It has 
established that the chapter will consider the dialogue’s memory of and engagement with 
                                                          
673 Pl. Phdr. 247d-e. 
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not only the Apology but also other genres such as tragedy. Finally, it has proposed a 
more nuanced reading of the Forms which, though tangential to the Theaetetus in some 
ways, will be seen to have a significant impact on this reading. 
 
3.2 Philosopher vs politician 
This section focuses on the Digression of the Theaetetus as a passage which directly 
recalls the Apology in a number of ways and in so doing, serves to establish Socrates’ 
position with regard to philosophy and politics. In the Digression, Socrates compares the 
man brought up around politics to the man brought up with philosophy. This passage has 
been construed by some as representative of Plato’s vision of the ‘gulf’ between politics 
and philosophy in the wake of Socrates’ death, as discussed by Hannah Arendt (see p. 
179). Indeed, if this comparison is taken at face value, it is easy to see the divide between 
politics and philosophy and Socrates’ reasons for marking it out. However, some scholars 
such as Rachel Rue and Avi Mintz, have used the Apology to demonstrate the idea that 
Socrates himself does not correspond to the figure of the philosopher in the Digression.676 
Rather, he represents a ‘middle way’ between the two extremes he draws here. This 
chapter builds on this idea but uses memory of the Apology to suggest that Plato is, in the 
Digression, offering another defence of Socrates’ conception of philosophical citizenship. 
As in the Apology, he draws a distinction not just between politics and philosophy but 
between different philosophical schools, one—sophism—which genuinely corrupts the 
political landscape and the other—Socratism—which improves it. 
In the Digression, Socrates explores the differences between those ‘who have knocked 
around since their youth in the courts and other such places’ and those ‘brought up on 
philosophy and similar pursuits’ (οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων 
κυλινδούμενοι and τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοιᾷδε διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους), 
henceforth, the politician and the philosopher.677 In the course of this discussion, he 
                                                          
676 Rue (1993), whole article but especially 75-91. and Mintz (2011), pp. 663-64. 
677 Pl. Tht. 172c-d. While Plato’s Socrates does refer to the man brought up on philosophy as the 
‘philosopher’, he doesn’t ever refer to the other as a ‘politician’ or any other such neat term. For ease, I will 
refer to him as the ‘politician’ here but on the understanding that this is a citizen involved in the public, 
political life of the city rather than, say, an orator or a sophist. The quotations from Pl. Tht are from Duke et 
al (1995); translations are a synthesis of Levett, revised by Burnyeat (1992) and Rowe (2015) and have been 
adapted by me. 
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details the flaws of the former, whom he views as ‘slaves’ (οἰκέται),678 constantly ‘urged 
on [in their speech] by the flow of the water [in the clock]’ (κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον);679 
they flatter (θωπεῦσαι),680 use deceit (ψεῦδός) and ‘injure each other in retaliation’ (τὸ 
ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν).681 The latter, meanwhile, he describes as ‘brought up in freedom 
and leisure’ (ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε και σχολῇ τεθραμμένον)682 and removed from 
the polis in all but body, while his mind ‘flies everywhere’ (πανταχῇ πέτεται).683 He is 
unable to find his way to ‘the assembly … the law court, the council chamber, or any 
other of the city’s public meeting places’ (ἀγορὰν … δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἤ τι 
κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον), the public spaces of the city, where the citizen 
performs his political duty.684 Furthermore, he is uninterested, even in his dreams, in 
‘political clubs striving after public office, meetings, dinners’ (σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιριῶν ἐπ’ 
ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καί δεῖπνα), those unofficial, elite settings in the city where 
connections were made and political knowledge shared.685 This philosopher, he says:  
ἰδίᾳ τε συγγιγνόμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑκάστῳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος 
ἔλεγον, ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἤ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας 
καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει.686  
whether he’s dealing with someone in private or in public, as I said at the 
beginning, as soon as he is forced, in a law court or somewhere else, to hold 
a conversation about things by his feet or before his very eyes, makes a 
laughing stock of himself.  
Yet, he seems to laud the figure of the philosopher also, saying that ‘flight [from the polis] 
makes us like god, as far is is possible, and becoming god is to become just and holy with 
wisdom’ (φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ 
φρονήσεως γενέσθαι).687 
It is possible to take this discussion at face value, arguing that the philosopher’s 
ineffectiveness at speaking in political situations such as in the law court offers an apology 
                                                          
678 Pl. Tht. 172d. 
679 Ibid, 172e. 
680 Ibid, 173a. 
681 Ibid, 173a. 
682 Ibid, 175d-e. 
683 Ibid, 173e. 
684 Ibid, 173d. 
685 Ibid, 173d. 
686 Ibid, 174b-c. 
687 Ibid, 176b. 
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of its own for Socrates’ failure to convince the Athenian jury of his innocence. The 
philosopher is unable to share the concerns or communicate in the language of the city. 
David Sedley reads the passage as being in this apologist tradition.688 He has also seen the 
philosopher’s freedom from the city, his ‘flying’ mind which maps the earth and the 
heavens and his closeness to god, as a precursor to Plato’s own version of philosophy 
represented in the Republic.689 He argues very persuasively that the ‘life of pure 
intellectual endeavour’ as more ‘godlike’ than ‘one devoted to civic virtue’ was a doctrine 
to which Plato subscribed. In addition, he suggests that the language relating to the 
philosopher potentially managing to ‘drag someone upwards’ with him (ὅταν δέ γέ τινα 
αὐτός ... ἑλκύσῃ ἄνω)690 connects the passage directly to the Cave passage in the 
Republic.691 To summarise rather bluntly, in this, the philosopher frees himself from his 
shackles, drags himself out of the Cave and travels up to the heavens where he finds the 
Forms before realising that he must travel back to the Cave in order to be of benefit to its 
other inhabitants. In this way, according to Sedley, Plato illustrates, for the alert scholar, 
the extent to which Socrates’ philosophy has influenced him and the way that he 
developed his own philosophy from where Socrates left off.692 
However, the pervasiveness of Socratic irony in Plato’s characterisation of Socrates, 
together with the memory of the portrait drawn of Socrates in the Apology, makes a 
wholehearted acceptance of this reading difficult. Unlike the philosopher of the 
Digression, Socrates is of the city. At the start of the Apology, he instructs the jury not to 
be surprised or to make a disturbance ‘if they hear him making [his] defence using the 
same words with which [he has] been accustomed to speak both in the market place at 
the money-changers tables, where many of you have heard me and elsewhere’ (ἐὰν διὰ 
τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου απολογουμένου δι’ ὧνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ 
τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκρὴκόασι, δαὶ ἄλλοθι).693 This suggests that he is a 
familiar figure in the public spaces of Athens. In the Theaetetus, he is at the gymnasium—
a civic institution; he is familiar enough with the prominent citizens of Athens to know 
                                                          
688 Sedley (2004), p. 66. 
689 Ibid, p. 70. It is widely accepted that the Republic is the earlier text but as discussed above (p. 186), 
Sedley suggests that the Theaetetus functions as an illustration of where Platonism departs from Socratism. 
690 Pl. Tht. 175b. 
691 Sedley (2004), p. 67 and p. 63 respectively. Pl. Resp. VII. 514a-520a. 
692 Ibid: the whole work details Socrates’ influence on Plato and Plato’s treatment of this influence in the 
Theaetetus. 
693 Pl. Ap. 17c. The quotations from Pl. Ap. are from Emlyn-Jones and Preddy (2017). Translations are based 
on the same volume used together with Fowler (1966) and have been adapted by me. 
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that Theaetetus’ father was Euphronius of Sunium, a well-respected man who left a 
significant legacy; and there is no suggestion that he will not be able to find his way to the 
law-court from the gymnasium when the dialogue ends.  
In spite of this, we know from the Apology that while Socrates may be ‘of the city’, he is 
not ‘of the polis’ in the conventional sense. Unlike the philosopher of the Digression, we 
know from other dialogues that he is familiar with elite settings such as symposia yet, in 
the Apology, Socrates must still defend himself against the perception that he takes no 
role in the active political life of the city. His accusers have some grounds for this 
perception: while he may know where these institutions are, he does not speak before 
the assembly and we know from the opening of the dialogue that this is his first time 
speaking before the law court.694 In view of this, Socrates may seem even worse than his 
philosopher: he is not ignorant of the polis, lost in philosophical thought, but deliberately 
eschews political life. In this, Thucydides’ discussion of Antiphon resonates 
uncomfortably. He too was ‘a man who never came before the dēmos nor before any 
other agōn if he could help it’ (ἐς μὲν δῆμον οὐ παριὼν οὐδ’ ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶρα ἑκούσιος 
οὐδένα).695 As Barker suggests, Thucydides’ attitude to Antiphon is reflective of his 
concern about the suppression of debate under the Four Hundred in Athens.696 This 
resonant comparison is perhaps suggestive of Socrates’ own alleged association with the 
tyrants.697 
Socrates’ defence in the Apology goes some way to exculpate him. At first, like the 
philosopher, Socrates states that his philosophical occupation allows him ‘no leisure to 
attend to any of the affairs of the state worth mentioning, or of my own’ (καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης 
τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν 
οἰκείων).698 This is partly interesting because of its wording. While Socrates stresses here 
that he is without leisure (ἀσχολία), the philosopher’s leisure (σχολή) is the very thing 
which, in the Digression, he seems to prize most. In a way, this seems to confirm the gulf 
between politics and philosophy in that Socrates prioritises his time to discuss philosophy 
over time he might spend in political involvement. However, although he seems to put his 
                                                          
694 Carter (1986) discusses those apolitical Athenians who abstained from political life but as I suggest here, 
Socrates did not abstain apolitically but rather practiced politics differently. His use of ‘political’ rhetoric is 
discussed in detail below, pp. 197-98. 
695 Thuc. 8.68.1, trans. Barker (2009), p. 224. 
696 Barker (2009), pp. 224-25. 
697 As discussed in Xen. Mem. 1.2.29-38. 
698 Pl. Ap. 23b. 
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failure to speak in the assembly or to hold public office down to the time taken up by his 
philosophical practice, he states later that ‘if [he] had gone into politics long ago, [he] 
should, long ago, have been put to death’ (εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ 
πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη).699 The reason he gives for this is that ‘no man will save his 
life who nobly opposes you or any other populace and prevents many unjust and illegal 
things from happening in the state’ (οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν 
οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ 
παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι).700 He holds himself back from the political realm 
because his opposition to popular policy on the grounds of justice and legality would have 
got him killed long before now. Therefore, unlike the philosopher in the Digression, the 
Socrates of the Apology is not abstracted from political life, his head filled only with loftier 
thoughts: he is held back from active participation in the political life of Athens because 
of his own, more honest, political convictions.  
There is also the suggestion that these ‘loftier thoughts’ to which Socrates devotes his 
time are not themselves totally removed from the political realm and that this discussion 
of philosophy which he privileges over the practice of politics might be a civic duty of its 
own. While Plato’s Socrates may not ‘attend to any of the affairs of the state’ in the 
conventional sense of the political involvement of the Athenian citizen, he appears to 
practise, in his position as Athens’ gadfly, a kind of philosophical citizenship predicated on 
the moral foundations of justice and truth to himself.701 The reason that his philosophy 
allows him no leisure for his own affairs or those of the city is not that he is sitting 
chatting idly with friends, but that he is ‘always busy in [their] interest, approaching each 
of [them] individually like a father or elder brother and persuading [them] to concern 
[themselves] with virtue’ (τὸ δὲ ὑπέτερον πράττειν ἀεί, ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ προσιότα ὥσπερ 
πατέρα ἣ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι άρετῆς).702 Socrates sees his 
mission as motivated by a god or spirit which comes to him and he defends his decision to 
‘go about and interfere in other people’s affairs to give this advice in private’ (ἐγώ ἰδίᾳ 
μὲν ταῦτα συμβουλεύω περιιὼν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ) on these grounds.703 At first, this 
seems to be his justification for not offering his advice publicly, to the city. However, he 
                                                          
699 Ibid, 31d. 
700 Ibid, 31e. 
701 For an excellent discussion of this see Farenga (2006), pp. 471-535. See also Villa (2001). 
702 Pl. Ap. 31b. 
703 Ibid, 31c. 
 194 
 
goes on to give the additional, rational reason that ‘he who in actual fact fights on behalf 
of what is just must, if he is going to survive even for a short time, do so in his capacity as 
a private citizen and not as a public servant’ (ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον 
ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μελλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ 
δημοσιεύειν).704 On the one hand, this is clearly critical of the corrupt democratic 
institutions of Athens because it suggests that for all their supposed celebration of free 
and frank speech, they cannot brook opposition. On the other, as I will explore below, it 
illustrates an alternative way of practising politics.  
All in all, then, Socrates’ actions here could well be described as political in that they 
pertain to the enactment of justice in the city. Where they differ from behaviours which 
the Athenians could accept as ‘political’ is that they are private and happen outside of the 
institutions of democracy. He depicts himself enacting a kind of philosophical citizenship 
by stinging Athenian individuals into being their best selves. In so doing, he says that he is 
attached to the city as a gadfly is to a horse. Just as a gadfly stings a sluggish (νωθής) 
horse which needs to wake up (ἐγείρω), so Socrates ‘urges [them] and reproaches each 
one of [them] and never stop[s] landing on [them] all day and everywhere’ (πείθων καὶ 
ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων).705 He is 
a constant irritating reminder that their thoughts and behaviours should be informed by 
truth and justice. What is more interesting here is that he jumps from speaking about 
himself as a gadfly ‘attached by the god to the city’ (ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθηκέναι) 
to speaking of stinging the people as individuals (each one, ἕκαστος).706 As discussed 
above, his mission does not involve working publicly with the people as a whole, but 
rather with individuals. In this way, he hopes to create an honest polis via a collection of 
honest individuals, empowered to act with integrity for the benefit of the city.707  
Reading the Theaetetus with memory of this part of the Apology also brings into doubt 
the idea, suggested forcefully through the centuries, that Plato and Socrates did not in 
fact believe in Athenian democracy. The Republic—where Plato’s Socrates imagines a 
world of philosopher kings—is often cited as evidence of this view.708 The Theaetetus, 
                                                          
704 Ibid, 32a. 
705 Ibid, 30e-31a. 
706 Ibid, 30e. 
707 Long (2014), p. 3. 
708 Ober, for example, argues that by the time of the Republic, Plato has moved from discussing the 
‘democratic-polis-as-it-is’ to the ‘polis-as-it-should-be’ (1998), p. 212. 
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read with memory of the Apology, does not bear this reading out for two reasons. On the 
one hand, when Socrates compares the city to a horse in need of a gadfly, he makes a 
point of stressing that there is nothing innately wrong with the horse. Indeed, he says 
that it is ‘well-bred’ (γενναῖος) and merely ‘rather sluggish because of its size’ (ὑπὸ 
μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ).709 This suggests also that Socrates sees nothing wrong—and 
much right—with the polis. On the other hand, while it is true that in the Digression, 
Socrates separates the freedom of the individual mind of the philosopher from the 
politician who must always flatter and pander to his slave-master, the Apology once again 
offers a way of bringing these poles closer together. In stinging individual citizens with his 
philosophy, each person who makes up part of the demos has the same freedom as the 
philosopher in the Digression and together—as a collection of self-reflective individuals, 
rather than a mob—they can act as a more effective political force. This definition of 
politics is not related to a support for democracy or otherwise but suggests that any 
political participation should be predicated on personal integrity. Philosophy is the means 
by which the citizen can explore what such integrity means. 
There is clearly some overlap here too between the ways in which Socrates and Plato 
practise philosophy. Just as Socrates approaches individuals and attempts, through 
dialogue, to bring them to their best selves, so Plato’s writing serves a similar purpose 
with his readers. I will address Plato’s teaching in much more detail as the chapter 
progresses, in the imagery of the midwife (section 3.3) and in my study of how his anxiety 
about prose as a genre informs his guidance about reading (section 3.5). In brief, though, 
my argument is that Plato’s readers, like Socrates’ interlocutors, are individuals and there 
is a definite sense in which Plato encourages his reader to engage with his text, 
replicating or improving on his characters’ engagement with Socrates. This is especially so 
in a text like the Apology where we know that, in Plato’s terms, the (mostly silent) 
interlocutor failed so dramatically. Long describes this overlap between Socratic and 
Platonic political didacticism, very usefully, in terms of topos and graphein.710 For him, 
topos is the space which opens between Socrates and the interlocutor, a space in which 
Socratic dialogue is shown to have a profound political effect; graphein is the space which 
opens between the Platonic text and the reader, a space in which the reader experiences 
                                                          
709 Pl. Ap. 30e. 
710 Long (2014), p. x. 
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that transformative political effect. Although my analysis differs from his in its details, this 
model holds true for my thinking here. 
Other evidence from the Apology and the Digression suggests that Plato, via Socrates, is 
not only proposing a new practice of philosophical politics but deliberately setting up this 
new practice in opposition to a public sphere which he sees as having been dominated by 
sophism. Plato explicitly addresses this notion in the Gorgias, where Socrates describes 
himself as the only one in the city to conduct ‘true’ politics because he speaks ‘toward the 
best, not toward the most pleasant’ (πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον).711 Where 
Socrates defines himself against the sophists in the Apology, his words serve two 
purposes: they simultaneously blame the sophists for the corruption besetting the 
Athenian political establishment and demonstrate his remove from the sophistic 
movement. This is important as in the Apology, Socrates blames his detractors for 
indoctrinating the people of Athens against him by falsely associating him with the 
sophists, the people popularly held to prioritise rhetorical victories over justice or the 
good of the city. 
In Rachel Rue’s reading of the Digression, she suggests that the politician represents the 
Protagorean, sophistic orators of the Athenian political world and further, that as such, 
the Digression is integral to the surrounding discussion about Protagoras and his dictum 
that man is ‘the measure of all things’ (πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον) in the main dialogue.712 
Undoubtedly, there is much in Socrates’ characterisation of the political men which 
corresponds to contemporary thinking about the sophists and it seems likely, at least, 
that they have had some form of sophistic education. Socrates speaks of them as always 
being bound to speak in ‘contests’ (ἀγῶνες), which leads to their ‘knowing how to 
wheedle their master with words’ (ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεῦσαι).713 They 
have knowledge of rhetoric and use it to ‘wheedle’ instead of winning their arguments 
with justice and the truth. Jon Hesk discusses the same kind of commonly held prejudices 
about sophism in the speeches of Aeschines and Demosthenes, particularly the idea that 
the ‘rhetorical activism’ of the sophist is ‘deceitful and harmful to the polis.’ This is so 
because sophistry is perceived as self-serving and as ‘lacking an ideological priority of 
                                                          
711 Pl. Grg. 521d-e. For a discussion of this passage in connection with Socrates’ politics see Long (2014), pp. 
10-13. 
712 Pl. Tht. 152e. Rue (1993), p. 91. This reading that equates Protagoras with all sophists is informed by 
Kramer (1976) and is equally influential in Mintz (2011), Giannopoulou (2013) and this chapter. 
713 Pl. Tht. 173a. 
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commitment to the demos.’714 Its commitment is, like the politician’s in the Digression, to 
the argument rather than to any conception of communal benefit.  
Rue’s discussion still speaks of these Protagoreans as political orators, counterposed to 
the philosopher. I suggest, rather, that it is important to bear in mind that Protagoras 
himself was not a politician but a philosopher, a sophist, who offered a sophistic form of 
philosophical education. The way in which the Theaetetus remembers the Apology shows 
that much of Socrates’ effort in his defence is directed at distancing himself and his own 
‘teaching’ from sophism—a philosophy which, he implies, corrupts the polis—and his own 
political philosophy which enhances it. Therefore, one might see the Digression as a 
contrast between two philosophical schools and their relative effects on the polis. 
That Socrates’ accusers in the Apology do associate him with sophism and that he does 
attempt to distance himself from this corruptive philosophy can be seen in his discussion 
of the ‘slander’ (διαβολή) of his accusers,715 in his ‘rhetoric of anti-rhetoric’ and in his 
characterisation of his own ‘teaching,’ a term which he disputes.716 Firstly, most of those 
who ‘slander’ him are, he says, unknown, but he refers both implicitly and explicitly to 
Aristophanes—that ‘writer of comedies’ (κωμῳδοποιός)—who characterised Socrates as 
using just such specious sophistry in his play, Clouds.717 He even goes on to describe the 
play which has ‘someone called Socrates swinging around there claiming that he’s 
treading on air and uttering a lot of other nonsense about which I have no understanding 
great or small’ (Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἅλλην 
πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδεν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαΐω).718 
Though we cannot take Aristophanes’ comic depiction of Socrates at face value there is 
clearly enough truth to the picture to make it recognisable to its original audience.719 This 
is not to say that Socrates behaved like this but that this representation tallied with, or 
more probably exaggerated, the common perception of him. Layers of Socratic irony also 
suggest that we cannot completely accept Socrates’ denial that the portrait is in any way 
accurate but what is more important here is that it shows him attempting to mark a 
                                                          
714 Hesk (2000) pp. 211 and 216. 
715 He uses this word repeatedly: see e.g. Ap. 18d, 19b and 23a. 
716 The ‘rhetoric of anti-rhetoric’ is discussed in Hesk (2000), pp. 202-291. 
717 Pl. Ap. 18d.  
718 Ibid, 19c. 
719 This reading of Aristophanes’ historical value is influenced by Pelling (2000), pp. 123-40 and Robson 
(2009), pp. 162-87. 
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distinct difference between himself and the sophists on the grounds that the evidence 
uniting the two is both slanderous and ridiculous. 
Secondly, Socrates opens his speech in the Apology by stressing his own unpolished 
speech in comparison to the fine words of his prosecutors. However, although Socrates’ 
defence fails to convince the jury, this is demonstrably not because of any rhetorical 
incompetence on Socrates’ part, another factor which differentiates him from the 
philosopher of the Digression who cannot speak in the language of the polis. He ascribes 
his unpolished speech to this being the ‘first time [he has] come before the court’ (νῦν 
ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα), a fact which makes him ‘simply a stranger to 
the manner of speech’ (ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως).720 His speeches, he 
says are not ‘made with fine phrases and words’ (καλλιεπέομαι), as his accusers’ are;721 
rather, he says that ‘[they] will hear from [him] nothing but the truth’ (ὑμεῖς δέ μου 
ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν).722 His testimony begins with a truth-formula similar to 
those discussed with regard to the Odyssey but here, the formula may be disingenuous: 
Socrates’ speech is eloquent and persuasive and far from being the rambling of an 
amateur.  
In Hesk’s vocabulary, as discussed with reference to Hecuba in chapter 2, we could see 
Socrates’ speech as epitomising the ‘rhetoric of anti-rhetoric’ and, indeed, it bears many 
of the hallmarks Hesk describes. Hesk discusses the idea that the orator often 
‘foregrounds his opponent as a technologist of performance,’ an act which ‘has a 
strategic and antagonistic quality.’723 By comparison, ‘the forensic orators frequently 
represent themselves as innocent of various procedures associated with rhetorical 
training and preparation.’724 Hesk stresses ‘that such claims to innocence or ignorance of 
rhetorical preparation describe a “dramatic fiction”.’725 Clearly, a consideration of 
Socrates’ possible disambiguation must weigh with an audience considering Socrates’ 
possible guilt. I suggest, however, that if Plato’s other texts serve as further testimony on 
Socrates’ behalf, then this further testimony illustrates in a sustained way that Socratic 
political philosophy offers something genuinely different from sophism. In contrast to the 
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723 Hesk (2000), p. 208. 
724 Ibid, p. 208. 
725 Ibid, p. 208, quoting Ober (1989). 
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politician in the Digression, the Theaetetus shows Socrates as uninterested in contests of 
persuasion for their own sake. He does enter into a sort of imagined contest with 
Protagoras but the purpose is not to win: it is to draw out the repercussions of 
Protagoras’ idea that ‘man is the measure.’ Socrates uses both competitive argument and 
collaborative dialogue in his pursuit of the truth.726 As Hesk writes, Plato appropriates 
rhetoric but subordinates it to his pursuit of ‘the good.’727 For this reason, the deceit, 
flattery and injustice of the sophistic politician of the Digression are far from this ‘political’ 
being. 
Thirdly, Socrates claims that not only does he not teach for money as the sophists such as 
Gorgias, Prodicus and Hippias do,728 but that the accusation that he teaches is part of the 
slander levelled against him by his detractors. As part of his exploration into wisdom, he 
says that he ‘still goes around inquiring and seeking, in accordance with the god, who 
among our citizenry and outsiders I am to consider wise’ (νῦν περιιὼν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ 
κατὰ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι).729 When he finds 
one who is not wise, he demonstrates that he is not.730 In turn ‘the young men who 
follow [him]’ (οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοὺντες) delight (χαίρω) in this and imitate (μιμέομαι) 
him. Socrates denies that this is teaching in three ways. Firstly his whole premise is that 
he is the wisest of men because he knows nothing (20c-23c) and this implies that he has 
no wisdom to impart: he cannot teach because he knows nothing. Secondly, he states 
that these young men follow him of their own accord (αὐτόματος). There is no teacher-
pupil contract involved, no money and no compulsion of any kind.731 Thirdly, he says that 
the idea that this is teaching comes only from the bitterness and humiliation of those 
whom he and the young men interrogate. He states: 
καὶ ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ ὅτι ποιῶν καὶ ὅτι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν 
εἰπεῖν ἀλλ’ ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων των 
φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι “τὰ μετέρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς” 
καὶ “θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν” καὶ “τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν.”732 
                                                          
726 Arendt, for example, explores this aspect of Socratic dialectic, (2005), pp. 15-18. 
727 Hesk (2000), p. 218. 
728 Pl. Ap. 19d-e. 
729 Pl. Ap. 23b. 
730 Ibid, 23b. 
731 Ibid, 23c. 
732 Ibid, 23d. 
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And when anyone asks them what it is he does and what it is he teaches, 
they can’t say and don’t know, and in order not to appear to be lost for 
words, they trot out the stuff ready to hand against all philosophers, such as 
“the things in heaven and the things under the ground,” and “not 
acknowledging the gods,” and “he makes the weaker argument the 
stronger.” 
These clichés, thrown out by the humiliated in their chagrin, are those same accusations 
of sophistry which, as discussed above, Socrates claims have been levelled at him for 
many years by detractors such as Aristophanes. In this way, according to Socrates, these 
‘vehement slanders’ (σφοδρὼς διαβάλλοντες) have gained a veneer of truth by the fact 
that they have ‘filled’ (ἐμπεπλημι) their listeners since ‘long ago’ (πάλαι).733 
This section has shown, then, that memory of the Apology reveals Socrates’ belief that 
the ‘stunted and warped’ (σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ) souls of the politicians in the 
Digression were made so by the influence of sophism. It also reveals the ways in which 
Plato distances his Socrates from sophism by associating him with a different kind of 
philosophical practice, one which offers the opportunity to cleanse rather than corrupt 
the political sphere. There are aspects of this practice represented in the figure of the 
philosopher of the Digression—his interest in pursuing truth in collaborative discussion, in 
particular—but Socrates differs from him in marked ways. In a stark contrast to Socrates, 
this philosopher not only lacks interest in the affairs of his fellow citizens but also lacks 
self-knowledge—he is not aware of what he does not know.734 As laid out above, Sedley 
argues that the differences between Socrates and the philosopher of the Digression are 
symbolic of the differences between Plato and his teacher, that the philosopher 
represents Platonic rather than Socratic philosophy.735 His reason for this is that the death 
of Socrates at the hands of political society has predicated the necessity for the removal 
of philosophy from the political realm. However, it must be hard to argue that lack of self-
knowledge is ever a trait to be emulated. If anything, this philosopher reads, as Rue 
suggests, more like the clichéd figure from Aristophanes from which Socrates distances 
himself so vociferously in the Apology. Socrates even describes the philosopher’s mind as 
flying off ‘both under the earth’ (τᾶς τε γᾶς ὑπένερθε) and ‘above the heavens’ (οὐρανοῦ 
                                                          
733 Ibid, 23e. 
734 Pl. Tht. 173d-e: ‘He doesn’t even know that he doesn’t know any of this’, καὶ ταῦτα πάντ’ οὐδ’ ὅτι οὐκ 
οἰδεν, οἰδεν.  
735 See discussion in this thesis, pp. 185 and 190. 
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θ’ ὕπερ) those very clichés which, he claims, the ignorant reach for when embarrassed by 
him.736 
For this reason, I suggest that both the philosopher and the politician of the Digression 
represent aspects of the corruptive philosophy against which Socrates defends himself in 
the Apology. Platonic philosophy, expressed through the figure of Socrates, does not 
represent a ‘middle way’ between these two figures, as scholars such as Rue and Mintz 
suggest, but a totally different alternative.737 As discussed above, this is the mode of 
philosophical citizenship posited in the Apology and predicated on justice and truth to 
oneself. The Theaetetus builds on this idea by suggesting that politics is inseparable from 
philosophy: that because this philosophy represents the search for truth, it should inform, 
and will enhance, every part of life, politics included.  
This chapter goes on to discuss the ways in which Plato communicates his philosophy in 
the Theaetetus, starting in the next section, with the simile of the midwife. In using this 
simile, Socrates does not seek to distance himself quite so radically from the figure of the 
teacher as this section has shown him doing in the Apology. He does, however, radically 
redefine the role of teacher in the light of his continuing assertion that he knows nothing. 
It is always difficult to guess at where the lines between the historical Socrates and Plato’s 
creation are drawn but it seems important to consider the fact that Plato was an 
established teacher in Athens even if Socrates did not classify himself as such. Therefore, 
the simile may be instructive for thinking about the ways in which Plato characterises his 
own teaching and for analysing the didacticism of his writing.  
 
3.3 Socrates as Midwife (148e-151d) 
In the image of the midwife, which Socrates uses to describe his philosophical dialectic 
method, Plato develops Socrates’ stance in the Apology of someone who knows nothing 
and teaches no one. In that respect, this section builds on the last, suggesting that 
memory of the Apology reveals the political reason why Socrates might have described 
himself in this way: again, as a way of creating distance from the sophist teachers of his 
day. It also suggests that one reason why Plato’s Socrates may have mellowed or nuanced 
                                                          
736 Ibid, 173e. 
737 For the ‘middle way’ see Mintz (2011), p. 664 and Rue (1993), p.91. 
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his stance on teaching here is that while Socrates may or may not have been a teacher 
himself, Plato clearly was one and political concerns about the corrosive influence of a 
sophistic education were still rife. In my attempt to understand the ways in which Plato 
and his Socrates characterise their teaching, this chapter will consider the image of the 
midwife itself: why Plato may have selected this image; its possible relationship with 
actual midwifery at the time; and the ways it helps to distance Socrates from sophism.  
Socrates’ image of the mental midwife may be summarised as follows. Socrates tells us 
that his mother was a midwife and that he inherited his skill (technē) from her but that 
whereas midwives practice their art with the bodies of women, he acts as midwife to the 
souls of men.738 He says that his practice as a mental midwife has often been 
misunderstood and has led to others describing him as strange (atopos) and as reducing 
people to confusion (aporia).739 He states that like midwives, who are beyond their 
childbearing years, he is ‘barren of wisdom’ (ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας).740 Like midwives too, 
he can recognise those who are pregnant, can bring on or ease labour pains and can 
induce delivery or abortion if it seems necessary.741 He also claims that, like midwives, 
part of his skill is in matchmaking, though midwives fear the association between their 
matchmaking skill and procuring.742 Finally, he claims that unlike midwives who are not 
required to judge the viability of babies in terms of whether they are true children 
(alēthina) or phantoms (eidōla), this is precisely his role with regard to the ideas which his 
patients deliver. The actual role he plays in Theaetetus’ delivery, then, seems to consist of 
recognising pregnancy, knowing when an idea has come to term, asking questions or 
setting out options in order to bring on Theaetetus’ delivery, and examining the 
product.743 
It is impossible to assess exactly how closely this picture of ancient Greek midwifery 
conforms to the actual practice at the time because the sources are so elusive on the 
subject. As Helen King points out, the Theaetetus itself is ‘the main non-medical source’ 
for midwifery in the Hippocratic age and the medical sources raise more questions than 
they answer about the technē of midwifery or, indeed, whether such a thing even 
                                                          
738 Pl. Tht. 149a and 150b. 
739 Ibid, 149a. 
740 Ibid, 149b-c and 150c. 
741 Ibid, 149c-d. 
742 Ibid, 149d-e. 
743 Ibid, 151b-c and 157d. 
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exists.744 With regard to the Theaetetus as a source, King suggests that the boy’s 
complete lack of awareness about midwives’ skills in matchmaking may indicate that this 
is a complete fabrication. She also uses Soranus’ Gynaecology (with caveats about the use 
of this as a source) to question Socrates’ statement that midwives have necessarily had 
children themselves and are past their childbearing years.745 There are three aspects of 
this thorny issue which, I suggest, are worth exploring further in order to make sense of 
Socrates’ use of this image within my framework of memory and politics. The first is the 
issue of the midwife’s technē alongside of Socrates’ declared sterility of knowledge. The 
second is the active role which Socrates plays in the process of delivery and the third is his 
association of midwifery with the (mis)conception by others that he is atopos. In these 
three areas, I suggest, Socrates either amplifies aspects of actual midwifery or creates 
them for his own purposes and in each case, memory of the Apology and his association 
with sophistry, discussed above, is instructive for thinking about why he might have done 
so. 
 
i) The technē of midwifery and Socrates’ sterility 
As mentioned above, the issue of whether a technē of midwifery existed in the fifth and 
fourth centuries BC has been the subject of much scholarly debate. The word implies a 
recognisable skillset that could be taught and learned and while some scholars, such as 
Rebecca Flemming, draw on Soranus’ Gynaecology to argue that such a thing existed, 
others, such as King, question his reliability and wonder whether Soranus may have 
sought to institute such a technē himself.746 In addition to this, while some suggest that 
levels of literacy among midwives were good enough that they could have read and 
learned the theory of their art for themselves—Demand, for example, suggests that the 
Hippocratic text Diseases of Women was aimed at midwives—others are more dubious.747 
Maurizio Bettini, perhaps most convincingly, speculates that ‘[t]here was a spectrum of 
midwifery’, with Soranus’ ‘scientific’ professionals at one end and the ‘folkloric’ old 
                                                          
744 King (1998), quotation on p. 177, discussion of medical sources, pp. 177-78. 
745 Ibid, p. 181, drawing on Sor. Gyn. I.ii (trans. Owsei, 1991). Soranus states that the ideal midwife does not 
necessarily need to have had children herself whereas Socrates tells us that only women who have 
experienced childbirth could understand the skills required. 
746 Flemming (2007), p. 261 and King (1998), p. 176. 
747 Demand (1994), p. 66 and King (1998), p. 178. 
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women educated only in traditional practices at the other.748 That there was some kind of 
technē seems likely, therefore, but that it was widespread, particularly among the lower 
classes, seems less so. 
Plato’s Socrates, however, stresses that his skill in midwifery is a technē, using the word in 
his description at 149a, 149c and 149e. His repeated use of technē suggests that whether 
this aspect of midwifery is factual or not, he amplifies this term and does so because it 
ties in to both the wider discussion with Theaetetus about the nature of knowledge in this 
dialogue, and his investigation into knowledge in the Apology.  
Theaetetus’ first answer to Socrates’ question ‘What is knowledge?’ equates knowledge 
(epistēmē) in the abstract with the skills or knowledges (technai) of craftsmen. He gives 
examples of the knowledge of geometry and cobbling, saying that ‘the skills that belong 
to other craftsmen – each one of those is nothing but knowledge’ (αἱ τῶν ἄλλων 
δημιουργῶν τέχναι, πᾶσαί τε καὶ ἑκάστη τούτω, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι).749 In 
addressing Theaetetus’ misconception, Socrates draws a distinction between knowledge 
and skill. He states that ‘He who is ignorant of what knowledge is won’t understand what 
cobbling is, or indeed what any other expertise is’ (σκυτικὴν ἄρα οὐ ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην 
ἀγνοῇ, οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην). Cobbling and other forms of technē are merely types of 
knowledge and while the details of their craft can be known and taught, those details do 
not allow us to understand what knowledge is.750 As others have discussed, the 
distinction between technē and epistēmē allows Socrates to maintain his stance of one 
who knows nothing.751 He has the technē of the mental midwife but can still be described 
as ‘barren of wisdom’ because his specific skillset does not equate to a wider, more 
abstract understanding.752  
This sterility, associated with age, also seems to be an aspect of the midwife which Plato’s 
Socrates either exaggerates or creates. King suggests that the model of the sterile older 
                                                          
748 Bettini (2013), pp. 176-77. 
749 Pl. Tht. 146d. 
750 In this sense, Socrates’ labelling of midwifery as a technē alongside crafts such as cobbling very much 
accords with the positive analyses regarding the technē of actual midwives by Flemming and Demand. 
Flemming specifically classes midwives along with cobblers and shop workers while Demand categorises 
them as poorer citizens involved in crafts or trades: Flemming (2007), p. 259 and Demand (1994), p. 67. The 
technē of the physician, rather than the midwife, is a feature of the Symposium, where Aristophanes 
compares Apollo healing abilities to those of a cobbler or leatherworker (Pl. Symp. 190e-91a). The 
comparison is also found in the Hippocratic treatise On Regimen, 1.15.  
751 E.g. Sedley (2004), pp. 32-35. 
752 Ibid, p. 33. 
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midwife may have been made up by Socrates to justify his own creation.753 Certainly, 
there seem to be contradictions in the passage where he explains why Artemis gave the 
gift of midwifery to older women. He says that Artemis herself was assigned the province 
of childbirth because she was barren but he goes on to say that mortals cannot acquire 
skills in things of which we have no experience and that, for this reason, she gives the gift 
to older women, past their childbearing years. This calls into question Socrates’ whole 
premise of sterility: if Socrates is sterile and always has been so, why does he stress that 
actual midwives must have given birth in order to be able to learn their craft? In the light 
of this, some, such as the ancient Anonymous Commentator have suggested that 
Socrates’ barrenness is merely a didactic tool, a pose of sterility designed to draw ideas 
from his pupils.754 Giannopoulou builds on this idea in her interpretation that Socrates’ 
sterility represents ‘the suppression of beliefs in the sense of definitions, and of theories 
for and against other people’s definitions and their relevant beliefs.’755 For me, as for her, 
this deliberate suppression of beliefs is a conscious cultivation of openness to uncertainty 
which stands in stark contrast to the certainties of the sophists as explored in the 
Theaetetus in relation to Protagoras’ theorem that man ‘is the measure.’ Protagorean 
relativism ‘ensures the infallibility of all judgments for those holding them’ while 
throughout the Theaetetus, but particularly in the Wax Tablet section which I addressed 
in the Introduction and will come to again below, Socrates is keen to stress the existence 
of false belief.756 
As Giannopoulou also discusses, the passages concerning the differences between technē 
and epistēmē and Socrates’ sterility clearly recall the Apology, where Socrates tells the 
story of his search for those wiser than himself, a search which includes the craftsmen of 
Athens. While these craftsmen ‘knew a lot that [Socrates] did not’ (ἀλλ’ ἠπίσταντο, ἃ ἐγὼ 
οὺκ ἠπιστάμην) their expertise (technē) in this area led them to think themselves very 
wise (σοφωτάτος) in other respects as well.757 Here therefore, Socrates again draws that 
distinction between craft knowledge and wisdom and this distinction enables him to cast 
himself as wiser than all others in that he knows that he has no wisdom. 
                                                          
753 King (1998), p. 181. 
754 PBerol. inv. 9782, LIV, discussed in Giannopoulou (2013), p. 12, citing Tarrant (1983) and Sedley (1996). 
755 Giannopoulou (2013), p. 41. 
756 Ibid, pp. 48-49. For other discussion of the Wax Tablet in this thesis, see Introduction, pp. 12-15 and 
below, section 3.4. 
757 Pl. Ap. 22d. 
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For Giannopoulou, as for this chapter, the distinction which Socrates draws between 
technē and epistēmē is part of his attempt to distance himself from the sophists. 
However, while Giannopoulou’s interest in this distinction is philosophical—she is 
concerned with the impact this has on the definition of knowledge as it evolves in the 
Theaetetus—my interest is primarily in the political ramifications as they relate to 
Socrates’ didacticism. In the Apology, Socrates narrates his conversation with Callias, a 
man who has spent a great deal of money on sophists to educate his sons, about how he 
chooses a good teacher. Here, Socrates compares the training of horses to the education 
of men and indicates that the skills needed in each case might be comparable. He 
questions Callias, ‘Who is there who has a knowledge of this kind of virtue, that of the 
human being and the citizen?’ (τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, 
ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν;).758 There is more than a suggestion of Socratic irony even here, in the 
equation of horse training and philosophical education and there is more so when 
Socrates contemplates Callias’ answer. He says to the court, ‘I thought Evenus was lucky if 
he really did have such skill’ (καὶ ἐγω τὸν Εὔηνον ἐμακάρισα εἰ ὡς ἀληθὼς ἔχοι ταύτην 
τὴν τέχνην), the implication clearly being that Socrates believed he did not. There also 
seems some irony in his use of the word technē here, as if knowledge of human virtue or 
excellence could actually be equated with the kind of knowledge needed to train horses. 
This memory of the Apology, recalled by the Theaetetus, may once more be seen to 
inform a reading of the later text. While Socrates distances himself not only from 
sophistry but also from teaching in the Apology (as discussed in section 3.2), the way in 
which he develops this distance between technē and epistēmē in the Theaetetus allows 
him to redefine his role slightly. As Blondell writes, it ‘enables Socrates to acknowledge 
some kind of educational involvement with the young of Athens, while denying 
responsibility for both their ideas and their behaviour’.759 He can employ that specific 
technē of midwifery in order to draw out abstract philosophical ideas from others and in 
this way, cannot be held responsible for those ideas if they do not find favour with the 
political establishment. The particular way in which he characterises this ‘educational 
involvement’ brings me to the second thorny issue: the precise involvement of Socrates’ 
midwife in the process of the birth. 
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ii) Socrates’ role in delivery 
What Socrates (or rather, Plato, via his character, Socrates) is at pains to show with the 
midwife image is that Socrates’ input in the education of Athens’ youth is at once crucially 
important and negligible. Memory of the Apology provides the political motivation for 
developing this model and given the continuing mistrust of sophistry into the fourth 
century BC, it may have been a defence which Plato needed to make on his own behalf 
also. This section will analyse exactly what Socrates’ contribution to the youths’ education 
is and in doing so, it will continue to develop the ideas explored above with regard to the 
Apology. 
In thinking about Socrates’ actual role in delivery, it is once again, difficult to look to 
historical midwives. Source information regarding the midwife’s part in childbirth—the 
relative labour put in by gravida, foetus and midwife—is hard to come by and harder to 
interpret. Possibly, midwives were largely omitted from the Hippocratic corpus because 
the writers of the corpus were content to leave childbirth to the domain of women. Here, 
Soranus may be a more useful source than before, however, as in writing about the 
process of delivery, he is not so much dealing with the realm of ideals as he was in 
describing ‘Who makes the best midwife?’ Soranus writes of the midwife not only 
soothing the gravida with warm oil and reassuring her, he also writes of her gently 
dilating the cervix with her fingers, of instructing the gravida in how to breathe low into 
her body, and of gently manoeuvring the foetus in the birth canal with one hand while 
pushing down on the belly with the other.760 How close this may have been to common 
practice is unclear. In contrast to this image, where the midwife is seen to play a more 
active role in delivery than the gravida, the Hippocratic texts see the main work being 
done by the foetus who pecks its way out of the uterus as a chick emerges from an egg.761 
What seems certain is that Socrates, once again, either creates or emphasises an image of 
the midwife whose involvement in the birth process is greater rather than smaller. The 
questions he asks and the scenarios which he lays before his labouring youths are 
designed to tease out the ideas from their minds just as the midwife may have palpated 
the outside of the womb and gently drawn on the foetus to aid in its delivery. 
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761 Littré 7.530-32 as discussed in Hanson (1992). 
 208 
 
If the midwife image is seen in the light of my articulation of memory and the Forms in 
the introduction to this chapter,762 it may also be possible to see the relationship 
between Socrates and the labouring youth as similar to one between the therapist and 
his patient. According to this analogy, Socrates becomes the mediator of his student’s 
memory of the Forms. He asks the questions which prompt his student’s memories and 
he articulates and tests his answers. However, as discussed in the Introduction to this 
thesis, there is no such thing as transparent mediation of memory.763 The mediator, as 
the remembering subject, is always operating within political parameters and, for this 
reason, the line between the student’s and the mediator’s roles in the remembering 
process is blurred. It will always be unclear how far the student’s memory is coloured by 
the mediator’s questions and how far the mediator’s articulation of that memory is 
coloured by his own experience as part of the political community. In the case of the 
therapist and patient, the False Memory hearings are a testament to this.764 
In the Theaetetus, Socrates characterises his relationship with these labouring youths in 
such a way as to make his politically educative role explicit by using the term sunousia. 
Sunousia, or association, functioned as an elite practice in Athens and traditionally 
involved fathers selecting influential friends of their own for their sons to associate with 
from whom they would learn about the institutions and practices of the democratic 
city.765 Socrates says that ‘those who associate’ with him (οἱ δ’ ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι) 
sometimes appear ignorant at first but as they continue to associate with him (πάντες δὲ 
προϊούσης τῆς συνουσιας), they make ‘the most amazing progress’ (θαυμαστὸν ὅσον 
ἐπιδιδόντες), indicating that they learn as a direct result of his involvement in their 
education.766 One of the places with which sunousia was commonly associated was the 
gymnasium, the setting, also, for the Theaetetus. A further exploration of this setting 
illustrates more about the way in which the term sunousia is used in the dialogue and 
what it suggests about the political education of the developing citizen. 
In classical Athens there were three gymnasia, all state-owned, which were perceived to 
play a significant role in the education of hoplites for the Athenian army.767 Clearly, this 
                                                          
762 See my discussion of the Forms on pp. 187-89. 
763 See Introduction to this thesis p. 18. 
764 For a discussion of the False Memory hearings see Introduction to this thesis, p. 26. 
765 Robb (1993), pp. 77-106, ref. to p. 82. There was also a sexual aspect to sunousia which Plato explores in 
the gymnasium setting of the Charmides. For a discussion see Goldhill (2002), pp. 88-89. 
766 Pl. Tht. 150d. 
767 Fisher (1998), pp. 84-104; Pappas (2016), p. 16.  
 209 
 
education was partly physical but it was also social and political. The gymnasia were 
popular public meeting places where young Athenians associated with older, more 
experienced citizens who could guide them in the workings of the democratic polis. The 
rise of itinerant sophist teachers, however, led to a new kind of sunousia, one by which, 
as we remember from the Apology, Socrates was tainted and which contributed to the 
charge of corruption against him. Whereas, under the old system, the youths would get 
their political education from established older citizens of the political community of 
Athens, the sophists were mainly non-citizens who may not have had the same concern 
for the city at heart, or so the accusation goes.768 For this reason, they were seen to 
advocate political practices which were considered un-Athenian.769 
The Charmides, also set at a gymnasium, is another text which uses memory of the 
Apology to operate as a sort of ‘second apology’ for Socrates’ type of sunousia. In this, he 
discusses and exhibits sōphrosunē (moderation or restraint) in his dialogue with the 
desirable young athlete, Charmides, and discusses tyranny with Critias, both of whom 
were prominent among the thirty tyrants in Athens.770 Scholarship on the text stresses 
Plato’s familial relationship to both Charmides and Critias, his supposed sympathies with 
the tyrants and the theory that his philosophy paved the way for later tyrannies.771 
However, although the dialogue ends in aporia, with no satisfactory definition reached 
for sōphrosunē, the part of the discussion which encompasses sexual self-restraint serves 
to distance Socrates from the taint of sexual corruption. Meanwhile, the discussion with 
Critias about the relationship between sōphrosunē and self-knowledge undermines 
Critias’ claim to know the human good sufficiently to establish a tyranny on that basis.772 
In this way, Plato also distances Socrates from accusations of political corruption in his 
sunousia and underlines the importance of self-knowledge (‘the examined life’) in all 
political engagement. 
The Theaetetus, in contrast, focuses on the metaphorical connection between physical 
exercise and philosophy, associating it, rather, with the physical training of the hoplite 
citizen. Theaetetus approaches Socrates fresh from the running track but Socrates makes 
it clear that wrestling is the sport he equates with philosophy. We might see running as 
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771 See discussion in Stern (2008), p. 399. 
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an exercise one undertakes solo, albeit in competition with others, whereas in wrestling 
one must truly grapple with one’s opponent. Theodorus accuses Socrates, saying: 
Λακεδαιμόνοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατ’ Ἀνταῖόν 
τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν· τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν 
ἄν ἀναγκάσῃς ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλαῖσαι.773  
The Spartans give an option, either to leave or strip, but you seem to me 
rather to be playing the scene Antaeus-style – if anyone comes near you, 
you don’t let him go until you’ve forced him to strip and wrestle with you in 
discussion. 
Socrates describes this as ‘a first-rate analogy’ (ἄριστά γε ... τὴν νόσον μου ἀπῄκασας)774 
and goes on to say that he would be no more likely to hold back from an encounter with 
one such as Heracles or Theseus, even if he knew he would be thrashed because ‘so 
extraordinary is the passion in [him] for working out on these subjects’ (οὕτω τις ἔρως 
δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας).775 Philosophy, as Socrates sees it, is a 
workout for the soul, as necessary for the education of the citizen as the real physical 
exercise undertaken by the hoplite in the gymnasium. Socrates’ insistence that those near 
him ‘strip’ and show what shape they are in is equivalent to and, as Euben suggests, 
predicated on Athenian democracy’s insistence on accountability, evinced in the practice 
of dokimasia, the process of examination which each citizen had to undergo before being 
accepted for public office.776  
Sunousia with Socrates, then, is vigorous and healthy mental exercise for the young 
citizen. In this way, though Socratic sunousia is seen to be different from the practice 
commonly associated with the elite in democratic Athens, Plato characterises it as ‘more 
democratic’ than that traditional elite practice. Socrates is not an itinerant sophist but a 
citizen who cares deeply about his city and sunousia with him not only prepares youths 
for the duties of citizenship but is itself predicated on democratic practices. Furthermore, 
according to the midwife image, although Socrates does not himself create the offspring 
of which the youths are delivered, his input is seen as being essential not only to the 
delivery of these ideas but also to their successful gestation and to the continued health 
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of their babies. This is a model of teaching in which the teacher is intimately and crucially 
involved in the educative process but yet does not impart knowledge.  
However, in spite of Socrates’ stress on the fact that he himself has nothing to contribute, 
his involvement as midwife in the pregnancies and births of these idea-babies may strike 
us as being unduly great. While a good midwife may have been able to deliver advice 
about healthy pregnancy and early childcare and almost certainly had a hand in successful 
delivery, Socrates claims that, where idea-babies are born healthy and live healthily into 
childhood, this is entirely because of association with him. While there is no knowledge as 
such passed down from Socratic midwife to labouring youth, Socrates attributes the 
youths’ progress to prolonged association with himself and says of those, who left him 
before they should have done, that:  
ἀπελθόντες δὲ τά τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν διὰ πονηρὰν συνουσίαν καὶ τὰ ὑπ’  
ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, ψευδῆ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ 
πλείονος ποιηςάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τελευτῶντες δ’ αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς 
ἄλλοις ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι.777 
they not only caused the miscarriage of what was left, by getting into bad 
company, but even neglected and lost the offspring of theirs that I’d already 
delivered, because they preferred stupid falsehoods and phantoms to the 
truth of things, and ended up looking stupid both to themselves and to 
everybody else.  
A cautionary tale! It seems that continued association with Socrates is the only way to 
deliver ideas successfully and to continue having a fertile intellectual life. Because of this, 
Blondell’s assertion (see p. 206) that the midwife image enables Socrates to disavow 
responsibility for the youths’ ideas and behaviour does not entirely hold true. It seems 
from this passage that Socrates feels that more credit attaches to him for his midwifery 
than to the youths for the ideas themselves. In this respect Socrates’ analogy seems 
stretched to breaking point. While it is easy, with actual midwives, to separate their 
involvement in pregnancy and birth from the genetic material which makes up the foetus, 
it is not so easy with Socrates’ image, as it is not in the therapist/patient relationship 
discussed above (p. 208). If it is only his involvement which makes these idea-babies 
viable and healthy and if these youths cannot conceive idea-babies with any other 
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teachers, then there must be some ‘genetic’ input into these ideas from Socrates himself. 
Even if his role is only to question and to force the youth to refine his idea until there is 
something viable there, those very questions play an enormous part in the formation and 
make-up of that idea.  
This section has considered the meaning and connotations of Socrates’ description of his 
relationship with the youths in terms of sunousia in the light of the accusations which led 
to his execution. While it seems that the midwife image purports, indeed, to offer a 
model of education by which Socrates might be closely involved and yet impart no 
knowledge, the discussion has shown the extent to which image is stretched, possibly to 
breaking point.  
Rather more successfully, however, Plato also uses the image to defend his questioning 
role against the common misconceptions and mistrust which gave rise to the case against 
him. The education that Socrates is shown to offer in the Theaetetus follows on from the 
enquiries he undertakes into wisdom in the Apology, but offers a more positive gloss. 
When, in the Apology, Socrates visits the series of men whom he might consider to be 
wise and questions the nature and extent of their wisdom, he exposes their foolishness 
and humiliates them. His aim, however, is not to humiliate and expose, except where 
beliefs of wisdom are held arrogantly and mistakenly, but rather to find true wisdom. In 
the Theaetetus, this is transformed into an educative process of questioning the 
foundations of belief, which seeks to work towards true wisdom or knowledge. As 
Socrates explains, this exercise is often misunderstood and can appear nihilistic although 
it is not.778 The next section explores the misunderstandings caused by the process in the 
light of the Apology and examines the further reasons why Plato may have chosen the 
image of the midwife to characterise his teacher. 
 
iii) Socrates’ midwife as atopos 
In explaining the image of the midwife, Socrates offers a further defence against the 
charges of moral and political corruption to add to that provided in the Apology. When he 
discloses that he has inherited his mother’s skill as a midwife, he says that ‘it has escaped 
others’ notice that [he has] this skill’ (λέληθα γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην) and 
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that because they are not aware of it, they say instead that ‘[he is] very strange (atopos) 
and reduce[s] people to puzzlement (aporia).’779 This section suggests that it is this 
‘strangeness’ which may have given rise to the charges against Socrates and examines 
Socrates’ decision to use the midwife image in this light. It also considers the further 
connotations that image carries for the way in which we might think about his practice of 
philosophy, again developing the idea of Socrates as a ‘teacher’, the role that he denied 
so vehemently in the Apology. 
Joel Alden Schlosser suggests that through the use of the midwife image, Socrates 
‘abjures the power of recognized expertise and instead embraces a shared practice 
among relatively powerless women.’780 It is this, he says, which makes Socrates’ 
philosophical practice atopos because it transforms sunousia from something ‘inside’ and 
recognised by the establishment to something ‘outside’ and strange. I have problems 
with Schlosser’s reading for the reason, already discussed above, that we simply cannot 
make the assumption that ‘the midwife in Athenian society also did not possess a 
knowledge deemed capable of systemization’ simply because she was ‘omitted entirely 
from the Hippocratic corpus.’781 However, I do find appealing his suggestion that there is 
a ‘strangeness’ associated with the image arising from the fact that the midwife operated 
within the closed world of women in Athenian society. It is this ‘strangeness’ that gave 
rise to mistrust and misconceptions about midwives, which Plato, via the midwife image, 
compares to the mistrust and misconceptions arising around Socratic philosophy. It was 
these which, he suggests, led to Socrates’ trial and execution. 
Nancy Demand writes that one of the reasons why men may have wanted male 
Hippocratic physicians to assist in managing the pregnancies of their wives was ‘[t]he 
general suspicion of women’s tendency to seek abortions that is expressed by the author 
of Diseases of Women.’782 On this subject, she also cites Aristophanes’ 
Thesmophoriazusae in which ‘men’s complaints about women include their skill with 
drugs (poisons and abortifacients), their propensity to take lovers, and—the greatest 
suspicion of all—their willingness to introduce supposititious children into the 
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household.’783 Maurizio Bettini also explores these fears in his analysis of the midwife’s 
association with cunning, witchcraft and sexual licentiousness, suggesting that her 
expertise in female anatomy and sexual pleasure led to her association or identification 
with prostitutes.784 This atmosphere of mistrust may have arisen, as Demand suggests, 
because women ‘brought up in seclusion and taught to be ashamed of their bodies’ 
preferred the ministration of midwives to male doctors and naturally turned to them for 
medical treatment well beyond the scope which we consider to be the midwife’s today. 
Perhaps this may have involved abortion at times but there is little doubt that this female 
world must have seemed inaccessible to men, rendering them powerless, and may well 
have generated a lack of understanding that gave rise to mistrust and mistaken ideas. 
This is the kind of atmosphere which Socrates also invokes in relation to his philosophical 
teaching. It is because others are unaware of what he practices that they do not 
understand and characterise him as atopos and nihilistic, only reducing people to aporia. 
While such accusations of ‘reducing people to aporia’ do not feature explicitly in the 
Apology, what we know of Socrates’ practice (and the resulting fury that he faces) from 
the later dialogues must impact on our reading of his encounters with the supposedly 
wise people of Athens.785 In this way, the Theaetetus and those other aporetic dialogues 
re-member the Apology, explaining the anger directed against Socrates which may have 
led to the indictment against him. 
In the Theaetetus, Socrates plays up the ‘strange’ aspect of midwifery, freely admitting 
that he causes his patients to miscarry (ἀμβλίσκω) when he considers it necessary, and 
emphasising their real or imagined role as matchmakers, which often leads to their 
association with procurers.786 In this way, Plato stresses that the connection between 
midwifery and Socrates’ art is not simply in the manner by which they tend their patients 
and deliver offspring of the body or of the soul, but in the misunderstandings that occur 
around their relative practices. In both cases, these misconceptions involve perceived 
corruption: sexual and moral corruption in the case of the midwife and moral and political 
corruption in the case of Socrates.  
                                                          
783 Ar. Thesm. 331f. Although the Woman Herald blames Euripides for slandering women, the implication is 
that they are not blameless but annoyed because he has drawn their husbands’ attention to their 
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It is this corruption which he must address in the Apology but here, in the Theaetetus, he 
offers some further explanation of why this misconception arises and of what his practice 
actually entails. When Socrates first discloses that he is a mental midwife to Theaetetus, 
he says that others have ‘failed to notice’ (λανθάνω) that this is what he does.787 He 
himself tells Theaetetus but, by asking him not to reveal his secret to others, he signals 
that his teaching is only for the initiated, those whom he considers worthy of his 
sunousia.788 Although I suggested above that this Socratic sunousia was ‘more 
democratic’ than the traditional elite conception, there is also the connotation here that 
Socrates is creating a new elite, one based on intellectual criteria. As with the class elite, 
this form of sunousia excludes others, in this case, those ignorant of Socrates’ skills and it 
is this exclusion which leads to resentment and misunderstanding.  
It is the ignorant and excluded, for example, who see Socrates’ questioning as nihilistic, 
only reducing people to aporia. As Socrates suggests, aporia is a misconception based on 
ignorance. As he develops the concept in the Meno, it might more profitably be seen as a 
stage on the journey towards knowledge: it is necessary to go through puzzlement and 
confusion on the way to truth.789 Socrates’ mother—from whom he inherits his art—was, 
after all, named Phaenarete, the revealer (phainein) of virtue (arētē). 
In its study of the midwife metaphor, therefore, this section has explored ideas about the 
ways that discussions of technē and epistēmē, together with Socrates’ ‘intellectual 
sterility’ re-member the Apology, elucidating his politics and developing his defence 
against Meletus’ indictment of corruption. Via an analysis of sunousia, it has also re-
membered the Apology by finding a way to characterise his teaching which yet conforms 
to his picture of himself as lacking wisdom. Finally, it has considered the misconceptions 
about his practice which led to the indictment—why they might have arisen and where 
they led—through a study of similar misconceptions surrounding ancient midwifery. It 
concluded by construing the accusations of atopia and aporia levelled at Socrates more 
positively as part of his search for truth. The next section considers the nature of this 
truth in more detail by examining Plato’s agonistic pitting of philosophical truth against 
poetic truth in the Wax Tablet passage. 
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3.4 Electra and the Wax Tablet 
I discussed the Wax Tablet in the Introduction to this thesis as the first known model for 
memory but its significance here is in Socrates’ use, and then rejection, of it as a way to 
explain the existence of false belief.790 As I will show, this discussion in the Theaetetus 
addresses and develops the concerns of the Apology, recalling Socrates’ trial in the way 
that it is framed. However, in the language of the Wax Tablet image, Plato also examines 
themes of recognition and false belief in poetry, constructing a competitive dialogue with 
the poets by which to authorise his own philosophical activity. Furthermore, because 
Plato has no need to convince the poets themselves of philosophy’s supremacy—the 
three main dramatists were already dead at the time of writing—the poetry he targets 
takes the form of the reader’s cultural memory. It is the reader’s relationship with poetry 
that Plato seeks to challenge. In the first of these analyses, the section draws on 
Giannopoulou’s work on the intertextual relationship between the Theaetetus and the 
Apology and also on Stern’s discussion of politics in the Theaetetus.791 In the second, it 
builds on Nightingale’s exploration of Plato’s parodic engagement with other genres.792 
Socrates introduces the Wax Tablet as a metaphorical model for memory as part of 
exploring Theaetetus’ definition of knowledge as true belief. He uses it to explore the idea 
that false belief exists and might be ‘the misalignment of thought with perception.’ 
Socrates says: 
Δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, 
καὶ ἐς τοῦτο, ὅ τι ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν ὑπέχοντας 
αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων 
σημεῖα ἐνσημαινομένους.793 
Let us say, therefore, that this [tablet] is a gift from Mnemosyne, mother 
of the Muses, and whatever we wish to remember from the things we see 
or hear or which we have in our thoughts, we hold the wax under our 
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perceptions and thoughts and impress them onto it, as if making 
impressions from signet rings… 
When we see people, our perception of them is (or is not) matched with the imprint of 
them on the Wax Tablet and this is how recognition, or knowledge of the person seen, 
occurs. In describing how misrecognition happens, for example, he states that in seeing 
Theodorus and Theaetetus indistinctly, he hastens to match the correct imprint of each of 
them to their appearance so that he might recognise them (τὸ οἰκεῖον ἑκατέρου σημεῖον 
ἀποδοὺς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὄψει ... ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις).794 This misalignment of images can 
occur as a result of thoughtlessness or haste, of lack of knowledge or of defective 
knowledge resulting in faulty judgement. He also illuminates this idea by saying that if the 
wax of the soul is too hard or too soft the imprint will not be clear and therefore, our 
knowledge will be unreliable and so, our memories will not function so well.795 However, 
just at the point when Socrates appears to have perfected the model, he abandons the 
metaphor as useless because it cannot deal with abstract conceptions. He illustrates this 
by saying that a person seeing twelve (not people or things but the abstract number) 
could not mistake it for the eleven in his memory.796 For this reason he dismisses the 
entire premise on which the Wax Tablet is based.797 
Although this description of the Wax Tablet does not, in itself, appear to have political 
resonances, the political importance of establishing the existence of false belief is 
underlined in the framing of the section.798 At 187d, Socrates questions whether he 
should pursue the topic of false belief or leave it to one side. Theaetetus replies that they 
should definitely pursue it because ‘when discussing leisure just now, you and Theodorus 
said very truly that in discussing questions like this there is no urgency’ (ἀρτι γὰρ οὐ 
κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε καταπείγει). 
This clearly recalls the Digression, where Socrates suggested that philosophers have time 
to discuss at their leisure. It also serves as a reminder that Socrates is on his way to be 
tried for just such discussions, and further, that those discussions are not abstract and 
irrelevant but vital for the political health of the city.  
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The specific reason why false belief is so important to Socrates’ position is explained by 
Stern as follows: ‘it is the issue of the nature of opinion, especially false opinion, that 
provides the nexus between Socrates’ activity and his fate.’799 If, as Protagoras argues, 
truth is relative and an individual’s beliefs cannot be wrong for her/him, then the jurymen 
in Socrates’ own trial cannot have been wrong in their condemnation of Socrates.800 This 
is underlined by the second recollection of Socrates’ trial which book-ends his discussion 
of false belief: the example of the Jurymen. 
The Juryman example contains two claims regarding the false belief of juries, both of 
which can be illuminated by memory of the Apology. Firstly, Socrates claims that because 
of the time limit imposed by the water clock, juries are persuaded rather than taught.801 
Secondly, he claims that the men of the jury must make their judgement from hearsay, 
without the knowledge provided by their own perception.802 Giannopoulou is convincing 
in her analysis of the difference between persuasion and teaching here: while persuasion 
breeds ‘intellectual dependence,’ imbuing the jury with ‘the opinions chosen by the 
speaker,’ teaching ‘would enable the jury to make inquiries and demand clarifications.’ In 
this case, dialogue would replace the litigant’s monologue.803 Both of Socrates’ claims 
suggest ways in which the Theaetetus develops and expands aspects of the Apology. In 
the Apology, Socrates has little time to teach the jury but must rely on persuasion. He 
says to the jury that whereas the prosecution has had a long time (πολύς χρόνος) in which 
to indoctrinate the jury with slander, he has only a short time (ὀλίγος χρόνος) in which to 
remove their prejudice.804 In response, the Theaetetus reflects a model of Socratic 
teaching based on dialogue and illustrating its possibilities. Although the dialogue ends 
inconclusively, it shows the considerable progress interactive association with Socrates 
can effect in a relatively short time. Furthermore, in its reflection of this model of 
teaching, the Theaetetus provides that very eyewitness evidence for the external jury of 
readers, which the jury in the court lacks. 
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Therefore, the Wax Tablet section might be described as political for two reasons. On the 
one hand, it is political insofar as all philosophical discussion is beneficial for the health of 
the polis; on the other, its specific subject matter bears directly on Plato’s extended 
defence of Socrates’ teaching. 
In addition to the Hesiodic resonances of this passage discussed in the Introduction (pp. 
14-15), the language which Plato uses to detail the image of the Wax Tablet is drawn from 
tragedy, a point which has received little critical attention but which, I suggest, could be 
fundamental to its interpretation. The Introduction discussed the idea that Socrates’ 
description of the Tablet as a gift from the mother of the Muses introduces a poetic 
dimension to the image.805 Chappell also suggests that Plato’s inspiration for the image of 
memories being imprinted on the soul may have come from tragedy.806 Though she says 
that this kind of image could have been widespread, she cites Aeschylus’ Libation Bearers: 
γράφον δι’ ὤτων δὲ συν – 
τέτραινε μῦθοι ἡσύχῳ φρενῶν βάθει.807  
Yes, record it, and let the words pierce 
right through your ears to the quiet depths of your mind. 
While there may be other iterations of this image in the tragic corpus, it seems no 
accident that the other images which Socrates draws on in the details of the Wax Tablet 
come from the three plays featuring Electra’s recognition of her brother, Orestes, and 
that he engages with Euripides’ Electra in particular.  
In describing the process of recognition or knowledge of the person perceived, Plato’s 
Socrates speaks of matching the perceived object to its ‘footprint’ (ἴχνος) in the soul,808 a 
reference perhaps to Electra in the Libation Bearers who recognises her brother by 
matching her footprint to his. However, this detail in the Theaetetus comes up in an 
exploration of false opinion or false recognition, where the footprints do not in fact match 
up and the person is misrecognised. This seems to draw on Euripides’ Electra where 
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Electra argues that matching footprints is not a reliable way in which to recognise 
someone as there is no reason why her footprint should match up with her brother’s:  
δυοῖν ἀδελφοῖν ποὺς ἂν οὐ γένοιτ᾿ ἴσος  
ἀνδρός τε καὶ γυναικός, ἀλλ᾿ ἅρσην κρατεῖ.809  
how could the foot of a brother and sister be the same size? The man’s is 
bigger. 
Furthermore, just as Socrates states ‘those in whom the wax is shaggy, jagged and stony, 
mixed with earth and excrement, receive only indistinct impressions’ (οἰ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ 
τραχὺ λιθῶδές τι ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσης ἔμπλεων ἔχοντες ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα 
ἴσχουσιν),810 so too Euripides’ Electra questions ‘How could a clear imprint of feet be 
made on stony ground?’ (πῶς δ᾿ ἂν γένοιτ᾿ ἂν ἐν κραταιλέῳ πέδῳ / γαίας ποδῶν 
ἔκμακτρον;).811  
This scene in Euripides’ Electra is riddled with ‘imprints’ in connection with true and false 
recognition. In addition to the footprints, when realisation about Orestes’ identity dawns 
on the Old Man, Orestes questions 
τί μ᾿ ἐσδέδορκεν ὥσπερ ἀργύρου σκοπῶν  
λαμπρὸν χαρακτῆρ᾿; ἦ προσεικάζει μέ τῳ;812  
Why is he looking at me as if he were looking at the hallmark on silver?  
Does he think I look like someone else?   
Here the word χαρακτῆρ literally means a mark engraved or impressed upon silver, in the 
manner of the impression upon the Wax Tablet, and Orestes reacts as if there is such a 
mark on him which has caused the Old Man’s recognition. Like the Wax Tablet passage 
too, this extract plays with ideas of true and false recognition: Orestes’ first reaction is to 
question whether the Old Man has mistaken him for someone else. There is, in fact, such 
an imprint on him which makes him unmistakable to those who know him: his scar. 
Plato’s use of this imagery, of footprints and of imprints, from tragedy might be 
compared to the way in which the poets used ‘souvenirs,’ as discussed in Chapter 2 with 
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regard to Hector’s shield.813 Such images signify a wealth of memory which deepens and 
enhances the significance of the image itself. This becomes particularly evident if one 
considers Orestes’ scar. The scar is a kind of indelible imprint on the skin. In this case, it is 
not a pictorial representation of the memory itself, as the sight-perception imprints on 
the Wax Tablet are, but a sign which stands in for a narrative. When Socrates introduces 
the idea of the Wax Tablet, he says specifically that we imprint on it our perceptions and 
the thoughts (ennoein) we have. The examples which he discusses are all of perceptions, 
particularly sight-perceptions, but this cultural memory of recognition and misrecognition 
in tragedy shows the possibilities of the model for dealing with imprints of thoughts and 
narratives. In addition, this imprint, or sign, signifies differently for different viewers, 
depending on their memories. For Orestes, it signifies the actual occurrence which caused 
it. For Electra, the sign is part of the whole perception that matches the man in front of 
her with her memory of Orestes. In addition to this, however, it signifies the return of the 
hero for whom she has been waiting. For the audience, there is yet a further level of 
signification which cultural memory brings. The scar recalls the episode in the Odyssey 
when Eurycleia recognises Odysseus by his scar, a sign which symbolises, as with Orestes, 
the return of a longed-for hero. The audience must judge whether the Orestes before 
them matches up to the epic heroic ideal. In a further twist, however, because the 
memory of Orestes is evoked by Homer as an heroic ideal to which Telemachus should 
aspire, the audience must also judge whether this Orestes matches up to his own epic 
reputation. 
Plato’s engagement with poetry in the Wax Tablet image goes beyond this thematic level 
to address what he sees as the essences of poetry and philosophy. His use of poetry in the 
images of the Wax Tablet gives the model a vivid immediacy for the reader. The allusions 
to Euripides and Homer are bolstered by the overarching Hesiodic sense that the Wax 
Tablet is a gift from the mother of the Muses and, in this spirit of poetic inspiration, the 
whole passage is infused with striking metaphors:814 the quality of the wax, for example, 
can ‘have the smoothness that comes from proper kneading’ (λεῖος καὶ μετρίως 
ὠργασμένος ᾖ)815 or it can ‘have a stony element, or with lots of earth or filth mixed up in 
it’ (οἱ δὲ δὴ λασιον καὶ τραχὺ λιθῶδές τι ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσης ἔμπλεων 
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ἔχοντες).816 By contrast, when he decides that the model will not stand, the images he 
uses (in line with the problems of the model as he sees them) are abstract and difficult to 
grasp. From being in the dynamic, tangible world of people and wax that we can imagine 
before our eyes, we find ourselves, with a jolt, in a world of abstract numbers—eleven 
and twelve, seven and five—which Socrates says explicitly do not represent ‘seven and 
five people’ (ἀνθρώπους ἐπτὰ πέντε).817  
In this way, although the Wax Tablet model is seen to offer enticing potential for thinking 
about false belief, and although the cultural memory on which the image is built, only 
adds to that potential, Plato ultimately characterises poetry as something dangerously 
seductive and misleading. If we accept, as is widely the case in the scholarly tradition, that 
Socrates’ interlocutors function in the texts as internal readers, Theaetetus’ reaction to 
the image may be illustrative of our own. We can see our gratification with the image, our 
satisfaction with its explanation and our thrill at the vivid poetic evocation, mirrored in 
him. He agrees with Socrates’ description emphatically and believes that ‘It wouldn’t be 
humanly possible to put it better’ (ὀρθότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις).818 When Socrates 
questions the model, Theaetetus does not understand why at first, questioning, ‘What 
makes you say that?’ (πρὸς τί τοῦτ’ εἶπες;) and continuing to state that to him, there 
‘seems nothing to be ashamed of’ in the image (ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν 
εἶναι τὸ ωῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον).819  
The destabilising effect of Socrates’ switch to numerical examples may potentially make 
us long for the concrete, vivid world of the Wax Tablet and I suggest that this is part of 
the episode’s generic dialogue with poetry. Nightingale says, summarising Socrates’ 
conclusion in Republic 6, ‘if the poet is explicitly defined as ignorant, as imitating 
appearances, as gratifying the multitude, as fostering the inferior part of the soul, then 
the philosopher is implicitly defined as the diametrical opposite.’820 In the Wax Tablet 
passage we can see this borne out. The poetic imagery of the Wax Tablet passage is 
vivid—‘imitating appearances’—and it clearly gratifies its audience, Theaetetus. Though 
                                                          
816 Ibid, 194e. 
817 Ibid, 196a. 
818 Ibid, 194d and 195b. 
819 Ibid, 195b and 195d. 
820 Nightingale (1995), p. 67. 
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the poet is not ‘explicitly’ defined as ignorant, he is implicitly described as such by the fact 
that poetry’s model of false belief—the gift of Mnemosyne—is dismissed as inadequate.  
While poetry offers the potential to think about false belief, or mismatching perceptions, 
in a much more multi-faceted way than Socrates’ imagery of mis-firing an arrow or 
putting shoes on the wrong feet, it still does not provide an account for false belief in 
abstract ideas. By basing the images of the Wax Tablet on poetry, Plato draws the reader 
in, seducing us with vivid imagery before pulling the rug from under us. Just as Hesiod’s 
Mnemonsyne is shown to offer forgetting, so Plato shows poetry as a distraction which 
can lead the philosopher to forget what is really important. In this way, he shows the 
dangerous attraction of poetry, dangerous because it is not based on truth, or on the 
whole truth. He does not disguise the fact—rather he emphasises it—that philosophy is 
difficult but in the competitive sphere of claims to authoritative logos, Plato shows 
Socrates as committed to a search for that truth. 
In a way, as with ‘the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric’ discussed above,821 there may seem 
something disingenuous about Plato’s dismissal of poetry. His very next strategy for 
illuminating false belief is to reach for another image, this time the Aviary, where birds 
represent pieces of knowledge for us to grasp and hold. However, while this image is vivid 
and useful in some ways it does not come with the weight of cultural memory—of 
poetry—which is attached to the Wax Tablet. Poetry, like sophistic rhetoric, has the 
power to entice us away from what is important because, as Chapter 2 demonstrated, it is 
persuasive. Both Euripides and Plato draw attention to the idea that in watching drama or 
listening to epic, the emotions can overpower the intellect and for this reason it is 
dangerous for the citizen. Where, however, Euripides merely highlights the problem, 
signalling a need for awareness of the ways in which rhetoric operates on the emotions 
and the cognitive faculties, Plato offers a solution in the form of philosophy. While he 
continues to employ aspects of poetry which make his writing immediate and make his 
philosophical ideas easier to grasp, he subordinates it to the pursuit of philosophical 
truth, deliberately distancing Socrates and himself from those aspects which seduce and 
mislead. 
                                                          
821 See earlier discussion, pp. 197-99. 
 224 
 
This section has discussed the Wax Tablet metaphor as a whole. In so doing, it has 
brought out the political resonances of its context which focused on the importance of 
the existence of false belief to the outcome of Socrates’ trial. It has also explored the 
agonistic relationship between philosophy and poetry, highlighted by the way in which 
the Wax Tablet passage remembers tragic drama. The following section focuses on the 
prologue of the Theaetetus and then on two words which are intrinsic to the ideas 
expressed in the Wax Tablet passage in order, firstly, to set up Plato’s problems with 
written philosophy as a genre and secondly, to offer a memory-based solution to those 
problems for the reader of philosophy. 
 
3.5 Memory, Philosophy and Writing 
As discussed at the start of the chapter, the Wax Tablet as a model for memory occurs in 
a dialogue which has memory at its core. This section discusses Plato’s concern for 
memory as evinced in the careful framing of the Theaetetus, in the Prologue, as a written 
version of a remembered conversation. It also addresses the tension in Plato’s work 
between writing and speech/memory through an analysis of Plato’s use of the word 
eidōlon. My discussion of this word as it occurs and recurs in the text builds a sense of its 
resonance and serves to illuminate the problems which Plato explores with regard to the 
medium of written philosophy. In the final part of the section, I build a similar network 
around the word exaleiphein in order to explore Plato’s answer to these problems. In 
view of this, the section on the eidōlon does not refer explicitly to memory and politics in 
itself but rather identifies the problem to which memory is the solution. The political 
ramifications of exaleiphein become clear in Plato’s attention to what should be 
remembered and forgotten and, once again, in the effects of practising these 
philosophical methods as revealed by the Apology. 
 
i) The prologue 
I stated in the introduction to this chapter, in the brief discussion of the Forms, that the 
understanding of memory which underlies Plato’s philosophy is one which is informed by 
belief in an absolute truth. This holds firm whether it be the truth of the Forms, seen by 
the immortal soul, or the truth of an experience which can be accurately recalled. He is, 
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however, concerned by the unreliability of human memory and by the ways in which 
memory is preserved and communicated.  
This is evident from the very beginning of the Theaetetus where Plato establishes the 
frame for the dialogue. Here, the Megarian, Euclides, tells a friend, Terpsion, that he has 
just seen Theaetetus being carried back to Athens from the army camp at Corinth, dying 
of dysentery. This, he tells Terpsion, reminded him of a conversation which Socrates had 
once relayed to him between Theaetetus and Socrates himself. He was so struck by this 
conversation that he wrote it down, checking with Socrates about passages that he could 
not remember clearly. In this way, as Giannopoulou writes, ‘Socrates and Euclides are the 
text’s efficient cause: they perform mimetically Plato’s role as author and writer of 
Theaetetus. Qua immaterial entity, the dialogue is the product of Socrates’ recollection 
cast in speech, and qua material entity, it is a written text, Euclides’ record.’822 The text is 
presented not so much as a written dialogue as a transcript based on Socrates’ memory 
of the event, a memory which he was able to relay verbatim, without notes, to Euclides. 
The writing of it is seen as passive and entirely transparent, an act of recording rather 
than an act of creation. 
Giannopoulou goes on to question whether ‘the prologue foregrounds memory in order 
to question the reliability of the written text.’823 She decides that it does not but I suggest 
that this tension between memory and writing is one of the key concerns of the dialogue, 
although it is not, as in the Phaedrus, something which is explicitly discussed. This 
discussion in the Phaedrus provides a useful starting point for thinking about issues 
surrounding memory and writing as they occur in the Theaetetus. 
When Socrates relates the story of Theuth and Thamus, he tells that Theuth, the Egyptian 
Hermes, god of memory (amongst other things) declares to Thamus that his discovery of 
writing ‘is an elixir of memory and wisdom’ (μνήμνς τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον 
ηὑρέθη).824 Thamus replies:  
τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λήθηω μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελετησίᾳ, 
ἅτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπ’ ἀλλοτρίων τύπων, οὐκ ἔνδοθεν αὐτοὺς 
ὑφ’ αὑτῶν ἀωαμιμνῃσκομένους: οὔκουν μνήμης ἀλλὰ ὑπομνήσεως 
                                                          
822 Giannopoulou (2013), p. 22. 
823 Ibid, p. 24. 
824 Pl. Phdr. 274e. 
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φάρμακον ηὗρες. σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν, οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις: 
πολυήκοοι γάρ σοι γενόμενοι ἄνευ διδαχῆς πολυγνώμονες εἶναι δόξουσιν, 
ἀγνώμονες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες, καὶ χαλεποὶ συνεῖωαι, δοξόσοφοι 
γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν. 825  
this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to 
use it, because they will not practise their memory. Their trust in writing, 
produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, will 
discourage the use of their own memory within them. You have invented an 
elixir not of memory, but of reminding; and you offer your pupils the 
appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom. 
Socrates confirms his belief in this, saying:  
οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην οἰόμενος ἐν γράμμασι καταλιπεῖν, καὶ αὖ ὁ παραδεχόμενος 
ὥς τι σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσόμενον, πολλῆς ἂν εὐηθείας 
γέμοι ... πλέον τι οἰμενος εἶναι λόγους γεγραμμένους τοῦ τὸν εἰδοότα 
ὑπομνῆσαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ᾖ τὰ γεγραμμένα.826  
He who thinks, then, that he has left behind him any art in writing, and he 
who receives it in the belief that anything in writing will be clear and certain, 
would be an utterly simple person … if he thinks written words are of any 
use except to remind him who knows the matter about which they are 
written.’ 
His reservations about the written text concern the fact that the text, unlike the speaker, 
addresses its recipients indiscriminately and that if the recipient wishes to question the 
text, ‘it always answers the same thing’ (ἕν τι σημαίνει ταὐτὸν ἀεί).827 
The model of writing and reading presented in the Theaetetus seems to confirm this 
belief further. Euclides evidently uses writing here as an aid to memory. He, unlike 
Socrates, cannot remember the conversation perfectly. When Terpsion asks him if he 
could ‘give a report of it,’ Euclides replies, ‘Zeus, no! Or at any rate not just like that, off 
the cuff’ (οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὔκουν οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος).828 Rather, he says, he made 
notes on the conversation when he returned home and wrote them up into the version 
                                                          
825 Ibid, 275a-b. 
826 Ibid, 275c-d. 
827 Ibid, 275d. 
828 Pl. Tht. 142d. 
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presented here, questioning Socrates ‘about anything [he] had not remembered’ 
(ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη ὃ μὴ εμεμνήμην).829 In addition to this, as Paul Stern writes, 
the manner in which Euclides and Terpsion simply lie back and listen to the slave reading 
the dialogue, without interjection, without discussion or without any further engagement 
at all, suggests that ‘Euclides and Terpsion seem to embody Socrates’ worries about 
writing, presenting as they do a picture of ossified philosophy.’830 They are the ‘utterly 
simple (εὐήθεια)’ people who sit back and listen passively to the dialogue, as if it presents 
a ‘clear and simple (σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον)’ message.831 
As Ferrari points out with regard to the passage from the Phaedrus, the ‘standard’ (as 
opposed to the ‘ironic’ or the ‘Derridean’) critical interpretation of this passage from the 
Phaedrus takes it as a serious expression of Plato’s own ‘distrust of the written word, his 
own writing included, and as an attempt nevertheless to annex a zone—legitimate, but of 
secondary value to that of the living word—in which to exercise his continuing urge to 
write.’832 Ferrari fundamentally agrees with this interpretation but qualifies it in several 
ways. Firstly, he points out that Socrates himself does not see all speech as equal, 
something I have explored above in relation to the Digression in the Theaetetus, where 
the philosopher’s speech differs from the speech of the politician.833 Secondly, in the 
Phaedrus, Socrates twice ‘conveys the advantages of oral communication through the 
metaphor of its contrary, saying that it gets itself “written” on the soul of the hearer.’834 
One of these occurs when Socrates describes the instruction of the philosopher as ‘really 
written in a soul’ (γραφομένοις ἐν ψυχῇ): these written words are of ‘clearness and 
perfection and serious value’ (ἐναργὲς εἶναι καὶ τέλεον καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς).835 Both of 
Ferrari’s qualifications reveal the same kind of irony at play and it is the same irony too 
that I discussed in relation to poetry and the Wax Tablet. Socrates dismisses rhetoric (and 
writing/poetry) only then to use it himself for philosophical ends. In all these cases 
                                                          
829 Ibid, 142d-143a. 
830 Stern (2008), p. 16. 
831 Similar anxieties are explored in the opening frame of the Symposium where, through Apollodorus, Plato 
warns his readers of the implications of reading a mediated dialogue. Apollodorus states that the speeches 
of the symposium will not be recalled fully because they were not recalled fully by his own informant but 
that they will hear what the mediator felt worth preserving and sharing (Pl. Symp. 178a), discussed in 
Henderson (2000), p. 304. 
832 Ferrari (1987), pp. 206-7.  
833 Ibid, p. 207. 
834 Ibid, p. 213. The examples he cites are at 276a and 278a. 
835 Pl. Phdr. 278a. 
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though, as the Apology shows, the actions of the philosopher remain dangerously open to 
misinterpretation. 
For Ferrari, ‘none of this implies that philosophy should not be written; only that it should 
not be written (nor read) without awareness of the dangers of writing.’836 For him, as for 
me (as I will go on to show), the absence of an authorial voice in Plato’s dialogues 
encourages active participation from the reader and ultimately, our voice—‘the voice of 
the interpretive performer’—becomes the ‘missing’ voice with which the text answers.837 
For Ferrari also, the writing in the soul suggests that ‘what ultimately matters is neither 
writing nor speaking but the way of life in which they can find a worthy place.’838 ‘Writing 
in the soul,’ for him, implies that the ‘fixity’ of the written word is only achievable when 
graven on the soul as ‘the unshakable conviction of a certain kind of life.’839 For me, 
however, writing on the soul recalls the Wax Tablet and a further study of the language of 
imprinting on the soul here adds nuance to our understanding of Plato as a writer and will 
inform my discussion below regarding the guidelines he offers for his readers. 
The prologue, therefore, sets out Plato’s concerns regarding memory and written 
dialogue from the very start. While some have suggested that the writing of the ‘true’ 
philosopher might offer something more trustworthy, I propose that in Plato’s use of the 
word eidōlon in the Theaetetus, he continues to question the fixity or truth value of the 
written word. This is a problem which, as I will go on to argue, can only be solved by a 
process of reading with memory. 
 
ii) The eidōlon 
In Socrates’ initial outline of the Wax Tablet, he refers to the image imprinted onto the 
wax as an eidōlon—an image or a phantom—saying that ‘whatever is imprinted on the 
block, we remember and know for as long as its image is in the wax’ (μνηομεύειν τε καὶ 
ἐπίστασθαι ἕως ἂν ἐνῇ τὸ εἴδωλον αύτοῦ).840 This is also the word which Socrates uses to 
describe the written word of the philosopher in the Phaedrus, saying ‘You mean the living 
and breathing word of him who knows, of which the written word may justly be called the 
                                                          
836 Ferrari (1987), p. 221. 
837 Ferrari (1987) p. 211. 
838 Ibid, p. 221. 
839 Ibid, p. 221. 
840 Pl. Tht. 191d. 
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image’ (τὸν τοῦ εἰδοτος λόγον λέγεις ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον, οὗ ὁ γεγραμμένος εἴδολον ἄν τι 
λέγοιτο δικάιως).841 In both of these examples, the eidōlon is a representation, or sign, of 
something which exists as real. It is, in linguistic terms, the sign. However, in addition to 
these examples, Socrates uses the word eidōlon to refer to the phantasmic false births 
with which his students often labour.842 In this case, the sign is separate from a reality or 
a truth. It signifies something false.  
In a similar vein, the word eidōlon resonates in cultural memory as marking a false version 
or a replacement for characters in poetry and drama. It is the word used by Homer, in the 
Iliad, when Apollo fashions an image of Aeneas to replace the real hero on the battlefield 
and in the Odyssey when Athena creates an image of Penelope’s sister to comfort her in 
her grief.843 It is further used in the Odyssey to describe the shades in the Underworld, 
those beings no longer animated by life’s breath, existing now as images or shadows. 
They are ‘imprints’ without corresponding objects in the real world. Finally and perhaps 
most significantly, it is the word used repeatedly in Euripides’ Helen—and reportedly, in 
Stesichorus’ Palinode—to describe the phantom Helen, created by the gods, who went to 
Troy with Paris and so brought grief upon the world while the real Helen was transported 
to Egypt.844  
In Homer and Euripides (and presumably, in Stesichorus), though the eidōla may vanish 
into the wind when they no longer serve the purposes of the gods, for the time that they 
are in service they look and function as ‘living and breathing’ people. As in the examples 
above, they are entirely convincing to everyone around them, for better and for worse. 
This is also the case with the true philosopher’s written word, as represented by Socrates, 
in the Phaedrus: it is the physical, permanent manifestation of the word of truth, a 
reminder to the philosopher in his age of what he already knows or a guide for his 
followers. In this sense, it is possible to see that Plato’s whole oeuvre exists in the 
capacity of an eidōlon, the sign which signifies his philosophical system. If so, the memory 
of those other eidōla might function as a built in caution. Not only do they suggest that 
the philosopher’s word might be misleading or impermanent in itself but, as eidōla of the 
                                                          
841 Pl. Phdr. 276d. 
842 Pl. Tht. 150c: βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ πότερον εἴδωλον καὶ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἡ 
διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές (‘to test, in this way and that, whether the mind of the young person is 
engendering a phantom, a falsehood, or something fertile and true’). 
843 Il. 5.449 and 451; Od. 4.796; Od. 11. 84ff. 
844 At, e.g. Eur. Hel. 34 and 582. Reports of Stesichorus’ use of the word eidolon occur in P. Resp. 9.586c; 
Aristid. Or. 2. 234 and Dio Chrys. Or. 11. 40s, as cited in Campbell (1991), p. 95. 
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cultural memory, they are always underscored by notions of impermanence and 
transience. 
Given the repeated use of the word eidōlon in the Helen and the play’s evident notoriety 
in the period following its first performance it may not even be much of a leap to 
speculate that Plato may have been drawing on a cultural association of the word with 
Euripides’ play.845 Wohl suggests a similar reading of Thucydides’ version of the 
attempted Athenian conquest of Sicily. Here she comments that Thucydides characterises 
the Athenians as chasing an eidōlon in their invasion attempt and thereby signals, in the 
recollection of Euripides’ Helen, the catastrophic effects of their actions.846 Alternatively, 
given his supposed quotation from the Palinode in the Phaeadrus, it is possible that Plato 
was more familiar with Stesichorus’ version of this story.847 Whichever may have been the 
case, reading Plato’s use of the word eidolon with the cultural memory of Helen’s 
substitution is interesting and instructive. 
A reading of Plato based on cultural memory illustrates that what all the poetic eidōla 
have in common is that they are false. Whether used with kind or malicious intent, they 
represent a real person but are not that real person. In the case of the Helen, in 
particular, belief in the reality of an eidōlon led to the deaths of many and, significantly 
for thinking about Plato’s politics, the destruction of a city. Plato’s Socrates in the 
Phaedrus cautions that the written word should always be accompanied by discussion; 
that the written words are, in themselves, useless and that a serious pursuit of truth 
underlies them. In writing his dialogues, Plato knew that they would be disconnected 
from his own spoken words and so everything in them suggests the need for engaged 
reading. If belief in writing is belief in an eidōlon, one moreover that seduces men into 
destroying whole cultures, then the truth of the written word can never be approached as 
transparent and must always be actively questioned. This is even more the case when 
thinking about the interpretation of the Forms as discussed in the introduction to this 
chapter.848 If the memory of the philosopher is not of a whole truth but of a truth partially 
glimpsed and imperfectly remembered, then philosophy is always a process of striving, of 
questioning and of moving toward, rather than of holding onto, or absorbing, an absolute. 
                                                          
845 For Helen’s notoriety see e.g. Wright (2006), pp. 33-47; this analysis on p. 36. 
846 Wohl (2015), pp. 110-16. 
847 Pl. Phdr. 243a. 
848 See earlier discussion pp. 187-89. 
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What we see in Plato’s writing is an ambivalence to the written word that embodies itself 
in the very fabric of his dialogues. He integrates the oral tradition into the form of the 
dialogue and also in the form of Socrates himself as a representative of that tradition; but 
at the same time he seeks to find a new authority for his form of philosophic practice. 
Therefore, on the one hand, ‘Socrates’ insists on the authority of spoken dialectic over 
the written word, while on the other hand, this Socrates is a literary creation, whose 
words in the dialogue are given weight and privilege by the author behind them. 
Whether authority lies in the spoken or the written word, however, the manner in which 
Plato incorporates the oral tradition is significant. Many have written about how Plato’s 
use of the dialogue form mirrors or adopts the political practice of democratic Athens in 
that it puts the responsibility for judgement on the shoulders of the reader, but reading 
Plato’s philosophy is not the equivalent of judging an agonistic debate, at least not in the 
case of the Theaetetus. Socrates does have adversaries in some of the dialogues with 
whom Plato makes it difficult for his readers to sympathise but Theaetetus is not one of 
them.849 The engagement of the reader in the text rests not in judgement between two 
opposing arguments, but rather in the interpretation of oblique metaphors, such as the 
Socratic midwife or of passages such as the Digression. With regard to both of these, the 
array of scholarly interpretations argues for their difficulty. The problems of 
interpretation that these passages present are not caused by the persuasive rhetoric of 
the orator (as they might be in the political sphere in or in tragedy) but by the disconnect 
between words and speaker: the problems bring us, once again, to an anxiety about the 
written text and our inability to ask questions of the absent author.  
In this respect, Plato seems to offer us some guidance with regard to interpretation not in 
terms of what we should think but in terms of the process of working through the 
problems. In his guise as midwife, Socrates warns Theaetetus that he may need to 
‘dispose of’ (ἀποβάλλω) anything Theaetetus delivers which may be an eidōlon and ‘not 
true’ (μὴ ἀληθές).850 In the context of philosophical practice, this entails a form of 
forgetting. Theaetetus must let the child go and not, possessively, ‘get angry like a mother 
over her firstborn child-’ (μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδία). In terms of 
                                                          
849 Though the imaginary Protagoras might be. 
850 Pl. Tht. 151c. 
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reading philosophy, this process entails a form of active reading—reading which balances 
remembering and forgetting—and this is the subject of the rest of this section. 
 
iii) Reading with memory: exaleiphein and Plato’s political philosophy 
If Plato’s dialogues stimulate active, engaged reading, there is also a sense in which this 
process relies on an active, engaged memory and there are political ramifications which 
come with adopting this method. By analysing Plato’s use of the word exaleiphen, this 
subsection explores the kind of remembering and forgetting which he proposes for the 
reader of philosophical writing. Although the Wax Tablet is dismissed as a model to 
represent false belief, it does illustrate a link, as Plato sees it, between memory and 
knowledge. Here, Socrates says that those with deep, smooth wax make imprints which 
are deep and lasting and that such people ‘are not only quick to learn but have good 
memories and instead of misaligning imprints with perceptions they believe what is true. 
… these are the people who are called wise’ (εἰσὶν οἱ πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, ἔπειτα 
μνήμονες, εἶτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα ἀλλὰ δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. ... 
καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται).851 This is similar to his treatment of memory and 
knowledge in the Republic, Book 6, where Socrates states that ‘The forgetful soul, then, 
we must not list in the roll of competent lovers of wisdom, but we require a good 
memory’ (ἐπιλήσμονα ἄρα ψυχὴν ἐν ταῖς ἱκανῶς φιλοσόφοις μή ποτε ἐγκρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ 
μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι).852 As important, or even more so, than good 
memory, however, is the ability to forget, not in a careless, haphazard way, but in the 
sense of a willingness to let go of ideas which are no longer useful or relevant. The Wax 
Tablet is a useful place from which to begin this exploration. 
As I discussed above, Socrates dismisses the model of the Wax Tablet because it cannot 
account for the false belief in abstract terms, but only with concrete perceptions. 
Whether he dismisses the Wax Tablet completely or only partially is, however, a matter of 
scholarly contention. F. M. Cornford suggests, on the one hand, that the model works ‘in 
its own domain,’ that is, as a model for memory and false belief that does not involve 
abstract thought.853 Chappell, on the other hand, argues that ‘Plato’s intention is to show 
                                                          
851 Pl. Tht. 194d. 
852 Pl. Resp. VI.486d 
853 Cornford (1935,), pp. 129-30. 
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that it is completely inadequate.’854 Certainly, in the context of the dialogue, as this 
section will make clear, a model of memory which cannot cope with abstract thoughts 
and ideas is not a useful one. And yet, the image of ‘wiping clean’ (exaleiphein), used here 
and elsewhere in the dialogue, suggests that perhaps the model can support such things 
after all. 
The Wax Tablet image is foreshadowed in the Theaetetus when Socrates dismisses 
Theaetetus’ first hypothesis, that knowledge is perception. He says that they need to ‘go 
back to the beginning, wiping out everything from before’ (καὶ ὅρα δὴ νῦν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, 
πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας).855 Here the image of ‘wiping clean’ (exaleiphein) clearly 
refers metaphorically to some sort of metaphorical block or tablet in the/as the memory 
which is inscribed on in order that we might remember and which is wiped clean when 
we must forget. This idea also arises specifically in the Wax Tablet passage itself when 
Socrates says that ‘whatever is wiped or proves incapable of being imprinted we have 
forgotten and do not know’ (ὃ δ’ἂν ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἷόν τε γέωηται ἐκμαγῆναι, 
ἐπιλελῆσθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπιστασθαι).856 Exaleiphein can be translated variously as to 
plaster or wash over, to wipe out and to obliterate. Although there are clearly differences 
between a gesture which obliterates and a gesture which whitewashes, there is also a 
striking overlap when thinking about inscriptions on stone or wax. 
Loraux, in her study of political forgetting following the oligarchy of 403 in Athens (the 
period in which the Theaetetus is set) comments on exaleiphein as an explicitly political 
term in that its main use was in the context of whitewashing the inscribed tablets which 
held the Athenian laws. In her terms, ‘Effacer, en sens grec, c’est détruire par surcharge’ 
(‘To erase in the Greek sense is to destroy by additional covering’).857 Painting over those 
inscriptions which prescribed animosity between Athenian citizens during the period of 
stasis in Athens was a way of forgetting, politically, of ensuring that grievances could not 
be remembered in an official or litigious capacity which might incite further conflict. 
Loraux goes so far as to say that ‘la politique, c’est faire comme si de rien n’était’ (‘politics 
means acting as if everything were fine’).858 In Loraux’s formulation, the person who is 
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capable of seeming to ‘forget’ is the most ‘political’ of people. As with the eklēsis at the 
end of the Odyssey, there is once more a balancing act to be managed between useful 
memory which encourages productive debate—such as the audience’s memory of 
Odysseus’ slaughter of the suitors—and harmful memory, like penthos alaston which 
halts social progress and threatens civil war. Whereas in Chapter 1, my stress was on 
useful memory, here the focus is political forgetting. 
Although, with a wax tablet, the act is one of subtraction rather than addition, it serves 
equally as an act of erasure. Just as the Athenians would paint over the text of an 
inscription on stone so as to be able to inscribe a correction to the law, so they would 
scrape the top layer of wax from a tablet in order to make a correction or to start afresh. 
Evidence suggests that wax tablets were used mainly for impermanent forms of writing—
in the way that we now use notebooks. They were less expensive than papyrus and 
parchment and easily reusable to boot.859  
The political forgetting, as described by Loraux, is clearly not true forgetting as we 
understand it. The events and laws are still present in the memory, under the layer of 
whitewash, but memory of them is not permitted to hamper progress. It is this ‘political’ 
kind of forgetting which Plato’s Socrates invokes with his use of the word exaleiphein: the 
philosopher must be able to move forward without being held back by a commitment to 
or an investment in ideas which are proven to be worthless or to ingrained truths or 
assumptions. In view of this, it seems that Plato elides these two senses of exaleiphein, of 
‘painting over’ and ‘scraping off.’ He preserves the political, pragmatic sense of 
whitewashing while also making use of the sense of ease and disposability associated 
with the wax tablet.  
While this analysis preserves the political sense of Loraux’s definition of exaleiphein, my 
interpretation differs in tone from hers. In his study, ‘Seven Types of Forgetting’, Paul 
Connerton characterises the amnesty of 403 BC as ‘prescriptive forgetting’.860 This is a 
kind of ‘repressive forgetting,’ mandated not to subdue a potentially revolutionary 
populace as in a totalitarian regime, but because it is seen to be in the interests of all 
parties concerned. The kind of forgetting which I propose that Plato advocates bears 
more in common with Connerton’s ‘Forgetting that is constituted in the formation of a 
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new identity’. Connerton describes this type of forgetting as one which emphasises not 
the ‘loss’ of forgetting but ‘the gain that accrues to those who know how to discard 
memories that serve no practicable purpose in the management of one’s current identity 
and ongoing purposes.’861 Aleida Assmann returns to this idea with a political slant, 
construing it ‘Constructive forgetting – a tabula rasa for a new political biographical 
beginning.’862 She, again, stresses the ‘hopeful’ aspect of this forgetting ‘which supports a 
break and lays the ground’ for a fresh start.863  
As a brief aside, this model for memory clearly has some problems – problems which 
Freud addressed in his recasting of the Wax Tablet as the Mystic Writing Pad. As 
discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, Freud’s model consists of a wax sheet overlaid 
by a double sheet of celluloid.864 According to him, one wrote on the top layer and could 
erase one’s writing by lifting the celluloid, but the impressions would be retained on the 
wax. Clearly, this operates more like ‘whitewashing’ in that the memory trace remains but 
is covered and written over. Plato’s model, does however, emphasise the idea that we 
should be able to move on from ideas which are no longer useful with the same ease with 
which we might scrape clean a wax tablet. 
In part, the ideas which Socrates suggests we must leave behind are academic. In the 
example above, the idea from which Theaetetus must move on is his definition that 
knowledge is perception. At other times, though, Socrates explicitly draws attention to 
commonly held truths about the political life of the city, specifically democratic Athens. 
While refuting Protagorean relativism Socrates asks Theaetetus and Theodorus to 
consider whether ‘anything a city thought was advantageous to itself and laid down as 
such would with absolute certainty turn out to be so’ (ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις συμφέροντα 
οἰηθεῖσα αὑτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ συνοίσειν).865 He also points the spotlight at the 
Protagorean, relativist view that there is no such thing as justice in itself but rather 
whatever seems to be just ‘to people collectively comes to be true at the moment it 
seems so to them and for as long a time as it seems so’ (τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται 
ἀληθὲς τότε, ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον).866 As Euben writes, drawing on Ober, 
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such ideas represent ‘“democratic knowledge” as exemplified by the enactment of the 
formula of the Athenian Assembly—edoxe tōi dēmōi (it appeared right to the people),’ 
and so to let go of, or move on from, such ideas represented a big and potentially 
dangerous step. This is so even if, like Euben, one emphasises ‘the degree to which 
Athenians institutionalized self-reflection and self-critique.’867 
The language of ‘wiping clean,’ though not the specific term exaleiphein is also used in an 
explicitly political context in the Republic, Book 6. Here, in speaking of philosopher kings 
as the rulers of the ideal city, Socrates states that  
λαβόντες, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἤθη ἀνθρωπων, πρῶτον 
μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν, ὅ οὐ ῥᾴδιον... τῷ μήτε ἰδιώτου μήτε πόλεως 
ἐθελῆσαι ἂν ἅψασθαι μηδὲ γρὰφειν νόμους, πρὶν ἢ παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν ἢ 
αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαν.868 
They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and 
first wipe it clean – no easy task... They would refuse to take in hand either 
individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or 
themselves made it clean. 
Although, this is a pinaka, a ‘slate,’ rather than a κήρινος ἐκμαγεῖον, ‘wax tablet,’ and 
although Socrates speaks of καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν to describe wiping clean, the similarity is 
clear. Here, the use of catharos (clean or purify) rather than exaleiphein has more to do 
with the writing being on a slate than with a difference in meaning. Just as a stone 
inscription was whitewashed and a wax tablet scraped away, the writing on a slate is 
cleaned off. Therefore, we may trace a continuity in Plato’s use of this image 
philosophically and politically. This states in bald, political terms what Plato suggests in 
the Theaetetus: that the current systems are not working and need to be jettisoned, or 
forgotten, with the same lack of sentimentality with which one might wipe clean a slate. 
Unlike in the Theaetetus though, there is not the same sense of preserving what is good 
and worthwhile. This is forgetting which is not held in balance by its counterpoint: 
remembering. 
In the ways detailed above, Plato’s Socrates counsels Theaetetus and, by extension, his 
reader, to let go of, or to forget, the hold of these ingrained political ‘truths.’ As an 
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internal representation of Plato’s reader, Theaetetus’ success or otherwise in this is a 
matter of some contention. Some, such as Paul Stern, have held that the Wax Tablet 
model ‘provides all [Theaetetus] yearns for. He longs himself to be the knower with the 
gift of fine wax.’869 He even goes so far as to say that Theaetetus’ reluctance to let go of 
the Wax Tablet is representative of his unquestioning acceptance of all that society tells 
us is ‘beautiful and good’ and that this continues to prevent his development into a true 
Socratic thinker until his death in battle, fighting for his city.870 Textual evidence suggests, 
rather, that Blondell’s opposite stance is more convincing. She argues that throughout the 
dialogue, Theaetetus actually represents Socrates’ ideal pupil and part of her reason for 
this is that he moves with Socrates at all times, never holding on for long to theories 
which Socrates has shown to be faulty and always willing to come up with alternatives.871 
With regard to the Wax Tablet, Theaetetus questions Socrates’ reasons for his change of 
mind but he does not seek to hold onto the image beyond its usefulness. It may be that, 
in the end, Stern’s reading of Theaetetus is borne out by his dying for Athens in war. He 
has not, after all distanced himself from the political life of the city. This is not, perhaps, 
conclusive evidence though: we know from the Apology that Socrates also fought for 
Athens and ‘ran the risk of death’ (ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν), albeit as a younger man.872 
If Socratic philosophical practice can be defined as a questioning of certain assumptions, 
including those most fundamental to political society, so Platonic writing encourages the 
very same thing, not only through its representation of Socrates’ words, but through its 
imperative to call into question even these words themselves.873 As discussed above, 
Socratic dialogue showcases a didactic relationship based on interaction and 
collaboration rather than on persuasion and this is the kind of relationship which Plato 
encourages with the text.874 Although the words of the text will always remain the same, 
as Socrates states in the Phaedrus, our relationship with them and our interpretation of 
them will change. This is because the answers to the questions posed by the texts are not 
supplied in the words themselves but are generated inside of its readers. These answers 
will change as we change, as we question further and refine our ideas. Both Socrates and 
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Plato, challenge their pupils on an individual level, rather than in a public forum, and in 
both, the individual is encouraged to cultivate a higher moral standard by which to reflect 
on and renegotiate, in her or his own terms, the laws and customs of the prevailing 
culture.  
In order to read actively, in an engaged way, the reader must always hold remembering 
and forgetting in tension. In this, the reader of Plato is akin to the audience of the 
Odyssey who must ‘forget’ for political unity and progress and yet, must also remember 
for those very same reasons. Plato’s reader must remember words, theories, practices, 
stories and poetry but must also be prepared to forget these if philosophical progress so 
demands it. This seems brutal and Plato’s record of Socrates’ life does not suggest 
otherwise. He lived and died according to his beliefs, demonstrating the high stakes 
involved in a commitment to the philosophical life. However, as in the conception of the 
Forms discussed above, it is also possible to see in the Theaetetus at least, an 
understanding that even the philosopher is human and fallible and the best we can ever 
do is to strive to be our best selves. 
The final section of this chapter considers an aspect of this in greater detail. I have already 
discussed aporia in connection with the midwife image. In this, Socrates suggested that 
aporia was a term given to the effect of his philosophical practice by the ignorant and 
that it might more usefully and positively be construed as a stage on the path to 
enlightenment. To conclude, I would like to consider aporia in greater detail alongside the 
ending of the Odyssey, sending this thesis ‘back to the beginning.’  
 
3.6 Aporia: a conclusion about the inconclusive 
The aporetic ending of the Theaetetus is an aspect of the dialogue which has received a 
lot of scholarly attention. Aporia, in general, tends to be construed as a didactic tool used 
in the early dialogues by Socrates and, it may be inferred, by Plato, ‘with the presumed 
intention of eliciting an active intellectual response, as opposed to passive learning.’875 
Because the Theaetetus is thought to have been written after dialogues such as the 
Republic, which do not end in aporia but offer positive and detailed philosophical 
theories, the return to aporia in the Theaetetus is marked out for special attention. This 
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thesis has already alluded to some of these interpretations as they affect readings of the 
midwife and Wax Tablet images, but opinions are divided as to whether the Theaetetus is 
genuinely aporetic or not. Those who seek a Unitarian reading of Plato see the Forms as 
providing a resolution to the aporetic ending: they, rather than any of the definitions 
discussed in the dialogue, represent the true definition of knowledge. Revisionists are 
more inclined to see the ending as suggestive of the fact that Plato has moved on from 
the theory he presents in the Republic.876 This thesis, while it does not speak of the 
Platonic corpus as a whole, sees an intertextual relationship between the Platonic texts 
and views the Theaetetus as refining and nuancing some of the theories found elsewhere. 
So it is with aporia. 
Progress, in Platonic terms, is in the eye of the beholder. The Theaetetus appears to end 
in aporia but we know from the midwife metaphor that reducing those around him to 
confusion is something which Socrates’ critics attribute to him because they do not 
understand his methods. With this in mind, whether, like Sedley, we see the progress of 
the Theaetetus as being out of Socratism and towards the Platonism of the Forms, or not, 
we might see Theaetetus’ progress in his increasing awareness of what he does not know. 
Aporia is, therefore, a negative way of construing something which Plato casts as positive. 
In the Cave of the Republic, when the prisoner becomes free of his fetters and is able to 
look up and see the sun, he initially feels pain (ἀλγέω) because of the dazzling 
(μαρμαρυγή) light and is unable to ‘discern the objects whose shadows he formerly saw.’ 
However, this state of helplessness is shown to be the first stage of his journey into 
freedom.877 So it is with the Socratic encounter: when our preconceptions are broken 
down, there will at first be confusion and intellectual pain. If we do not give up here but 
pursue the subject, holding remembering and forgetting in balance, then from this state 
of confusion we might move towards true knowledge.  
In casting himself as Athens’ gadfly, Socrates implies that acknowledgement of this state 
of aporia, in its true sense, represents an engaged political, as well as philosophical, 
consciousness. It suggests questioning and striving to be better, to find the best political 
solutions and practices, rather than blindly accepting convention and looking for lazy or 
self-serving shortcuts. As readers of Plato, we are challenged in the same way as the 
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Athenians were by Socrates, to be a Theaetetus, pushing through our uncertainty and 
confusion, rather than a silent spectator like Euclides, or a Theordorus, refusing to strip 
down and fully engage.  
In this way, aporia is a term which accrues meaning in Plato’s texts. The early dialogues 
show the frustration associated with it and the Cave metaphor illustrates, through 
imagery, the sense of helplessness and pain at not being able to see, or know, anything 
clearly. Its imagery also suggests that this state is the first stage in a journey to true 
knowledge or freedom, something the Theaetetus claims more literally, in Socrates’ 
statement that aporia is the term bestowed by those ignorant of his methods. Though it 
is generally accepted that the Theaetetus follows the Republic, I suggest an intertextual 
relationship which adds depth or nuance to our understanding of the terms used and do 
not try to pass comment on the order or dating of the texts. Memory of the way that 
aporia occurs across the texts adds to our understanding of the term in each specific 
instance. 
One of the effects of aporia is that the lack of resolution sends the reader back to the 
beginning to read and think through the ideas again, this time with a balance of 
remembering and forgetting. This is also the effect of concluding this chapter with aporia. 
In a forthcoming work, Joel Christensen suggests that the forced eklēsis at the end of the 
Odyssey works in the same way as Socratic aporia. He argues that an aporetic ending 
requires ‘group intellectual and emotional work’ in ‘shaping its own and each other’s 
perception of and response to the narrative,’ a process which ‘invites us to go back to the 
beginning and examine the problem again.’ It is this ‘jarring finish,’ he writes, which ‘may 
just be the thing to shift us out of a passive, paradigmatic mindset,’ inviting us to ask 
questions such as ‘If revenge is wrong for Eupeithes, was it wrong for Odysseus?’878 The 
similarities here are clear but I suggest that there are fundamental differences too. 
As Chapter 1 suggested, the forced ending of the Odyssey does raise questions which the 
community of the audience must discuss and address for the benefit of their own political 
well-being.879 Memory of earlier episodes in the poem is one of their interpretive tools 
here, especially where they can remember details to which those in the poem were not 
privy or which they had been forced to forget. So far, Christensen’s theory holds true.  
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However, as Elton Barker suggests in his reading of Euripides’ Orestes, the eklēsis 
functions in a similar way to the deus ex machina of tragedy: at the moment of crisis, a 
god steps in to bring a wayward myth back in line with tradition.880 This moment is, in one 
way, reassuring, in that it re-establishes order on chaos and soothes us with familiar 
narratives, even happy endings. Simultaneously, however, it asks us to question whether 
those feelings of reassurance are entirely appropriate. In this way, the eklēsis, like the 
deus ex machina, breaks that immersive experience of listening or watching which I 
discussed at length in connection with the Trojan Women in Chapter 2. For this reason, I 
suggest that the eklēsis and the deus ex machina are particularly suited to poetic genres 
which engage the audience’s emotions, immersing them in another world and involving 
them in empathic relationships which unsettle their own identities and from which they 
need to be ‘woken.’ 
Aporia functions differently in the Platonic dialogues because Socrates and Plato 
deliberately distance themselves from such seductive, poetic techniques, as I showed in 
my analysis of the Wax Tablet passage.881 Although they do, as I suggested there, 
preserve aspects of poetry which serve their philosophical endeavours—Socrates’ use of 
imagery, for example, or Plato’s use of characterisation—there is nothing reassuring 
about aporia: it is utterly disorientating. Philosophical thought is deliberately presented 
as something which is painful and difficult, like childbirth, and when it becomes attractive 
or immersive, it is usually because we are being lulled into a false sense of security and 
are falling into mental traps.  
Finally, I suggest that aporia and the eklēsis function differently because of their 
respective contexts of performance/reading. Chapter 1 discussed the idea that the 
Odyssey was performed publicly in classical Athens, as part of an institutionalised ritual 
replaying constantly the founding moment of the polis. Because of this performance 
context, it invited its audience to remember and reflect as a group on that foundation 
and on their own political institutions and practices. Plato, however, operates outside any 
political institution. His texts were either read privately, by individuals, or read aloud in 
front of small, select groups of students. While Socrates declares his practice to be 
beneficial to the polis, he, like Plato, engages with individual, private citizens outside of its 
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institutional forms. The main concern of the Theaetetus is not the political health of the 
community but the philosophical health of the individual. As a consequence, while the 
eklēsis is put upon and negotiated by the group, the remembering and forgetting 
stimulated by aporia is experienced by the individual. In this way, as stated in the 
introduction to this chapter, the political effect of memory associated with epic reflects a 
model of memory which is based on the collective: it is experienced together with the 
effect that it reconstitutes the participating group. The political effect of memory 
associated with Platonic philosophy, reflects a model of collected memory. By this, the 
group is reconstituted or re-membered, but by collected individuals, whose personal 
experience of philosophy becomes shared and subsequently, informs, challenges and 
shapes the make-up of the political community. In the end, however, whether memory is 
experienced individually or as a collective, these differences of context and semantics do 
not detract from the central idea here. In all three cases—eklēsis, deus ex machina and 
aporia—the act of balancing remembering and forgetting is configured as the foundation 
of responsible citizenship. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has set out to explore the role played by memory—with its twin facets of 
remembering and forgetting—in the establishment and development of the political 
group in ancient Greece. In order to do this, it has examined three texts across three 
genres and asked the same three questions of those texts. These were: How do literary 
representations of memory shape and reshape the internal communities of the texts? 
How might the audience’s memory of earlier moments, other texts, myths or historical 
events affect their interpretations of the texts? How might those memories affect the 
audience’s own experience and performance of politics? In order to make the idea of 
represented memory more tangible, the thesis has focused on testimony as a narrative 
expression of memory and it has taken the (sometimes notional, sometimes actual) frame 
of the trial as a starting point.  
My analysis has been underpinned at all times by modern theories of memory, trauma 
and testimony. This theory was drawn from a variety of disciplines, but the most 
important for this thesis were Olick’s theory of social memory, the Assmanns’ theory of 
cultural memory and LaCapra’s theory of ‘empathic unsettlement.’ My investigation of 
memory in the texts and my conclusions about the receiving audiences have borne out 
Olick’s notion that the act of remembering as a group reshapes that group. The idea of 
cultural memory I have used as a kind of interpretive tool: a shifting, impermanent 
resource signalled by the author and brought to realisation by the audience or reader. 
‘Empathic unsettlement’ has proven particularly useful for thinking about the emotional 
effect of a text on an audience as a political stimulus. These are all ways of integrating the 
theory of memory into the study of classical literature which have been used relatively 
little until now. 
In my investigation of the Odyssey, I discussed the idea that remembering is often 
represented in epic as an infusion or absorption and that this is both transformative and 
effective of action. When Telemachus was infused with the menos of Odysseus, he began 
to act as a leader and called his first assembly. Because the people were not similarly 
infused with this memory, their political allegiances were seen as fluid at best: at one 
moment they wept with Telemachus while at the next, they were silently complicit with 
the suitors. In this way, I demonstrated that memory not only stimulated political 
action—the refounding of the Ithacan assembly—but was also indicative of the political 
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make-up of the community. That is to say, who and what the people remembered and 
how strongly they remembered them/it, determined their political allegiances on Ithaca. 
The collapse of the first Ithacan assembly was shown to stimulate the audience’s memory 
too. Had they remembered Athena’s instructions to Telemachus, they would have known 
that the assembly was never meant to succeed. The promise of a political solution was 
raised so as to be dismissed and because of this, the audience was provoked to reflect on 
the performance of politics in their own community: what success or failure of the 
assembly consists of and what it rests on. 
In order to examine the power dynamics which operate in the play of memory and 
politics in the poem, I adapted Farenga’s model of the trial as a useful frame. Within this, I 
suggested that memory narratives acted as testimonies which revealed the poem’s desire 
to control its own interpretation. Zeus’ paradigmatic memory narrative, regarding 
Aegisthus and the foolishness of mortals like him, was seen to establish the normative 
message of the poem and many of the other memory narratives shared in the poem 
added authority to this message. Other memories, such as Amphimedon’s and Eupeithes’, 
were discredited by association with the suitors and because they disputed a version of 
events authorised by the triumvirate of Odysseus, the narrator and Zeus. The trial 
metaphor drew attention not only to the political power play at work in the authorization 
(or otherwise) of these narratives but also to the audience’s political role in listening to 
and judging them.  
The chapter concluded that the audience’s memories of the mythic tradition and of 
resonant details from the poem itself made alternative readings of the poem possible. 
The eklēsis—Zeus’ imposition of complete forgetting on the Ithacans—provided a 
moment which categorically differentiated the internal and external audiences of the 
poem. Whereas the internal audience were subject to Zeus’ decree, the audience were 
not and were, therefore, encouraged both to remember and to question. In this way, 
although Zeus remains the ultimate authority in the poem and his testimony strengthens 
the poem’s dominant, normative narrative, the audience’s memory provides a way to 
challenge this reading. The eklēsis provides an incitement not just to remember passively 
but to be infused with the memory, as Telemachus was. Just as Telemachus embodies the 
memory of his father and this represents a political awakening on his part, so memory of 
the slaughter may be embodied by the audience, prompting them to retell the story and 
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to discuss the political values of society in order to prevent a recurrence of such violence 
and collective trauma. The eklēsis draws attention to the importance of balancing 
remembering and forgetting in political life. On the one hand, it shows the importance of 
jettisoning alaston penthos—Loraux’s ‘unforgetting’ grief which never gives way to 
amnesty—as represented by characters such as Aegyptus in the first Ithacan assembly 
and by Eupeithes in the last. This is the kind of unhealthy remembering which leads to 
irresolvable conflict. On the other hand, it holds out still for a kind of intellectual, political 
remembering, one which leads the individual within the collective to question and to 
debate the norms and values of her/his society. The chapter concluded with the idea that 
poem’s public re-performance in the Athenian ritual of the Panathenaea, a festival which 
celebrated the re-founding of the city every four years, was central to this idea. 
Chapter 2, on Euripides’ Trojan Women, picked up from this point, focusing on the public 
and political experience of re-membering at the City Dionysia. It explored the ways in 
which tragedy was the successor of epic not only in an aesthetic sense but also in terms of 
the institutional embedding of its foundational narrative. It analysed the differences for 
the audience between hearing poem with an omniscient narrator and viewing a tragedy 
with no omniscient voice. It also continued to view the audience as a collective which 
responds politically to the actions it witnesses. In this sense, the quasi-trial, represented 
by the agōn scene, adds a political context and once again, puts the audience members 
into the position of citizen jurors.   
Whereas in the Odyssey, where memory was seen to authorise but also to challenge the 
normative thrust of the poem, here I demonstrated the ways in which memory was used 
and manipulated to establish and sanction Hecuba’s narrative of the war. In this, I 
mobilised the theory of trauma, articulated by Aleida Assmann, in order to analyse 
Hecuba’s authority as the traumatised victim. I also considered the way in which the 
play’s remembering of the Iliad served to support this version of her and of the war. This 
chapter also showed Hecuba making the personal political in her performance and 
harnessing tropes of trauma in order to create a community of feeling on stage and in the 
theatre.  
In the course of this investigation, Chapter 2 used work by Johnstone and Hesk to identify 
Hecuba’s memory narratives, especially the speech which she delivers in the agōn, as 
examples of the kind of persuasive political speech prevalent in democratic Athens. In this 
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way, the chapter suggested that this ‘community of feeling’ was also a political 
community, not just in that it was literally made up of the citizens of Athens, but also in 
the sense that it forged a political allegiance with Hecuba against Helen and the Greeks. 
The chapter explored the construction of this allegiance using LaCapra’s ‘empathic 
unsettlement’, alongside Hoffman’s articulation of cognitive dissociation in listening to 
trauma theory. It suggested that the cognition of the audience may be ‘unsettled’ not just 
by the immersive experience of theatre but also by affective nature of traumatic 
testimony. In discussing the audience’s role in judging the agōn, it further suggested that 
for the political and juridical citizen, caution was needed in situations where empathy 
may have been aroused by emotive political speech.  
Just as in the Odyssey chapter, I also showed the ways in which audience memory—of the 
play and their cultural memory—served as an interpretive tool and a means of breaking 
the immersive ‘bubble’ created by the theatrical experience. As part of this, I examined 
the less immediately obvious ways in which the play remembered the Odyssey, especially 
the epic’s similar attempt to control narrative and its interpretation. Here the chapter 
concluded that the absence of a narrator in the Trojan Women was an important generic 
difference between tragedy and epic, underlining the idea that Hecuba’s story was not 
the whole story of the play. To an extent, that absence of narrator could be seen to make 
interpreting the drama more challenging for the audience because Hecuba’s narratives 
are so dominant in the play that she acts as a kind of playwright or orchestrator herself. 
Both of these contribute to the difficulty for the audience in creating cognitive distance 
from her testimony. 
Like the Odyssey chapter too, this chapter concluded that ultimate responsibility for 
judgement rested with the audience of the play who must measure themselves against 
the inadequate judges onstage. In this case, Menelaus in the agōn stands out in 
particular. The analysis of the agōn drew attention to the uncomfortable moral ground 
onto which empathy with Hecuba could lead the audience. Others had already 
commented in depth on Hecuba’s use of rhetoric in the agōn, but in so doing, had 
identified it as cold and emotionally detached. My analysis, however, found continuity in 
her use of rhetoric across the play and also in the strong emotion which drove it. Memory 
was seen to provide the means by which to question Hecuba’s dominant narrative of the 
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Trojan War and to encourage the audience to reflect collectively on their own 
performance as citizens in a political society which thrived on such persuasive speech.  
This last idea also became a prominent strand in Chapter 3. Here, I explored the idea that 
the Theaetetus triggers a memory of the Apology which suffuses the text and transforms 
it into a kind of prequel. It simultaneously sets up the events of the Apology as Socrates is 
on his way to meet the charges brought against him, and extrapolates ideas from the 
Apology, providing a greater depth of evidence for the jury of readers to reach a more 
informed verdict than that reached in court. I suggested that this memory of the Apology 
functioned as the ‘memory of literature’, a kind of intertextuality. Here though, the 
memory was author-centred, triggered by Plato intentionally, but requiring the reader to 
realise the intertextual relationship.  
One of the main effects of reading the Theaetetus with memory of the Apology was that 
it added a political nuance to Plato’s conception of philosophy as explored in the 
Digression, the midwife image and the Wax Tablet. In the case of the Digression, I 
examined the way in which memory of the Apology allowed Plato to develop arguments 
to further distance Socrates from allegations of sophism. I suggested that both the 
philosopher and the politician represented aspects of corruptive sophistic philosophy and 
that Socratic practice served, rather, to the benefit of Athenian political society. 
The midwife image addressed this also but from the point of view of Socrates as a teacher 
of philosophical citizenship. Whereas in the Apology he had taken the stance that he was 
categorically not a teacher because he had no wisdom to impart, the midwife image 
allowed him to develop a different model of teaching predicated not on imparting 
information but on drawing knowledge from those with whom he associated. I proposed 
that the midwife/patient relationship which Plato’s Socrates constructs is similar to that 
between a therapist and her/his patients. S/he is a mediator of their memories. As such, 
Socrates’ involvement in his students’ knowledge production could be read as far greater 
than acknowledged by the midwife image. Finally, I suggested that the midwife image 
served to explain some of the misconceptions surrounding Socrates’ practice of 
philosophy which led to his conviction for corrupting Athens’ youth. In this way, the text 
offered a version of Socrates’ practice which construed strangeness and confusion as 
positive attributes and encouraged the reader to judge Socrates differently from the 
actual jury of his peers in the light of these.  
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The Wax Tablet model for memory, meanwhile, focused on false belief, a central concern 
for Plato’s case for Socratic ‘truth’ versus sophistic relativism, given that ‘false belief’ 
needed to exist in order to show that Socrates’ jury was mistaken. In addition to offering 
further comment on Socrates’ relationship with sophism, I suggested that the Wax Tablet 
image exemplified the competitive relationship Plato constructed between philosophy 
and poetry and the agonistic language which underlay that connection. Also, in its 
analysis of the terms eidōlon (‘phantom’) and exaleiphein (‘to wipe clean’ or ‘to paint 
over’), occurring particularly in that passage, the chapter found that the process of 
reading and thinking with increasing precision and focus was constitutive of abilities 
associated with ideal citizenship. It explored the connections between wiping clean and 
forgetting and concluded that the ideal reader of philosophy, as well as the ideal citizen, 
needs to learn to hold remembering and forgetting in balance. Philosophical reading and 
thinking require the reader to forget ideas which are no longer useful. At times, Plato 
proposes that these ideas might include things considered sacred to Athenian democracy, 
such as the notion that what appeared right to the people was, indeed, right. In this way, 
philosophy and political citizenship were identified as being inextricably linked. This kind 
of forgetting was construed positively, as a way of moving forward and constructing 
something new: focusing on the future rather than on the past. 
Finally, the chapter brought the thesis full circle by considering the notion of aporia in 
connection with the Odyssean eklēsis and the tragic deus ex machina. Even though the 
gods feature at the beginning of the Trojan Women rather than at the end as is more 
usual in tragedy, all three techniques have a similar impact in that they require the 
audience to engage, or re-engage, with the text, bringing a new understanding, 
awareness or context. Where the eklēsis leaves the external audience with their memory, 
prompting them to use it in order to judge the events of the poem, the deus ex machina 
asks the audience to read this version of myth against the broader mythical backdrop or 
tradition. Aporia, meanwhile, requires the reader to re-evaluate her/his philosophical 
reading based on what has worked in the process of reasoning and what has not. The 
chapter concluded that aporia and eklēsis function differently because of their different 
generic contexts. Because the eklēsis was part of a poem delivered in a public, political 
setting, it was more likely to generate collective debate and focus the audience on the 
concerns of the city as a political entity. In contrast, because philosophy was read by 
private individuals and focused on the philosophical health of the individual, its political 
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effect on the city would only be felt if those individual philosophers saw fit to come 
together, as in Plato’s vision of the ideal state presented in the Republic. 
This investigation has found many continuities in the use of memory across the genres. All 
three texts were seen to interact with a body of cultural memory—of other texts or of a 
mythic tradition—on which their audiences might reasonably draw. These memories 
seemed to be deliberately invoked, at times, to serve a range of purposes. Like the Iliadic 
references in the Trojan Women, they sometimes served to add resonance to moments 
and ideas or to suggest the authority of particular characters or versions of events. At 
other times, like the intratextual recollection of slaughter in the Odyssey, such memories 
seemed to prompt the audience to question the narrative and their own feelings about it.  
Like the memories of tragedy in the Theaetetus, memories were seen to be invoked to 
highlight innovations in the form of departures from tradition. In the Trojan Women, for 
example, Hecuba’s recollection of moments from the Iliad concerning Astyanax’s 
projected and actual death, recast his life and death in terms of the women around him 
rather than the men. This mirrored the way in which the play as a whole focused on the 
plight of the women of Troy, a result of the actions of men, rather than those actions of 
the men themselves. In nearly all cases, such departures were seen, simultaneously, as 
positive, progressive moves and questionable, not to be taken entirely at face value. In all 
cases, these memories were affective—altering the audience’s, or reader’s, emotional 
relationship to the text—and effective of political action. In the Odyssey, for example, 
when Eupeithes was able to communicate his penthos alaston (‘unforgettable grief’) and 
to cultivate, thereby, a sense of cultural trauma, forces mobilised against the house of 
Odysseus. Though the reactions of external audiences could only be speculated upon, the 
actions and reactions of internal audiences suggested the active role of memory in re-
membering political groups. 
Where differences occurred in the use of memory, they mainly did so around the 
purposes and performance contexts of the texts. In all cases, these differences proved to 
be integral to the genres themselves and in this way, the study of memory also added 
nuance to our understanding of the composition of texts in different genres. The text 
which proved most different from the others—Plato’s Theaetetus—was particularly 
difficult to address within the confines of this thesis because its conception of memory 
was so different from the one that informed this thesis as a whole. However, as my 
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introduction to Chapter 3 suggested, my memory-centred reading of the Theaetetus 
alongside the Meno, the Phaedo and the Phaedrus opens up new possibilities for thinking 
about recollection and the Forms and this in turn could feed into thinking further about 
Platonic politics.  
In that introduction, I gestured to the idea that while Plato’s Socrates professes a belief in 
absolutes such as the Forms, as opposed to relativistic truths, he cannot ‘remember’ 
them, cannot grasp them and know them. For this reason, while the notion of absolute 
truth holds in the abstract, in practice it is completely destabilised, and knowledge, like 
memory, becomes shifting and rootless. The most that the philosopher can do is test, 
refine and move towards something which seems more weighty and solid. Clearly, there 
remains much work to be done here on the relationship between Socratic and Platonic 
philosophy and on dialogues such as the Republic where these ideas are worked through 
much more fully but I believe this study has demonstrated the potential of such research.  
Given the current interest in the representation of trauma in ancient Greek literature, this 
thesis has also shown the potential for thinking through performances of trauma in epic 
and particularly, tragedy in a more nuanced way. It is in its treatment of trauma theory 
that the thesis really makes an impact. My consideration of Hecuba and less centrally, 
Eupeithes in the Odyssey, aimed to avoid simplistic, familiar definitions of trauma as 
something which is only individual, isolating and incommunicable. It has focused instead 
on the specific behaviour of individuals in the context of the texts and their performance. 
This investigation found that in these cases, trauma was not silent and insular but 
prompted the individual to communicate, share and build supportive, vengeful 
communities. In so doing, it has questioned clichéd notions of victimhood, building on 
work by Jeffrey Alexander, Barbara Biesecker and Mitchum Huehls and has offered a 
productive alternative to the more traditional, individual-focused study of trauma in 
literature.   
Chapter 2 has provided a theoretical framework and an example for working through 
these ideas in tragedy more widely, especially in other Euripidean tragedies where the 
roles of victim and perpetrator are so often conflated, the Hecuba, for example, Medea or 
Electra. It has also shown the potential for thinking about audience receptions of tragedy 
and the literature of trauma more generally, in the light of immersive theatre, 
postmemory and ‘empathic unsettlement.’ The study of Hecuba has underlined the 
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importance of interrogating our prescribed emotional reaction to traumatised testimony, 
of ensuring that the cognitive response is not lost and of exploring the political 
dimensions of the relationship which testimony constructs. 
My reading of the eklēsis in the Odyssey was the stimulus for this thesis and its ideas 
underpin the whole project. The notion that memory divides internal and external 
audiences, offers a way of reading that upholds or authenticates normative 
interpretations but simultaneously challenges them. In the case of the Odyssey this 
provides a means by which the audience can read ‘past’ the authority of Zeus, 
remembering what ‘should’ have been forgotten. The thesis has demonstrated the 
promise of such a mode of interpretation across a variety of texts. In this, it has laid the 
groundwork for thinking about the ways in which political society is established and re-
established by memory, across the genres and through the ages. 
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